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Economic Policy Reform in Late Industrialisers: Argentina
and Spain since 1950
Abstract of Thesis:
The new institutionalist school of economics addresses the divergence between 
countries’ long-run economic performance by attributing it to differences in 
institutional heritage. Institutions which suppress the kleptocratic inclinations of 
governments and enshrine a ‘credible commitment’ to protect property rights encourage 
productive activity. But that is not to say states that cannot ensure universal property 
rights have not achieved economic growth. Such governments may resort to clientelist 
arrangements that guarantee a subset of asset holders their property rights will be 
protected in exchange for political and economic support. Such a system of ‘crony 
capitalism’ is an inefficient allocator of resources but it can ensure political stability 
which in turn allows an otherwise weak government to preside over sustained growth. 
This thesis compares the fortunes of Spain and Argentina, two ‘crony capitalist states’ 
characterised by distributional conflict, between 1950 and 2000. The principal 
hypothesis is that Spain’s economic performance far outstripped that of Argentina over 
subsequent decades because the web of alliances between the state and society included 
a greater variety of economic interests than its Argentine counterpart and consequently 
achieved a closer approximation of a credible commitment to universally guarantee 
property rights.
Argentine corporatism constructed in the late 1940s by president Juan Peron 
failed to integrate powerful interests and Argentine society is consequently defined by a 
variety of well-organised and powerful economic interest groups that compete for a 
share of national rent. The executive is forced to negotiate directly with these groups to 
secure support for new economic policy rather than operate through an effective state 
bureaucracy. Interests left out of the alliance will act to change the policy or remove the 
president, resulting in Argentina’s perpetual cycle of economic and political instability.
In Spain, the executive presided over a state segmented between interest groups. 
Each group was rewarded in return for loyalty with control over the ministry pertinent 
to a particular area of Spanish society. Economic interests such as labour, business and 
agriculture, meanwhile, were represented through compulsory membership of a 
monolithic syndicate. Within this bureaucracy, different factions representing a variety 
of economic interests engaged in a war of attrition to shape policy before the arbitrating 
dictator. This highly centralised state bureaucracy survived the transition to democracy 
and Spanish political parties abandoned their class-based identities and became mass 
movements organised under disciplined hierarchies of control. Thus negotiations over 
reform continued to operate within the state which ensured political stability which is a 
pure public good and encourages productive activity.
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Introduction
1
In the mid twentieth century many underdeveloped economies embarked on 
state-led drives to industrialise and renegotiate their status on the periphery of the 
world economy. In its early stages forced industrialisation through fiscal expansion is 
redistributional and transforms society. It empowers a new industrial bourgeoisie to 
challenge old, land based elites and encourages such processes as urbanisation and the 
growth of a proletariat to eclipse the peasantry. Later in the cycle, the expansionism 
characteristic of this model proves inflationary, puts a strain on reserves and the 
increased instability creates the need for an orthodox stabilisation.1 Yet in the newly 
industrialised economy, fiscal restraint and deflationary structural adjustment will 
meet stiff opposition from groups associated with or nurtured by industrial growth. 
The prescribed austerity will be resisted at popular levels because reduction in excess 
demand to curb inflation translates into reduced purchasing power for urban waged 
labour. Meanwhile, the elite ideologues who elaborated the model as a blueprint for 
modernisation will consequently reject a change in policy direction in the name of 
order and progress. In short, rapid economic change necessarily creates tensions that 
threaten political and, by extension, economic stability.2
Political order is commonly identified as a public good and an economy’s 
long-term path dependence is defined as directly influenced by a state’s capability to 
provide it. This depends in turn on whether the state has the capacity to convince its 
citizens that it would fastidiously enforce their property rights which means a robust 
set of institutions are required as a foundation of secular success.3 But what if the state 
is unable to make this ‘credible commitment’ on account of institutional 
shortcomings? The argument suggests progress will necessarily be pedestrian yet 
strong economic growth rates sustained over decades are by no means exclusive to 
countries with a tradition of unconditional protection of property rights. More recent 
work suggests governments that cannot universally enforce such rights adopt 
clientelist arrangements to protect the interests of a subset of asset holders in
1 See for example, Alesina, A. ‘Political Models o f  Macroeconomic Policy and Fiscal Reform,’ in: 
Frieden, J., Pastor, M. and M. Tomz, Modem Political Economy and Latin America: Theory and 
Policy, Boulder, 2000, or Haggard, S. ‘Inflation and Stabilisation,’ in: Frieden, J and Lake, D, 
International Political Economy, London, 1995.
2 Huntington, S. Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, 1968.
3 North, D. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge 1990; North, D. 
Summerhill, W. Weigast, B. ‘Order, Disorder and Economic Change’, in Bueno de Mesquita, B and 
Root, H Governing fo r  Prosperity, New Haven, 2000; North, D.C. ‘The New Institutional Economics 
and Third World Development’ in Harriss, J, Hunter, J, Lewis, C, The New Institutional Economics 
and Third World Development, London, 1995
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exchange for political and economic support. This ‘crony capitalism’ is an inefficient 
allocator of resources but can ensure political stability, which in turn allows an 
otherwise weak government to preside over sustained growth.4 The literature is less 
clear, meanwhile, on what determines divergence in long-term economic performance 
between crony capitalist systems.
This study uses a comparison of two such state systems, Spain and Argentina, 
to show that the greater the variety of economic interests ‘vertically integrated’ into 
the web of clientelism, the closer the approximation to a credible commitment 
regarding universal property rights. The state is thus able to exist more autonomously 
and is less prone to capture by specific interests. If a government forms an alliance 
with a narrower range of interests, then groups excluded from the embrace of that 
credible commitment may mobilise against it. If they are sufficiently organised they 
will exert economic and political pressure on the government to grant concessions, or 
even seek to topple the regime and replace it with one more sympathetic to their 
interests.
At the start of the period addressed here, economic policy under president 
Juan Domingo Peron in Argentina and general Francisco Franco in Spain was state- 
led and autarkic with industrialisation held up as a priority. Both regimes were acutely 
aware of social polarisation in their respective societies and were at pains to construct 
corporatist states that subordinated class discourse. Indeed, such tensions in Spain had 
shortly beforehand boiled over into a highly destructive distributional struggle, the 
1936-39 Civil War. But from this shared institutional and ideological tradition mid 
twentieth century, their respective fortunes diverged considerably in terms of 
economic growth. This thesis holds that the root of this divergence lies in the fact that 
Spain’s post-Civil War corporatist state achieved a more broad based vertical political 
integration than its Argentine counterpart. Though the state evolved over time in 
Spain, its democratic successor inherited many of its structures after the political 
transition of 1975 and it was better able to withstand the strains associated with the 
progression of the industrial development model.
By the end of the twentieth century, both countries had attempted to reduce the 
state’s role in the economy through deregulation, liberalisation and privatisation yet in 
spite of the continued similarities in policy trajectories, growth had diverged
4 Haber, S. Maurer, N. & Razo, A. ‘Sustaining Economic Performance under Political Instability’, in: 
Haber, S. (ed.) Crony Capitalism and Economic Growth in Latin America, Stanford, 2002.
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conspicuously. Figures 0.1 and 0.2 demonstrate the comparative economic 
performance of the two countries over the period in question. Spain, which remains 
one of Western Europe’s least developed economies, has caught up, converged with 
and overtaken Argentina, Latin America’s most advanced. In a sense therefore, each 
case represents a crude counterfactual of the other in that the Spanish political 
economy would continue to resemble Argentina’s had it not installed a relatively 
inclusive system of political integration that harnessed potentially awkward economic 
interests.
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This introductory section of the thesis will proceed with an explanation of the 
choice of Argentina and Spain as appropriate case studies before elaborating a 
methodological framework for subsequent substantive chapters. This incorporates an 
overview of the principal literatures of the political economy of economic divergence 
with a focus on shifting views of the role of the state in economic policy. The final 
section of the introduction will outline the structure of the thesis with a comment on 
the sources used in its elaboration and its principal findings.
Why Argentina? Why Spain?
Argentina and Spain are bound together by a separateness in that they present 
challenges to political scientists and economic historians alike on account of their 
dissimilarity to other nations in their respective regions. Argentina is a glaring 
inconvenience to scholars seeking to identify factor endowments as an explanation for 
the diverging fortunes of North and South America because of its temperate climate 
and fertile Pampas.5 Similarly, an abundance of comparisons with other large Latin 
American economies are forced to address Argentina’s northern, characteristics of a 
relatively homogenous population and large middle class which render it distinct to its 
neighbours by the early twentieth century. Attempts to compare it with other settler 
economies are presented with the institutional and historical difference between a 
Latin heritage and the Anglo Saxon institutions of Canada, Australia or even the 
United States. This is used with some success in explaining divergence in long-term 
economic performance exploring the notion of path dependence associated with 
institutional heritage but does not offer any suggestions on differences within subsets 
of institutional regimes.6
Spain, meanwhile, evolved in isolation from its European neighbours for much 
of the twentieth century and as such is neglected by comparativists working on 
Europe from the economics and political science disciplines because of a lack of
5 Engerman, S and Sokoloff, K. ‘Factor Endowments, Institutions and Differential Paths o f Growth 
among New World Economies’, in Haber, S How Latin America Fell Behind, Stanford, 1997
- ‘The Evolution of Suffrage Institutions in the New World’, Journal o f  Economic History Vol.65 (4) 
2005
6 North, D. Summerhill, W. Weigast, B, 2000. For a comparative study o f long-run economic 
performance in Mexico and Spain since 1800 see: Coatsworth, J. and Tortella-Casares, G ‘Institutions 
and Long-Run Economic Performance in Mexico and Spain’, 1800-2000, Working Papers on Latin 
America, Paper No. 02/03-1, David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, Harvard University, 
2002, who adopt the Northian approach o f  attributing both countries’ relative underperformance to 
poor institutions resulting from a shared historical legacy.
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points of reference. This is not helped by the fact that both economics and political 
science are something of a novelty in Spanish academia.7 Clearly, it would be futile to 
attempt a crude comparison of economic performance between the two countries from 
a factor endowments perspective on account of huge differences in size, climate, 
topography and resource wealth. Indeed, according to the terms of this model, 
Argentina’s physical characteristics should have served it well compared with Spain, 
because its abundance of high quality land lends itself better to less concentrated 
ownership of resources (and political power). Poor quality land is associated with 
social inequality and less efficient domestic markets because it favours the pursuit of 
economies of scale through larger landholdings and bonded, even slave, labour. A 
temperate climate and high quality land such as that found in Argentina, on the other 
hand, is associated with mixed farming centred on grains and livestock and 
encourages the evolution of more equal distributions of wealth, more democratic
• Rpolitical institutions and the pursuit of more growth-oriented policies.
Another camp in the institutionalist school rejects the centrality of factor 
endowments as a conclusive explanation for divergence in long term economic 
growth. One influential essay compares North and South America during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and attributes the economic divergence between 
them to the institutional regimes inherited from distinct colonisers. At independence 
the United States inherited a set of institutions from the British which were enshrined 
in the Constitution, buoyed by societal consensus and a shared belief system. The 
result was what the authors term, ‘a consensual basis of political order.’ The British 
North American colonies had existed as semi autonomous units, later becoming 
components of a federation of states, with the British Crown’s (laissez faire) authority 
replaced by a central government. This allowed a strong system of market preserving 
federalism to emerge and the crucial “credible commitment” to limited government 
and enforcement of property rights.
Spanish America, on the other hand, had experienced a colonial regime where 
the Crown had imposed authoritarian political order. The Crown’s removal at 
independence left a vacuum and there was no emergence of institutions capable of 
keeping order. Furthermore, the Crown had relied heavily on a corporatist 
organisation of society and politics, granting rights in land to elites in return for
7 Heywood, P. The Government and Politics o f  Spain, Basingstoke, 1995. p.6
8 Engerman, S and Sokoloff, K, 1997. p.262
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loyalty. Together with a mercantilist trading system, the overall institutional structure 
inherited by the new republics was not conducive to economic growth.
Yet the analysis does not explore sufficiently differences within the latter 
institutional group, focusing instead on seeking to explain evident success with 
relative failure. This is the gap in the institutionalist literature that this study aspires to 
address. From an institutional and ideological point of view, Spain and Argentina 
shared much in common and faced similar challenges during the period under scrutiny 
in this study. In addition to a common institutional root, namely the Roman Iberian 
legacy which Spain transmitted to its colonies,9 the economic models of the early 
Franco dictatorship before 1957 and the Peron presidency were both inspired by 
nationalism and a quest for national autonomy from foreign capital which was 
perceived as extractive. They also prioritised a push for modernisation through import 
substitution, state patronage of a nascent industrial sector and increased purchasing 
power for an urban wage earning proletariat.10 Periodic and cumulative reforms 
imposed from the late 1950s to address fiscal imbalances and monetary instability 
centred on similar ideas of continued, centrally planned industrial development 
complemented by hitherto prohibited foreign capital.
The authoritarianism of Spain’s Franco regime invites speculation that the 
ability to keep interest group conflict to a minimum, most obviously by subduing 
popular protest with the threat of violence, explains the more ordered political 
economy. But this alone does not account for the divergence between the two 
countries as the potential for military suppression of popular protest also existed in 
Argentina. Furthermore, work by political scientists such as Geddes and Maravall 
shows the idea that authoritarian governments are more capable of implementing 
painful economic reforms does not stand up to scrutiny. Rather than whether a regime
9 Coatsworth and Tortella 2002
10 Argentina’s Peronist economic policy was not the product o f a deliberate economic model and was 
never coherently articulated. The prioritisation of state intervention, social justice and economic 
nationalism reflected the regime’s support base among popular classes and the military (See: Torre, J-C. 
‘Argentina since 1946’ in Bethell, L. (ed.) Argentina since Independence, Cambridge 1993). Spain’s 
policies o f the 1940s, on the other hand, reflected an ideological movement elaborated by senior figures 
in the early Franco dictatorship such as Antonio Robert, director general o f  industry immediately after 
the Civil War, and Manuel Fuentes Irurozqui, inspector general o f trade and tariff policy at the 
Ministry o f Trade and Industry. The most influential o f these was Juan Antonio Suanzes, Minister of 
Industry and founder o f the Institute o f National Industry (INI).
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is democratic or authoritarian, it is internal variations within regime categories that 
determine the success of economic reforms.11
It is worthwhile at this point to stress that the historical approach employed 
here compares two less than ideal economic systems and does not claim the Spanish 
model offers a winning formula for crony capitalist economies to converge with 
leading economies. Economic policy in both cases focused on inward looking 
development strategies that are by their very nature costly for growth because the 
distortions they engender in the economic system compromise efficiency and
i  'y
undermine entrepreneurial incentive.
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Figure 0.3a: Spanish GDP per capita in 1990 US $> compared with average of eight 
advanced European economies (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great 
Britain, Nederlands, Sweden). Source, Prados de la  Escosura, L. El Progreso 
Economico de Espaha, Madrid, 2003, p. 177.
11 See: Geddes, B. ‘Challenging the Conventional Wisdom’, in: Frieden, J, Pastor, M. and Tomz, M, 
Modern Political Economy and Latin America: Theory and Policy, Boulder, 2000. or: Maravall, J-M, 
‘The Myth of the Authoritarian Advantage’, Journal o f  Demiocracy, 5(4) 1994:17-31
12 Taylor, A. ‘On the Costs of Inward Looking Development:: Price Distortions, Growth and 
Divergence in Latin America’, Journal o f  Economic History;, Vol.58 (1) 1998, p.9
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Figure 0.3b: Spanish annual GDP compared with advanced European economies. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) September 2006, ESDS 
International, (MIMAS) University of Manchester
Figures 0.3a and 0.3b show that while Spain may have surpassed Argentina in 
terms of GDP, both absolute and per capita, the extent to which it has caught up with 
its European neighbours is negligible though there is a small relative improvement in 
the latter. Economic growth during the second half of the twentieth century was 
sustained and represents conspicuous advances in Spanish levels of productivity and 
living standards. In relative terms, however, the Spanish economy did not progress 
towards convergence with western European peers, underlining the approach 
employed in this thesis of not treating Spain as a success to compare with Argentine 
failure so much as an example of a system that is less than ideal but more functional 
at an institutional level than the Argentine political economy.
A Framework fo r  Analysis
A common ‘centralist’ tradition has endowed both cases with a top-down 
structure of government dominated by an executive who is permitted extensive 
decision making power by the Constitution.13 This lends itself well to personalistic 
politics and what O’Donnell calls ‘vertical accountability’14 This constitutes a 
plebiscitary form of government whereby once the presidential candidate achieves
13 See: Veliz, C, The Centralist Tradition o f  Latin America, Princeton, 1979
14 O’Donnell, G. ‘Delegative Democracy’, Journal o f  Democracy Vol.5( 1), 1994
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high office, institutional checks on his power are limited in practice. A weakness of 
such a system is that it is prone to cronyism as the executive has the power to appoint 
directly, or at least has the final word on nominated candidates, to important positions 
in the State including the judiciary. If the hierarchy of State is rigidly disciplined, and 
if economic interests have limited power to disrupt implementation of policy, then the 
system can present a coherent front. The Spanish model fits broadly into this category. 
Highly centralised government is a historical feature of Spanish politics that was 
enhanced by the Franco regime.15 The corporatism of the dictatorship successfully 
diluted the social conflict that had destabilised society in the run-up to the Civil War 
by incorporating all the main factions into the State hierarchy. Non coalition members, 
such as the socialist union confederation the UGT (General Workers Union), were 
proscribed and pursued a strategy of opposition that included infiltration of the 
official syndicate. This syndicate was considered a ‘natural’ unit of society as was 
local government and the family, each of which was represented by elected 
procuradores in parliament. Ironically, this may have served to legitimise the 
syndicate as a representative voice of labour in government. In the process of 
policymaking, therefore, labour’s priorities were represented against differing views 
from other factions of the ruling coalition, be they economically liberal technocrats, 
the Catholic Church or the business and landed elites. Franco himself arbitrated more 
as a referee than a team captain so policymaking was an orderly war of attrition 
between factions who unquestioningly adhered to the rules of the game. In 
consequence all sides were granted some concession in new economic policies while 
enforcement of discipline prevented them pushing for more and destabilising the 
system (see figure 0.4).
This centralised, highly disciplined hierarchy was inherited by the 
regime’s heirs, namely the political parties of post 1976 democratic Spain and the 
networks of cronyism reflecting a far reaching but weak state survived the 
transition.16 Although Spain’s principal parties are federations of regional affiliates, 
they are tightly controlled and centrally administered according to a top-down 
pyramid shaped hierarchy of power originating with the leader and ending at the grass 
roots municipal level. This structure translates into administration of the State when
15 Preston, P. Franco, London, 1995. pp.339-342
16 Heywood, P. ‘Continuity and Change: Analyzing Political Corruption in
Modern Spain’, in Little, W and Posada-Carbo, E. (eds), Political Corruption in Europe and 
Latin America, New York, 1996, pp. 115-36.
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the party gains power and the party leader occupies the office of the presidency (see 
figure 0.5).17 Furthermore, Spain’s main parties, particularly the Spanish Socialist 
Workers Party (PSOE) and later the Popular Alliance (AP/PP), evolved from 
representing partisan, class oriented interests into centrist mass parties jostling for the 
middle class vote. As part of this process, the PSOE jettisoned its affiliated 
associational group, the General Workers’ Union (UGT) and consequently resembles 
the cross class coalition conceived by the architects of Franco’s dictatorial state in the 
1940s as a ‘natural’ structure that promotes the national interest over specific class 
priorities. The strength of State and party in Spain leaves little room for associations 
as a real influence on policy or as standalone entities as they are too fractious and 
weak to exercise real economic power to challenge the government. That is not to say, 
however, that the Spanish political economy is not oligarchic and that some interests 
have closer influence over policy than others. But the case presented here is that even 
the most powerful vested interests, the most favoured “cronies”, are ultimately 
subordinated to central government.
17 Newton, M. and Donaghy, P. Institutions o f Modem Spain, Cambridge 1997 p.91
Figure 0.4 Structure of hierarchy of representation within the Spanish Corporatist 
State c l946.
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Figure 0.5: Structure of hierarchies of representation within the state bureaucracy and 
the political party after 1975
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This contrasts with Argentina where ostensibly similar constitutional
provisions for top-down, centralised government exist alongside far more powerful
organised economic interests. Associations such as the Argentine Rural Society
(SRA), the Argentine Industrial Union (UIA), the General Economic Confederation
(CGE) and the General Workers’ Confederation (CGT), in spite of frequent internal
strife have represented the reasonably coherent voice of primary exporters, the
international bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie and labour respectively. The reason
for their relative coherence and power is that different governments devoted greater
attention to them as mobilisers of political and economic support than they did to
political parties. On the demise of the patron regime or the proscription of the relevant
party, the association remains as the most coherent representative of a vested interest.
These interests, because of their coherence, are thus able to weald devastating
economic weapons. Labour can organise the disruption of economic life through
strikes or factory occupations. Industry, incorporating national and internationally
oriented capital, can withhold products from market, as can agricultural interests,
pushing up prices and inflationary pressure. Common interests among groups mean
alliances are possible between, for example, labour and the national bourgeoisie,
• • 1 8national and international capital or agriculture and the international bourgeoisie.
This makes the institutions of state redundant because the executive has to negotiate 
directly with the interests in order to secure their cooperation in addressing an 
economic crisis with structural reforms. But despite the potential for alliances, what 
pleases one interest may be at odds with the priorities of another. Some executives 
have attempted to appease all interests simultaneously and made unfulfillable 
promises to each. Figure 0.6 outlines the way in which the executive bypasses 
institutions of state such as Congress, the judiciary and even his own party to bargain 
directly with organised interests to gain their acquiescence. Though he may be able to 
secure alliances between more than one at a time on issues where two groups share 
the same priority, at least one will always be disenfranchised and alienated. So a low 
exchange rate policy, for example, will please sectors with access to export rents such 
as ‘international capital’ (i.e. the component of domestic capital tied to foreign trade
18 Lewis,C.M ‘The Political Economy o f Macroeconomic Stability: history, democracy and the rules 
of the economic game in the Argentine’, in J. Buxton & N. Phillips (eds.) Case Studies in Latin 
American Political Economy, Manchester, 1999; Erro, D Resolving the Argentine Paradox: Politics 
and Development 1966-1992, Boulder, 1993
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and investment) and agricultural interests. On the other hand, labour will prefer a high
exchange rate that increases its purchasing power while the national bourgeoisie will
agree to it as a labour subsidy that might neutralise pressure to raise wages.
Figure 0.6. Hierarchy of Representation between executive and interest group in 
Argentina.
Corporate Entities/Interest Groups -  strong,
President
Institutions o f State:
- Federal Government
- Provincial 
Government
- Congress
highly organised (Erro, 1993 p.32)
Potential Alliances
Agriculture:
Argentine Rural Society 
(SRA)
Wages: low 
Exchange Rate: low 
Agricultural Prices: high 
Internal Economy: liberal 
External Economy: open
International Bourgeoisie: 
Argentine Industrial Union 
(UIA)
Wages: low 
Exchange Rate: low 
Agricultural Prices: low 
Internal Economy: liberal 
External Economy: open
Wages: high 
Exchange Rate: Low 
Agricultural Prices: low 
Internal Economy: interventionist 
External Economy: closed
Labour:
General Workers' Confederation 
(CGT)
National Bourgeoisie:
General Economic Confederation 
(CGE)
Wages: high 
Exchange rate: high 
Agricultural prices: low 
Internal Economy: interventionist 
External Economy: closed
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As suggested in the diagram, attempts to pursue greater economic openness
and liberalise the current account will elicit opposite reactions from different groups.
Agricultural interests and international capital will approve while domestic capital
(the national bourgeoisie) will attempt to block it on the grounds of concern about
competition. Because, therefore, survival politics in such a polarised arena is
unsustainable, groups that are excluded from the alliance will seek to replace the
executive. This relationship is used to explain the persistent failure of democracy in
Argentine political life and the frequency of military intervention.19 Conservative
groups representing capital and land who lack a popular support base are traditionally
unable to achieve a change in government democratically and may see to it the
president is deposed and replaced by a military concerned about the breakdown of
social order in the ensuing economic crisis. The alliances of Argentine history were
not static and some administrations were inconsistent in their allegiances. The impact
of this on economic performance is twofold. Firstly, ‘distributional coalitions’ are self
centred, monopolistic, oligopolistic and impede efficient allocation of economic 
onresources. Secondly, in a system pervaded by cronyism such as the two cases 
examined here, an executive negotiating directly with powerful coalitions will reward 
them for cooperation by appointing representatives of the favoured interests to 
government posts. When the executive is replaced and a new alliance is formed, the 
appointees will also be overhauled. This results in fragmentation of policy and is 
severely detrimental to institution building. Economy-oriented institutions of state 
will be subjected to persistent political meddling reflecting the priorities of the 
favoured coalition.
As mentioned above, strong associations with influence over factors of 
production wield considerable power through mobilising to disrupt supply of goods 
and services. Given that such actions, by cutting supply quickly drive up prices, they 
are inflationary and have been used in Argentina with some success in achieving 
wage increases. Comparative data on wages in figure 0.7 shows that from a similar 
starting point, the two cases diverge considerably with Argentine wages growing ever
19 Cavarozzi, M. ‘Political Cycles in Argentina since 1955’, in: O’Donnell, G. Schmitter, P. and 
Whitehead, L. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Volume 2, Latin America, Baltimore, 1986.
20 Olson, M. The Logic o f  Collective Action, Cambridge MA, 1971
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more rapidly after the 1960s. Figure 0.8 shows inflation in both cases during the 1940s 
was at similar levels but diverged thereafter with a marked acceleration in Argentine 
price rises and volatility throughout the period. In contrast, Spanish inflation becomes 
less acute as the period progresses, reflecting a more ordered political economy. The 
assumption here is that wage and price inflation is a crude measurement of 
associational strength.
Figure 0.7. Source: Mitchell, B.R. International Historical Statistics: The Americas 
1750-2000, Basingstoke, 2003; International Historical Statistics: Europe 1750-2000, 
Basingstoke 2003.
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So what is the solution? Albert Hirschman believed he had identified a social 
concertation occurring in Argentina as far back as 1987 where some parties were 
abandoning notions o f ‘intransigence’ and there was ‘give and take’ between left and 
right.21 Orthodox policies in the late 1970s which broke with the inward looking 
development models in place since the 1940s had exhausted Argentines who were 
now more inclined towards compromise.22 Some analysts take the view that Argentina 
has changed for the better because of the demise of associational strength, either
23gradually through persistent attacks by the state or more recently following 
aggressive neutralisation of both labour and bourgeois power by president Carlos 
Menem in the early 1990s.24 This study argues there was no fundamental reordering
21 Hirschman, A. ‘The Political Economy o f Latin American Development’ Latin American Research 
Review. Vol.22(3) 1987. pp.30-31
22 Kahler, M. ‘Orthodoxy and its Alternatives: Explaining Approaches to Stabilisation and Adjustment’, 
in Nelson, J. (ed.) The Politics o f  Economic Adjustment in Developing Nations, Oxford, 1989 p.40
23 Erro, D. Resolving the Argentine Paradox, Politics and Development 1966-1992, London 1993.
24 Acuna, C. ‘Politics and Economics in the Argentina of the Nineties (Or Why the future is no longer 
what it used to be) in: Smith, W. Acuna and Gamarra, E. (eds.) Democracy, Markets and Structural 
Reform in Latin America. Miami, 1996.
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of the Argentine political economy, however. Though certain associations lost their 
bite as threats to economic and political order, particularly labour, there was no 
parallel strengthening of political institutions, particularly the party system. The 
dynamic of negotiation between executive and economic interests remains in place in 
Argentine policy making.
Two common themes in social sciences literature purport to explain variations 
in long-term economic growth between cases such as these. The first, from the 
political science discipline would identify a shift from conflictive to consensual 
politics in Spain while social conflict never subsided in Argentina.25 The second, 
which is the argument of choice in leading multilateral institutions charged with 
financing economic development in laggard countries and coming to the rescue 
during financial crises, focuses on economic discipline in public policy. The 
differences between Spanish and Argentine long-term performance might be 
explained by different qualities of economic management in areas such as fiscal and 
monetary policy and debt maintenance. This view, often referred to as ‘the 
Washington Consensus’, prioritises fiscal discipline over Keynesian stimulation. It is 
preferable, meanwhile, to reduce the fiscal deficit through a cut in spending, ideally 
by reducing the burden of the state sector, rather than by raising taxes which is 
associated with less lasting solutions to fiscal crises.27 Certain types of government 
spending are regarded as beneficial on condition that they constitute investment in 
social capital by being directed at education and health rather than indiscriminate 
subsidies. Subsidisation, encourages inefficient allocation of economic resources 
because it plays into the hands of, and can be manipulated by, vested economic 
interests. Interest rates should be market determined rather than politically conceived, 
thus avoiding the type of resource misallocation that results from bureaucrats 
rationing credit according to non economic criteria. Similarly, exchange rates should 
be left to market forces to prevent them being hijacked and set according to the 
priorities of specific economic interest groups. In terms of trade policy, liberalisation 
is positive while protectionism is not ideal because in shielding domestic industries,
25 O’Donnell, G and Schmitter, P. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Tentative Conclusions about 
Uncertain Democracies, Baltimore, 1986, pp. 6-9
26 Balassa, B. et al Toward Economic Growth in Latin America, Mexico City, 1986, pp. 13-15
27 Alesina, A; Perotti, R; Giavazzi, F; Kollintzas, T ‘Fiscal Expansions and Adjustments in OECD 
Countries,’ Economic Policy, Vol. 10, (21) October 1995 pp. 205-248.
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one stifles their progress by not exposing them to competitive pressures, thus creating 
costly distortions. This system penalises exports and impoverishes the domestic 
economy. Foreign investment should be encouraged as a source of capital, skills and 
know how so economic nationalism will always be to a country’s detriment. Lastly, 
deregulation, to dismantle monopolies and liberalise the market leads to a more
efficient economy, encourages entrepreneurial activity and stifles rent seeking by
28interest groups.
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Figure 0.9a:. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) 
September 2006, ESDS International, (MIMAS) University of Manchester
Figures 1.9a and 1.9b compare the two cases according to the Washington criteria. 
The former charts gross domestic savings a measure of the sum of public savings and 
private savings. Public savings is the difference between total revenue and current 
expenditures of the consolidated public sector and reflects the discipline of the 
government in terms of spending and can also be taken as a proxy measurement of 
monetary stability if we assume people are more inclined to save in a more benign,
28 Williamson, J. ‘What Washington Means by Policy Reform’ in: Williamson, J. (ed.) Latin American 
Adjustment: How Much has Happened, Washington DC, 1990 pp. 9-15
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less volatile environment. Throughout much of the period, Argentina boasts the 
higher rate, indicating a better quality of growth because of the implied investment 
potential. The Spanish rate only surpasses that of Argentina in earnest after 1985. But 
the most telling feature of the comparison, however, is the difference in volatility. The 
smoother Spanish trend reflects a consistency while the fact that the Argentine rate 
swings between wider extremes indicates rapidly shifting circumstances, and by 
implication, economic instability. Spanish economic policymakers have steered a 
steadier course and this is reflected in more consistent rates of savings in both the 
public and private sector.
Figure 0.9b compares the current account balance of each case as a percentage 
of GDP. An economy that conforms more closely to the Washington consensus with a 
more liberal policy in terms of trade would have a healthier balance sheet and be less 
susceptible to imbalances. In this case, Spain fares better over the period. But it is the 
purpose of this thesis to argue that Spain since the mid twentieth century was more 
successful at creating the right conditions to encourage economic activity because of 
the way it managed the political economy of a conflict society. What the data shows is 
consistent with this because it highlights a divergence between the two cases with 
Spain inching ahead from a similar starting point.
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Accepting that tighter economic management is beneficial for long-term 
economic performance, the type of short-term pain associated with initial deflationary 
policies make a regime resembling the “consensus” an elusive goal in divided 
societies. What this thesis suggests is that its central theme of higher qualities of 
crony capitalism resembling more closely than less successful peers a credible 
commitment on property rights can be applied to the Washington hypothesis. The 
Spanish system, by embedding vertical political integration, is a crony capitalist 
system where the cronies are more easily managed, resulting in an environment where 
disciplined monetary and fiscal policy is less difficult to implement than is the case in 
Argentina where groups are better equipped to prevent it. As subsequent chapters 
show, however, in Spain economic discipline falls far short of what technocrats in 
Washington view as the ideal because it remains a less than perfect, semi clientelist 
system.
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This analysis also seeks to contribute to, rather than challenge the second 
politically focused hypothesis that Spain benefited from a more concerted shift from 
conflictive to consensual political debate than Argentina. Both cases have come under 
considerable scrutiny because of their respective political transitions to democratic 
government during the 1970s and 1980s. The theorists state that a concerted move to 
pluralism is more the result of a crisis of confidence and legitimacy in the 
authoritarian regime itself rather than the initiative of a restive and disgruntled 
populace whose part in the process is secondary and comes at a later stage.
According to this model, the process of political liberalisation begins when 
authoritarian incumbents begin to modify their own rules to provide better guarantees 
for the rights of both individuals and groups.30 Individuals may gain institutional 
guarantees such as habeas corpus or freedom of speech while groups might regain the 
right to express collective dissent from government policy without the threat of 
punishment.
The political transitions experienced in Argentina and Spain do not challenge 
the worth of this idea. Change occurred in response to economic instability and the 
discrediting of previous policies, leading to shifts within the authoritarian regimes and 
new policy directions. In Spain, economic crisis during the 1950s led to reforms that 
included a degree of economic opening, with a view to deflecting opposition and 
ensuring continued social stability (see chapter 3). But the “reactionary agrarian” 
Franco regime in the late 1950s planted the seeds of its own eventual disintegration. 
The reforms resulted in a shift of power away from the old guard who had dominated 
during and immediately after the Civil War, to a new financial elite, more 
international in perspective and likely to call for further changes.31 A reshuffle in the 
hierarchy of cronies, therefore.
In Argentina, taking the most recent episode of democratisation after 1983, in 
a context of severe economic imbalances both political opponents and elements 
within the military regime concluded authoritarian rule had failed. Thus the military 
suffered a loss of confidence in its own capacities. Argentina’s transition was brought 
about in this instance by a political collapse, hastened by military defeat in the 
Falklands, whereas the Spanish transition was a more ordered affair with no challenge
29 See O’Donnell, G and Schmitter, P Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions 
about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore 1986, pp.6-20
30 Ibid,, p.6
31 Preston, P. The Triumph o f  Democracy in Spain, London 2001 pp.4-11
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to the legitimacy of the outgoing authoritarians. But what this thesis aspires to show, 
is that social division in Spain was just as entrenched as in Argentina. Indeed, the 
experience of the Civil War and the Franco regime’s tactic of rule by division into 
victorious and defeated suggest that its divisions were deeper. But the structure of the 
state and its relationship with society and economic interests, conceived along similar 
lines to the Argentine state being constructed in the late 1940s by Peron, ensured 
better management of the social conflicts. It also suggests that the Spanish transition 
to democracy is not so complete as often assumed in that many vestiges of the 
original post-Civil War state are still in existence as shown in figures 0.4 and 0.5 
above. This maintains a system that can defined as crony capitalism, reliant on 
clientelist relationships and patronage. Though at a political level Spain is now a well 
established parliamentary democracy, many features of its political economy retain 
elements of the original authoritarian corporatist state. Argentina’s state was built 
using many of the same ingredients but was never consolidated and is less able to 
override conflicts between different interests and suffers from perpetual crises of 
legitimacy and credibility. The drama of political collapse, and indeed the acuteness 
of the economic crisis in early 1980s Argentina, therefore, can be taken as the 
accumulated result of failure to manage division between rival cronies and vested 
interests.
The Theoretical Background to Economic Divergence and Convergence.
Theories o f Economic Growth and Catch-Up
The ostensible relevance of growth theories developed on the back of Western 
European and North American industrialisation would appear to challenge the 
conventional view that Spain is exceptional. Indeed, Juan Pablo Fusi and Jordi 
Palafox present a case that Spain’s experience of the last two centuries is more 
ordinary than is traditionally believed. An absence of industrialisation during the 
nineteenth century was by no means unique to Spain; many European countries were 
late developers. The restructuring of the Spanish economy and its incorporation into 
the rich group of nations in the twentieth century conformed to a wider phenomenon
24
that was taking place across the European continent. In terms of growth theory, 
therefore, Spain might be taken as a textbook example of the orthodox models of 
catch-up and convergence articulated in the 1950s by such figures as Robert Solow.
At the end of Spain’s autarkic period, technocratic ministers opened the economy 
sufficiently to allow the country to absorb some of the ‘pure public good’ of 
technology developed in more advanced nations, resulting in accelerating 
productivity levels. Logically, therefore, we might deduce that Argentina’s relative 
underperformance is attributable to the persistence of protectionist policy. However, 
an important point of comparison between the two cases is their retention of inward 
looking protectionist policies of import substitution in addition to relatively high 
levels of state intervention. While this approach may explain the relative 
underperformance of both economies, it does not help us understand the divergence 
between them. Certainly, believers in a more orthodox interpretation of economics 
despair at continued Spanish belief in the responsibility of the state in managing the 
country’s economy. Gabriel Tortella, for example, acknowledges that state 
intervention in the Spanish economy has moderated since 1959 but suggests that the 
‘mercantilist tradition’ continues to exert strong influence in the country, so that the 
state considers itself to be providential with the agreement of the populace. While the 
country’s unfortunate and turbulent history has left most Spaniards fearful of the state, 
they simultaneously harbour ‘unreal expectations’ of an institution regarded as 
possessing inexhaustible coffers and powers that extend in every direction. “Most 
Spaniards seem utterly impervious to the elementary principles of economics,”
Tortella states.34 Likewise, Fuentes-Quintana believes that Spain’s leading economic 
agents, the business sector, workers and the state, have failed to fully embrace the 
principles of an ‘open’ economy because of the legacy of a protectionist economic 
‘pedigree’.35
Furthermore, the Solowian neo-classical model assumes convergence in terms 
of productivity levels and does not allow for divergence after the catch up. Another
32 Fusi, J. Palafox, J. Espafia 1808-1996: El Desafio de la Modemidad, Madrid, 1997; See also. Prados 
de la Escosura, L. El Progreso Economico de Espafia, Madrid 2003.
33 Solow, R. ‘A Contribution to the Theory o f Economic Growth’ Quarterly Journal o f  Economics 
Vol.70, 1956
34 Tortella, G. The Development o f  Modem Spain: An Economic History o f  the Nineteenth and  
Twentieth Centuries, London, 2000 p.409
35 Fuentes-Quintana, E. El Modelo de Economla Abierta y  el Modelo Castizo en el Desarrollo 
Economico de la Espaha de los Ahos 90 Zaragoza, 1995 p.23
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strand of growth theory that addresses this is the ‘endogenous growth’ model. This 
differs from the neo-classical school because it assumes economic growth is an 
endogenous consequence of an economic system rather than the result of external 
forces.36 Varying degrees of growth across countries are therefore determined by 
choices made by actors in both the private sector and government. Therefore, if 
productivity growth is an outcome of different incentive structures in different 
countries, countries can diverge and overtake the leader. Exogenous technical change 
is not as important as a country’s own efforts at innovation in promoting higher per; 
capita income. The Argentine and Spanish states attempted to create an incentive 
structure through promotion of industry with ambitious public investment and a 
complex system of subsidies, tax breaks and protectionism against foreign 
competition. Endogenous growth theory can explain both economies’ inability to 
converge with industrialised leaders by blaming poor choices and misguided policy 
with Argentina making the worse decisions in terms of achieving higher productivity.
Abramovitz and David identify two constraints on a country’s ability to catch 
up. First is the degree of ‘technological congruence’ between new technology and the 
conditions of a country that might wish to adopt it. It would be extremely costly for a 
firm to switch from one practice with its associated technologies to an entirely new 
regime developed elsewhere. Laggard countries therefore face varying degrees of 
difficulty in adopting and adapting the current practice of those who hold the 
productivity lead.37 Second is the notion o f ‘social capability’ and whether there are 
embedded constraints to entrepreneurship. Does the aspiring power have the right 
levels of education or technical competence for growth to run smoothly and is there 
an institutional structure capable of financing and operating modem large-scale 
business? Abramovitz and David argue that social capabilities transform in the long 
term as proven methods gain credibility and are emulated elsewhere. This approach 
was devised to explain how Western Europe closed the gap in productivity levels with 
the United States after the 1950s. Can it be applied to the cases examined here?
Indeed the model might again help explain why Argentina and Spain remain well 
behind their neighbours and rivals. A lack of social capability and technological 
congruence is again, perhaps a consequence of inward looking development models
36 Romer, P. ‘The Origins o f Endogenous Growth’ Journal o f  Economic Perspectives, Vol.8,.(2), 1996
37 Abramovitz, M and David, P. ‘Convergence and Delayed Catch-Up: Productivity, Leadership and 
the Waning o f  American Exceptionalism’ in Landau, R. Taylor, T. and Wright, G. (eds.) The Mosaic o f  
Economic Growth, Stanford, 1996. p.32
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that stifle the adoption of methods and technology developed elsewhere. But is 
Spanish society more socially capable than Argentina’s? It would appear that an 
interventionist state provided the requisite institutional structure to start the 
industrialisation effort from the 1940s while Spanish technological congruence and 
social capability did indeed shift over time so that Spain was able to progress further. 
The corporatist state, where interest groups were less able to veto policy decisions 
may have allowed a higher degree, therefore, of social capability compared with its 
counterpart in Argentina.
Theories o f late industrialisation
Walt Whitman Rostow argued in 1960 that development was best analysed in 
terms of stages through which every society passed. A country experienced a ‘drive to
•50
maturity’ when certain ‘preconditions for take o ff  were in place. Then in 1962 
Alexander Gerschenkron argued that the shortcomings of institutional actors in the 
marketplace, particularly the capital market, prevent the kind of spontaneous 
industrialisation outlined in Rostow’s work. In this case the state can substitute for 
those prerequisites by creating new institutional arrangements that will catalyse a 
‘spurt’ in industrialisation. Gerschenkron’s thesis came out of a comparative analysis 
of the industrialisation experience in Europe. The first country to industrialise, 
England, did so because it had an institutional framework supporting property rights 
alongside a prosperous agricultural sector allowing markets to function and private 
agents to thrive. More ‘backwards’ parts of Europe suffered from an absence of 
crucial factors of production such as skilled labour, sufficient savings ratios, low 
literacy or ideological approval, particularly from the ruling class. When the state 
overcame one or all of these factors, industrialisation would ‘spurt’, proceeding at a 
relatively high rate of growth of manufacturing output. The more backwards an 
economy prior to take off, the greater the part played by institutional factors designed 
to increase supply of capital to new industry. Furthermore, the greater the extent of 
required catching up, the greater role the state played in providing the new industries
*>Q
with centralised entrepreneurial guidance.
38 Rostow, W, The Stages o f  Economic Growth: A non-Communist Manifesto, Cambridge, 1960, p.4
39 Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, Cambridge MA, 1962. pp.353-4
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Albert Hirschman,40 a contemporary of Gerschenkron, rejects the notion that 
the state is motivated to undertake the required effort to industrialise when the 
realisation of relative backwardness makes the advantages of growth appear more 
obvious. This, he argues, implies actors in the backwards country are endowed with 
an unrealistically clear idea of exactly what is required of them prior to undertaking 
the drive to modernisation. Hirschman argues that the perception of what is required 
to develop is acquired only gradually in the development process and it is the role of 
the state to act as a ‘binding agent’ to reconcile society’s perceptions with realities. 
Firstly, the state has to steer a path between two inappropriate perceptions of growth; 
a ‘group focussed’ view where growth is seen to affect the wider group so an 
individual’s relative position will remain unchanged, and an ‘ego focussed view’ 
where change is a zero sum game beneficial to the individual at the expense of others. 
Both of these are inimical to genuine development as the former suffocates dynamism 
while the latter stifles the cooperative component of entrepreneurship. Meanwhile, the 
crucial reality is that growth is ‘unbalanced’ in that it occurs in some sectors before 
others and the benefits to wider society filter through later. A development minded 
government should therefore not be afraid to favour certain sectors or indeed regions 
in its drive to industrialise, acting as an ‘initiator’. When the advances of the favoured 
industry or area highlight shortcomings elsewhere it can act on them. For example, 
the growth of a steel industry will expose deficiencies in energy provision and 
transport thus acting as a ‘necessary detour’ allowing the government to learn how to 
maintain a transport or energy network. If a government is understandably reluctant 
for political reasons to favour a particular sector or region even temporarily, the 
discerning and objective nature of foreign capital can make those difficult decisions 
instead, Hirschman argues.41 Thus, like Gerschenkron, Hirschman identifies a need 
for inducement mechanisms to nurture the entrepreneurial contribution to the 
development process. If  there are social or cultural constraints on innovative 
behaviour, then the state can intervene by acting as a surrogate. But Hirschman’s 
point of departure is to reject the idea that underdeveloped countries suffer from a 
shortage of capital in favour of a theory that capitalists lack motivation.
Developmentalist policies with parallel concepts of assisted capitalism were 
applied in both Argentina and Spain from the mid twentieth century. The best known
40 Hirschman, A The Strategy o f  Economic Development, New Haven, 1959
41 Ibid, p. 204
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‘grand theory’ associated with Latin America was what came to be known as the 
theory of structuralism. This was directly enshrined into policy, comprising a drive to 
industrialisation across Latin America. It was forged following the creation in 1947 of 
the Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL), a United Nations agency 
based in Santiago, Chile. The theory elaborated by Raul Prebisch, the Argentine 
executive secretary of CEPAL, argued that a lack of development in the world’s 
‘periphery’ is part of the same economic process as development at the ‘centre’. Latin 
American countries had been peripheral since the colonial era as producers of primary 
products, the prices of which were in long-term decline on account of low elasticities 
of demand.42 Prebisch believed that productivity gains at the centre were not reflected 
in lower prices at the periphery.43 The Cepalista solution was Keynesian style state 
managed industrialisation in a protected environment to shelter the ‘infant industries’ 
from the rigours of the free market until such time that they are mature enough to 
compete in their own right. Alongside import substituting industrialisation with an eye 
on eventual diversification of exports, Prebisch prescribed agrarian reform and 
regional integration so that wider markets in mutually minded developmentalist states 
would facilitate economies of scale. Essentially, Prebisch was advocating a 
renegotiation of the terms under which peripheral countries participated in the world 
economy so that they might gain what Susan Strange calls ‘structural power’ in taking 
greater charge of their own terms of trade in an international system 44
The remit given to the state to supplant market forces in nurturing new 
industries puts Cepalismo, ‘developmentalism’ or structuralism as it has come to be 
known, in the same tradition that informed Gerschenkron. While the thesis was 
consistent with an increasingly prevalent perception in Latin America of the region as 
perpetually disadvantaged by unequal terms of exchange, it was also firmly within a 
tradition that had central European antecedents such as the work of Mihael 
Manoilescu 45 Nevertheless, it provided an influential alternative to modernisation 
theories postulated by Rostow and others. Cristobal Kay hails CEPAL as “the first
42 See Prebisch, R. The Economic Development o f Latin America and its Principal Problems, New 
York, 1950
43 Thorp, R. Progress, Poverty and Exclusion: An Economic History o f  Latin America in the 2Cfh 
Century, Washington, 1998 p. 133
44 Strange, S. State and Market: An Introduction to Political Economy, London, 1994 pp.24-29
45 Fitzgerald, E.V.K. ‘ECLA and the Formation o f Latin American Economic Doctrine’, in: Rock, D. 
(ed.) Latin America in the 1940s, Berkeley, 1994 pp. 100-102
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original body of development theory to emanate from the Third World.”46 Prebisch’s 
ideas marked a watershed in development economics. CEPAL’s status as a United 
Nations agency meant Prebisch, as a Latin American economist based in Santiago, 
exerted global influence, hitherto unthinkable 47
Spain’s impressive late twentieth century growth and successful transition to 
democracy might be taken as support for Rostow’s idea that a ‘mature’ society will be 
inclined to support individual liberty rather than issue monolithic directive from 
above as observed in statist planned economies during the Cold War. On the other 
hand, for much of the period in question, centrally administered development ‘Plans’ 
were the order in Spain while industrialisation was not spontaneous in the Rostowian 
sense in either Spain or Argentina. The links to Gerschenkron are easier to qualify. 
The Gerschenkronian view of ideology as a central prerequisite has parallels in the 
history of Spain, where success may be attributed to conviction by certain sectors of 
the regime that industrial growth was in their interests. But if modernising elites are 
unable to overcome traditionalist objections, the result might be a polarised society 
where there are two elite factions with different interests each of which will 
persistently hamper any process that aids accumulation by the other.
This scenario would apply to the divisions within Spain’s Franco regime
4o
during the 1960s where there was conflict between conservatives and modernisers .
It is also an apt description of Argentine history which an influential analysis defines 
as a protracted struggle between a rural exporting elite and industrialists, both vying 
for control of the state through ‘colonisation’ of the bureaucracy 49 Spanish 
industrialisation had only recently started in earnest when Gerschenkron elaborated 
his work. Nevertheless, the Spanish example nominally supports his argument that a 
value system favouring economic progress originating in a subset of the elite, the 
availability of an entrepreneurial group in society and wider ‘social approval’ will 
prevail over the old guard and facilitate industrialisation.50 In Argentina, however, 
despite the existence of an urbanised, wage earning working class and an industrial,
46 Kay, C. Latin American Theories o f  Development and Underdevelopment.London 1989, p. 10
47 Abel, C. Lewis, C (eds.) Latin America, Economic Imperialism and the State, the Political Economy 
of the External Connection from Independence to the Present, London, 1998 p.4
4 Preston, P, The Triumph o f  Democracy in Spain, London, 2001, p.3
49 O’Donnell, G, ‘State and Alliances in Argentina’ in Bates, R, Toward a Political Economy o f  
Development (Berkeley, 1988), p.202
50 Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, Cambridge M A, 1962 
, p.353
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entrepreneurial elite, the power of the landed oligarchy has never been truly overcome. 
Indeed, while Argentina underwent developmental state led experiments during the 
mid 20th Century, the regimes that implemented them did not enjoy a great degree of 
longevity. New ideologies favouring industrialisation never suppressed the interests of 
the landed aristocracy.51
The Argentine experience may represent a societal failure, therefore, rather 
than a discrediting of Gerschenkron’s ideas. On the other hand, Gerschenkron 
describes variation in the rates of industrialisation across countries more in terms of 
their relative backwardness at the outset rather than the quality of government 
intervention. Borrowing Hirschman’s terminology, perhaps Argentine perceptions of 
growth are too ‘ego centred’? Progress can only be achieved at the expense of others, 
in this case other sectors of society, so the country’s failure lies in an inability to 
capture the public imagination with a presentation of change or reform as universally 
beneficial?
While features of all the ‘grand theories’ outlined above can be found in the 
experiences of both Spain and Argentina it is worth pointing out that unlike Rostow, 
neither Gerschenkron nor Hirschman outline a role for democracy in their view of an 
interventionist, some might say heavy handed, state. So an unkind interpretation of 
their respective visions might dismiss them as manifestos for authoritarian regimes.
On the other hand Spain’s successful democratisation after the mid 1970s might be 
taken as vindication of Rostow’s view that economic development naturally fosters a 
democratic society.
The onset of authoritarianism in the 1960s and 1970s provoked an intellectual 
crisis in Latin America. In terms of ‘grand theory’ the phenomenon posed a serious 
challenge to development literature, and Rostow in particular, that had suggested a 
positive association between economic modernisation and democracy. An intellectual 
consequence was the quest for an answer and a critique of the old ideas, comprising
c'y
what came to be labelled ‘dependency theory’. The common thrust, was that
51 Schvarzer, J. ‘Empresarios del pasado. La Union Industrial Argentina’ Buenos Aires 1991
52 See: Cardoso, F.H. and Faletto, E. Dependency and Development in Latin America ’, London, 1979; 
Furtado, C, Economic Development o f  Latin America: Historical Background and Contemporary 
Problems, Cambridge, 1976; Sunkel, O. ‘National Development Policy and External Dependence in 
Latin America’ Journal o f  Development Studies, Vol.6, (1), October 1969; Evans, P. Dependent 
Development: The Alliance o f  Multinational, State and Local Capital in Brazil, Princeton, 1979; 
O’Donnell, G. Modernization and bureaucratic-authoritarianism : studies in South American politics, 
Berkeley, 1973.
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authoritarianism was a consequence of the socio-economic tensions that had grown 
out of developmentalism. The CEPAL ideas gave too much ground to international 
capital, resulting in a colonisation of Latin American economies by multinational 
enterprises. Industrialisation, in the language of the literature, had become ‘externally 
integrated’. One way or another, this meant that capital was not accumulated in the 
periphery because the capital intensity of the new industries meant minimal impact on 
employment, and the foreign firms were inclined to repatriate profits. Perhaps, then, 
the multinational had become the Gerschenkronian substitute, a private agent hired by 
the state to create the appropriate conditions for a spurt in industrialisation. From this 
perspective, their function would lie in their impartiality when promoting the 
unbalanced growth identified by Hirschman.
A radical strand of the dependency literature which is arguably its best known 
version particularly outside Latin America, is that of Andre Gunder Frank who 
published the work: ‘Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America’ in 1967. 
Frank modified the Cepalista notion of centre-periphery and reproduced it as 
‘metropolis-satellite’ whereby the latter, because of its integration into the capitalist 
system was condemned to deepening underdevelopment (as opposed to backwardness 
diagnosed by Gerschenkron, Prebisch and others). The relationship between the two 
poles is exploitative and the cycle needs to be broken if the metropolis is to develop. 
This, Frank suggested, is most likely to be achieved through socialist revolution.53
The arguments of the dependency theorists are to a certain degree supported 
by this thesis in that authoritarian government was evidently a response to social 
conflict arising from the empowerment of certain social and economic sectors as a 
direct consequence of redistributional policies. But the authoritarian form of 
government did not endure in either Argentina or Spain and policy was elaborated and 
reformed under both pluralist and dictatorial systems. The focus here is on underlying 
institutional continuity determining how groups are represented to and within 
government and the ability of a state to dissipate interest group self interest by 
applying rigid rules of the game to negotiations over policy.
After decades of broadly similar policies of state-led, import substituting 
industrialisation applied around the world it was clear that the model was more 
successful in achieving development, measured in productivity levels, in some
53 Frank, A.G. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies o f  Chile and 
Brazil, New York, 1967
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countries than others. The contrast between Eastern Asia and Latin America was 
especially conspicuous but the theoretical literature of Gerschenkron and others 
lacked a framework to explain divergence among late industrialisers. This inspired a 
cross regional literature from the political economy tradition which took up the 
Gerschenkronian mantle to assess why some developmental economies were more 
successful than their peers. Among the best known work is that of Alice Amsden who 
argues that the success of industrialisation will depend on the extent to which the state 
acts as a ‘disciplinarian’ for the industries it nurtures.54 She does not accept 
Gerschenkron’s idea that the later the process of industrialisation, the larger the 
participation of the state. In Amsden’s model, late industrialising countries are 
successful if the state intervenes ‘to get prices wrong’, in other words to subsidise 
nascent industries, on account of the fact that they could not compete on the basis of 
low wages alone.55 In this situation it falls on the ‘disciplinarian’ state to impose the 
conditionality of high performance standards on subsidy allocation. If much is 
expected of subsidised industry by the state, then society ultimately expects more of 
the state because the performance of bureaucrats involved in choosing which firms to 
subsidise can be judged. Higher performance standards thus reduce rent seeking in 
both the public and private sectors, Amsden argues. In short, rather than the degree of 
backwardness dictating the speed of economic growth, it is the extent to which 
government imposes ‘reciprocity’ on its relations with firms.56
Higher performance standards lead to greater efficiency and ultimately lower 
subsidies. So was the Spanish state a more effective disciplinarian of industry than the 
equivalent in Argentina? Work by Mauro Guillen, which compares industries in 
Argentina, South Korea and Spain suggests that the Spanish state was more effective 
at nurturing its industrial sector in a way that did not suffocate the wider economy. 
Argentine industry suffered, meanwhile, because of persistence in employing inward 
looking industrial policy and industries remained perpetually inefficient so that they 
could never be weaned off subsidies and other forms of state aid.57 A related line of 
analysis highlights the extent to which a state achieves the correct balance between 
autonomy of the state from interest group pressure and ties to business. A state which
54 Amsden, A ‘A Theory o f Government Intervention in Late Industrialisation’ in Putterman, L and 
Rueschemeyer, D (eds.) State and Market in Development: Synergy or Rivalry, Boulder, 1992
55 Ibid, p.61
56 Amsden, A. A sia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialisation, New York, 1989, p. 146.
57 Guillen, M. The Limits o f  Convergence: Globalisation and Organisational Change in Argentina, 
South Korea and Spain, Princeton, 2001.
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is too autonomous stifles innovation and alienates private enterprise. If it is too 
‘embedded’, defined by clientelist relationships, then it is vulnerable to capture by
CO
interest groups. This would suggest that the Spanish and Argentine states during the 
period were too embedded, the former less so than the latter. A common criticism of 
Argentine industrial policy focuses on the domination of elites in the policymaking 
process, forcing governments to favour firms engaged in activity associated with the 
traditional agro-exporting sector.59 Yet it would be hard to substantiate an assertion 
that the Spanish state was less clientelistic in its relations with business than its 
counterpart in Argentina. Local capital comprised an important component of the 
Franco regime and the state sector was used throughout the period as an instrument of 
influence peddling (see chapter 1). The focus on this thesis is to support work 
attributing the ability of the state to act as disciplinarian to subsidised industries by 
focusing on the broader based concept of political stability. Essentially, the principal 
concern is whether a state, or head of state, can act as an effective disciplinarian in the 
struggle between economic interests to capture rents rather than as an assessor of 
industrial performance.
Theories o f State Capacity
Thus, the line of enquiry applied here concentrates on state capacity and 
institutional strength as an enforcer of political stability that can withstand factional 
objections to policy. The varied success of third world structural adjustment 
programmes in the wake of the 1980s debt crisis led to an intellectual revival of 
Weberian views of the state’s role: an organisation invested with authority to make 
decisions on behalf of the populace and implement them, forcefully if  necessary.60 
But for that implementation to be effective, that State requires an extensive, internally 
coherent bureaucratic structure. If such a system is in place with functioning 
hierarchies and regulations, the abuse of power by individuals is minimised as is the 
possibility of disproportionate representation of a partisan interest from the wider 
society. In short, an effective institutional structure overrides the pursuit of personal 
gain by individuals or groups.
58 Evans, P. Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation, Princeton, 1995.
59 Schvarzer, J. La industria que supimos conseguir, Buenos Aires, 1996.
60 Rueschemeyer, D and Evans, P. ‘The State and Economic Transformation: Toward an Analysis o f  
the Conditions Underlying Effective Intervention’, in: Evans, P, Rueschemeyer, D and Skocpol. (eds.) 
Bringing the State Back In, Cambridge, 1985, pp. 46-47
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It is an unfortunate truth, however, that the state will itself necessarily 
become an arena of social conflict because groups will always attempt to use its 
structures as a means of realising their particular interests.61 Therefore, the state in a 
crony capitalist system can only function ‘autonomously’ if a faction gains an upper 
hand. So the coherent and effective state is one where a hierarchy has fallen into place 
reflecting a “pact of domination”. But once that structure is in place, it strengthens, 
argue Rueschemeyer and Evans, evolving into an approximation of Weber’s effective 
and autonomous bureaucracy. It is social divisions, they argue, that can inadvertently 
strengthen the state. Figure 1.4, which outlines the structure of the Spanish corporate 
state in the 1940s shows the protagonists of this pact of domination, namely the 
members of the winning coalition from the Civil War. The Church, the military and 
the Falange, a fascistic ideological organisation that elaborated the Spanish inward 
looking autarkic development model and much of the corporatist system that endured 
through the period under study here, were each given control of ministries and other 
state agencies that related to particular areas of Spanish life. The Cortes, was 
effectively an impotent rubber stamp parliament but it was the arena in which societal 
interests interacted with the upper end of the hierarchy. Representatives in the 
congress were elected members of the ‘natural’ units of Spanish life, namely the 
family, the community and the national syndicate which represented both labour and 
the employers. Labour, though not a member of the pact, was a beneficiary of 
Falangist expansionism and therefore incorporated into the state, albeit in a way that 
did not recognise it as a distinct group.
A further means by which social division might empower the state is the rift 
within the dominant class as a result of Gerschenkronian industrialisation, whereby 
the once unassailable landowners are forced to compete with the industrial class 
which itself may be divided between loyalty to foreign and local capital. Thus a lack 
of coherence within a once cohesive dominant group may unshackle the bureaucracy 
from serving interests that are now much harder to define. A corollary to this 
argument suggests that popular discontent might further state autonomy in that as 
demands grow on the state to suppress protest by one group, it will become more 
willing to move against dominant groups as well.
61 North, D. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge, 1990. p.59
62Rueschemeyer, and Evans, 1985. p.48
63 Ibid. p.63
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These arguments appear to be vindicated by the findings of this study 
regarding the experience of economic reform in Spain. The ‘elite’ of landowners 
represented by the dictatorship in the mid twentieth century found itself weakened by 
the regime’s own policy of forced industrialisation which rendered them less 
economically dominant in Spanish society. Furthermore, authoritarian suppression of 
popular discontent during and after the Civil War might be interpreted as increasing 
the authority of the state in the face of other sectors. The Argentine experience, 
however, presents some problems to the hypotheses. Divisions in society, between 
elites and popular sectors and within these groups resulted in different parts of the 
state becoming affiliated at different times to specific interests, according to the 
O’Donnell view. So such division, rather than freeing the state, divided it to such an 
extent that it was unable to act coherently or consistently.
Thus what might distinguish the two models, is that success or failure in 
attempts to reform policy may not be decided merely on an institutional level.
Another theme much explored in the analysis of state capacity is the role of 
individuals in the process with a school attributing much to the role of technocrats. A 
seminal analysis in this tradition is provided by Merilee Grindle and John Thomas 
who focus on the role of decision makers in government.64 Policy elites are forced to 
operate within a ‘policy space’ which is determined by the ability of a regime and its 
leadership to introduce a reform without provoking political upheaval or without 
being forced to abandon the initiative.65 The size of that space depends not just on the 
‘environmental context’ within which decisions are made but also on the ability of the 
reformers to utilise information and exploit relationships with key actors. So the 
emphasis on decision makers thus goes beyond the institutionalist path dependency 
idea that the ‘environmental context’ is shaped by history and therefore static. Policy 
elites are capable of expanding policy space by using their own initiative.
In pursuit of this line of inquiry, came the ‘technopols’ categorisation of 
politically minded technocrats or politicians with a grounding in economics. A 
technopol designs economic policy with an eye on the nation’s circumstances. The 
ability to achieve this balance is what separates successful from unsuccessful reforms.
64 See Grindle, M and Thomas, J. Public choices and policy change : the political economy of reform in 
developing countries, Baltimore, 1991
65 Ibid, pp. 7-8
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In other words, bad reform will be entirely technical to the exclusion of political sense 
or vice versa.66
The examples and case studies examined in this study in both Spain and 
Argentina appear to be dominated by particular personalities, either heads of state or 
technocratic economics ministers. Indeed, many of the policies, particularly in the 
Argentine case are closely associated with the policy architect. But the idea of a 
“technopol” suggests a platonic ideal of the statesman striving selflessly for the 
common good which may be deemed unrealistic.
A well known model elaborated by Barbara Geddes portrays the state as 
subject to the actions of “rationally self interested political leaders... who attempt to 
maximise career success.67 Thus state autonomy is defined by the behaviour of these 
individuals. Those same figures, on the other hand, may choose to represent particular 
societal groups if they consider it to be in their interests. The worth of this argument 
in either of the cases examined here is difficult to qualify, however, and the extent to 
which episodes of reform were attempts to resolve macroeconomic crisis might 
undermine the personal ambition idea. Though the architects of Argentina’s 
Convertibility Plan in the 1990s, for example, might have enjoyed the praise heaped 
on them when they successfully curbed hyperinflation in 1991, it was as a solution to 
severe macroeconomic imbalances (see chapter 5). So to claim vanity or personal 
ambition was the leading motive behind its conception would not stand up to much 
scrutiny. Reformers under Spain’s Franco dictatorship in the late 1950s (see chapter 
3) similarly appear, as members of a conservative Catholic lay group and an 
intellectual clique, to have taken inspiration from religious zeal and ideological 
conviction rather than ambition. Their predecessors and successors, meanwhile, were 
obsessed with the need to keep popular discontent to a minimum in order to maintain 
political stability.
A further problem presented by the rational choice model of the state, is that 
such a system does not lend itself well to ensuring the consolidation of a new policy. 
If action is the product of individual choice, whether motivated by personal ambition 
or not, the policies are associated with their figurehead. This makes them more 
vulnerable and less able to withstand popular discontent. The departure of the man
66 See: Dominguez, J. Technopols: Freeing Politics and Markets in Latin America in the 1990s, 
Pennsylfania, 1997, or: Willamson, J. ‘In Search o f a Manual for Technopols’, in: Williamson, J. (ed.) 
The Political Economy o f  Policy Reform, Washington DC, 1994
67 Geddes, B. Politicians Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America, Berkeley, 1994, p.7
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permits the reversal of the reform and the next generation of technocratic civil 
servants or politicians can implement their own agenda based on an entirely different 
ideological tradition. To avoid these analytical problems, therefore, this thesis 
emphasises the role of institutional continuity rather than the actors themselves in 
dictating the success or failure of attempts to implement economic policy reform.
Concluding Remarks.
The structure of the thesis will proceed as follows. Chapter 1 identifies the 
principal political and economic forces in Argentina and Spain, comparing the 
structure of the State, the polity, associational life and the hierarchical relationships 
between these agents. It argues that the extent to which a corporatist system was 
successfully embedded into state-society relations in Spain distinguishes it from the 
Argentine case which is regarded as a system founded on an incomplete corporatism. 
Corporatist entities which represented interests such as business or labour were built 
into an official syndicate by the Franco regime, which represented an approximation 
to a credible commitment by the state to consider the interests of a broad range of 
groups. Similar bodies were created as pillars of Peron’s state in Argentina but after 
he was overthrown and his party proscribed, the entities were orphaned. They 
subsequently operated as autonomous, highly organised bodies that could either 
oppose or support, wielding potent economic weapons such as threats to strike or 
withhold production. The executive thus interacted with society either through 
suppression or direct negotiation with these groups, offering economic incentives in 
return for political support rather than through a strong and effective political party 
system.
Chapter 2 gives a short comparative economic history of the two cases. After a 
summary of the relevant literatures, it addresses both histories as stories of 
simultaneous quests for development which the respective regimes, like Gerschenkron, 
Prebisch and their contemporaries, equated with industrialisation. Both economies 
were undeniably industrialised by the middle of the period in question, though Spain 
alone is considered developed. The difference lies in how the Gershenkronian- 
Hirschmanian projects pursued by both mid twentieth century were modified 
subsequently. The harnessing of economic interests by the Spanish state resulted in 
gradual but consistent change, whereby opposing factions within government, 
subordinated and disciplined by centralised authority, negotiated on equal terms.
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Though slow, and by many estimations inadequate, change in Spain was orderly and 
continuous and comprises the pure public good of political stability. Argentina, also 
characterised by centralised power and a history of social conflict was not able to 
subordinate or co-opt economic interests which remained divorced from the state. A 
zero sum conflict between groups simultaneously supporting or opposing the policies 
of any particular president exacerbated political instability and resulted in policy 
instability which harmed the progress of the process of industrialisation.
A second section to the thesis attempts to illustrate the varying success of 
different approaches to implementation of policy change through the use of case 
studies. The section examines three historical moments which represent attempts by 
policymakers to change the rules of the game for national capitalism in response to 
economic crisis associated with exhaustion of existing policies. The methodology of 
the thesis assumes the Argentine and Spanish political economies are shaped by 
comparable historical legacies of powerful groups jostling for access to national rents. 
In such a scenario, economic crisis, in part caused by groups “over appropriating” 
resources, leads to a need for difficult reform whereby one or more groups are forced 
to relinquish some of their privileges. The chapters in this second section of the 
thesis, therefore, use such scenarios as tests of Argentine and Spanish institutions to 
withstand the strains associated with unpopular reform that strikes at hierarchies of 
interest group privilege.
On account of international conditions, the first two studies in chapters 3 and 4 
are near simultaneous reforms carried out in Spain and Argentina. Thus chapter 3 
assesses attempts in both countries to implement macroeconomic stabilisation ‘plans’ 
sponsored by the International Monetary Fund at the end of each economy’s initial 
cycle of fiscal expansion in the late 1950s. The studies show that liberalisation of the 
autarkic Francoist economy during this period was a partial and gradual process 
representing a war of attrition between distinct groups with opposing economic 
ideologies within the regime. On the one hand, a generation of reforming technocrats 
wished to end Spain’s economic isolation. On the other, the Falangists and military 
old guard, because of an ideological slant towards economic nationalism, were 
opposed in principle to features of the reforms such as entry of foreign capital and 
greater fiscal restraint that threatened Spain’s march to greatness through
68 Tomell, A. ‘Economic Crises and Reform in Mexico’, in Haber, S. (ed.) Crony Capitalism and 
Economic Growth, p. 130.
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industrialisation. An industrial bourgeoisie that had benefited from the model of 
autarkic and protected industrialisation were also threatened by the notion of 
economic opening. Under the Spanish corporatist system, all such groups were 
represented by branches of state that claimed a monopoly of legitimacy and 
recognised the authority of the dictator who acted as a final arbitrator between 
technocrats and diverse economic interests. The reformers consequently found that 
the dictatorship acted both as a brake on their attempts to liberalise the economy and 
impose fiscal restraint, as well as an enforcer of discipline on groups which might 
have mobilised against what reforms were carried out.
At the same time, Argentina was experiencing a parallel attempt to transform 
the economy under president Arturo Frondizi whose policies focussed on deepening 
the industrialisation presided over by previous regimes but with the help of foreign 
capital. Yet his vision antagonised certain groups and his democratic hold on power 
was not strong enough to withstand that opposition. Frondizi was politically weak, 
elected to power through tenuous pacts so subsequent efforts to build alliances of 
support for his new programme were severely disadvantaged. The flirtation with 
foreign capital upset nationalist elements in both the military and the Peronist working 
class while the pursuit of heavy industry fostered suspicion among elites that he 
intended to continue discrimination against the agricultural exporting sector that 
characterised Peron’s administration. Thus Frondizi was forced to focus on heading 
off the threat of a coup, ultimately a vain effort as he was deposed in 1962 and 
succeeded by a ‘nationalist’ administration that reversed much of his progress in 
opening the economy to international capital.
While this first episode contrasts the success of an authoritarian transition in 
Spain with frustration of attempts at reform in Argentina by a democratic president, 
the models are reversed in the subsequent section. Chapter 4 looks at an episode 
marked by an Argentine attempt to implant a neo-liberal economic model in 1976 
under the disciplining auspices of an authoritarian military government. 
Simultaneously in Spain, the death of Franco in 1975 had permitted a transition to 
political pluralism for the first time since the 1930s which inauspiciously coincided 
with economic crisis caused by the global economic downturn of the era. Both cases 
represent frustrated economic orthodoxy, whereby market focused economics 
ministers saw attempts to put an end to dirigiste practices stymied by authorities wary 
of exacerbating political and social unrest. Argentina’s Cambridge educated
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economics minister Jose Martinez de Hoz attempted a profound break with past 
interventionism while his Spanish counterpart, Enrique Fuentes-Quintana pursued 
monetary discipline but because of the political tensions of the time, tempered it with 
fiscal magnanimity. Paradoxically, however, Fuentes-Quintana’s ‘pacted’ economic 
transition of 1977 bore many of the hallmarks of an authoritarian reform. Interest 
group representatives were excluded from negotiations, their voice captured by 
political elites while the threat of military intervention disciplined civil society so that 
demands were softened. Democratic post-Franco Spain is frequently interpreted as 
characterised by negotiated settlements with interest groups. The argument presented 
here acknowledges that there were wage agreements with trade unions and other 
groups throughout the 1970s and 1980s but the most important, and significant 
economic reforms, the Moncloa Pacts addressed in this chapter were negotiated 
between political parties that claimed exclusive legitimacy to represent clearly 
identified constituencies, or economic interests. As under the corporatist dictatorship, 
therefore, reform was a negotiation within the state.
In Argentina, meanwhile, Martinez de Hoz represented the interests of an 
ascendant social group, in his case the economically liberal elite, following 
suppression of its rival, the salaried middle and working classes. While for the time 
being at least, the ruling military junta was unassailable and enforced an assault on the 
institutions of Peronism on which it blamed Argentina’s ills, Martinez de Hoz’s 
tenure was weak. His liberalism was at odds with the nationalistic ideals of certain 
factions of the armed forces who balked at his proposals to privatise ‘strategic’ state- 
owned industries and were predictably resistant to pressure for fiscal restraint. As 
such, the neo-liberal reforms were curtailed and Martinez de Hoz eventually replaced. 
Significantly, the liberal idea he espoused was briefly adopted by a dominant faction 
of the military on account of its unflattering interpretation of Peronist economic 
ideology as a root of economic imbalances. But the military itself, like Argentine 
society was factional and incoherent so the seven year period of military rule was 
characterised by coups within the coup, and saw four heads of state. Martinez de Hoz, 
thought the most ambitious, was just one of six economics ministers appointed under 
the junta. Military defeat in the Falklands put an end to the military’s credibility and 
democratisation followed with another lease of life for traditionally ‘heterodox’ 
economic policy. Though factions within a ruling military junta might be deemed 
comparable to this study’s interpretation of the Spanish model, whereby negotiation
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takes place within a state, the armed forces had a tenuous claim to legitimate 
representation of particular factions. In spite of Martinez de Hoz’s attempts to put an 
end to corporatist practices, the executive continued to negotiate directly with vested 
interests outside the state, often bypassing the economics minister. The clandestine 
nature o f these negotiations, the variety of deals made and resulting contradictions in 
policy reflect Argentine institutional weakness and indiscipline.
It is important to note that both these moments in history came before Spain’s 
accession to the European Economic Community, as it was then known, in 1986. It 
would be tempting to argue that membership of the rich trading bloc offered an instant 
solution to Spain’s backwardness, a kind of end of history which superseded domestic 
rigidities. This study argues that this is a simplistic view, as Spain had to travel a long 
and arduous road to reform before it could qualify for membership. The two historical 
snapshots narrated here were crucial episodes in that process, but took place years 
before Spain joined. In other words, helpful though membership may have been in 
terms of lending credibility to Spanish economic institutions, channelling 
development funds south of the Pyrenees and offering an incentive to political and 
economic actors to accept reform, it was primarily the culmination of progress already 
made.
The third and final moment examined in Chapter 5 differs from the previous 
two in that it represents a thematic rather than chronological comparison. It addresses 
exercises by both economies to impose ‘neo-liberal’ reform of the economy, by 
Spain’s Socialist government led by Felipe Gonzalez after 1982, and Argentina’s 
Peronist president Carlos Menem who was elected in 1989. For the Spanish the early 
1980s represented an economic end game whereby the pace of change was increased 
ostensibly in readiness for membership of the European Community. Markets were 
deregulated, state enterprises privatised and labour law liberalised in direct 
contradiction to the ruling party’s working class ideological origins. But the snapshot 
shows that the reforms were limited, privatisations were selective or partial and in 
spite of deregulation, Spain continued to operate as a crony capitalist system. Spanish 
companies had too long a history as instruments of development policy dating from 
the early years of the twentieth century. Utilities, banks, the state oil company, the 
steel industry and the state telecommunications company had been nurtured under 
Franco because of their Hirschmanian linkages to the wider economy, but also 
because of their ‘strategic’ importance to national security. Thus the modem,
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privatised enterprises are still run by political appointees and monopolies are not all 
dismantled. Private they may have been but political they remained. Political power, 
meanwhile, albeit subject to democratic methods of selection, was highly centralised 
and dominated by a top down hierarchy within the monolithic and highly disciplined 
ruling party which turned its back on ever weaker non state associations. In short, the 
democratic system of policy reform continued to operate along similar lines of 
internalised negotiation with an arbitrating supreme leader as that pursued by 
Franco’s single party state.
The Argentine section for this case study covers the early 1990s and finds the 
country again undergoing concerted economic liberalisation in response to 
macroeconomic crisis. Argentina underwent a puritanically implemented example of 
the ‘new economic model’ imposed by the by the democratically elected government 
of president Carlos Menem and thus broke a historical association of economic 
liberalism with political authoritarianism in Latin America. This involved a rapid 
retreat of the state from the economy with the wholesale privatisation of hundreds of 
state-owned enterprises. The sell off included such monolithic firms as the state oil 
and steel companies, one time dirigiste altarpieces and therefore representative of the 
extent of the shift in paradigm. But this apparent rupture with tradition and the 
suddenness of the dismantling of a statist economy is deceptive and this thesis states 
that the period does not represent a fundamental change in the Argentine political 
economy. It was possible to implement the new model at the start of the decade 
because of the discrediting of alternatives by recurring crisis and the weakness of 
traditional institutional obstacles to liberalism such as the national bourgeoisie and 
popular sectors such as organised labour. But though particular groups were 
weakened, others such as foreign capital were strengthened and thus the dynamic of 
presidential negotiation with economic interests outside the state in order to ensure 
acquiescence to reforms continued. There was no deepening of representative 
institutions such as a political party system to supplant the old dynamics and the 
Argentine state remains further than its Spanish counterpart from extending the 
perceived reach of its credible commitment to asset holders and economic interests. 
Thus in the hierarchy of crony capitalist systems, Argentina is necessarily less able to 
ensure the political stability required to encourage productive activity.
The final section offers some conclusions which hinge upon the idea that 
Spain’s economy outperformed Argentina’s because of a more successful
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management of social conflict and the ability to offer political stability as a pure 
public good. This occurred despite institutional, ideological and historical similarities, 
and Spain’s disadvantage in terms of factor endowments. Key to political stability 
was the weakness of associational life, so that representation of economic interests 
was channelled through a monolithic state via official corporatist entities, and later, a 
ruling ‘mass’ party. Political representation during and after the dictatorship was 
highly disciplined and centred on a head of state who acted as an arbitrator between 
factions, and solutions were compromises. In Argentina, construction of the 
corporatist state was truncated which left a variety of highly organised and 
autonomous corporatist entities that were disconnected from the state. Each one of 
these passed through periods of cooperation and enmity with the head of state who 
was forced to negotiate with them directly rather than via the institutions of state 
which were inherently weak. Such a situation lends itself to political instability in that 
a president is necessarily friend to one interest and enemy to another. It also facilitates 
macroeconomic instability because powerful economic interests are likely to generate 
inflation. Organised labour can mobilise to pressurise the government for higher 
wages, increasing demand and driving up inflation. Producing groups, both industrial 
and agricultural can withhold production, thus restricting supply and driving up prices.
Finally, a brief word on the sources used in the research to complement the 
methodology and approach outlined above. The thesis rests on documentary evidence, 
including legal texts, many now obsolete but still available in archives, government 
reports as well as economic and political analyses carried out by international 
organisations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The 
principal handicap presented by this kind of material is that records in ministries and 
government depositories in both the countries are often incomplete. Many of the 
regimes involved were non transparent, authoritarian and patriarchal which means in 
house studies were at times less than objective. The poor human rights records of 
governments in both cases also resulted in much documentation being hidden or 
destroyed while access to the researcher is at times restricted. Where possible, 
therefore, the research seeks evidence from international sources less influenced by 
vested interests. Some archival material, such as the personal correspondence of 
Antonio Suanzes, founder of Spain’s state industrial holding company, childhood 
friend to Franco and the architect of post Civil War economic policy is used here for 
the first time in any academic study thanks to progress by Spanish government
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archivists in organising the material. But a similar resource in Argentina, the Frondizi 
archive of personal correspondence and other records, is no longer available to the 
researcher following its acquisition by Argentina’s National Library which lacks the 
resources to catalogue the material. On the other hand, this is compensated for to 
some extent by an excellent archive of largely untapped World Bank documents at the 
Argentine Economics Ministry dating back to shortly after the institution’s foundation, 
including declassified memoranda and reports covering all three periods scrutinised in 
this thesis.
Meanwhile, much use is made of newspaper archives as sources of 
contemporary accounts and in search of views held by participants in the events in 
question. But the regime of Francisco Franco in Spain was not known for its 
protection of press freedom, and at the time, debates were ideologically charged so 
newspaper sources must be treated with some caution. Again, a solution was sought 
through the use wherever possible of international non partisan sources such as the 
Financial Times and The Economist newspapers.
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Chapter 1
The State, Vested Interests, Political Parties and the 
Management of Distribution.
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This chapter examines the relationships between government, parties and 
interest groups in Argentina and Spain. It is a comparative survey that puts evolving 
state-political party-interest relations into historical perspective. The principal 
argument is that both cases are best understood as systems shaped by parallel 
corporatisms left in different stages of completion by their respective architects in the 
1940s. This impacted on the capability of the state to embed new policies that might 
be opposed by vested interests.
Corporatism is defined as a system whereby economic interests and social 
groups are represented by non competitive, hierarchically ordered organisations, 
recognised by the state which grants them monopolies of legitimacy within their 
respective categories. The state, acting as the overall authority, takes the role of 
mediator between groups as well as the ultimate decision maker on policy.69 It is a 
system of ‘vertical integration’ whereby corporatist entities representing interests such 
as labour, industry or agriculture, have direct access to the state, and indeed may form 
a part of it. The premise of this study is that the system functions most effectively if 
all the entities are granted, in theory at least, equal access to the executive in a state 
which adopts a pyramid shaped structure. Each interest is granted legitimacy before 
the arbitrating head of government who in turn is accepted as the only possible 
channel for negotiation, so groups engage in a war of attrition to shape policy within 
the state. But if economically powerful interests are excluded from the hierarchy, and 
if they are sufficiently organised, they will attempt to scupper policies that they deem 
to reduce their share of national rent. They may even try to achieve this through the 
overthrow of the government so that it might be replaced by one more sympathetic. In 
which case the corporate entities originally favoured by the regime will find 
themselves cast adrift and the cycle starts once more.
Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe Schmitter argue that associations are a source 
of social order because they act as ‘organisational concertations’ that amalgamate 
other institutional bases of order, namely state, market and community. This model 
is associated, however, with advanced industrialised economies with functioning 
liberal democracies which benefit from an additional unit of representation and
69 Schmitter, P. ‘Still the Century o f Corporatism’, The Review o f  Politics, January 1974 p94; Wiarda, 
H. Corporatism and National Development in Latin America, Boulder 1981.
70 Streeck, W and Schmitter, P. ‘Community, Market, State and Associations? The Prospective 
Contribution o f Interest Governance to Social Order’, in: Streeck and Schmitter (eds.) Private Interest 
Government: Beyond Market and State, London 1985
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bargaining because of the bluntness of a universal voting system. In less developed 
economies associations are potentially more disruptive. Mancur Olson has shown that 
‘distributional coalitions’ seek to capture national rent and maintain monopolistic or 
oligopolistic positions harmful to economic growth. This in turn prevents coherent
n  i
government and stifles social mobility. Early seminal work by O’Donnell focuses 
on conspiracies between social groups to ensure public policies benefited them while 
non coalition members bore the costs as a stage in the process of economic 
modernisation.72 O’Donnell’s work seeks to provide models rather than case studies 
and his writing does not explicitly mention Argentina though it is clearly a principal 
inspiration. The thesis was rebuffed by Benjamin Most who acknowledged that while 
such coalitions are undoubtedly important for undertaking public policies in some 
instances, the dynamic is more incoherent than O’Donnell claims. Rather than the 
rational choice o f unified coalitions, policies may just as often be the results of 
bargaining and compromise and as a result, what is achieved may not be what the 
groups’ leaders had in mind.73 Such a scenario is observable in the histories of 
Argentina and Spanish policymaking. But if  that bargaining takes place between 
factions of the state hierarchy with a powerful executive to act as arbitrator and final 
decision maker, as in the case of Spain, the compromise will not threaten political 
stability because of the existence of institutionalised rules of the game. If on the other 
hand, those interests are free standing and outside the state, as they are in Argentina, 
then the undesirable outcome will not be recognised as legitimate and the system 
becomes prone to political instability as groups seek to install an executive who will 
conform to their priorities.
This section will proceed with a brief comparison of the two corporatisms of 
the 1940s, arguing that the Spanish version was more inclusive and more successfully 
consolidated than its Argentine equivalent. An overview of how subsequent relations 
between ruling parties, organised interests and government are shaped by this 
founding system follows before a conclusion which conceptualises these interactions 
into a model that explains greater institutional continuity and policy coherence in 
Spain than in Argentina.
71 Olson, M The Logic o f  Collective Action, Cambridge MA, 1971.
72 O’Donnell, G. ‘Tensions in the bureaucratic-authoritarian State and the Question o f  Democracy’, in: 
Collier D. (ed.) The New Authoritarianism in Latin America, Princeton 1978.
73 Most, B. ‘Authoritarianism and the Growth o f the State in Latin America: An Assessment o f their 
Impacts on Argentine Public Policy 1930 -  1970, Comparative Political Studies, V ol.13 (2) July 1980, 
pp. 173-203
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The Two Corporatisms o f  the 1940s and Beyond.
The early administrations of Franco and Peron were ‘vertically’ conceived, 
designed to transcend, or at least negate, class differences by incorporating such 
factions as business and labour into the state on equal terms. They were also designed 
to shape societies so that the maximum amount of energy should be directed at greater 
productivity to achieve modernisation and greater autonomy of the economy. 
Consequently each regime constructed a system of ‘vertical syndicalism’, whereby 
both employers and unions were incorporated into the state. In the case of Argentina, 
this meant the creation of a new industrial association, the General Economic Council 
(CGE) to mirror the existing labour union confederation, the General Workers 
Confederation (CGT), as a second pillar of Peronist populism. The two groups were 
to act together as representatives of societal interests in advising the government on 
economic policy.74 In Spain, meanwhile, the Franco government of the 1940s, 
recognising the need to address the social conflict which had caused the 1936-39 Civil 
War, established the Syndical Organisation (OS), a catch-all association with 
compulsory membership for workers, management and employers.75 Thus state 
syndicalism in Argentina and Spain institutionalised control over the entire process of 
industrial relations and social welfare, ensuring the maintenance of ‘populist’ labour 
policies such as high real wages to nurture a domestic market of consumers catered to 
by new state owned enterprises. The difference between the two is the extent to which 
these institutions, which were incorporated into the state, reflected the structure of 
society as a whole.
Peronist corporatism was exclusive, disproportionately representing, and 
rewarding, Peron’s support base among the working and middle classes. Because 
Peron sought to transform the Argentine economy, ending its orientation towards 
exports of agricultural produce in favour of internally integrated industrialisation, 
policy necessarily discriminated against agricultural producers. Indeed, the corporatist 
machine expropriated export rents from Argentina’s traditional elite, the owners of
74 Teichman, J. ‘Interest Conflict and Entrepreneurial Support for Peron’ Latin American Research 
Review, Vol.16 (1) 1981, pp.144-155; Lewis, P. The Crisis o f  Argentine Capitalism, Chapel Hill, 1990.
p. 168.
75 Balfour, S. ‘From Warriors to Functionaries: The Falangist Syndical Elite 1939-76’, in: Lannon, F. 
and Preston, P. Elites and Power in Twentieth Century Spain, Oxford, 1990.
49
land, through the creation of IAPI (Argentine Exchange and Promotion Institute).
This was a marketing board to which farmers were compelled to sell their produce so 
that it could be sold on the international market at a profit as a means to raise fiscal
7revenues. It also sold beef and grain cheaply to the domestic market as a mechanism 
to increase real wages at the expense of landowning elites. The low prices offered for 
produce in addition to an aggressively progressive tax regime enhanced the perception 
of discrimination against traditional Argentine agriculture in favour of industry and 
intensified opposition among the elites. Furthermore, the creation of the CGE and its 
incorporation into the state did not mean Peron managed to co-opt the entire 
bourgeoisie. The existing Argentine Industrial Union (UIA) was closed down under 
Peron as an oligarchic bastion of traditional industry, closely integrated with the now 
discredited agro-export economy. The favoured economic model, oriented towards 
light ‘horizontal’ industrialisation to provide consumer goods to a market enriched 
through full employment and generous wage policy, did not sit comfortably with the 
older, larger enterprises affiliated to the UIA. These were more likely to be integrated 
with foreign capital and the export economy.77
The state did achieve a degree of autonomy from the traditional dominant 
classes for the first time but Peron’s legacy proved to be a divisive one that infused a 
sickness into Argentine state-society relations. Because of the expansion of the state’s 
operations under the banner of Peronism and the overt discrimination against 
traditional holders of capital, he created the perception not of a state serving the 
national interests so much as one that could be wielded by groups in power against 
groups out of power. Ultimately, Peron was removed from office and his 
reorientation of the state and the economy truncated. He had served long enough, 
however, to construct important components of the corporatist state, strengthening 
and enriching the organised labour movement in particular. Though Peron himself 
was exiled and his party proscribed, Peronist labour remained a force to be reckoned 
with, adding to the number of freestanding distributing coalitions severed from the 
state and struggling to capture a share of national rent.
76 Torre, J-C. ‘Argentina since 1946’ in Bethell, L. (ed.) Argentina since Independence, Cambridge 
1993 p.250
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In contrast, the corporatism constructed contemporaneously in Spain, was 
more successful at incorporating a wider variety of interests into its structure even if it 
favoured some groups over others. At its inception, the state reflected the coalition 
which had defeated the forces of liberalism, Socialism and Anarcho-syndicalism in 
the Civil War, namely the Church, the military, the rural aristocracy and its allies in 
the industrial bourgeoisie and the Falange a fascistic movement inspired by Mussolini 
style national populism. None of these groups had much in common but were united 
in their loyalty to Franco whose executive power was unlimited. The reason for their 
acquiescence was the role of the dictator as protector against an unpalatable 
alternative, namely a left leaning, anti clerical redistributionism of the kind they had 
just defeated. In return for their loyalty, they were each granted control over an area 
of public life. Thus, the Catholic Church regulated the moral life of the nation with 
control over the Ministry of Education while the armed forces administered their own 
ministries and several others including the Interior Ministry. The Falange, meanwhile, 
was left in charge of labour and economic policy and founded institutions to 
implement their vision. In addition to the state syndicate, the OS, Falangists 
established the Institute for National Industry (INI) as a holding company for state 
enterprises and planner, financier and guardian of the drive to industrialise. In the late 
1950s, supporters of Falangist ideology lost control of economic policy to a younger 
generation of economically orthodox technocrats but retained the INI, the Labour 
Ministry and for a time, the Ministry of Industry. The technocratic young Turks, 
meanwhile, led the newly created ministries of Trade and Finance. In a sense, 
therefore, economic policymaking was divided between two factions. But the nature 
of the system meant that the dictator, having delegated power to ministers 
representing different interests while retaining absolute authority, arbitrated between 
the factions. Less a captain of the team than the ‘referee’, therefore.79
Argentine and Spanish corporatism served to cement a common feature of 
both political systems, namely a disproportionately strong executive in a system
on
vulnerable to domination by a personalistic style of politics. Although according to
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1985 p.7
80 Amodia, J. Franco’s Political Legacy: From Dictatorship to Faqade Democracy, London, 1977 
pp.62-63; Jones, R. Beyond the Spanish State, London 2000 pp.52-53: p.91; Johnson, D. ‘Argentina: 
Parties and Interests Operating Separately by Design and in Practice’, in: Thomas, C (ed.) Political 
Parties and Interest Groups: Shaping Democratic Governance, Boulder 2001. p.229; O’Donnell, G.
51
the Argentine Constitution, laws require approval by both chambers of Congress 
before they can be passed, in practice bills are sponsored by the president in a top- 
down process. This was in part a historical legacy of the exclusionary state 
constructed by the oligarchic governments of the nineteenth century, manipulated to
o ]
prevent potentially hostile economic interests gaining access to policymaking. Peron 
exploited this structure that stifled the effectiveness of democratic institutions such as 
the Congress, using corporatist entities such as the CGE and CGT to rally support for 
his policies. Bills were typically only submitted to Congressional debate after they 
had been sponsored by the executive which meant the legislature’s primary purpose 
was to enact into policy, laws decided upon by the president. Similarly in Spain, the 
executive dominates the policymaking process and the Constitution affords higher 
priority to bills sponsored by the Prime Minister than by legislators. But the varying 
reach of each system has dictated the capacity of the next tier of the state under 
subsequent regimes, namely the party political system. In Argentina, the strong 
executive presides over a weak party system whereas in Spain, the opposite is true 
despite the youth and initial fragility of Spanish democracy after Franco’s death in 
1975. This reflects greater success in centralisation of control by Franco, leaving a 
legacy of enhanced central government and inhibited associational life. In Argentina, 
Peron’s centralisation of power was curtailed leaving an institutional legacy of 
untethered and powerful organised interests to compete with each other for power and 
access to subsequent governments.
It is now possible to make a more detailed reference to the diagrams of the 
previous chapter. Figure 0.4 (p. 12) refers specifically to the structure of the Spanish 
state during the early stages of the dictatorship. Branches of central government were 
divided between members of the Civil War’s winning coalition according to which 
ministries controlled the area of public life such entities as the military, the church or 
the Falange wished to influence. This represented a distinct feature of Franco’s 
variety of European Fascism. Unlike its equivalent in 1930s Italy, for example, the
‘Delegative Democracy’ in: Diamond, L. and Plattner, M. (eds.) The Resurgence o f  Democracy, 
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dictator was a supreme authority but acted more as a constitutional monarch than a 
despotic dictator. His method, which proved effective in pacifying an eclectic group 
of coalition members, was one of divide and rule. He was prepared to allow his 
ministers much influence in formulating policy, and initially the structure of the state 
as long as it continued to bolster order. He was not himself a designer of Spain’s 
economic model, rather an endorser of what was suggested to him by others on the 
condition that it was effective. The next tier of government was the Cortes, a 
parliament comprising representatives from the same coalition in addition to ‘natural’ 
groups from socioeconomic life, namely the OS, regional and provincial government 
and the family. This system remained in place throughout the dictatorship though 
shifts in power and influence within the regime influenced the direction of policy. The 
rise of a technocratic generation of civil servants and ministers in the late 1950s, for 
example, presented a challenge to the Falangist vision though this old guard remained 
in place to temper liberalisation of the economy (see chapter 3).
Figure 0.6 (p. 15), meanwhile, illustrates the perennial problem of Argentina’s 
political economy. While the institutions of state are constitutionally enshrined, they 
are undermined by the strength of corporatist entities, each representing a distinct 
economic interest.84 Two of these, the SRA and the UIA representing agricultural 
interests and upper end, oligarchic business respectively, predate the Peron 
governments of 1946-1955. The remaining sectors if not created by Peron such as the 
CGE representing national capital, were strengthened and acted as mobilisers of 
support for him, particularly the organised labour movement associated with the CGT. 
Peron had bolstered these two groups as pillars of his corporatist state and the lines of 
contact between his office and society at large ran via these entities. After the system 
was decapitated in 1955 and Peron forced into exile, these organisations acted as the 
most effective representative of Peronism in the absence of the movement’s 
figurehead and under the proscription of the party.
84 For meticulous description o f the Argentine institutions o f state see: Anzoategui, V. and Martire, E. 
Manual de Historia de las Institutciones Argentinas, Buenos Aires, 2004
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Party-Group relations in Spain and Argentina: Parties, Leadership and Power
Much is made in the political science literature of the weakness of Argentine
o r
party politics and its failure to represent society in government. In the absence of an 
effective mediator between executive and society, economic interests such as labour 
or industry are forced to appeal directly to the executive. If the appeal fails, options 
include the use of economic weapons such as strikes or the withholding of produce 
from market. There is an extensive literature on the zero sum distributional conflict 
that pervades political discourse which presents Argentine policymaking as a
or t
perpetual struggle between groups to control political decision making. Distinct 
economic interests such as landowners, labour and business view the economy and 
the state as commodities to be captured. Gains by one group are necessarily at the 
expense of another. In other words, Argentina’s perennial problem is that groups have 
fought to claim the largest possible slice of the pie rather than work towards 
increasing the size of the pie. But why does the Argentine state fail to manage this 
conflict? There are a number of approaches by political scientists to this question. One 
branch focuses on ‘factionalism’ in Argentine discourse, whereby political parties 
remain fragmented and split along lines of regionalism, ideology or personalism. In 
other words, forces such as ‘Peronism’ or Radicalism, while nominally reflecting 
distinct political movements, are really unwieldy ‘movements’ of collective identity 
rather than institutionalised political parties. Factions emerge within these movements 
that become effectively parties within the party. Presidents thus find that they cannot
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rely on the unified support of their own party and seek to bypass the party as well as 
Congress.87
An increasingly influential line of analysis reflecting on the changing 
relationship between the state and interest groups in Argentina suggests that while the 
state has strengthened, groups have lost power on account of persistent political
OQ
persecution and economic crisis. If this is indeed the case, and the policy style of 
president Carlos Menem who sought to ‘neutralise’ both ‘capitalist’ and union 
opposition to his economic reforms in the 1990s suggests the argument has some 
credibility, then Argentina may have turned a comer. Nevertheless, this optimistic 
view agrees that distributional conflict has contributed to Argentina’s history of 
political and economic instability while it is a central theme of this thesis to argue that 
in spite of a shift in distributional fault lines, the dynamic of direct negotiation 
between executive and interest groups in the context of a weak political system, 
remains very much in place (see chapter 5).
Spain has received less attention from political scientists though the literature 
on state-society relationships is growing. This is partly because of the location of 
politics in Spanish academia as a subset of law which means political analyses focus 
on the minutiae of the 1978 Constitution rather than its application, as highlighted by
OQ
Heywood. The transition to democracy, on the other hand, produced a wealth of 
work and the fact that it persisted in spite of acute economic crisis, inspired attempts 
to conceptualise it as a potential model for reference elsewhere.90 Attempts to analyse 
political parties, their linkages to interest groups and the effect on policymaking 
burgeoned after the 1990s.91 This section attempts to explain the relative strength of
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Spanish political parties compared to their Argentine counterparts and the manner in 
which they have eclipsed organised interest groups in the ability to influence political 
decision making.
Political parties in both Argentina and Spain have experienced a precarious 
existence and were outlawed in the name of public order for periods of varying length 
both collectively and individually. An underlying weakness of the Argentine party 
system identified by Snow and Manzetti is the failure of the landowning elite which 
monopolised power in the late nineteenth century and ensured the continuity of liberal 
economic policy, to tolerate increased participation in political life by groups other 
than their own. Yet the example of Spain illustrates that this is by no means 
exceptional. Just as Argentina’s old order, on realising they could not regain political 
hegemony through pluralistic means, backed a military coup in 1930, the Spanish 
Civil War began when a conservative faction of the army led by General Francisco 
Franco revolted against the democratically elected ruling coalition of the Second 
Republic. Indeed, in Spain as in Argentina, the political scene of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries was dominated by a politicised military which intervened in 
political life whenever it perceived stability or public order to be under threat.92
Both party systems also display features of what Latin Americanist political 
scientists term movementism (movimientismo), whereby they operate as vehicles to 
rally popular support rather than representatives of a coherent ideological tradition. 
Mass parties such as the Spain’s Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) and Popular Party 
(PP), formerly the Popular Alliance (AP), and Argentina’s Radical Civic Union 
(UCR) and the Peronist Justicialist Party (PJ) are defined by personalist leadership 
and ideological imprecision.93 There is also a shared history of direct affiliation 
between parties and interest groups, particularly regarding labour movements. What 
then distinguishes the two cases? Firstly, the main Spanish party of the Left, 
historically associated with the General Workers’ Union (UGT) evolved into a 
centrist multi class party during the 1980s. This simultaneously alienated and 
weakened the affiliated union movement until ties were formally severed in 1989.
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Spanish interest groups, including the large labour confederations are not strong 
enough to seriously disrupt policymaking, excepting a handful of instances where 
groups formed alliances to orchestrate a general strike as in 1988.94 The Argentine 
state, meanwhile, was never able to convince its citizenry that it served the national 
collective interest over that of a particular faction that had captured the executive at 
any given point. With highly organised interest groups more prominent than political 
parties, there was greater opportunity to disrupt policy. What, then explains the 
weakness of the Argentine party system?
At the start of the period examined in this thesis there were three principal 
forces in Argentine political discourse: the conservative National Autonomous Party 
(PAN), which reflected the interests of landowning elites, The Radical Civic Union, 
(UCR) formed in 1889 to represent a disparate selection of interests disenfranchised 
from the PAN hegemony95 and, after 1946, Peronism, which claimed the majority of 
its support base from the workers. None of these could claim any coherence and 
existed as a series of ‘incumbent party hegemonies’96. When in government they were 
monopolistic, seizing the opportunity to attack rivals, and were ‘disloyal 
oppositionists’ who often supported, or even provoked military coups to remove the 
hated other from office. The power of the conservative PAN waned after the first 
decade of the twentieth century, never able to overcome increased electoral 
participation after 1912 and supported a military coup to overthrow the military 
government of Hipolito Yrigoyen in 1930. After Peron was ousted in 1955, his party 
was banned and allowed only limited participation from 1962 to1973 when he was 
finally allowed to return from exile. The military coup of 1976 was given tacit support 
by the non Peronist parties but the subsequent junta banned party politics until the 
return to democracy in 1983. At this point for the first time a semblance of electoral 
politics emerged with the main parties accepting each other as legitimate contenders 
for power. However, the incoherence of the megalithic Radical Party prevented 
effective action against an acute hyperinflationary economic crisis by the president 
Raul Alfonsin who had adopted a chameleonic approach to policymaking in an
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attempt to keep his party together. When in 1989 Carlos Menem managed to unite the 
various factions of the Peronist Partido Justicialista, he did so on a traditionalist 
popular ticket but effected neo-liberal economic reforms that contradicted his early 
promises.
The conservatives effectively monopolised power in the late nineteenth 
century and relied on limited suffrage and electoral fraud to maintain their hold on 
power. The PAN was in fact a federation of smaller, provincial oligarchies and state 
building in this period thus logically reflected the interests of rural elites and was 
designed to assure the smooth functioning of the agro-export system. The touted 
ideology was one of economic liberalism though the purity of that liberalism was 
sullied if  it was deemed to affect the interests of the elites. While ostensibly the 
landowners earned their income from exports of agricultural produce, the extent to 
which Argentina subscribed to completely free trade had its limits. The government 
relied on import and export duties as its most important source of revenue which 
landowners supported in view of the fact that it would otherwise have had to rely on 
other fiscal mechanisms such as land and property taxes.97 Furthermore, state 
institutions including the judiciary were often populated with representatives of 
landowning interests to ensure a friendly voting majority so that instead of a platonic 
civil service in the service of the national interests, the bureaucracy came to resemble
QQ
a ‘gentlemen’s club’ with little capacity to act autonomously.
A reforming faction of the PAN broke away in 1889 to form the UCR which 
aimed to appeal to the growing middle classes but was frustrated by continuing limits 
to suffrage. After winning support from an army faction they staged a series of 
unsuccessful coup attempts in 1890, 1893 and 1905, the latter after losing fraudulent 
elections.99 Promises of continued ‘intransigence’ by party leader Yrigoyen and 
repeated abstention from elections on the basis that they were rigged eventually 
forced the conservative party, now led by blue blooded Jockey Club member Roque 
Saenz Pena, to pass an electoral reform law in 1912 that made the ballot secret and 
voting compulsory for every (male) citizen who had completed his military service.
97 Diaz Alejandro, C. ‘No Less than 100 Years o f Argentine Economic History and Some 
Comparisons’, in: Velasco, A. (ed.) Trade, Development and the World Economy, Oxford, 1988. p.240; 
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The UCR won a landslide in the 1916 election and Yrigoyen assumed the presidency. 
The extent to which the UCR successfully established itself as a mass party at this 
point is debatable. There were splits caused by internal rivalries and objections to 
Yrigoyen’s personalist leadership and overtures to labour and landowners aimed at 
incorporating them into a national movement were unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the 
UCR could claim enough electoral support to prevent the conservatives from 
regaining the presidency by electoral means, partly because unlike elsewhere in Latin 
America, Argentina lacked a peasantry to provide landowners with a ‘captive’ vote.100 
The UCR’s hold on power became hegemonic, meanwhile, and Yrigoyen filled the 
public administration with his own appointees and cronies. State activity also became 
more nationalist and interventionist with the creation of entities such as Yacimientos 
Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF), the state oil monopoly. He was overthrown in 1930 by a 
conservative backed military coup and the Yrigoyenist faction of the UCR was barred 
from contesting elections the following year which were won by a coalition of ‘anti 
personalist’ Radicals, conservatives and Socialists. The interim between Yrigoyen’s 
ousting and the ascendance of Peron to the presidency was marked by cycles of 
authoritarianism followed by brief restorations of democracy. Meanwhile, a new 
movement which was to shape Argentine politics into the twenty first century was 
gathering strength.
The Peronist Party, later renamed the Justicialist Party, was formed out of a 
union between the Argentine Labour Party and the Radical Reorganising Group and 
held together by the charisma and personality of Juan Domingo Peron. Beyond that, it 
struggled to exist as a cohesive group and as an identity was interpreted distinctly by 
different factions in different parts of the country. To working class inhabitants of 
Buenos Aires and other urban centres it was perceived primarily as a labour party 
while outside the cities it was regarded as either a social Christian movement or an 
ultranationalist Catholic organisation. At times it existed as little more than a 
personalistic vehicle for provincial caudillos, a divisiveness that survives to this 
day.101 Peron’s leadership style was plebiscitarian, based on direct ties between 
himself and his followers, and in spite of his creation of a party that bore his name, he 
shunned conventional party organisation.
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In sum, Argentine political parties are weak, in large part because of the 
contempt with which they are treated by both their opposition and from within their 
own ranks. During election campaigns they are used as vehicles to promote 
presidential candidates who sideline them on gaining office. In this respect, as will be 
described below, the role of Argentine and Spanish parties do not differ greatly. Yet 
Argentine parties’ are less disciplined internally than those in Spain, allowing 
ideological incoherence to destabilise them. If the presidential candidate decides his 
party is cumbersome, or if he fails to achieve enough consensus to support his 
platform, he forms a new splinter, as did Arturo Frondizi in 1958 (see chapter 3).
Spanish political parties since the 1970s have consolidated their strength in 
spite of an inauspicious start. Under Franco, all political parties were banned with the 
exception of his own ‘National Movement’, an agglomeration of rightist groups from 
the winning side in the Civil War. Therein lies a distinction from the Peronist 
equivalent, namely that in spite of the ‘vertical’ corporatism of Peron’s government 
(1947-1955), Argentina’s party political system remained in place, at least nominally. 
In its place the Franco state installed a system of ‘organic democracy’ whereby 
citizens were represented in parliament through membership of organisations that 
represented ‘natural’ units of society such as the family, the municipality or the 
syndicate. In comparison, the ideologues claimed, political parties were artificial 
manifestations of an ‘unnatural’ system: western style liberal democracy.
The Political Reform Law of 1976 legalised political organisation and 200 
national and regional parties were established in anticipation of the first general 
election for four decades, scheduled for June 1977. This was won by the Centre 
Democratic Union (UCD) with 38 per cent of the vote but the ensuing years saw its 
support eroded by the capture of centrist politics by other parties, particularly the 
PSOE. The UCD, which had never consolidated its identity beyond a fractious 
coalition of right leaning groups, many identified with the Franco regime, was finally 
disbanded in 1982. Thus Spain’s post Franco political parties are dominated by two 
forces originating at the left and right of the ideological spectrum that since the 1970s 
have shifted towards the centre in order to become mass based, as opposed to class 
based, movements. Because they are multi class, and multi regional, they maintain
102 Gilmour, D. The Transformation o f  Spain: From Franco to the Constitutional Monarchy, London 
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rigid internal discipline and centralised organisation. Figure 0.5 (p. 13) in the previous 
chapter illustrates how the top-down hierarchy of the hegemonic party mirrors the 
centralised post corporatist structure of the Spanish state. When a party is elected to 
power, therefore, each tier of the party can amalgamate effectively into its respective 
level of government. Thus the party leader and the federal executive committee 
occupy the seat of the executive and the Office of the Presidency while the next tier of 
the movement takes over the Council of Ministers and the ministries themselves. 
Further down the structure, the federal components of the party, its regional and 
community based tributaries, occupy the regional, provincial and municipal structures 
of Spanish administration.
The architect of Spain’s contemporary economy, patron of accession to the 
European Union and designer of the welfare state is the PSOE, which held power 
from 1982 to 1996. The PSOE was founded in 1879 by an ideologically dogmatic 
group of Marxist print workers led by Pablo Iglesias and seven years later established 
one of Spain’s most influential union movements, the General Workers Union (UGT). 
The party was weakened in the early years by struggles between radical and reformist 
factions that continued until the Civil War. Franco’s victory scattered the party 
leadership across Europe and Latin America though in 1947 the party based itself in 
Toulouse from where it aspired to engineer Franco’s overthrow. But it was not the 
exiled Civil War veterans that shaped the PSOE that emerged from the debris of 
authoritarian rule in the mid 1970s. The party, operating as a series of embattled 
regional cells claiming their greatest support in urban centres such as Bilbao and 
Seville, had evolved into a moderate oppositional force that declined to advocate the 
strikes and mass demonstrations preferred by the more radical older generation. The 
PSOE instead pursued a strategy of negotiation with more progressive elements of the 
Franco hierarchy.103
This moderate front was abandoned in the run up to the first general elections 
following the restoration of democracy, in favour of identification with Marxist 
ideology so the party ran on a more radical ticket under the new leader, Felipe 
Gonzalez. This, according to Paul Heywood, represents a pragmatic decision to 
capture popular support by matching the radicalism of the PSOE’s competitor for
103 Wozniak, L ‘The Dissolution o f Party-Union Relations in Spain’ International Journal o f  Political 
Economy, Vol.22 (4), 1992
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working class allegiance, the Communist Party (PCE).104 The strategy appears to have 
worked and the Socialists claimed 28 per cent of the vote, establishing themselves as 
the dominant force of the Spanish Left. Gonzalez quickly moved to drop Marxist 
ideology and realign the party towards the political centre in order to attract more 
middle class support.105 He staked his reputation on a battle with more hard line party 
members on the issue of dropping Marxism from the manifesto, at one point resigning 
only to return to the leadership in 1979 with renewed strength. The PSOE won the 
1982 elections with enough of the vote to form a majority government and Gonzalez 
became prime minister, or “president of the government,” a position he retained until 
1996. The party adopted the clientelistic methods of the dictatorship, ensuring loyalty 
from party members when implementing unpopular policy, particularly market 
friendly reforms during the 1980s, by populating the public administration with 
cronies.106 Thus the PSOE had become a catch all party, appealing to the political 
middle ground where ideological traditions were abandoned in favour of pragmatic 
economic management to pursue long-term agendas of economic restructuring. 
Gonzalez’s legacy to the PSOE is disciplined central control of a complex 
organisational structure which pays lip service to internal democracy.
The second leftist party in the post Franco era is the Spanish Communist Party 
(PCE) which was widely tipped to be on the cusp of dominating political life during 
the dictatorship’s twilight. The PCE was a weak electoral force during the Second 
Republic but became a more active and vocal opposition force during Franco’s rule 
both through guerrilla activity in the 1940s and early 1950s and through workplace 
activism carried out by its affiliated union movement, the Workers Commissions 
(CCOO, see below). In 1956 the PCE secretary general Santiago Carrillo shifted 
party strategy towards less belligerent methods, aiming instead to bring down the 
regime through general strikes with a long-term goal of achieving socialism through 
gradual democratic change. The party worked hard, therefore, to infiltrate the 
corporatist structure of the state with sympathisers through the actions of the CCOO. 
By the 1970s Carrillo abandoned the last vestiges of his radicalism, conforming to the 
ideal of a negotiated transition to democracy and pursuing what he referred to as
104 Heywood, The Government and Politics o f  Spain, Basingstoke 1995 p. 195; See also: Newton, M. 
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‘Eurocommunism’ which emphasised respect for liberal democracy. The party was 
run according to principles of ‘democratic centralism’ whereby all party organisations 
were subordinated to the party congress which forbade the formation of ideological
t  r y i
factions that undermined discipline. Nevertheless the party disintegrated into 
factions for and against Carrillo over his rejection of Soviet style communism with a
1 ORthird renovating group seeking more representative party democracy. The party had 
by this stage lost its popular appeal, claiming less than 10 per cent of the vote in 1977 
and fared even worse in 1982. In spite of its successes as an opposition force during 
the dictatorship, the aging leadership of Civil War veterans could not compete with 
the charisma of Felipe Gonzalez.
The main rightist political group to run in the 1977 elections was an alliance of 
parties dominated by an older generation of ex ideologues from the old regime who 
sought “Francoism after Franco” and as much political continuity as possible across 
the transition. The leader of this Popular Alliance (AP) was Manuel Fraga Iribame, a 
Francoist stalwart and former Minister of Information and Tourism in the early 1960s. 
Fraga was credited with presiding over Spain’s tourist boom, and aimed to remind 
voters of his association with ‘miracle’ economic growth under the dictatorship, but 
had an authoritarian record.109 After losing to the Socialists in 1977, the AP leadership 
attempted to temper their association with Francoism by identifying the party with 
‘liberal conservatism’, stressing democratic values. They neglected, however, to 
abandon emphasis on ideals of authority, public order and Catholic values. The party 
won a respectable 20 per cent of the vote in 1982 having attracted right leaning 
supporters of the defunct UCD but failed to build on this in 1986. By the early 1990s, 
under a new leader, Jose Maria Aznar, the now renamed Popular Party (PP) was 
identifying itself with European Christian Democracy. The PP thrived off public 
outrage at a series of high profile corruption scandals that weakened the PSOE, 
winning the 1996 general election. Like its counterparts on the Left, meanwhile, the 
PP is characterised by highly centralised neo-corporatist internal bureaucracy and 
Aznar in particular was widely criticised for stacking the party leadership with like 
minded appointees.110
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The third force in Spanish party politics is the plethora of regional parties. 
While the main central parties have local offshoots, such as the PSOE’s Catalan 
Socialist Party (PSC), there are a number of entirely regional bodies with no 
associates in Madrid. The largest of these are the Catalan Conservative Coalition 
(CiU), a right of centre nationalist force and a similar organisation in the Basque 
region, the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV).
Spanish parties emulate the centralised, top-down approach to policy and 
internal management of the Francoist state, which impacts on policymaking when in 
office. While they display features of the ‘movementism’ identified as a weakness in 
Argentina, and much strength in electoral politics is gleaned from the personal appeal 
of the party leader, there is less opportunity for internal instability and destabilising 
factionalism. This is perhaps surprising given that Spain is divided by regionalism and 
regional nationalisms, and the main parties consequently have Catalan and Basque 
wings. But while this allows the Socialists and the Popular Party to maintain distinct 
regional identities, they do so within the structure of the central party and maintain an 
affiliation to the centralised hierarchy.
To summarise, the political systems of Argentina and Spain are both 
characterised by a strong executive, an institution inherited from the corporatism of 
previous regimes. As such the executive is constrained by ‘vertical’ as opposed to 
‘horizontal’ accountability whereby having been elected, there are limited institutional 
checks on his rule. In consequence, political parties are used as vehicles to secure 
election so have abandoned class politics in favour of multi class mass appeal and 
place themselves at the political centre. This makes them ideologically incoherent, 
even contradictory, yet Argentina has experienced greater fragmentation of policy and 
political instability. Part of this distinction lies in the more effective cohesion of 
Spanish parties which are more disciplined in spite of their heterogeneity. Another 
distinction lies in the strength of Argentine interest groups relative to their Spanish 
counterparts.
Industry and the Rise o f Popular Groups
The economic history of the period in question here is one of Argentine and 
Spanish industrialisation (see chapter 2). As this process advanced, the power of 
industry as an economic, and indeed political force, has grown so that by the 1950s it 
presented a credible challenge to the hegemony of rural interests. Nevertheless,
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industry is necessarily an eclectic and heterogeneous group incorporating a variety of 
vested interests. Groups representing smaller industry, for example, may be in favour 
of protectionism while heavier industry, or that associated with an export commodity 
or foreign capital, may prefer more liberal policy. In general, however, Argentine 
industrial and business interests have presented a more coherent and organised front 
than their Spanish counterparts. In Argentina, industrialists are generally represented 
by two bodies: The UIA and the CGE. The former is the older of the two, established 
in 1887 to coordinate efforts to lobby government for greater protection of infant 
industries at a time when the prevailing priority was open trade. It was founded by 
‘agro-industrialists’ who sought government aid in setting up refineries and 
processing plants for their agricultural produce. Indeed, its first chairman Antonio 
Cambaceres was primarily a landowner who possessed cattle ranches and meat salting 
plants.111 Like the SRA, the UIA has on occasion lent its support to the forced 
removal of governments its members deem unfavourable to their interests, most 
notably in the coup of 1976. It is this coincidence of interests with the rural sector that 
has led to accusations of the UIA not acting as a true representative of industry so 
much as a promoter of industry as the traditional elite perceives it.112
The CGE on the other hand, was established by Peron in 1952 to act as a 
business corporation within his regime after the UIA refused to lend its support. The 
CGE mostly represents the owners of small and medium sized firms, predominantly 
from the Argentine interior who produced for domestic consumers. On account of this 
association with Peron’s model of horizontal, consumer oriented industrialisation, the 
CGE shares many interests with labour that are at odds with the preferences of elites. 
For example, it has traditionally favoured low agricultural prices as an implicit 
subsidy of labour costs, while also rejecting the notion of a free market in favour of 
protection from imports. Attempts by Argentine presidents such as Arturo Frondizi 
(1958-62) and Juan Carlos Ongania (1966-73) to form alliances with industry in order 
that they take benign attitudes to policy reform have run into trouble because of this 
heterogeneity. In spite of such diversity, industrialists have on occasion exercised 
collective power to affect policy using such tactics as withholding products from
111 Lewis, P The Crisis o f  Argentine Capitalism Chapel Hill. 1990 p.81
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market or increasing prices in order to put inflationary pressure on the economy and 
pressurise the president.113
Spanish industrialists were also empowered by policies of expansionary 
modernisation undertaken during the early part of the period. ‘Industrial Corporatism’, 
as in Peron’s Argentina, was an important ingredient of economic nationalism.114 As 
mentioned, employers were compelled to join the state syndicate, the OS, but unlike 
their employees, never felt the need to organise clandestinely under Franco. Indeed, 
the higher positions within the state enterprises were held by government cronies, 
many of whom were appointed as a reward for loyalty to the regime. Sections of 
private industry, meanwhile, enjoyed close links with the technical elite in the regime 
and were able to gain favourable treatment and exercise influence in public 
investment decisions. One analysis concludes that the relationship between business 
and the Franco regime was more clientelist than corporatist in that networks of 
representation within the state were structured around personal contact rather than 
official process.115 It would be erroneous to assume that business was a cohesive and 
active pillar of support for the regime. Important segments of the sector retained a 
distance from Franco, particularly those based in the Basque and Catalan industrial 
heartlands116 and private enterprise throughout the 1950s and 1960s was constantly
117frustrated by Falangist discrimination in favour of the state sector.
Private domestic capital in Spain is a heterogeneous group with some sectors 
wielding more power than others. Arguably the best connected faction is the private 
banking sector, including the Cajas de Ahorro, or savings banks, whose elites have 
remained close cronies of the government both during the Franco regime and ever 
since. The most evident, and institutionalised manifestation of a corporatist web of 
contacts between the private banks themselves and the government is through the 
system of “shared board members,” whereby financial institutions and important 
firms have shareholdings in each other and thus board representation and voting rights. 
At the time of Franco’s death in 1975, 51 of the 68 largest Spanish had common
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board members.118 In the case of banking, the system gives private financial capital 
direct access to the State and policymaking because the Banco Exterior de Espana, 
Banco Urquijo, Banco HispanoAmericano, Banco de Fomento and Banco Central all 
boasted board representation within the Spanish Central Bank, the Banco de Espana.
A further direct, corporatist link to government that existed until the mid 1990s was 
through the financial business association, the Consejo Superior Bancario (Higher 
Banking Council). This was made up of 20 representatives from the private banking 
sector, chosen through a voting system that favoured larger institutions. Its purpose 
was to act as a business lobby but it enjoyed close links with the Finance Ministry 
from the 1950s and exerted considerable influence on policy.119
Through the system of cross shareholdings and common board members, the 
banking industry was linked to other organisations from the private sector engaged in 
various different industrial activities. But banks were not the only sectors of private 
capital with direct links to government. The electricity sector, for example, had a 
highly organised lobbying association, UNESA, whose members represented 80 pet 
of Spanish generating capacity. UNESA’s official role was of a purely technical 
nature, coordinating interconnection between Spanish regions and infrastructure 
management. In reality it was an aggressive defender of the interests of the electricity 
industry, promoting higher tariffs against the more populist inclinations of the Franco 
regime. It also acted, at times, as a policymaking partner, or co-designer, to the 
government.120 But while it was closely associated with the government and had some 
influence over decisions, it was very much a junior partner in the relationship and 
conformed to its status as an implementer of policy. It was put in charge of 
elaborating a National Electricity Plan for 1972-81, for example, which constitutes 
considerable benefit for the sector of the oligarchic elite engaged in electricity 
generation but highlights its status as answerable to central government.
A feature of the latter part of the Franco period is the rise of private domestic 
capital relative to the state sector in terms of its importance in the Spanish economy 
relative to the state sector. By the time of Franco’s death in 1975, of the 100 largest 
Spanish firms, 46 were private, compared with 23 pet associated with the state either 
as part of the INI holding company or through government shareholdings. The least
118 Tamames, R. La oligarquia financiera en Espana, Barcelona, 1977 p. 147
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powerful sector, in contrast to Argentina, was foreign capital, with just 12 firms in the 
top 100.
But oligarchic power remained concentrated in certain sectors and never 
presented a serious challenge to central government authority in policy decisions. 
After Franco died, a perception that the legalisation of Left leaning unions would 
present a greater challenge from organised labour provoked a rush by entrepreneurial 
groups to form a cohesive organisation. The result was the Spanish Confederation of 
Business Organisations (CEOE) created in June 1977 with 800,000 member firms 
accounting for 60 per cent of employed workers. This organisation was always 
fractious, however, with most of its efforts directed at maintaining harmony among its 
affiliates. In sum, the heterogeneity of Spanish business has not lent itself well to the 
formation of a powerful lobby. This can, of course, be attributed in large part to 
apathy and complacency in that governments during and since the transition have
1J  tpursued a pro business agenda. In general, entrepreneurs have supported the efforts 
of democratic governments to integrate Spain with Europe, pursue political stability 
and impose market friendly reforms.
However, the period after democratisation brought profound shifts in the 
balance of power between different sectors of private domestic capital and the state. 
The economic and industrial reforms of the 1980s, which saw many former state 
industries privatised and an increased presence of foreign capital, were also associated 
with the consolidation of power for certain interests as well as the central 
government’s paternalistic relationship with the private sector. The most powerful 
sectors of private domestic capital from the early 1980s to this day are 
telecommunications, energy, oil and gas while the weight of the private banking 
sector has multiplied. The linkages between these and the central government remain 
strong and the system of common shareholdings is still in place. Other industrial 
groups saw their power decline during the last years of the Franco regime, surpassed 
by the state sector, and later, foreign capital. These were mainly from the 
manufacturing sector and industries such as steel which had been the industrial power 
base of industrial oligarchs during the early Franco years and the state managed rush 
to industrialise. As the power and influence of the new oligarchy waxed, this segment
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of private domestic capital was excluded from favoured crony status in its relations 
with the government, and from strategies of selective protectionism during the 1980s.
Market Share (in production) of Spanish Private Capital Versus State Core 
Import Substitution
Industrialization Sectors and Energy, Prereform Period
1970 1978 1982
% Spanish % Spanish % Spanish
Sector Private Capital 
State
% State Private Capital % State Private Capital %
Industry
Steel a 37 63 26 74 21 79
Shipbuilding b 40 60 13 87 13 87
Automobiles c 0 46 0 34 0 38
Chemicals d 68 32 68 32 57 43
Coal e 48 52 34 66 32 68
Aluminum f 39 61 43 57 21 79
Energy
Oil g 55 45 53 47 55 45
Electricity h 67 33 83 17 67 33
a. Integrated subsector (raw steel in tons).
b. In registered gross tons.
c. Number o f  vehicles (commercial and industrial).
d. Fertilizers and potassium.
e. In tons.
f. In tons.
g. Refined oil in tons.
h. Electricity generation in gigawatt hours.
Figure 1.1 Source: taken from Etchemendy, S. ‘Revamping the Weak, Protecting the 
Strong and Managing Privatisation. Governing Globalisation in the Spanish Takeoff, 
Comparative Political Studies, Vol.37 (6) Aug. 2004
Figure 1.1 illustrates the diminishing influence of domestic private capital in 
various industries that had been subject to protectionism in the early Franco period, 
during the period leading up to the era of Spanish privatisations of old state industries 
in the 1980s. The cases of steel and shipbuilding, one time power bases of the Spanish 
industrial class and centrepieces of the original drive to industrialise in the 1940s, 
highlight how private business lost ground to the state over the period in terms of their 
hold over the trade. In the case of the car industry, domestic private capital has no 
presence in a sector shared between foreign capital and the state. This contrasts with 
the cases of oil and electricity, where the market share in terms of production 
accounted for by domestic private capital retained its position relative to the state. In
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short, the industrial bourgeoisie associated with manufacturing was weak compared 
with the state in Spain, as argued by Etchemendy, who suggests this explains the 
government’s willingness to privatise them in a way that saw them fall into the hands 
of foreign capital during the 1980s, in spite of a traditional Spanish preference for 
national champions.
A selective method of privatisation illustrates this difference. The steel and car 
industries were sold directly to foreign bidders, relegating them to the status of 
subsidiaries to foreign corporations. Privatisation of industries where the national 
bourgeoisie was stronger, was carried out through public offerings of shares, whereby 
the government retained a stake, exercised disproportionate voting rights through the 
use of ‘golden shares’ and enjoyed considerable control in the board room. The senior 
management of Endesa, Repsol, and Telefonica, continued to be politically appointed 
for some time after privatisation (see chapter 5).
This in turn benefited the private banking corporations and larger savings 
banks, who acted as coordinators for the public offerings, giving them options to take 
stakes of their own. The corporate boardrooms of Spanish energy, telecoms and oil 
groups are therefore staffed with state and bank appointees and the relationship with 
the government, still managed largely through the banks, remains close. Crony 
capitalism’s principal instrument is still characterised by a system of linkages through 
shared board members.122
Argentine private domestic capital has also experienced a shift characterised 
by concentration of ownership but a factor that distinguishes it from Spain is its 
relative decline in importance compared with foreign capital. The dominant group 
during the Argentine belle epoque of growth fuelled by agro-exports was logically the 
landed elite in an economy characterised by concentrated ownership of land. Foreign, 
mainly British, capital was focused on finance and industries associated with agro 
exports, such as the railways or refrigeration plants. But when the model reached its 
zenith, a new kind of Argentine oligopoly emerged so that by the 1930s, national 
private capital was manifesting itself in the form of conglomerates with interests in 
both agriculture and the ascendant industrial sector. Perhaps the best known of these, 
the Bunge y Bom company, diversified into industry through the early twentieth 
century, particularly areas associated with agricultural commodities, where its
122 Tamames, 1977 p. 143
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traditional assets lay such as flour and textiles. It did not venture into areas dominated 
by foreign capital, however, such as ports, maritime transport or finance, even though
* ,  1 9 1it was predominantly an export focused business, thus avoiding conflict.
Peron enhanced the power of the state so that by the 1960s there were three 
centres of power in Argentina, namely the government, foreign capital and the local 
oligarchy, which maintained the root of its wealth in agriculture. The developmental 
era from the late 1950s, enhanced the presence of foreign corporations setting up 
manufacturing operations which had the effect of stifling the element of private 
domestic capital associated with small to medium sized enterprises. Local 
manufacturers did not have the technology or efficiency to compete in the Argentine 
market with the newcomers. This led to further concentration of ownership in the 
hands of Argentine oligarchs, with local capital becoming increasingly absorbed into 
larger organisations.
Distribution of Argentine firms by % of total production against size measured 
in number of employees 1963-1973.
No. of employees: 0-10 11-50 51-100 101-300 301+
No. of firms
1963% 87.8 9.6
1973% 85.7 11.0
Proportion of Industrial Production 
1963 % 13.46 17.30 10.47 18.70 40.07
1973 % 8.91 14.65 10.03 20.66 45.75
Figure 1.2: Source: Azpiazu, D. Basualdo, E. Khavisse, El nuevo poder economico en 
la Argentina de los anos 80, Buenos Aires1986, p.62
Figure 1.2 shows a process of concentration of production within national 
private capital in favour of oligarchic interests to the detriment of smaller firms. In
123 Azpiazu, D. Basualdo, E. Khavisse, M. El nuevo poder economico en la Argentina de los anos 80, 
Buenos Aires, 1986, pp. 19-23
1.3 0.9 0.4
1.6 1.2 1.2
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1963, firms that employed more than 100 people, 1.3 pet of the total, accounted for 
58.77 pet of industrial production. In 1973, this group accounted for 2.8 per cent of 
the total and 66.4 pet of industrial production. The share of activity associated with 
smaller firms declined, meanwhile.
The 1976-83 period of military rule and neo-liberal economic policy continued 
this process of preserving the power of the oligarchic sector but it was the 1990s that 
brought the most significant shift in the balance, this time in favour of foreign capital. 
This had always been an important player in the Argentine economy in spite of 
sustained efforts to sideline it under Peron, but it was granted unprecedented influence 
at the expense of local capital, including the oligarchs during the 1990s (see chapter 
5).
Share of total revenues by type of firm in percent (Argentina).
Ownership 1991-95 1995-97
% %
State 10.5 2.7
Local independent 12.1 11.6
National Conglomerate 21.8 19.9
Foreign multinational 12.2 17.7
Local subsidiary of -
foreign firm 14.8 18.1
Local/foreign -
joint ventures 28.6 30.0
Figure 1.3: Source: Basualdo, E. Concentration y  Centralization del capital en la 
Argentina durante la decada de los noventa, Buenos Aires, 2000, p.89.
The table in figure 1.3 highlights the growing influence of foreign over local 
capital during the 1990s as privatised enterprises are bought up by foreign 
corporations. The share of total revenues declines for both the oligarchic sector as 
well as smaller, medium sized enterprises while it increases for sectors associated 
with international capital. As such, the Menem government of the 1990s empowered a
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vested interest, namely foreign capital, which emerged from the period with 
considerable bargaining power.
Labour
Labour movements in Argentina and Spain make interesting comparators on 
account of their common ancestry and by extension their shared ideological origins. 
They are also arguably the most conspicuous, if not the most prominent interest 
groups in each country. Mass immigration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, much of which originated in Spain, bestowed a modem, metropolitan, wage 
earning working class on Argentina. The new arrivals also brought with them ideas 
and experience of syndicalist industrial unionism which challenged employers’ 
control over the workplace and the period 1910 to 1921 witnessed an upsurge of 
labour radicalism and strike action.124 Indeed, in the primary export oriented economy, 
organised labour that could seize control of the country’s main port or railways holds 
significant bargaining power due to its ability to choke revenues from exports and 
port duties. This elicited heavy handed reactions from the state and strikes were put 
down with some violence during the early decades of the twentieth century. Similar 
conflicts raged in Spain making it, alongside Italy, an exception to the prevailing 
European trend towards moderation by labour leaders.125 Thus both nations endured 
their respective ‘Semana Tragica’ (Tragic Week) in Barcelona (1909) and Buenos 
Aires (1919) where urban industrial insurrections were put down by the authorities 
with significant loss of life. Both labour movements examined here, therefore, have a 
common history of militancy and conflict with authority. They are also most 
commonly identified with syndical confederations rather than particular unions, which 
in both cases have, albeit briefly, enjoyed direct access to policymakers and each 
country’s characteristically strong executive.
In Argentina, organised labour formed the mobilisational backbone of the 
Peronist government after 1947 while the largest Socialist union in Spain, was closely
124 Armstrong, W. ‘The Social Origins o f Industrial Growth’: Canada, Argentina and Australia 1870- 
1930, in, Platt, DCM and DiTella, G (eds.) Argentina, Australia and Canada: Studies in Comparative 
Development 1870-1965, London 1985; Adelman, J. ‘State and Labour in Argentina: The Port 
Workers o f Buenos Aires 1910-1921' Journal o f Latin American Studies, Vol.25 (1); Solberg, C 
Immigration and Nationalism: Argentina and Chile 1890-1914, Austin, 1970.
125 Malefakis, E ‘A Comparative Analysis o f  Workers’ Movements in Spain And Italy’ in: Gunther, R. 
Politics, Society and Democracy. The Case o f  Spain. Boulder, 1993. pp59-60.
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tied with the Spanish Socialist Party leader Francisco Largo Caballero, the effective 
second in command of the pre Civil War Republic. Neither movement has ever 
regained this level of influence in spite of closely held aspirations to do so. This is 
surprising in the sense that the main union confederations in each case were affiliated 
to political parties which enjoyed mass support. Yet this exposes a fundamental 
difference between the two. The main Argentine labour confederation continued to 
operate openly while its associated Peronist party was proscribed between 1955 and 
1973 and retained significant negotiating power despite government interventions and 
temporary abolition. The established Spanish associations, meanwhile, spent almost 
four decades underground, exerting influence through infiltration and exploitation of 
the ‘vertical’ syndical infrastructure of Franco’s corporatist state. Following
democratisation, their power waned, eclipsed by the rise of mainstream political
1parties. Indeed, as oppositional forces under the dictatorship, they had acted as the 
tools of oppositional parties rather than forces unto themselves. In sum, Argentine 
workers were more effectively represented in negotiations with the executive branch 
of government by unions while the associated political party was marginalised while 
in Spain, the exact opposite occurred. While, as will be described below, the Francoist 
state strengthened and gave coherence to labour as an oppositional force, that 
momentum was incorporated into leftist political parties after the return to democracy 
which in turn de-radicalised. Argentine organised labour historically retained greater 
bargaining power and ability to scupper economic policy reforms sponsored by the 
executive.
The Argentine union movement emerged in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century following the arrival of European immigrants who brought with them 
ideologies of socialism, Marxist syndicalism and anarchism.127 These factions 
competed with each other for hegemony within the labour movement but in part due 
to the declining proportion of European bom members among their ranks, were 
eclipsed by the Peronist movement in the 1940s. Nevertheless, labour mobilisation 
developed in response to pressures generated by growing competition in the labour 
market and bargaining successes by certain groups emboldened others. The coherence
126 Heywood, P. The Government and Politics o f  Spain, London 1995, pp.250-254
127 Solberg, C. ‘Immigration and Urban Social Problems in Argentina and Chile 1890-1914’, Hispanic 
American Historical Review, Vol.49 (2) May 1969; pp.226-227; Munck, R. ‘Cycles o f Class Struggle 
and the Making o f the Working Class in Argentina, 1890-1920,’ Journal o f Latin American Studies, 
Vol. 19(1), May 1987. p.22
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of organised labour at the turn of the twentieth century became such a potent force 
that employers were forced to institute a parallel process of collective organisation in 
response.128 Furthermore, in the wake of rising unrest, the oligarchic government took 
up the issue of social reform and established in 1907 the National Department of 
Labour, (DNT) to act as a state mediator between employers and unions to foment 
national peace.129 The union movement itself, initially fragmented along ideological 
lines according to affiliations to anarcho-syndicalism or socialism, underwent a period 
of consolidation during the early decades of the twentieth century. The General 
Workers Union (CGT), formed in the 1930s and came under the control of Peron 
when he was a labour minister. Meanwhile, the Partido Laborista, formed by CGT 
members, became an important component of the Peronist Party. In short, by adopting 
the labour cause, Peron acquired a ready made constituency which he nurtured as a 
crucial pillar of his ‘syndicalist state’. By 1951 all independent labour union leaders 
were purged and the CGT was transformed into a supervisory body that could 
intervene in any member organisation, a power it used to ensure political support for 
its patron.130 It was this link with Peronism that made the CGT a target for subsequent 
regimes who sought alternatively to suppress, infiltrate or court it as a force to be 
reckoned with in Argentine civil society. This met with limited success, however. The 
military regime which toppled Peron, for example, set about the destruction of 
Peronism’s institutions but in apparent acknowledgment of the dangers of 
antagonising organised labour, limited its actions against the CGT to ‘interventions’ 
in unions’ leadership selection. Basic Peronist labour legislation regarding the right to 
organise and strike remained untouched while the majority of the CGT’s member 
organisations remained avowedly loyal to the Peronist cause.131 When the Peronist 
party was banned, it ironically strengthened the labour movement because the absence 
of legal political representation meant the unions were the only avenues of political 
action open to Peronist labour. To political leaders such as Frondizi in 1958 and 
Arturo Illia in 1963 who successfully courted labour support through often secret 
deals, it provided the margin of victory. Both these agreements were made under the 
premise that the Peronist party would be granted legal status, which both governments
128 Korzeniewicz, R. ‘Labor Unrest in Argentina’ Latin American Research Review, VoI.24(3), 1989, 
pp.71-98.
29 Adelman, J. ‘State and Labour in Argentina: The Portworkers o f Buenos Aires 1910-21, Journal o f  
Latin American Studies, VoI.25(l) Feb. 1993. p.75.
130 Lewis, P. The Crisis o f  Argentine Capitalism, Chapel Hill 1991, p. 162.
131 Anzoategui, V and Martire, E. Manual de historia de las instituciones Argentinas, p.775
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failed to fulfil and consequently found themselves subject to labour agitation in 
opposition to their economic policies.
Labour action continued to prove a headache to governments between the 
1960s and 1970s with the CGT adopting tactics designed to bring economic life to a 
standstill such as general strikes and plant seizures. Some regimes, such as that of 
General Ongarria in the late 1960s acted to curb union power and according to Davide 
Erro, labour power declined significantly because of sustained attack by governments 
between 1966 and 1992. In particular, the 1976 to 1983 military junta intervened in 
unions and severely restricted their power in addition to banning the CGE. This 
accumulation of attacks, Erro argues, has combined with the loss of bargaining power 
caused by constant economic crisis to chip away at the interest group edifice. In 
modem day Argentina, therefore, bodies such as the CGE, the CGT the SRA and the
1 T9UIA are at their weakest and least able to destabilise governments. Nevertheless, 
leaders such as Alfonsin and Menem in the 1980s remained true to the tradition of 
negotiating directly with interest groups in order to win their support while 
electioneering. Failure to fulfil promises then led to strikes and direct action.
Menem’s government, in spite of his Peronist credentials, imposed sweeping neo­
liberal reforms and went into direct conflict with the unions. While he is credited with 
curbing the power of the unions, it remains to be seen whether labour’s relative 
weakness is a consequence of high unemployment rather than the resolution of 
inadequacies in the party system.
Spain’s oldest labour union confederations are the Socialist General Workers 
Union (UGT), established in 1888 and the anarcho-syndicalist National Workers’ 
Confederation (CNT), an unaffiliated group committed to revolutionary change. Both 
groups were forced underground after the Civil War because of their association with 
the Second Republic of the 1930s while the UGT was the more successful of the two 
at surviving four decades of proscription. Ironically, however, the corporate structure 
of the Franco regime inadvertently strengthened labour as an oppositional force 
within the state. The Falange attempt to reorganise society along vertical lines thereby 
obliterating institutional recognition of class differences, meant that forms of 
organisation based on social class differences, such as unions, were particularly 
frowned upon. Thus labour was represented in the state as a component of the OS as
132 Erro, D. ‘Resolving the Argentine Paradox: Politics and Development 1966-1992,’ Boulder 1993
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were employers and factory bosses. The idea was that the natural function of
individuals within an economy was to produce goods for consumption at a national
level, so labour’s demands should be filtered through an organisation that ensures
maximum productivity. ‘Horizontal’ organisations typically articulate demands that
are not conducive to this end, such as higher wages, and are thus harmful to the
production process and by extension, national development.
Nevertheless, within the OS, the remains of the UGT survived as the organiser
of clandestine workplace committees, though the risks involved in participation meant
such action remained small scale throughout the dictatorship.134 More prolific within
the confines of the OS were the Workers’ Commissions (CCOO), created as company
wide bargaining units after the Franco regime legalised collective bargaining in 1958
through the creation of workplace committees. There were instances of opposition
activists making use of the official OS structure to help mobilise collective worker
1action in the early dictatorship, transforming localised strikes into general strikes.
But it was the evolution of the CCOO after the late 1950s that surpassed this early 
penetration of the regime’s vertical union as the principal outlet for labour opposition. 
The CCOO portrayed itself outwardly as a non-partisan entity, representing the 
interests of all workers with no particular ideological affiliation, thus conforming to 
the regime’s disapproval of traditional unionism. But while members included 
Falangists, Christian Democrats and representatives of Catholic organisations, 
members of the banned Communist Party rapidly made their presence felt in the 
leadership.136 Ultimately, the CCOO became affiliated to the Communist Party just as 
the UGT was intrinsically linked during and immediately after the dictatorship to the 
PSOE. As Communists gained control of the CCOO, it began to adopt a strategy of 
infiltrating the networks of official labour representation within the OS. The UGT 
opposed this on the basis that it implied recognition of the regime’s structure of labour 
representation though many of its sympathisers, if  not members, stood for election to 
factory committees, mirroring the CCOO tactic. Figure 1.4 (p.l 1) in the previous 
chapter illustrates this unofficial channel of representation for opposition forces 
within the structure of a state created by their Civil War conquerors. Whether or not it
133 Gunther, R. Public Policy in a No-Party State, Berkeley, 1980, p.27
134 Wozniak, L ‘The Dissolution ofParty-Union Relations in Spain’ International Journal o f  Political 
Economy, Vol.22 (4), 1992. p.77
135 Fishman, R. Working Class Organization and the Return to Democracy in Spain, Ithaca, 1990 p.96
136 Hamann, K. ‘Spain, Changing Party-Group Relations in a New Democracy’ in: Thomas, C.
Political Parties and Interest Groups, Boulder 2001
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was sanctioned by party or association leaders, activists pursued their agenda through 
the official syndicate so corporatist representation extended further than envisaged by 
the Falangist architects of the OS.
After the return to democracy, the two main union organisations consolidated 
their ties to their respective leftist political parties and competed for working class 
loyalty. But while the UGT, through boycotting all involvement in corporatist 
syndicates, had weakened itself during the dictatorship, it was able to re-establish 
itself as a significant labour movement in the late 1970s. Thus it started to openly 
compete with, and eventually surpassed the CCOO in a battle for working class 
loyalty through gains in factory council elections. The Spanish labour movement was 
at its most powerful immediately after the transition, in terms of membership, 
bargaining power and militancy. In 1976, 150 million working hours were lost in 
disputes while the UGT and CCOO could claim their membership lists represented 58
1 ^ 7per cent of salaried workers. Both organisations were compliant regarding their 
respected political party affiliates’ signing of the Moncloa accords, in spite of the 
predicted drop in real wages. The bonds with the political parties broke down during 
the 1980s, however, and the relationship became acrimonious. When the PSOE 
backtracked on its electoral pledges to prioritise labour interests and instead instituted 
pro market industrial restructuring, criticism from the UGT mounted. In 1988, the 
UGT and CCOO jointly called a general strike and the following year, the UGT 
refused to endorse the PSOE election campaign. In 1990, the PSOE amended its 
statutes and abolished the requirement that party members join the UGT, formally 
ending a historic link.
Similarly, the Communist Party and the CCOO are also estranged, if  less 
hostile towards one another. As the PCE declined as an electoral force in the 1980s 
and was absorbed into the United Left (IU), a coalition of small left leaning parties, 
the CCOO remained autonomous, though broadly cooperative. As representatives of 
workers’ societal demands, unions have been eclipsed by the PSOE and what 
bargaining power they retained following disassociation with their patron parties, was 
undermined by high unemployment.
137 Heywood, 1995, pp.250-254
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Conclusions.
A centralist tradition, in large part inherited from the Castilian common ancestor 
means government in both Argentina and Spain is dominated by an executive with
138 rr»iextensive decision making power guaranteed by the Constitution. The difference 
between the two polities, however, lies in the extent to which organs of state between 
the executive and the populace act as effective intermediaries. If a country has a 
historical tradition of social conflict, as do both the relevant cases, it is all the more 
crucial to have an effective system of representation between the executive and the 
populace. Spain under the dictatorship at the start of the period, represented a rigidly 
disciplined state which presented a coherent front while economic interests were all 
presented with organisations of state to represent them. This reflected the fact that the 
corporatism of the Franco regime successfully diluted the social conflict that had 
destabilised society in the 1930s. All factions of society were incorporated into the 
State hierarchy even though their priorities were destined to conflict. Non coalition 
members such as the UGT were proscribed because of their adherence to ‘decadent’ 
ideologies of the type driven out by Franco’s Civil War victory. They were forced 
therefore, to pursue a strategy of opposition by infiltration of the official syndicate, 
the OS which was conceived to nullify class based action on behalf of specific 
economic interests within a system of centrally planned capitalism. In the elaboration 
of new economic policies, therefore, labour’s voice was at least nominally represented 
through this mechanism which also provided a voice for more clandestine elements.
As such, forces in favour of labour friendly policies enjoyed an effective lobbying 
mechanism before the arbitrating dictator against the suggestions of economically 
liberal technocrats. Within this controlled arena, policymaking proceeded as an 
orderly war of attrition between factions who adhered to the rules of the game. In 
practice, therefore, all sides were granted concessions in the formulation of new 
economic policies while enforcement of discipline limited attempts to destabilise the 
system.
The democratic governments which inherited the Spanish state in 1976, in 
spite of a new Constitution in 1978, retained important elements of the Francoist order. 
In 1982 a highly disciplined and hierarchical Socialist Party which had abandoned its
138 Veliz, C, The Centralist Tradition o f  Latin America, Princeton, 1979
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exclusively working class identity as part of a campaign for mass appeal, 
superimposed itself on the top-down pyramid shaped State. The strength and 
coherence of state and party in Spain diffuses the power of interest associations to 
influence policy and as stand alone entities they are too fractious and weak to exercise 
real economic power to challenge government. There are, as highlighted, oligarchic 
elements in Spanish society who wield significant power and influence. However, 
their power was attained with the implicit approval of the government to which they 
are subordinated. As Franco was recognised as an ultimate authority by an eclectic 
alliance of interests, oligarchic elites do not present a serious challenge to the 
government’s authority.
The Peronist state was similarly conceived with a vertical system of 
representation for labour and capital though it was not so successfully implemented. 
Firstly, elite factions of capital and the landowning class were not successfully 
incorporated or co-opted into the state, acting as an opposition force. Secondly, after 
creating new corporatist entities such as the CGE, or empowering existing ones such 
as the CGT, Peron was overthrown and his party outlawed. The legacy of this is that 
Argentine political economy is historically dominated by the presence of powerful 
and highly organised socio economic factions with opposing economic policy 
priorities. Different successive political regimes were forced to form alliances with 
particular factions and devote particular attention to them as mobilisers of political 
and economic support rather than political parties. This alienates the interests 
excluded from the alliance which can use their economic power to pressurise the 
government or precipitate an inflationary crisis, through the retention of produce or, in 
the case of labour, through strike action.
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Chapter 2
A Comparative History of Economic Policy in 
Argentina and Spain, 1950-2000.
(Industrialisation and the Demise of Populism)
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This chapter seeks to outline a comparative history of economic policy for 
Argentina and Spain since the mid twentieth century with a focus on how greater 
institutional strength in the latter translated into the pure public good of political 
stability. The political life of both cases at the start of the period was shaped by social 
conflict, which in the case of Spain was characterised by violent confrontation 
throughout the nineteenth century.139 But in spite of this inauspicious foundation, 
Spain was the more successful at resolving conflicts between hierarchically organised 
interest groups such as labour, business and other elites including the landowning 
class through corporatist social organisation.140 The interpretation proposed here is 
that the evolution of Spanish economic policy since the autarkic early years of the 
Franco dictatorship was slow but consistent and underpinned by institutional 
continuity. The more far reaching ideas proposed by technocrats were restrained by 
sceptics with an equal voice before the arbitrating head of state. The result is a 
particularly Spanish form of capitalism, or ‘corporate capitalism’ as Enrique Fuentes- 
Quintana141 calls it, a paradoxical combination of orthodoxy applied to a society 
which still regards the state as providential. In other words, liberalisation of the once 
autarkic developmental economy proceeded gradually during the period under 
scrutiny here, and remains incomplete. In Argentina, meanwhile, factions were able to 
disrupt rather than merely influence policy, so tough reforms elaborated by 
technocrats were dismantled by subsequent governments with new interest group 
loyalties.
There follows an analysis of the historiography of both cases which informs 
the subsequent scene setting description of the intellectual and political currents that 
shaped autarkic nationalist industrialisation in each country during the 1940s. The 
final part of the chapter offers a brief historical summary of shifting economic policy 
over the period.
139 Prieto, C. ‘A Spanish Spring?’ New Left Review, Vol.31 Jan-Feb.2005 pp.45-46
140 Biggart, N and Guillen, M ‘Developing Difference: Social Organisation and the Rise o f the Auto 
Industries o f South Korea, Taiwan, Spain and Argentina’, American Sociological Review, Vol.64 (5), 
Oct 1999, p.738; Linz, J. ‘A Century of Politics and Interests in Spain’ in: Berger, S. Organising 
Interests in Western Europe, Cambridge, 1981.
141 Fuentes-Quintana, E. El Modelo de Economia Abierta y  el Modelo Castizo en el Desarrollo 
Economico de la Espana de los Anos 90 (Zaragoza 1995)
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The economic histories of Spain and Argentina during the second half of the 
twentieth century are characterised by the legacy of simultaneous quests for 
modernisation through forced industrialisation in isolation. Argentina and Spain were 
both Tate’ industrialisers in the sense that while recent work highlights the presence 
of industry in each during the nineteenth century, as a sector it was traditionally 
comparable with agriculture in terms of the proportion of national income it 
represented until early in the twentieth century. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show that the non- 
agricultural sectors of the economy increased in importance significantly during the 
period examined in this thesis. Though there were shifts in the favoured model, 
industrialisation continued apace throughout the period.
From a comparable starting point in the late 1940s to early 1950s, with rapid 
industrialisation informed by populist and nationalist ideas, both economies followed 
similar trajectories, evolving into centrally planned developmental models with a 
greater role assigned to foreign capital, towards reintegration into the world economy 
after the 1970s.
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Figure 2.1 Argentina GDP by Sector, Source: Della Paolera, G and Taylor, A 
(eds.)^ New Economic History o f Argentina, Cambridge, 2003. Statistical Appendix.
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Figure 2.2: Source: Prados de la Escosura, L. Elprogreso economico de Espana 
1850-2000, Bilbao, 2003. Statistical Appendix.
Of course, more recently state involvement has fallen out of favour and neither 
economy can now be categorised as state-led. So have Argentina and Spain become 
mausoleums of Gerschenkronian ideas? It may have seemed so at the peak of the so- 
called “Washington Consensus” on the triumph of free market economics after the 
late 1980s. Neo-liberal reforms carried out in Spain after 1982 and in Argentina after 
1991 by personalist executives, apparently at odds with the founding ideologies of 
their respective parties, appeared to represent concerted abandonment of the old 
model.142 An alternative explanation, to which this thesis conforms, stresses the
142“ Pastor, M and Wise, C. ‘State Policy, Distribution and Neo-Liberal Reform in Latin America’, 
Journal o f  Latin American Studies, Vol.29, (2), May 1997;
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continuity of cronyism and dirigiste policymaking for both cases in spite of market 
oriented economic redesigns in the late twentieth century.143
But it is the interpretation of the overall experience since the mid twentieth 
century which has caused an ideologically charged division in the historiography over 
the nature of both economies’ experience of industrialisation since it became a self- 
conscious process. Policy since the first third of the twentieth century is defined in 
both cases by the legacy of perceptions of economic backwardness by intellectuals 
and governments. This view depended on an assumption that Argentina and Spain 
lacked an industrial base of any significance at the start of the period examined here, 
which was used to justify action by the state to jump start industrialisation. The 
opposite, neo-classical camp claims that adherents to this view have ‘hijacked’ history 
with these claims and in fact industry was in rude health before the state intervened. 
Thus perceptions of economic history reflect the polarisation of society.
In the case of the historiography on Argentina, for example, one side claims 
the transition from agrarian exporter to industrialised economy did not start until 
around 1930.144 Others of a more liberal persuasion have argued that industry 
emerged during the late 19th Century Belle Epoque, and its development was stunted 
by later state meddling when industrialisation became a more self-conscious process 
at the heart of paternalistic economic policy.145 Adherents to the latter camp do 
acknowledge, however, the 1930s as a watershed in Argentina’s industrialisation, as 
much on account of international conditions and necessities as any internally driven 
shift in priorities.146
‘Stabilisation and its Discontents: Argentina’s Economic Restructuring in the 1990s, World 
Development, Vol.27, (3), March 1999;
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Vol.42, 1998.
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2003
146 See Diaz Alejandro, C. Stages in the Industrialisation o f  Argentina, in: Diaz Alejandro, ‘Essays on 
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The impact of Spain’s authoritarian development model after the 1940s means 
the historiography of Spanish economic development is also marked by partisan 
disagreement about when, and indeed how, industry started to develop. The post 
Franco era has seen a re-examination of Spanish industrial history conceived as an 
antithesis to the ‘hijacking’ of history by the dictatorship whose aspirations were 
autarkic, holding centrally managed industrialisation as a priority and thus took an 
overly gloomy view of the years preceding the 1936-1939 Civil War. This school also 
cautions against defining the period from the late 1950s as a golden age which set the 
pace for continued economic growth to the present, on the basis that it merely 
continued the trajectory established in the decades before the Civil War.147
The desire to understand their respective long-term economic performance 
records is made all the more acute by awareness of protracted decline from regional, 
and even, in the case of Spain, global hegemony. For Argentina, the performance 
peak was the more recent, ending with the close of the ‘long’ nineteenth century after 
1914. For Spain, the zenith of economic and political power was the seventeenth 
century though serious intellectual focus on the country’s decline only came in 
response to the loss of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines in 1898. Beginning with 
Argentina, national income had equalled and begun to surpass that of western Europe 
by 1913, immediately before a dramatic and prolonged reversal of fortune. 
Argentina’s GDP fell to 90 per cent of Western Europe’s by 1950, 68 per cent in 1973
14kand 43 per cent in 1992. This stagnation coincided with the onset of global 
Depression in the 1930s which neo-orthodox economic historians such as Carlos Diaz 
Alejandro blame for misguided policies of inward looking developmentalism 
throughout the remainder of the twentieth century.149 The alternative view is that late 
nineteenth century growth was dependent on the historically unique conditions o f the 
day whereby growth in (agricultural) productivity and exports depended on expansion 
of Argentina’s frontier of cultivation across the Pampas. When all available land was 
claimed, exploited and consolidated from the Atlantic coast to the Chilean border,
147 See: Prados de la Escosura, L. El Progreso Economico de Espaha 1850 -2000, Madrid 2003; or 
Jordi Nadal, Albert Carreras, Carles Sudria, ‘Introduccion’, in Nadal, Carreras, Sudria, (eds.) La 
economia espanola en el siglo XX, Barcelona, 1987
148 della Paolera, G and Taylor, A. ‘Introduction’ in: della Paolera and Taylor, A New Economic 
History o f  Argentina, Cambridge, 2003. p.4
149 Diaz Alejandro, C ‘Essays on the Economic History o f the Argentine Republic, London, 1970; See 
also Taylor, A. ‘On the Costs o f Inward-Looking Development: Price Distortions, Growth and 
Divergence in Latin America’, Journal o f  Economic History, Vol.58. (1) 1998 pp3-4.
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Argentina’s commodity export based growth rate became unsustainable. The first 
promoter of this view was one Alejandro Bunge, who through his Revista de 
Economia Argentina (established in 1918), started to question the euphoria associated 
with Argentina’s rapid expansion of the day. The argument went that Argentina was 
overly dependent on a narrow selection of agricultural exports and the economy was 
consequently headed for a period of stagnation. The primary export model had served 
Argentina well thus far but it had depended on continued expansion of the agricultural 
frontier, robust flows of foreign investment directed mainly towards railway 
construction and growing international demand for Argentine produce. Bunge warned 
that agricultural expansion had reached its limit as had the sector’s capacity to absorb 
labour and attract immigration. Foreign markets were closing as protectionism 
became the policy norm and foreign investment flows were starting to slow.
Argentina needed to become less externally dependent, therefore, and develop a self- 
sustaining domestic market that would allow the economy to withstand exogenous 
shocks. Unless steps were taken to diversify and intensify agriculture and promote 
industry, Argentina would sink into a cycle of economic stagnation and long-term 
decline.150
The international crisis of the 1930s, which created an environment hostile to
primary exporters, eventually vindicated Bunge and gave believers in industrialisation
the upper hand. In other words, the end to the feasibility of the primary export model
which had hitherto nurtured a fast growing economy encouraged the search for an
alternative. That alternative was industrialisation and an institutional base was
established to oversee the development of a manufacturing sector. But early literature
on the subject, such as the classic Evolucion Industrial Argentina by Adolfo Dorfman
published in 1942 suggested that industry, while a necessity, was essentially
subordinate to agriculture in the Argentine economy.151 Such faith in Argentina’s
physical attributes over un-Argentine industrial entrepreneurship is to blame for
subsequent stagnation, according to a school that emerged in the 1960s. One time
minister and developmentalist ideologue Aldo Ferrer described a ‘non-integrated
industrial economy’, shaped by misguided social forces that relegated manufacturing
1 ^
to secondary importance behind agriculture. Others cited the post-World War I
150 Bunge, A. Una Nueva Argentina, Buenos Aires, 1940, pp. 17-20
151 Dorfman, A. Evolucion Industrial Argentina, Buenos Aires 1942.
152 Ferrer, A. La Economia Argentina: las etapas de su desarrollo y  problemas actuates, Mexico, 1963
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period as a missed opportunity to pursue industrialisation as recommended by Bunge 
because of an erroneous faith that the disruption of 1914-1918 was a short-term 
phenomenon.153
A liberal backlash against this emerged in the 1970s with Carlos Diaz 
Alejandro leading the charge with a critique of the import substitution that had guided 
policy since the 1940s. Protectionism had become self perpetuating in the sense that 
by the 1950s, two decades o f ‘sheltered industrialisation’ had created its own set of 
vested interests resistant to any reversion to a more liberal, unrestricted regime. 
Although by 1970 the state’s role in the economy was pervasive and the resources at 
its disposal were vast, policy and ideological direction were haphazard and chaotic, 
the argument goes. Thus the business of reconciling diverse economic pressures 
converging on the public sector meant policymakers were not able to take an overall 
look at industrialisation.
“Political instability contributed to the lack of an integrated policy. As a result, the 
vast influence that the public sector exercises on industry through its many policy 
instruments and direct purchases is often capricious, inconsistent and sometimes the 
prey of private interests that manipulate it for their own gain”, writes Carlos Diaz 
Alejandro.154
In short, a state apparatus with tentacles stretching into most areas of 
economic activity resulted in an industrial sector that was fundamentally inefficient. 
Argentine manufacturing had become chronically uncompetitive and was only 
capable of catering to the domestic market. Mario Brodersohn, a contemporary of 
Diaz Alejandro’s suggested that Argentina’s best option was to redefine industrial 
strategy, putting greater emphasis on exporting manufactures, thus increasing the 
dimension of the market.155
Diaz Alejandro argued more recently that a tendency to restrict the efficient 
running of economic forces in Argentina goes back further than widely thought. The 
much maligned policy of protectionism, for example, was already a feature of policy
tViin the late 19 Century ‘golden age’. Even if one accepts the argument that
153 Di Telia, G. and Zymelman, M. Las etapas del desarrollo economico argenlino, Buenos Aires 1967.
154 See Carlos Diaz Alejandro, ‘Stages in the Industrialisation o f Argentina’, in: Diaz Alejandro, Essays 
on the Economic History o f  the Argentine Republic, London, 1970
155 See Mario Brodersohn, ‘Introduccion,’ in: Brodersohn (ed.) Estrategias de Industrializacion para la 
Argentina, Buenos Aires, 1970
landowners with fortunes made through agricultural exports were, as is widely 
assumed, the dominant influence on policy at the time, “their enthusiasm for 
completely free trade and flexible currency arrangements had certain practical 
limits”.156 The government needed to raise revenue and the landowning class, 
dependent as they were on export revenues, would have preferred this to be achieved 
through import duties rather than from land and property taxes.
The Diaz Alejandro focus on vested interests and distributional conflict bom
157of misguided political meddling in the economy has inspired an extensive literature. 
Within this a neo-orthodox view refers to ‘elephantitis of the state’ starting in the 
1930s, extending through the Peronist 1940s and beyond, which may have stunted 
development because a lumbering bureaucracy is prone to factionalism and 
incoherence.158
The impulse for autarky, protectionism and state intervention in the Spanish 
economy predates that in Argentina though it is frequently associated with the policies 
of the early Franco dictatorship. If Argentina’s comparative advantage as an 
agricultural producer bolsters the neo-classical, non interventionist line of argument, 
Spain’s physical inadequacies traditionally inspire the opposite view. Spain, with its 
arid climate, rugged terrain and high altitudes does not have the physical attributes 
that make economic development easy. This made protectionism a necessity both to 
reduce competitive pressures on an embattled agricultural sector, and nurture 
industrialisation. The loss of Spain’s last significant colonies in 1898 meant there was 
little doubt regarding the nation’s status as a minor power. The fact that this 
represented the culmination of a protracted decline from global superpower status lay 
at the heart of a ‘regenerationist’ movement seeking to improve the country’s status in 
the twentieth century. An intellectual impulse to explain Spain’s contemporary state 
of agrarian backwardness burgeoned, which influenced an anti-liberal movement 
emphasising the poverty of the country’s soil, the retardation of industry and
156 Carlos Diaz Alejandro, ‘No less than 100 years o f Argentine economic history’, in: Andres Velasco 
(ed.) Trade, Development and the World Economy, Oxford, 1988,p.255., p.240.
157 Paul Lewis, The Crisis o f  Argentine Capitalism, Chapel Hill, 1990; Mallon, R and Sourouille, J. 
Economic Policymaking in a Conflict Society: The Argentine Case, London, 1975; Wynia, G. 
Argentina in the postwar era : politics and economic policy making in a divided society, Albuquerque, 
1978; Cortes Conde, R. La economia argentina en el largo plazo, Buenos Aires 1997; O’Donnell, G. 
‘State and Alliances in Argentina’ in Bates, R Toward a Political Economy o f  Development: a rational 
choice perspective, Berkeley, 1988; Sikkink, K. Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil 
and Argentina, Ithaca, 1991; Gerchunoff, P and Llach, L. El ciclo de la ilusiony el desencanto : un 
siglo de politicos economicas argentinas, Buenos Aires, 1998
158 Lewis, 1990. p.96
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insufficient exploitation of the resource base. Figures such as Lucas Mallada, Macias 
Picavea and Joaquin Costa identified industry as the answer and inspired the policies 
of the authoritarian regime of Primo de Rivera in the1920s.159
The ideologues of the 1940s adopted the idea of state action to overcome 
Spanish disadvantage with industrial self sufficiency160 and added a nationalist 
element when they elaborated the blueprint for an autarkic industrialisation model 
after the Civil War. Some of the writing that informed the autarkic ideal was distinctly 
moralistic, blaming Spain’s downfall from global imperial power on foreign liberal 
decadence.161 Other theorists, particularly those in government were more pragmatic. 
Antonio Robert, for example, was director general of industry in Franco’s regime 
during and immediately after the Civil War. His work owed much to the writings of 
the Romanian corporatist theorist Mihael Monoilescu, identifying Spain as agrarian 
and prescribing state-led industrialisation as the solution. The explanation for that 
state of agrarian backwardness, meanwhile, was nationalistic in tone portraying it as 
the result of foreign machinations.162
Robert’s Industrialization Necesaria, for example, blames Spain’s downfall 
from imperial superpower to impoverished backwater squarely on malign foreign 
interference and proposes centrally directed industrialisation as the best means for 
Spain to recover its dignity. The American empire had acted as a drain on Spain’s 
resources, absorbing the best of its manpower, investment and entrepreneurship. 
Central government in Madrid had not merely tolerated this but actively encouraged 
this depopulation of the peninsula as a part of official policy to promote growth in the 
colonies as a form o f ‘regional development’. Unfortunately, the Napoleonic invasion 
of Spain in 1808 cut the country off from its colonies long enough to destroy the 
political and economic ties built up over centuries. Spain was thus left high and dry 
having selflessly donated its best industrialists and agriculturalists to the colonies. If 
that was not destructive enough, the French interference also allowed ‘liberal ideas’ to
159 See: Mallada, L. Los males de la P atriay la futura revolution Espahola, Madrid 1890, or: Picavea, 
M. Elproblema national, Madrid 1899 or. Costa, J. Oligarquia, Madrid, 1902. Pardo, L. La conquista 
del Ebro, Madrid 1931 recounts public works initiatives o f the Primo de Rivera dictaroship informed 
by the Regenrationist movement.
160 See: Fuentes-Irurozqui, M. Evolution presente y  futuro del comercio exterior de Espana, Madrid, 
1942 or Suanzes, A. La industrialization: obra evidente y  preeminente del regimen de Franco, Madrid 
1952.
161 See for example: Paris, H. El nuevo orden economico, Madrid, 1942
162 Love, J. Crafting the Third World: Theorising Underdevelopment in Rumania and Brazil, Stanford, 
1996, p.90
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corrupt the Hispanic system so that the Spanish state gave away its best mining 
concessions to foreign speculators. This was all, Robert believed, part of an 
international conspiracy by the British and the USA among others, to exploit Spain’s 
decapitation and ensure it could never regain its former greatness. Indeed, Spain’s so- 
called allies in the peninsula war against the French had taken care to destroy Spain’s 
fledgling infrastructure in order to prevent it becoming an industrial competitor after 
the war.164 The result of all this was the agrarianisation of Spain’s economy and the 
forced extension of cultivation into ever more unproductive marginal land -  hence the 
perpetual poverty and political unrest.
So, to overcome this maliciously inflicted poverty, Spain needed to 
industrialise as quickly as possible. New industry would increase the country’s self 
sufficiency and eliminate the trade deficit. Meanwhile, new factories would absorb 
surplus labour from the countryside, a problem associated with the country’s 
underdevelopment, simultaneously promoting the mechanisation of agriculture thus 
increasing its productivity but decreasing the number of workers necessary to achieve 
it. Salaries would rise and with it the purchasing power of the population, increasing 
further the momentum of industry. All this required a “subordination of economic 
development to the requirements of (central) policy”.165
The idea of necessary protectionism to counteract Spain’s physical 
disadvantages in a hostile world market was also inherited by classic works of 
Spanish history. Jaime Vicens Vives, whose work, published in 1955, is an 
educational staple in Spain, stresses the role of geography and climate in condemning 
the country to backwardness. On the other hand, he points out that Spain’s location at 
a crossroads of trading routes between Europe, the Americas and North Africa is 
potentially an advantage.166 Similarly Ramon Tamames’ Estructura economica de 
Espana, first published in 1960 and now in its 19th edition, attributes a historical 
tradition of interventionist government to the need to overcome the limitations of
1A7rugged terrain.
A further backbone of this classical school is work by German economist 
Jurgen Donges, a disciple of structuralist theories elaborated in Latin America by
163 Robert, A. Un problema national: la industrialization necesaria, Madrid 1943, pp.35-37
164 Ibid. p.38
165 Ibid, p. 126
166 Vicens Vives, J. Una historia economico de Espana, Barcelona 1955, p.678
167 Tamames, R. Estructura Economica de Espana, Madrid 1960
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Raul Prebisch. Protectionism, Donges argued, acted as a catalyst for Spain’s
industrialisation by improving the domestic terms of trade for the manufacturing
sector, thus attracting capital and investment from less efficient sectors of the
economy. The viability of orthodox economic ideas for countries yet to complete their
progression towards industrialisation, he claims, is called into question by the
• 168interventionist experience of Spam.
But there was a parallel tradition that argued against the benefits of 
protectionism, on the basis that it had served to retard the Spanish economy by 
ensuring the least optimal allocation of resources. This view was first articulated by 
Roman Perpina-Grau, a Catalan economist who drew on the German school of central 
place theories for his ‘structural’ interpretation of Spanish backwardness.169 Spain, he 
believed, is best understood as a country divided into two zones; interior and 
periphery, comprising roughly concentric rings. The interior languished in poverty on 
account of the inadequacies of infrastructure, agricultural yields and market potential. 
The periphery fared marginally better except for the fact that terms of trade with a 
third space, the outside world, are to its disadvantage. Capital imports, such as cotton 
for the textile industry, and petroleum, were indispensable and constant while exports 
such as citrus fruit were vulnerable to terms of trade shocks -  a combination that put 
pressure on the balance of payments. Protection of the interior maintained the status 
quo of rural backwardness with high illiteracy, small settlements and low productivity 
while simultaneously stifling greater interchange with the periphery. The reason 
behind this seemingly irrational protectionism of an inefficient sector, Perpina-Grau 
believed, was an obsession with national production. The irony was, however, that the 
resulting backwardness and lack of technological progress and expertise made 
industry disproportionately dependent on foreign capital and know how. The solution 
lay in restructuring the economy to find a space for Spain as an industrial exporter in 
the international division of labour.
This critique of the protectionist tradition appealed to and informed the work 
of an orthodox school of economists that emerged in the 1950s. The leading light of 
this generation of intellectuals was Enrique Fuentes-Quintana, a self professed 
admirer of Perpina-Grau, career civil servant and Economy Minister during the 1970s.
168 Donges, J, La industrialization en Espana: Politicos, Logros, Perspectivas, Barcelona 1976
169 Perpina Grau, R. De estructura economica y  economia hispana, Madrid, 1952 (first published in 
German, 1935)
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This group was also the first generation of Spanish economists to learn their discipline 
in Spain where its association with foreign ‘liberal’ ideas kept it off university 
curricula until the early 1950s.170 It was this current of thought that informed the ideas 
of technocratic reformers after the late 1950s who gained control of crucial economy 
oriented ministries and launched a protracted campaign to open the Spanish economy 
(see chapter 3).171
This school in turn influenced more recent work which adopts the quantitative 
methods of the ‘new’ economic history to reassess perceptions of Spain’s 
backwardness during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.172 The principal 
departure from previous analysis is to reject the assumption of a slow nineteenth 
century which justified state intervention in order to administer centrally planned 
industrialisation. Albert Carreras, for example, states that if Spanish industrialisation 
depended on protection then there must have been some kind of Rostowian take-off or 
Gerschenkronian spurt immediately after one of the new tariff laws were implemented 
in 1891, 1906 or 1922. Using a cliometric approach and an index of industrial 
production, Carreras shows that this was not the case. In fact, the periods of history in 
which protectionism was highest were the least productive in terms of industrial 
output. The result is a sharp critique of the autarkic tendencies of the dictatorship, 
justified as it was on a false notion that Spanish industry performed better in 
isolation.173 Taking the critique further, Jose Luis Garcia-Delgado blames the autarkic 
period for causing Spain’s growth to diverge yet further from that of western Europe. 
The 1940s represented a ‘night’ of Spanish industrialisation, namely stagnation 
following the killing off of sustained growth that had started in the 1870s and 
continued until 1929.174
The most recent contribution to this tradition is Leandro Prados de la Escosura 
with a vast data set of economic indicators starting at 1850, which attempts to 
compensate for the idiosyncratic nature of Spanish accounting methods throughout
170 See: Fuentes Quintana, E. ‘Perspectivas de la Economia Espanola 1940-53, Revista de Economia 
Politico, VoI.IV Num. 1-2, Agosto a Septiembre 1952
171 Fuentes-Quintana, E. ‘La economia espanola desde el plan de estabilizacion de 1959: El papel del 
sector exterior’, in Martinez-Vara, T. (ed.) Mercado y  desarrollo economico en la Espana 
contemporanea, Madrid, 1986
172 See for example: Acena P-M y Prados de la Escosura, L (eds.), La nueva historia econdmica en Espana, 
Madrid, 1985
173 Carreras, A. ‘La Industria: Atraso y Modernization’, in: Nadal, Carreras, Sudria, (eds.) La economia 
espanola en el siglo XX, Barcelona, 1987
174 Garcia Delgado, J-L ‘Estancamiento industrial e intervencionismo economico durante el primer 
franquismo’ in: Fontana, J. (ed.), Espana Bajo el Franquismo, Barcelona, 1986
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history. The study purports to debunk the assumption that the nineteenth century was 
a period of failure while the twentieth one of success, industrialisation and take-off. 
One cannot explain recent growth as a consequence of the ‘golden age’ approximately 
between 1950 and 1974, so often used to vindicate the economic record of the 
dictatorship. Prados points to earlier origins of the growth trajectory, particularly 
between 1850 and 1883 and again during the 1920s.175
Meanwhile, Spain’s best known adherent to the new institutional economics, 
Gabriel Tortella maintains the argument that Spain was economically retarded in the 
nineteenth century on account of a ‘Euro Latin pattern of development’. The 
institutions at fault have yet to be dismantled, Tortella argues, and until they are,
Spain will remain a laggard compared with its European neighbours. This analysis 
emphasises Spain as institutionally distinct from Europe, which explains its relatively
17 (\low national income.
To summarise the debates common to the two cases, opinions are split over 
the extent of economic backwardness before steps were taken by government to 
implement centrally planned modernisation. There is also dispute over whether 
protectionism was beneficial or detrimental to long-run performance, with the revival 
of a neo-orthodox view that it retarded development during and after the mid 
twentieth century. Spanish commentators such as Fuentes-Quintana and the 
institutionalist Tortella believe that the persistence of state interventionism means 
Spain will remain a laggard in Europe. This thesis conforms with this view, as it 
categorises Spain as comparable to Argentina because of a shared tradition of ‘crony 
capitalism’. But within this category of institutional imperfection, Spain boasts the 
stronger and more persistent growth performance. So ‘convergence’ of the kind 
described by Solow, Olson and growth theorists, whereby Argentina and Spain catch 
up in terms of productivity with more advanced economies, remains elusive. But 
Spain during the period under scrutiny here, caught up with and overtook Argentina 
both in terms of productivity levels and national income. This can be accounted for by 
a less volatile and more consistent rate of growth as figure 2.3 shows. Argentine 
economic growth was not always slower than that seen in Spain, but it was more
175 Prados de la Escosura, Elprogreso economico de Espaha, Madrid, 2003.
176 Tortella, G. The Development o f  Modern Spain: An Economic History o f  the Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Centuries, Cambridge MA, 2000.
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prone to dramatic reversal immediately after a period of expansion while Spanish 
rates maintained momentum between less diverse extremes.
Annual GDP change in %
Argentina
 :_______
Figure 2.3. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) April 2005 , 
ESDS International, (MIMAS), University of Manchester
At the root of this divergence is the Spanish success at taming factional 
dispute and interest group conflict in such a way that it never threatened institutional 
and political stability. The structure of the state placed limitations on its component 
factions in their ability to shape policy. If, for example, a group of technocrats wished 
to impose tough economic reforms, conservative elements were able to exert a 
restricting influence though an outright veto was not possible. Policy thus proceeded 
at a slow pace but in a consistent direction and enjoyed a relatively high degree of 
perceived legitimacy because of the solidity of representative institutions within the 
state. In Argentina, policy reflected the priorities and loyalties of a particular 
administration perceived as (or suspected of being) allied to a specific economic 
interest to the detriment of others. Following the departure of the government in 
periodic economic and political crises, the new regime would shape new allegiances 
and policy would reflect this.
The relative fragmentation of Argentine policy compared with its Spanish 
equivalent is demonstrated by the institutional arrangements made by each
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government to oversee industrial development. A state holding company comprising 
German and Italian companies expropriated during World War II, the National 
Directorate of State Industries (DINIE) enjoyed some continuity beyond changes in 
central government but was abolished in 1958. In that same year a permanent 
planning department was set up within the Office of the Presidency, with 
responsibility to define national economic objectives but exercised little real control 
over a disparate and fractious state sector. A more successful institution, the National 
Development Council (CONADE) was established in 1962 which exerted centralised 
control over the bureaucracy and financing of development, including state 
enterprises and the relevant ministries, but political instability meant a high turnover 
of staff and frequent changes in policy direction. In the early 1970s CONADE was 
disbanded and replaced by a National Economic Planning Institute (INPE) to operate 
alongside a new holding company, the Corporation for National Enterprises (CEN). 
The latter organisation did not survive the neo-liberal reforms of the 1976 military 
government while INPE had its powers severely curtailed by a regime suspicious of 
its association with the previous political order.177
Furthermore, state agencies, though officially non partisan departments of the 
civil service, were in practice directly controlled by the presidency and thus populated 
with presidential appointees. The short lifespan of each presidency meant a high 
turnover of directors of state enterprises, development agencies and credit institutions. 
It also meant agencies’ remits changed frequently according to the priorities of who 
occupied the executive. A case in point is the National Development Bank which 
suffered the modification of its charter several times reflecting the changing political 
climate until when in 1993, debilitated by the exhaustion of its capital, it was 
abolished by Menem.178 It was established in 1944 as the Industrial Credit Bank to 
provide medium and long-term credit to industries seeking to import capital goods. It 
was also intended to allocate a proportion of its credit towards regional development, 
promoting the growth of industry in the provinces. Under Peron it was obliged to 
grant the majority of its loans to small operations and consumer goods and services 
industries according to his doctrine of horizontal industrialisation, consequently 
neglecting to nurture heavy industry. It also operated as a financier of IAPI’s
177 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Economic Memorandum: Argentina, 
March 2 1984, pp.69-73.
178 Decreto N° 1027/93
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programme of forced purchase of agricultural produce directly from farmers for sale 
at a profit to overseas buyers as a source of fiscal revenues. Loans by the bank to IAPI 
by 1955 represented 36 per cent of the total while loans to public sector organisations
170as instructed by presidential decree made up half its exposure. This represented an
early departure from its original role to provide credit directly to small industries in 
favour of supporting traditional sectors of the economy. In 1957 the bank’s charter 
was modified so that it was decoupled from the Central Bank and forced to rely on 
foreign sources. In 1961 it was forced by the Frondizi administration to purchase 
shares in large industrial corporations previously held by the Instituto Movilizador de 
Inversiones Mobilarios, a state holding company as well as shares in SEGBA, a 
Buenos Aires power company. It was now being used as a tool by government to 
rescue ailing and politically sensitive enterprises rather than a provider of loans to 
promote domestic industry. In 1971 it acquired its new name, the National 
Development Bank and continued to finance industrial development according to the 
priorities of the government which now assigned domestic savings deposits as its 
main source of finance. Under the neo-liberal military regime of 1976 to 1983 it was 
sidelined and starved of funds and compensated by selling a significant proportion of 
the share holdings it had been obliged to acquire since the 1960s.
Continuous political instability affected the ability of institutions to function 
effectively while the associated political meddling undermined the functioning of 
organisations such as the National Development Bank. It followed the swings of 
official policy even when it meant a departure from its charter, increasing loans to 
small operations under one president, restricting them in favour of heavy industry 
under the next. Its boardroom was populated with political appointees and thus 
suffered a high turnover of staff reflecting Argentina’s inherent political instability. 
During the period 1944 to 1980, for example, directors at the Bank stayed an average 
18 months.180
Contrast this experience with Spain where a state holding company was 
established, the National Institute of Industry (INI), as an umbrella organisation of 
which state enterprises were component parts. It was a principal tool and overseer of 
state development policy to achieve economic modernisation from a similar if not
179 Lewis, P. The Crisis o f  Argentine Capitalism, Chapel Hill, 1990 p. 159-160; Schvarzer, J. The 
National Development Bank and the Technological Development o f  Argentine Industry, Buenos Aires, 
1981
180 Schvarzer 1981. p.39
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deeper level of industrial retardation as that in Argentina. As policies evolved over 
time, so did the role played by the INI and amendments were made to its founding 
articles. But this reflected belated adjustment to the evolution of Spain’s economy 
rather than political meddling and the leadership has always retained a degree of 
autonomy from government. It developed from being a supervisor of autarkic 
industrialisation in the 1940s to administrator of centrally planned development 
programmes in the 1960s. During the 1970s and 1980s it oversaw the restructuring of 
the post-Franco economy including the privatisation and de-monopolisation 
associated with the Gonzalez government.181 Nevertheless, it is a bastion of 
institutional continuity and retained its status as a stronghold of dirigiste policy. It 
survives to the present, under a new name as a holding company for state interests, 
including, ironically the assets of state enterprises which bought privatised Argentine 
firms during the 1990s.
Comparative Economic History
The following narrative illustrates that from a common starting point in terms 
of the development model employed during the 1940s, subsequent reforms and 
adjustments were more ordered and less subject to social conflict in the Spanish case. 
It starts with a description of the autarkic model in each country during the 1940s and 
the ideas behind its conception followed by short accounts of each country’s 
subsequent experience.
Argentine and Spanish intellectuals had begun to compare their economies 
unfavourably with those of western Europe and north America by the early twentieth 
century focussing on a need to industrialise. In the case of Argentina this idea was 
founded on a sense of impending fall from grace due to the exhaustion of a 
commodity export-led model which had served the economy well at least since the 
1870s.182 In Spain, intellectual currents were influenced by awareness of protracted 
decline from hegemonic status after the seventeenth century. This was attributed to
1RTgeographic disadvantage related to an arid and unproductive landscape by some,
181 Acena, P-M and Comm, INI, 50 anos de industrialization en Espana, Madrid, 1991.
182 Bunge, A. Una Nueva Argentina, Buenos Aires, 1940
183 Perpina-Grau, R. De estructura economica y  economia hispana, Madrid, 1952 (first published in 
German, 1935)
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and the malicious conspiracies of foreign powers by others.184 The common solution, 
however, was industrialisation overseen by the state, and protectionist policies of 
import substitution.
The principal similarity between the economic policies pursued under Peron 
and Franco is the influence of nationalist syndicalist ideology. Both regimes were 
manifested through a single party, though defined as a movement by the protagonists 
with stated ideals of cross class collaboration in a national project of development. 
This depended on the authoritarian implementation of civil obedience justified as 
being in the national interest. There is evidence of links between the two185 but it 
appears that it was the common inspiration of Mussolini’s Italy that accounts for the 
commonalities. This link was explicit in the Spanish case, with the Instituto 
Nacional de Industria (INI), the state holding company, openly acknowledged as an 
immitation of Italy’s lstituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI) and Nazi
187  •Germany’s Goering Organisation. In Argentina, Peron never publicly 
acknowledged the link though historians treat it as an open secret, and base this 
assumption on similarities between his legislative initiatives and the policies of 
Mussolini.188 As Labour Minister to the military regime that preceded his presidency, 
for example, Peron laid the foundations for a corporatist state that incorporated 
organised labour with a Law of Professional Associations which brought the unions 
under his control. This 1945 legislation was almost an exact copy of Mussolini’s 
labour code.189
Each regime applied policy and rallied support through corporatist states 
which incorporated interests such as labour and business through compulsory 
membership of official associations. There were also similarities in the development 
minded economic model applied in each case though the theory behind the policy was 
more clearly articulated in the Spanish case. For both countries, economic policy was 
state-led and autarkic with industrialisation held up as a priority alongside a strategic
184 Robert, A. Un problema nacional: la industrializacion necesaria, Madrid 1943
185 Rein, R. The Franco-Peron Alliance, Relations Between Spain and Argentina 1946-55, Pittsburgh, 
1993
186 Lewis, P. ‘Was Peron a Fascist? An Inquiry into the Nature o f Fascism.’ Journal o f  Politics,
Vol.42(1) Feb. 1980.; Benavent, J, Peron, La Dictadura Populista, Barcelona 2006
187 Presidencia del Instituto Nacional de Industria, Notas en relacion con la creacion y  
desenvolvimiento del Instituto Nacional de Industria, (Founding Articles) Madrid, 1941 pp.24-25
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focus on national self sufficiency which favoured national over international capital. 
This was as much a feature of the times as a shared ideological root. The world of the 
1940s was consumed by international conflict, which increased the impetus for self 
reliance, while Keynesian expansionism was the strategy of choice for many 
governments. Yet the peculiarities of each case’s economic focus reflect the dynamic 
of support within the respective regimes. The most influential factions of Peron’s 
support base were the military and the labour movement. But because of this division 
of support, Peron was faced with a choice between a project of ‘strategic’ heavy 
industrialisation for national defence favoured by the former, and light manufacturing 
of consumer goods, to the advantage of the latter.190 Ultimately, the president took the 
second option which set out to boost employment and capture a greater proportion of 
national wealth for popular sectors. Meanwhile, much stress was put on horizontal 
industrialisation, a drive to produce consumer goods domestically for consumers 
whose purchasing power had increased.
In Spain, though the syndicalist movement of the Falange was a leading 
architect of policy, the military faction of Franco’s coalition was granted a greater 
hearing in the formulation of economic policy in the early post Civil War government. 
Juan Antonio Suanzes, founder of the INI, for example, was a childhood friend of 
Franco and like the dictator a career officer. His background as a military engineer 
shaped his beliefs and inspired him to seek a path between the socialist statism the 
dictatorship identified as the corruption it had vanquished in the Civil War, and 
“arbitrary” capitalist liberalism which had opened Spain up to foreign economic 
domination.191 He also inherited an absolute faith in industrialisation as a means to 
renegotiate Spain’s terms of trade and held up increased national productivity as an 
urgent priority to achieve self sufficiency.
Thus, Spain’s natural resources were to be exploited at all cost. This needed to 
be undertaken by the state if the private sector balked at the costs involved. Under 
Suanzes’ charge the INI’s operations were characterised by the primacy of technical 
over economic expertise. The focus of the industrialisation effort was on ‘strategic’ 
sectors such as oil refining, steel, transportation, mining and so on as a consequence 
of the aspiration to achieve self sufficiency.
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Because of intense industrial re-equipment drives within an autarkic system, 
they soon fell victim to disequilibria to the balance of payments on account of capital 
starvation. The need to import capital goods and populist labour policies with an 
emphasis on high consumer purchasing power meant deliberately inflated currency 
valuations which made traditional commodity exports uncompetitive. Macroeconomic 
imbalances resulted in changes of strategy and, eventually, replacement of 
governments. However, the distinction here is the fact that this was manifested as no 
more than a cabinet reshuffle in Spain, whereas in Argentina, Peron was forcibly 
removed from office by a disillusioned military. So the new Spanish government, 
though stacked with reforming technocrats, was still operating within the rigid 
constructs of Franco’s centralised state. It comprised a part of the same mechanism to 
which organised labour, business and an array of other conservative economic and 
social interests also belonged. So reforming technocrats and ministers, were subjected 
to an equal subordination before the arbitrator-dictator as the Falange, who still 
controlled labour policy, and Suanzes who remained head of the INI. There was no 
constitutional crisis, therefore.
The distinct degrees to which the military were able to exert an influence on 
industrial priorities has a point of reference in Gerschenkron’s observations on 
Russia’s industrialisation after the 1890s. The centrality of the Russian military to the 
state, which was the primary agent propelling economic progress, shaped the 
experience of industrialisation. In order to exact effectively the required sacrifices 
from the populace, Russia’s government subjected a reluctant population to severe 
oppression. Because of the magnitude of these exactions, a period of rapid 
development was very likely to give way to prolonged stagnation because the effort 
had exceeded the limits of physical endurance. The result was economic progress by
1Q9“fits and starts”. The comparison of Argentina and Spain appears to contradict this. 
Argentine economic growth was characterised after the 1940s as a series of fits and 
starts yet Spanish industrialisation, initially at least, reflected military priorities. On 
the other hand, the military inspired autarkic model did suffer a crisis in the late 1950s 
and was subsequently modified though this was a consequence of capital starvation 
rather than exhaustion of the labour force. Perhaps it was a blessing, therefore, that 
the military became less of a force in Spanish policymaking and was challenged
192 Gerschenkron 1962, p. 17
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within the state by civilian technocrats. If it had remained in place, the Spanish 
economy could have resembled more closely the belligerent totalitarian model 
Gerschenkron observed in Russia.
In Argentina following Peron’s removal in 1955, the corporatist state was 
effectively decapitated, leaving its dispossessed components, such as the official 
labour confederation, the CGT, and the employers association, the CGE, as stand 
alone pressure groups. The military government ‘intervened’ in both but the CGT in 
particular proved very quickly after its patron’s overthrow, that it remained a 
formidable pressure group. The junta invited Raul Prebisch, secretary general of 
CEPAL to assess the Argentine economy and formulate a prescription for rapid and 
long-term recovery. The Prebisch Plan, published in January 1956, sought to promote 
monetary stability in order to boost national savings and attract foreign investment. 
This balance was perceived as crucial to promote productivity as well as 
establishment of new operations because it increased purchasing power for continued 
industrial re-equipment.193 Essentially, the currency was to be devalued in order to 
promote agricultural exports, thus mitigating the deficit in the balance of payments. 
This, Prebisch acknowledged, would increase living costs for wage earning 
Argentines so employers were urged to increase salaries. To prevent this having an 
inflationary effect, the wage increases were to be taken out o f company profits. The 
plan argued this was not such a burden because higher productivity resulting from the 
new stability meant these profits would be regained in the long term.194
Opposition came from all quarters. While Prebisch indicated the cost of living 
would rise by a mere 10 per cent, the CGT, which had been ‘intervened’ by the 
military government, was demanding a 40 to 50 per cent wage increase. At the other 
end of the social spectrum, business leaders were claiming that no company or 
industrial sector boasted profits high enough to absorb a wage increase of 10 per 
cent.195 The unpopularity of the plan was used as a rallying cry for the political 
opposition which had begun preparations for a return to democracy. Arturo Frondizi, 
leader of his own splinter of the UCR, the ‘Intransigent’ Radical Party (UCRI), was 
particularly vocal in his rejection of Prebisch’s prescriptions. After Frondizi became 
president in 1958, however, the ‘developmentalism’ underpinned by monetary
193 Prebisch, R. Moneda Sana o Inflation Incontenible: Plan de Restablecimiento Econdmico, 
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discipline bore a strong resemblance to Prebisch’s ideas. The Plan promoted ‘vertical’ 
industrialisation, including promotion of a steel industry and greater energy self 
sufficiency, particularly through improved exploitation of oil reserves. This lends 
support to the view that Argentine politics is defined by a battle for allegiances rather 
than pragmatic solutions to common problems measured according to their merit. 
Indeed, both Prebisch and Frondizi were evidently aware of this. Prebisch beseeched 
Argentines to temper their class allegiances in favour of the nation’s wellbeing. He 
called on “all social groups to demonstrate solidarity with an effort that was of great 
importance to the country.”196 Frondizi, meanwhile, attempted to achieve a three way 
‘national movement’ formed of an alliance between the state, industry and labour, 
each of which would act as a pillar of his centrally planned developmentalist vision 
(see chapter 3).
The government that commissioned the Prebisch plan was a transient affair 
and the spectre of civil disobedience meant its leaders were reticent about 
implementation of such features as wage freezes to check inflation. The military was 
keen to maintain order before a planned return to democratic rule and these political 
concerns made the economic restructuring Prebisch envisaged an impossibility. 
Frondizi came to power after securing the working class vote by persuading the exiled 
Peron to lend support. Once in power he attempted to solicit further support from 
industrialists for an ambitious programme of intense industrialisation which
107emphasised domestic heavy industry, particularly oil, energy, steel and chemicals.
The intention was to improve the balance o f payments by increasing industrial self 
sufficiency and pursuit of a Hirschmanian, unbalanced, development model. The most 
controversial aspect of the plan was Frondizi’s overtures to foreign capital, which led 
to accusations from all sectors of society that he had undermined national security by 
allowing too much access to strategic sectors.
Frondizi claimed these ideas as his own and did not acknowledge any link 
with similar intellectual currents emanating from CEPAL. The reason for this lies in 
the fact that the best known economist at CEPAL was Raul Prebisch, the 
organisation’s secretary general, who had elaborated its effective manifesto with his
196 Prebisch 1956. p.3 8
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structuralist theory of development.198 Frondizi was thus attempting to distance 
himself from Prebisch while pursuing policies apparently influenced by his work.
This is interpreted as astute political manoeuvring by Kathryn Sikkink.199 Prebisch, 
on account of the 1956 economic plan was associated with the anti-Peron military 
government. As leader of the opposition, it was in Frondizi’s interests during his 
election campaign to employ anti-Prebisch rhetoric.200
Society post-Peron, however, was irreconcilably divided and the 
contradictions inherent in Frondizi’s fragile web of allegiances with disparate interest 
group associations finally collapsed amid disillusionment and open rebellion. Many in 
the military and among Peronist labour, opposed Frondizi’s courtship of foreign 
capital, particularly regarding involvement in strategic assets such as the oil industry. 
In order to appease his Peronist supporters, meanwhile, the president also made steps 
towards legalisation of the Peronist party and allowed it to place candidates in the 
1962 congressional elections. This was too much for the military and Frondizi was 
deposed in a coup towards the end of 1962. After a brief military interlude, Arturo 
Illia was elected president, also through aggressive courtship of labour interests, and 
pursued a more nationalist ticket. He cancelled contracts signed by Frondizi with 
foreign firms to exploit oil reserves and focused efforts on increased production in 
order to achieve self sufficiency and equilibrium to the balance of payments. To his 
critics from the SRA, and in the military, Illia had returned to the corporatism of the 
first Peron government. Labour was co-opted with wage increases while a state 
agency, the Direction National de Abastecimiento (National Supply Office) 
controlled prices with spot checks on companies’ inventories in order to keep inflation
901down in an environment of rising demand. A National Grain Board which bought 
up wheat and sold it at a profit abroad was to many evidence that Illia intended to 
resuscitate LAPI and usurp control of the export sector.
In spite of efforts to keep prices under close supervision, the agricultural 
sector was able to wield its power by cutting back production in reaction to export 
taxes and unfavourable exchange rates. This not only strained Argentina’s reserves, 
but also drove up inflation, frustrating Illia’s efforts to keep prices under tight control.
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Illia was ultimately removed by the military in 1966 amid macroeconomic chaos and 
stagnating production. What came next was portrayed by its protagonists as the 
‘Argentine Revolution’, with the military junta that controlled government searching 
for a resumption of economic development and restoration of institutional 
normality. After an initial attempt to continue populist pro-labour policies, the 
soldier president general Juan Carlos Ongania appointed Adalbert Krieger Vasena as 
his economics minister. Policy then took a turn for the orthodox with greater emphasis 
on macroeconomic stability achieved through the reduction of demand and fiscal 
discipline. Government expenditure was slashed while utility rates and taxes were 
hiked in order to boost government revenues. When Krieger Vasena introduced a 
wage freeze in 1968, the purchasing power of Argentine popular classes went into 
reverse and organised labour adopted its preferred strategy of direct confrontation and 
civil disobedience. Acute unrest in the industrial city of Cordoba in May 1969 did 
irreperable damage to the government’s credibility and Krieger Vasena was promptly 
replaced.
Nevertheless, the military government which lasted until 1973 was 
characterised by social conflict and intensive lobbying by economic interest groups 
for concessions. The military itself was divided into factions sympathetic to one or 
other of the economic interests which resulted in three internal coups during the 
period. Ironically, a faction of the military targeted as potential support by the labour 
movement and certain factions representing local capital, was ideologically opposed 
to the liberal slant of Krieger Vasena’s economic policy. These were members of a 
powerful elitist club of conservative Catholics, the Atheneum of the Republic, who 
were outspoken admirers of Franco’s anti-liberal policies in Spain. Yet the 
Francoism they held in such high regard was of the type which was modified in the 
late 1950s. So perhaps, political discourse under the authoritarian Revolution 
Argentina resembled that of Spain. Different interests in society were represented 
within the inner circle of (the militarty) leadership so that policy could potentially 
have evolved through tightly regulated negotiation as it did in Spain. Unfortunately, 
the system was not bound together by recognition of the head of state’s authority or of 
the legitimacy of state institutions. If a faction of the military did not approve of the 
policies, they would strive to replace the president with an officer more sympathetic.
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So despite the fact that coups were internal, within the regime rather than episodes of 
nationwide political crisis, institutional continuity was not assured. It is also 
significant to note that the Spanish military was but one faction within the Franco 
corportatist state.
Recent work on the economic record of this period of Argentine history 
suggestst that opposition to policies intensified in spite of strong growth rate. 
Agricultural lobbies such as the SRA, for example, lamented export taxes which 
ranged between 9.5 and 25 per cent which they claimed were detrimental to 
exports.204 However, Gerchunoff and Llach show that agricultural production 
increased by more than 5 per cent per annum between 1960 and 1974, a phenomenon 
they attribute to the adoption of new technology by farmers. This in turn was reflected 
in greater export volumes and contributed to an overall trade surplus between 1963 
and 1973. Overall economic growth rates, meanwhile, outstripped those experienced 
in Europe and the United States during a period widely categorised as a golden age of 
expansion brought to an end by oil shocks after 1973.205
This suggests, therefore, that in Argentina’s conflict society, there is a problem 
of perception regarding economic performance. Impressive headline figures are 
insufficient because of a lack of state credibility and the fact that national rents 
including export revenues, are the prize sought after by economic factions. 
Appreciation of immediate performance does not mitigate insecurity about the future 
so that economic interests will continue attempts to capture as much as possible of the 
policymaking process and indeed national rents.
A central issue for the labour lobby that fomented the rise in political violence 
throughout the 1960s and early 1970s was continued proscription of Peronism. 
Elections in 1973 returned the Peronist party to power for the first time since 1955 
and Peron himself returned from exile to serve as president for the last year of his life. 
His third wife succeeded him when he died in 1974 until she was herself removed 
from office by the military in 1976. This second Peronist era, while less autarkic than 
the first, was unashamedly populist and resuscitated many of the corporatist alliances 
of the early 1950s. At its heart was a ‘social pact’ between the government, the CGE 
and the CGT, though political and economic pragmatism prevented the total exclusion 
of more liberal factions from the industrial and agricultural sectors. Nevertheless, the
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pact resulted in a price freeze alongside increased wages, which squeezed profit 
margins and alienated local capital. The alliance, therefore, was untenable. Economic 
instability and political violence prompted the military to seize control yet again in 
1976. Given the sense of degeneration, the junta led by general Jorge Videla put great 
emphasis on structural change which translated on the first concerted attack on the 
Gerschenkronian model of centrally planned industrial development. Though Krieger 
Vasena was ostensibly a liberal who sought to reduce the burden of the state sector, in 
particular inefficient state enterprises, his military superiors in the Ongania 
government had restricted the degree of austerity he was able to impose.
Videla appointed Jose Alfredo Martinez de Hoz, a steel magnate closely 
linked with the ULA as the new economics minister. As described in chapter 4, 
Martinez de Hoz attacked the closed economy model that had existed since the 1930s. 
The priorities were liberalisation of the economy and a reduction of the role of the 
state based on the minister’s full confidence in in the capability of market forces to 
allocate resources more efficiently than the state, which had hitherto adopted the 
role. In the eyes of the military, the political violence that beset the country was a 
result of ideological, political and economic distortions originating in the first Peron 
presidency. The military was now prepared to break with its own traditions of holding 
the state (of which it was a component part) as guardian of national destiny and 
sponsor of industrial growth, in part because of the extremity of Argentina’s social 
and economic breakdown. Groups advocating exclusion of Peronism from the 
political process and champions of liberal economic ideas therefore found a 
sympathetic audience in the armed forces. Yet like Krieger Vasena before him, 
Martinez de Hoz’s ability to impose monetary austerity was restricted by his military 
superiors in government who considered themselves to be fighting a civil war. A 
primary concern, therefore, was the potential radicalisation of labour so the 
economics minister was instructed to minimise any rise in unemployment. 
Furthermore, while Martinez de Hoz wished to cut government expenditure, the 
military budget was not to be touched.
Ultimately, these restrictions in addition to overtures made to labour prevented 
effective action against macroeconomic instability. Economic crisis and military
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humiliation in the Falklands War resulted in a return to democracy in 1983 with 
elections won by the Radical candidate Raul Alfonsin.207 The new government 
inherited an economy in deep crisis following virtual default on foreign debt in 1982 
and annual hyperinflation at more than 340 per cent. Though exports had grown under 
military rule, industry had declined which led to accusations that Martinez de Hoz had 
behaved according to class loyalty, favouring the traditional agro-exporting elites at 
the expense of industry.208 Alfonsin came to power with broad-based support having 
won votes from all the UCR’s rival parties.209 He initially pursued populist policies 
aimed at increasing demand in order to boost the domestic industrial sector. When this 
failed to bring about a significant improvement the government tried a new 
‘heterodox’ approach to tackle inflation. This improvised mixture of orthodox and 
structuralist policy involved tighter monetary policy, including a new currency fixed 
to the dollar, alongside wage and price freezes to tackle the ‘indexation’ of the 
economy.210 Yet again, economic lobby groups undermined the effectiveness of 
economic policy with demands for concessions. Agricultural producers were 
antagonised by the price freeze as well as taxes on exports while demands for wage 
increases by organised labour grew ever louder. The government’s ultimate response 
was to ease the wage freeze and allow prices to rise but this loosening of controls 
resulted in runaway inflation once more.
Elections in 1989 were won by the Peronist candidate Carlos Menem who 
initially conformed to the party’s populist tradition and pledged another heterodox 
attack on hyperinflation. But the failure of Menem’s initial policies led him to 
abandon his populist credentials and appoint a new economics minister, Domingo 
Cavallo in June 1991 who launched the ‘Convertibility Plan’ which used a currency 
board to calibrate the monetary base to the level of foreign currency assets. Menem 
simultaneously curtailed public spending and revamped the tax system to increase 
government revenues. The result was buoyant economic recovery and a return to
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single digit inflation. Meanwhile the successful democratic transition of power from 
the defeated Radical Party president Alfonsin to the Peronist candidate was the first 
such constitutionally sound process to take place since the 1920s.
But the victory against inflation came at a cost and is aptly described by Pastor
911and Wise as ‘hyperinflation replaced with hyper-unemployment.’ Policy 
insensitivity in sacking hundreds of thousands of government workers to reduce the 
state’s wage bill contributed to the social discontent that accompanied the eventual 
collapse of the model. Furthermore, wholesale privatisation of formerly sacrosanct 
‘national’ assets such as the oil industry, the utility companies and transport networks 
and their acquisition by foreign, often Spanish, multinationals was particularly galling 
to traditional nationalists from Menem’s own party.
Nevertheless, the reforms are regarded by some as a paradigm shift in 
Argentine political economy, representing a belated and permanent abandonment of 
the inward looking model adopted at least since the 1930s. This assumption rests on 
the idea that Martinez de Hoz’s policies, for all their liberal credentials, failed to make 
a significant dent on overall policy because of a failure to address interest group 
power to resist.212 On the other hand, the neo-liberal policies of the 1990s may 
represent little more than an upturn in the fortunes of the traditional elites to the 
detriment of popular classes, in particular organised labour.213 By extension they were 
a resumption of the liberalising effort initiated by Martinez de Hoz and deepened a 
process of concentration of wealth and ownership that began in 1976.214
Given the extent of the sell-off of the state sector, and the virtual impossibility 
of a Peron style expropriation and re-nationalisation, it appears that in terms of an end 
to state-led economic policy, the 1990s do represent a new paradigm. Following such 
a retreat of the state from the economy, both in its capacity as entrepreneur, investor 
and employer, there is arguably less scope for economic interests to capture or 
colonise agencies and further their own interests. Nevertheless, though labour as a 
coherent force was severely weakened by the end of full employment in the 1990s,
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this does not represent a permanent shift. Other interests were empowered and in 
particular, the era saw a rise in the influence of foreign capital as a group to be 
appeased by the government. Though the division of power and ability to capture 
national rents among Argentine economic interests has changed, the dynamic of 
negotiation between government and non-state interests has not.
Spain
Autarkic policy in Spain had exhausted itself by the end of the 1940s. The 
industrial growth that had occurred since the end of the Civil War was limited by its 
isolation. Tariff barriers, an impoverished domestic market with little purchasing 
power and ideological aversion to importing the capital goods necessary for 
modernisation of what were essentially smokestack industries, all served as an 
economic tourniquet. Fiscal policy had been subordinated to the government’s 
programme of industrial expansion and an ‘accommodating’ monetary policy 
whereby budget deficits were financed unconditionally by the Bank of Spain. The 
result was a rapidly expanding money supply so that the 1950s were characterised by 
rising inflation. Meanwhile, fixed multiple exchange rates that had formed the fabric 
of Francoist protectionism could not prevent a build-up of current account imbalances 
and by 1959, the regime was faced with a severe financial crisis and rapidly declining 
foreign exchange reserves. High inflation meant an increase in wage demands despite 
the ban on collective action and the period saw much heavy handed repression of civil 
disobedience.
So for the post-war recovery to continue, concessions needed to be made to 
the outside world. In the words of Carr “A moment had arrived in which the desire 
for industrialisation (had to be) reconciled with the conditions industrialisation 
demanded”.215 Put simply, it had become clear that foreign finance and capital goods 
were needed to continue Spain’s march to modernity. From the point of view of the 
ideologues within the regime, economic liberalisation was risky. While the increased 
affluence it promised might mitigate social discontent and prolong the life of the 
regime, a consequence of more broad based development might be empowerment of 
an industrial proletariat. Such a shift would hasten the demise of agrarian dominance. 
Landowning elites, who unlike in Argentina had a vested interest in protectionism,
215 Carr, R. Modem Spain p. 156
110
would be eclipsed in wealth and power by the other faction in Franco’s regime, the 
financial and industrial oligarchs whose interests were perhaps more internationally 
oriented. This is the point at which the power of the Falangists waned in the regime, 
usurped by more pragmatic and economically orthodox technocrats, some of whom 
were members of Opus Dei, a secretive Catholic lay group which adhered to an 
ideology of economic liberalism and strict moral standards.
The most conspicuous milestones in the economic opening of Franco’s Spain 
were its accession to the IMF in 1958 and the World Bank in 1959 although a mild 
opening had begun at the start of the decade with a series of bilateral agreements with 
the United States. The US was by this stage concentrating on the Cold War as a 
foreign policy priority and had started to nurture Spain as an ally and NATO member, 
providing aid in return for US bases on Spanish soil. Here lies more substance for the 
argument that Spanish reform was exogenously driven. Indeed, the economic crisis of 
the late 1950s was ultimately tackled with a stabilisation plan agreed with the IMF in 
1959, which it had only joined one year earlier (see chapter 3).
The 1959 Stabilisation Plan was designed to curb excess demand and inflation 
through devaluation of the hitherto overvalued peseta alongside a raft of inducements 
to capital inflows which it was hoped would solve the balance of payments deficit. 
Limits were placed on the swollen public sector’s expenditures, curbing a fiscal 
deficit, while constraints were imposed on money and credit expansion. With fiscal 
and monetary discipline came an opening of the economy, trade barriers were lifted 
and foreign investment courted. It was a thoroughly orthodox programme, highly 
successful in reducing annual inflation from 10 per cent in 1958 to 3 per cent in 1960. 
Foreign exchange reserves rose sharply enough to render the offer of IMF loans 
unnecessary and while the initial impact was recessionary (GNP growth was -0.5 per 
cent in 1960), growth rates reached 7 per cent in 1962.216 Economic opening was not 
absolute, however, and the outward looking policies were implemented under close 
government supervision. Prados and Sanz describe the 1960s as an era in which 
liberalisation was restricted by the pressure of interest groups resulting in a mixture of 
market and dirigiste economics 217 The Opus Dei period of government saw the 
implementation of various development ‘plans’, essentially a continuation of previous
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designs for growth based on centrally conceived national economic policy 
prescription. The plans created a system whereby firms negotiated with the 
government, promising to reach a defined production target in return for a variety of 
financial and fiscal aid over terms of four to eight years.
Much literature identifies the Opus Dei period as a turning point in Spain’s 
fortunes whereby Spain passed through an “invisible barrier which separates an
9 1Runderdeveloped nation from one capable of sustained economic growth.” 
Liberalisation increased access to capital goods from abroad, increasing productivity, 
while a devalued peseta boosted exports. With industrialisation came rapid 
urbanisation and the decade was characterised by an abandonment of the countryside 
as labour migrated to the cities. Furthermore, in excess of a million Spaniards 
emigrated to northern Europe and their remittances added to the foreign exchange 
being accumulated by the rapidly developing tourist industry and strengthened the 
balance o f payments. Enrique Fuentes Quintana highlights the 1959 Stabilisation Plan 
as the turning point in Spain’s development219
But though the Stabilisation Plan and industrial policies of the Opus Dei 
technocrats are held up by many as paradigm shift in Spain’s late 20th Century 
fortunes, the miracle was not without its limitations. While the regime congratulated 
itself, feeling vindicated by the progress made, the aforementioned development plans 
are now widely perceived to have retarded rather than catalysed growth. The cheap 
credit directed at firms by the state was unevenly distributed by both region and 
industrial sector, exacerbating asymmetries. Robert Harrison argues that they 
represented an ‘arbitrary’ scheme handsomely rewarding heavy industry favoured by 
the technocrats such as the steel and shipbuilding industries, while neglecting other
990crucial sectors such as food processing. The Hirschmanian aim to foster regional 
development was disrupted because schemes to establish new industries favoured 
areas that already had a modem infrastructure of roads, railways and schools and 
backwards peripheral regions were overlooked. Here there is a clear parallel with 
Hirschman’s view that growth is unbalanced so the state should favour specific 
sectors.
218 Anderson, C. The Political Economy o f  Modern Spain: Policy Making in an Authoritarian System, 
London, 1970. p.233
219 Fuentes-Quintana, E. ‘Tres Decenios de la Economia Espanola en Perspectiva’, in Garcla-Delgado, 
J.L. Espaha Economia, (Madrid 1988) p.2
220 Harrison, R. The Spanish Economy in the Twentieth Century, London 1985 p. 152
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Commentators less than enthusiastic about the Franco regime’s record 
regarding the Stabilisation Plan and the following economic miracle are not in short 
supply. Paul Preston, whose extensive work on Spain is pervaded with a distaste for 
the regime, argues that the development of the 1960s was almost accidental, as the 
over cautious intervention of Spanish planners could easily have stifled progress. The 
development that did occur was mostly a consequence of the effect of repressive 
labour legislation in the 1940s ensuring a cheap workforce cowed into submission, a 
criticism also aimed at Latin American industrialisation presided over by 
‘bureaucratic authoritarian regimes’. The other important factors in the miracle were 
receipts from emigrants, tourist spending and foreign direct investment attracted by
• * 9 9 1an anti communist, anti union regime. These latter exogenous factors would 
suggest that in spite of the propaganda, Spain’s success in the years following the 
Stabilisation Plan of 1959 was not attributable to enlightened policy.
On the other hand, a focus on the tourist industry was a component part of the 
Opus Dei faction’s developmental aspirations and was consciously nurtured by the 
state with the aid of foreign investment as a means to attract hard currency. 
Furthermore, state-led investment in the tourist industry focused on Spain’s periphery 
- the underdeveloped Mediterranean coast, Andalusia and the Balearic and Canary 
islands, far from the industries of Barcelona, Bilbao and Madrid. Given that Spam’s 
main selling point to the north Europeans of the time was a benign climate, it could 
even be taken as a state-led, developmentalist exploitation of a natural resource. The 
charge that the effects of misguided policy were mitigated by emigrant remittances 
and therefore inadvertent is also vulnerable to scrutiny, given that the regime actively 
encouraged emigration as an escape valve for an excess supply of labour, thus 
reducing pressure on the labour market and the risk of civil unrest. It may, however, 
be attributing too much foresight to the technocratic planners of Franco’s government 
to suggest that it was a conscious attempt to ensure a stream of foreign currency into 
the economy.
Industrialisation itself did provide a powerful engine for the Spanish economy 
in its own right throughout the 1960s. Following the liberalisation of 1959, Spanish 
industry started to benefit from high levels of technology transfer and imports of raw 
materials, semi-manufactured and capital goods comprised over three quarters of total
221 Preston, P, The Triumph ofDemocrac in Spain, London, 2001, pp.6-7
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purchases from abroad by 1970. Moreover, between 1961 and 1970, exports of
industrial equipment made in Spain increased threefold to US$229 million compared
222with US$17 million at the start of the decade. Meanwhile, the government 
introduced a variety of incentives to Spanish entrepreneurs to encourage exports, 
including tax credits, rebates of export duties and the insurance of export risk. This 
latter feature fits well with Hirschman’s idea, that the state can shoulder the risk 
associated with entrepreneurship in a backwards economy in order to stimulate a 
growth spurt.
The new economy created a new Spain, the most conspicuous feature of 
which was a massive transfer of financial and human resources away from their 
traditional base in agriculture. With this restructuring came new prosperity that 
introduced new pressures on the regime, apparently unforeseen given that the Opus 
Dei vision had perceived rapid growth as a means to dissipate social tension. To 
borrow the language of Merigo’s analysis, the growth of the 1960s was ‘self 
destructive’ as far as the regime was concerned because it made the population less 
inclined to accept the authoritarian regime.223 In short, the aspirations of the masses 
were higher. This view is backed up by Preston who believes economic liberalisation, 
prosperity and its consequences led to stresses and contradictions within the regime 
and rendered its ideologies and authoritarian leanings obsolete. “Economic growth in 
the 1960s was something of a political time bomb,” he writes.224 The technocrats had 
assumed economic liberalisation would create sufficient affluence to deflect 
opposition but in implementing such successful policies, the regime acquiesced in the 
creation of a mass industrial proletariat and a swollen middle class whose loyalty was 
dependent on continued prosperity. It is evidently difficult to maintain an ‘antiquated’ 
political structure in the context of rising prosperity and modernisation. Carr believes 
that a ‘new’ middle class emerged, distinct in its values and priorities to the ‘old’ 
middle class of the previous generation, with its eye across the Pyrenees and less 
inclined to tolerate an absence of political pluralism and a paternal state. The conflict, 
therefore, was between generations. “Parents lose authority in industrial societies,” 
Carr writes.225 In spite of the aspirations of the new society, and the shifting dynamic 
of economic power from landed elite to indutrial bourgeoisie associated with
222 Harrison, R. The Spanish Economy, p. 160
223 Merigo, E. ‘Spain’, in Boltho, A. (ed.) The European Economy: Growth and Crisis, Oxford, 1982
224 Preston, P, The Truimph o f  Democracy, p. 11
225 Carr, R. Modem Spain, 1875-1980, Oxford, 1980, p. 162
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industrialisation, there was no crisis of state credibility and the regime retained 
control until Franco’s death. Indeed, though new groups were created and empowered, 
the arena for negotiation within the state between conflicting interests remained solid 
and there was never a serious challenge to state authority.
The boom years closed with the first oil shock of 1973 to which Spain was 
especially vulnerable because development policy had focussed on heavy industry, 
raising the energy intensity of output. This meant a deterioration in Spain’s terms of 
trade resulting from rising energy import prices. Essentially, the oil shock exposed 
shortcomings in the country’s development path that had hitherto been masked by the 
rapid growth of the economy. In spite of the ‘orthodox’ nature of the 1959 
Stabilisation Plan and protracted liberalisation, the economy remained intertwined 
with the state. The enterprise sector, comprising small and medium sized firms with 
weak financial and technological structures, was still protected from foreign 
competition by price controls and import barriers. Meanwhile, the rigidity of the 
labour market and wage indexation meant that lay-offs and wage adjustment were 
near impossible.
In short, the economy was not manoeuvrable in the face of a shock and 
political rigidities meant the government was slow to act. Franco’s death in 1975 and 
the subsequent transition to democracy following elections in 1977 might have 
permitted a change in direction and more concerted action. However, there was a very 
real threat that conservative elements in the armed forces would step in and put an 
abrupt end to democratisation so reform had to be implemented with utmost caution 
making concessions to all interest groups to prevent any civil disorder that would 
vindicate Francoist predictions of chaos without the heavy disciplining hand of 
authoritarianism.
Hence there was a recognition by both Leftist and Rightist members of the 
new political establishment that demands needed to be tempered in order that a return 
to economic stability might be achieved that would vindicate the viability of Spain’s 
new pluralism. The response was the so-called Moncloa Pacts, a mix of wage 
restraint and fiscal reform which incorporated heavier wealth and income taxes, while 
inflation was tackled with tighter monetary policy. Meanwhile the peseta was 
devalued by 20 per cent in order to boost exports. It was the wage policy that 
illustrated the concessionary mood of the negotiators. In implementing a 22 per cent 
wage ceiling, slightly lower than the rate of inflation, the government promised in
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return a reduction of inflation to 15 per cent by the end of 1978, which it was to 
achieve with tighter monetary policy. Ostensibly this settlement embodies the 
negotiated nature of Spain’s political and economic transition and is often cited as an 
emphasis on agreement, consent and compromise that permitted the substitution of 
one regime for another.
However, it does not represent a negotiation between the government and 
interest groups or associations over economic policy. The administration of prime 
minister Suarez had refused to consult the newly legalised trade unions on wage 
policy but the unions in the event agreed to recommend wage restraint to their 
members as a means of containing unemployment (see chapter 4).
The accords are not without their detractors. To critics, the Moncloa Pacts 
made the most concessions to the old elites. At heart, the reform was a “social pact
997based on austerity in the interest of capitalist recovery”. The agreements thus 
favoured the capitalist class and the ‘bourgeois government’. While the result was an 
elimination of the balance of payments deficit, the reduction of inflation to 16 per 
cent and long overdue fiscal reform, the agreements brought few benefits to the 
working classes who had been denied meaningful representation at the negotiating 
table and were subject to the wage restraints.
Nevertheless, the reforms enshrined an institutional and legal continuity from 
one regime to the next and there was no radical departure from the economic policies 
pursued by the old regime. Bodies such as the INI, albeit under a different name, 
remain instruments of government industrial policy to this day. The continuity of 
legal institutions and a high degree of formal respect for the legality of Franco’s 
system acted as a framework for reform, ensuring that it was carried out through pact 
and negotiation albeit within the inner sanctum of the political elite.
The Socialist government of Felipe Gonzalez, elected to power in 1982, 
retained a fastidious regard for institutional and legal continuity in the name of 
stability and order.228 Though credited with a neo-liberal structural adjustment o f the
226 Maravall, J.M. and Santamaria, J. ‘Political Change in Spain and the Prospects for Democracy’ in 
O’Donnell, G, Schmitter and Whitehead, L. Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe, 
London, 1986 p.73
227 Aguilar, S. Bartelo, A. Muniesa, B. Regio, A. Vidal-Villa, J.M. ‘Notes on the Economy and Popular 
Movements in the Transition’, in Abel, C and Torrents, N. Spain: Conditional Democracy, (London 
1984) p. 128
228 Petras, J. ‘Spanish Socialism: The Politics o f  Neo-Liberalism’ in : Kurth, W. and Petras (eds.) 
Mediterranean Paradoxes, Oxford 1993 pp.97-98
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Spanish economy, the depth of the reforms is questionable. On gaining power, the 
new government inherited a political crisis, engendered by the collapse of the centrist 
UCD party which had held power since Franco’s death. Furthermore, the previous 
year a disgruntled conservative Civil Guard officer had staged an abortive coup 
attempt. The sense of political instability had in turn created an economic crisis as 
foreign capital had taken fright resulting in a current account deficit and low foreign 
currency reserves. Gonzalez appointed a new Finance Minister, Miguel Boyer, a 
former central bank economist known for his economically orthodox views. Thus the 
response to macroeconomic instability was ostensibly monetarist. Restrictive 
monetary and fiscal policies were implemented to regain budgetary equilibrium while 
a devalued currency boosted exports and replenished currency reserves. Labour 
market liberalisation was offset by sweeteners offered to union leaders to continue 
with existing incomes policy though it became possible to employ people on part time 
or temporary contracts.229 At the same time, however, Gonzalez was moving to 
distance his party from the unions (see chapter 5)
Structural adjustment was a centrepiece of the new government’s attempt to 
qualify for membership of the European Economic Community. A much touted 
programme to privatise Spain’s state enterprises was presented as an important step 
towards de-monopolisation and market liberalisation. Nevertheless, liberalisation was 
limited and closely managed.230 Most privatisations of state enterprises were often 
partial, the monopolies remained in place and the chief executives of the reshaped 
stock market listed firms are political appointees to this day. Spaniards still look to the 
state to play an overarching role in economic and social life. The economy at the turn 
of the millennium remained shaped by a dirigisme that had not entirely vanished and 
in spite of an impressive economic record in terms of GDP growth as much as rising 
living standards, Spain is still a crony capitalist economy. In short Spain presents us 
with a model of a mixed system of economic orthodoxy that coexists within the 
confines of a centralist and protectionist tradition.231 Spain is not a post corporatist 
system, neither is it neo-corporatist. The ‘social concertations’ that characterised
229 De La Dehesa, G. ‘Spain’ in Williamson, J. (ed.) The Political Economy o f  Economic Policy Reform, 
(Washington 1994)
230 Etchemendy, S, ‘Revamping the Weak, Protecting the Strong and Managing Privatisation’: 
Governing Globalisation in the Spanish Takeoff, Comparative Political Studies Vol.37(6) August 
2004
231 See: Fuentes-Quintana, E. El Modelo de Economia Abierta y  el Modelo Castizo en el Desarrollo 
Economico de la Espaha de los A nos 90, Zaragoza, 1995
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responses to macroeconomic instability in the 1970s represented the continuity of the 
old structures albeit through involvement of previously outlawed political parties. The 
shocks that did occur were in the early period tempered by the strength of old 
expansionist ideologies that perceived high inflation as an unfortunate side effect of 
an overwhelmingly positive process, namely economic growth. Following the demise 
o f the dictatorship, adjustment packages were only applied after painstaking 
negotiation between political groups which claimed to represent economic interests, 
the fear being that political unrest resulting from IMF style austerity would stir the 
military into rescinding the new democracy. Thus a deeply ingrained corporatism has 
not vanished from the Spanish political economy. The threat of violence kept change 
at a minimum until the 1980s but this alone does not account for its survival.
On the other hand Argentine political economy is best understood as a power 
struggle perceived by the protagonists -  perpetually conflicting social groups -  as a 
zero sum game where gain by one is necessarily at the expense of the other. To 
borrow the terminology of R. Mallon and Juan Sourouille (himself a one-time 
economics minister) Argentina is a ‘conflict society’ and an inability by policymakers 
to recognise that when formulating policy is at the foundation of its industrial ‘semi­
stagnation’.232
232 Mallon, R. and Sourouille, J. Economic Policymaking in a Conflict Society: The Argentine Case, 
London 1975, p.4
Chapter 3:
The Crisis of Autarkic Exhaustion 1957-1960.
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This chapter applies the analytical approach elaborated in the early sections of the thesis to a 
comparison of almost simultaneous economic reform programmes in Argentina and Spain in the 
late 1950s. Both sets of reforms incorporated IMF backed macroeconomic stabilisations centred on 
fiscal restraint and monetary tightening intended to address imbalances associated with the 
exhaustion of autarkic experiments in forced industrialisation in the 1940s and 1950s. Both 
packages were components of broader reforms of each country’s development model associated 
with liberalisation of the economy and encouraging foreign investment. In each case 
implementation was imperfect, where orthodox reforms were tempered to appease factional 
pressures after intensive lobbying by interests. In spite of these parallels, the longer term legacy of 
the programmes differed considerably. The Spanish reforms are commonly identified as the catalyst 
for an economic miracle lasting until the mid 1970s that added credibility to the government and 
prolonged the Franco dictatorship. In Argentina, however, the reforms failed to overcome resistance 
within the state and civil society and their architect, president Arturo Frondizi, was removed from 
office by the military in a context of widespread disenchantment with his economic record.
This section builds on the argument outlined in earlier chapters that the structure of the 
Spanish dictatorship, where different departments of government, while influenced by competing 
factions and interest groups, were subordinated to the binding and all powerful dictator. Each 
faction represented directly or indirectly the interests of principal economic groups and 
policymaking was characterised by a negotiation between these groups within the state and 
arbitrated by the dictator. In Argentina, on the other hand, civil society was similarly divided but 
organised into strong associational groups which were highly organised and wielded considerable 
bargaining power. This forced the executive to make bilateral pacts with as many conflicting groups 
as possible to achieve his objectives until the web of consensus collapsed and the government was 
deposed. The comparison examined in this chapter therefore, illustrates how the former scenario 
permits greater political stability and institutional continuity which in themselves are public goods 
beneficial to economic growth. The latter is less ordered so an outwardly similar economic situation 
conceals profound disorder and less rigid hierarchies in place.
The chapter, because it examines policies centred on simultaneous IMF backed stabilisations 
also has implications for the debate surrounding conditionality and ownership of loans and rescue 
packages bestowed by multilateral institutions. A consensus has emerged in the literature 
surrounding the debate that ‘ownership,’ whereby the recipient government controls the policy 
surrounding the plan, is a prerequisite for success.1 The implications of this study are that 
‘ownership’ was in evidence in each case as neither, as is argued in this section, fully subscribed to
1 IMF Policy Development and Review Department, Strengthening Country Ownership o f  Fund-Supported 
Programmes, Washington DC, Dec 5 2001, p.6
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the type of conditions required by the IMF in the long term. Unorthodox elements in government 
and civil society blocked full reform as the IMF would have designed it. Recent work from the 
Wold Bank that examines the Spanish episode addressed in this chapter suggests the Fund 
identified the reformers and decided to back them up, aware that they were a faction within an 
unorthodox government.2 The argument here suggests the Fund may have approached the 
Argentine reformers in the same way but erroneously identified the president as someone capable of 
implementing meaningful reform. President Frondizi courted the IMF, with the help of his 
genuinely orthodox economy minister Alvaro Alsogaray, but was in truth seeking little more than 
high profile endorsement of his economic and financial capabilities in order to increase his 
bargaining power when negotiating a bilateral alliance with foreign capital.
Why was this moment in history chosen as an appropriate case study in particular? From an 
institutional and ideological point of view, Spain and Argentina shared much in common and faced 
similar challenges during the period under scrutiny here. The economic models of the early Franco 
dictatorship before 1957 and the Peron presidency were both inspired by nationalism and a quest for 
national autonomy from foreign capital. They also prioritised a push for modernisation through 
import substitution, state patronage of a nascent industrial sector and increased purchasing power 
for an urban wage earning proletariat. This section assesses each country’s experience of adjusting 
the development model following exhaustion of their respective autarkic experiment. The reforms 
imposed in the late 1950s to address fiscal imbalances and monetary instability centred on similar 
ideas of continued, centrally planned industrial development complemented by hitherto shunned 
foreign capital. This in itself presented a challenge to government because it would provoke 
opposition from both nationalist elements in the military and certain sectors of business concerned 
about increased foreign competition. Furthermore, each case involved an orthodox stabilisation, in 
part to convince foreign capital of sound economic credentials but also to improve the balance of 
payments. Because this translates into falls in output, and declines in real wages for workers, 
resistance from popular sectors would challenge political stability.
Each case represents a counterfactual to the other, regarding different levels of state 
capability addressing comparable problems with closely related antecedents but with divergent 
long-term consequences. The two sections in this chapter comprise narrative accounts of each 
country’s experience during the late 1950s comparing the theoretically conceived plans of 
technocratic planners with the realities of the reforms. The principal aim is to illustrate how policy 
reform was a result of bargaining between actors whereby negotiation in Argentina took place 
between the government and economic interest groups whereas in Spain these interests were
2 Calvo Gonzalez, O. ‘Ownership and Conditionality in IMF Sponsored Programs’ 2006, Unpublished World Bank 
Paper.
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represented by factions within the state. The chapter is divided into two parts corresponding with 
the case studies, which in turn begin with an overview of the reformers’ intentions followed by 
accounts of the successes and failures of the respective economic policies. A concluding section 
summarises the issues raised in the comparison.
Argentina:
Arturo Frondizi, the democratically elected president who served from 1958 to 1962, 
attempted a fundamental transformation of the Argentine economy with a state-led drive towards 
industrial self sufficiency that harnessed foreign capital as a subordinate partner. But his plan for 
industrial ‘deepening’ was likely from the start to be at odds with the wishes of much of society. 
From the point of view of the landowning class, it represented a continuation of the redistribution of 
income away from rural interests, the owners of cattle and land, to urban sectors prioritised as a 
constituency of support by Peron. To nationalist elements in the military and among the popular 
classes who had embraced the rhetoric of their deposed icon Peron during the late 1940s, the 
involvement of foreign capital was a threat to economic sovereignty. Furthermore, to attract the 
necessary foreign investment would require some fiscal and monetary discipline in order to lend the 
regime economic credibility which would impact the living standards of the salaried classes.
Nevertheless, Frondizi aspired to construct a new national capitalism to supersede the zero 
sum game of Argentine discourse. To achieve this he attempted to build alliances between classes 
and interest groups as an alternative to the situation where these groups strove against one another 
to capture policy and shape it towards their interests. However, given the conflicting interests o f 
powerful social groups with whom the regime wished to form pacts, the president adopted a 
chameleonic approach of short-term and inconsistent pledges to buy temporary support rather than 
persuading groups that his plan had their long-term interests at heart. A characteristic of Frondizi’s 
tenure, therefore, is that his developmentalist model was not spelt out to Argentines beforehand so it 
was never endorsed by any particular sector of society and much less society as a whole. Thus 
alliances were built on vague assurances and false promises, many of which were rescinded later. In 
respect of some of the model’s principal features, Frondizi remained coy until the moment of 
implementation and policy often contradicted previous statements of belief.
Commentators have described these apparent changes in direction variously as “astute” 
political manoeuvring3 and a genuine change of mind or “ideological transformation”.4 These 
swings, particularly an apparent contradiction between nationalist rhetoric and later courting of
3 Mallon and Sourrouille, Economic Policymaking in a Conflict Society: The Argentine Case, London 1975 p. 19
4 Sikkink, K. Ideas and Institutions, Ithaca, 1991, p.74
122
foreign capital are often cited as pivotal to Frondizi’s eventual discrediting and downfall.5 To Celia 
Szusterman, the period represents a failure of institution building on account of inability to 
dismantle inherited ‘prejudice and demagoguery.’ The clandestine implementation of policy, 
whereby profound shifts in priority were implemented without warning, meant the regime could be 
accused of ‘ruthlessness’ in its approach, and disappointment quickly turned to bitterness and 
anger.6 This represents a portrayal of the era as missed opportunity, whereby the government failed 
to diffuse Peronism as a political force and keep the military in their barracks. Another school in the 
literature dismisses the regime as doomed from the outset. The military government may have 
stepped down but the threat that they might dismantle the new democracy remained. Thus Frondizi 
was constrained not just by the social conflicts of Argentine society, but was also under the shadow 
of the military watching for excessive concessions to Peronism or even Communism.7 A related 
interpretation focuses on the poor economics of developmentalism with its ‘elephantitis of the state*, 
inefficient, protected industry and inflationary public spending.8 Developmentalism was thus a 
long-term approach to policy that was brought down by its own shortcomings.9 Inevitably, critics, 
both contemporary to the events and since, accused the regime of paving the way for foreign 
domination of the economy via the entry of transnational corporations, a powerful insult in 
Argentine political debate10 The view expressed here is that appeasement of different groups and 
semi clandestine changes in policy direction reflected an attempt to implement a new economic 
model by brokering a pact between the State and two forces at play in the Argentine political 
economy: industry and labour. A third and more controversial pact was also formed with foreign 
capital but the measures required to seal this jeopardised the other two alliances. This section 
continues with a brief outline of the structure of Frondizi’s attempt at a social alliance followed by a 
narrative account of the main incidents of policy reform during the period.
The ‘National Movement.
Frondizi was intent on steering a path rejected by all existing political groups and formed his 
own splinter of the Radical Party so that he should remain unconstrained by the dogma of the 
traditional branch while campaigning for election in 1958.11 On assuming power he discarded even 
this bespoke party to free his hand in negotiating pacts with interest groups and avoid political
5 Schvarzer, La industria que supimos conseguir, 1996 pp. 224-5
6 Szusterman, C. Frondizi and the Politics o f  Developmentalism in Argentina 1955-62, London 1993
7 See Gerchunoff and Llach, El Ciclo de la Ilusion y el Desencanto, Buenos Aires, 1998 p.245
8 Lewis, P The Crisis o f  Argentine Capitalism, Chapel Hill, 1990 p.258
9 See: Petrecolla, A Unbalanced Development 1958 -  62 in Di Telia and Dombusch (eds.) The Political Economy o f  
Argentina 1946-83, Oxford 1989 p. 108
10 See Katz and Kosacoff, El Proceso de Industrializacion en la Argentina: Evolucion, Retroceso y  Prospectiva, 
Buenos Aires, 1989;
11 Sikkink, 1991 p.85,
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challenges to his authority. The entire party system was sidelined and any measures Frondizi 
thought might encounter parliamentary opposition were put into effect by decree. No part of his 
economic reforms, however controversial were sent through Congress and the cabinet convened 
only twice during his first year in office.12 The alliance building began while electioneering in 1958, 
which included a high risk and secret pact with the exiled Peron to secure the labour vote in return 
for legalisation of the Peronist movement and other concessions. Rhetorically, Frondizi put great 
emphasis on a ‘national movement’ calling on Argentines to tolerate short-term sacrifice in order to 
guarantee longer term national greatness and autonomy. What he envisioned was a three-way effort 
shared between the State, labour and industrialists, each assigned a particular role in the equation. 
The State was to act as the chief planner of development and enforcer of stability. Industrialists 
were to stimulate productivity by adhering to the dictates of the central plan and supervising the 
modernisation of plants. Labour represented the most basic contributor to increased productivity 
and were to be nurtured as a group through augmentation of skills levels. The three way alliance 
would lie at the heart of the national project to increase productivity and ensure the modernisation 
of the Argentine economy.13 Frondizi was more coy about a fourth partner, foreign capital, which 
was to be courted as a source of investment and expertise for the industrial expansion he had in 
mind. There were powerful factions within his proposed national alliance opposed to the concept.
To attract foreign capital would require action not in the interests of labour, namely a degree of 
monetary discipline, which would translate into falling real wages, to persuade investors of 
Argentina’s sound economic credentials and financial responsibility. Some sections of business, 
meanwhile, had a vested interest in the continuation of discriminatory policies regarding foreign 
entry to the Argentine market because of concerns about having to compete with superior foreign 
manufactures. In addition, a politicised and vehemently anti-Peron military which had just 
relinquished power and retained deep suspicions about any overtures to labour groups needed to be 
placated. There was a potential for military objections to the involvement of foreign capital in 
certain ‘strategic’ sectors of the economy such as the oil or steel industries.
12 The Economist, April 25 1959, p.349. Frondizi Seeks New Friends.
13 Frondizi, Algunos Aspectos del Pensamiento Economico Radical, in: Frondizi et al ‘UCR Intransigente, Definiciones 
Radicales, 2nd edition, Buenos Aires 1958, p .130
Figure 3.1: Frondizi’s attempted three-way alliance between the state and two factions of civil society and 
the fourth deal with foreign capital.
State Foreign Capital
Labour Industry
Initially, Frondizi appeared to master the intricacies of managing such a precarious web of 
treaties. Decisions in the early months of his presidency reflected payment of political debts 
incurred while canvassing support but also evidenced limitations on the government’s sense of 
obligation to particular interests. The purchase of a British aircraft carrier was widely understood to 
be repayment to the navy for its allegiance, for example.14 In reality, the alliances were bilateral, 
between central government and each agent but in appeasing one, Frondizi necessarily antagonised 
the other and failed to reconcile interests. Measures were taken and rhetoric adjusted to placate 
forces in order to buy more time for the new model to be embedded and produce tangible results. 
This vindication, it was hoped, would reinforce the alliance and in turn consolidate the new model. 
Ultimately, however, the alliance failed and Frondizi fell foul of the social sensitivities of all three 
forces as well as the groups excluded from the alliance; the landowning class and the military. 
Frondizi came to power on a democratic mandate and inherited a society that was irredeemably 
divided so any attempt at social concertation was likely to be stillborn.15 One year after Frondizi 
took office The Economist appraised his success in building consensus in managing conflicting 
demands by concluding that: “every man is out for himself and most are against the president”.16 
What this meant was failure to implement a well coordinated attack on all factors at work in 
economic instability. This indicates a lack of discipline identified as key to success of an 
industrialisation policy by Amsden17 In the model, summarised in the introduction to this thesis, it 
falls on the ‘disciplinarian’ state to impose the conditionality of high performance standards on 
subsidy allocation. If much is expected of subsidised industry by the state, then society ultimately
14 The Economist, September 20 1958, p.950, President Frondizi’s Tightrope
15 Personal interview with Aldo Ferrer, Minister o f Economy and Finance for Buenos Aires Province 1958-1960, 19th 
April 2005, “The country was irredeemably divided in the 1950s... too divided to form pacts successfully. ”
16 The Economist, July 4, 1959 p. 19, President Under Pressure
17 Amsden, A ‘A Theory o f Government Intervention in Late Industrialisation’ in Putterman, L and Rueschemeyer, D 
(eds.) State and Market in Development: Synergy or Rivalry, Boulder, 1992
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expects more of the state because the performance of bureaucrats involved in choosing which firms 
to subsidise can be judged. This discipline was absent in Argentina as shown by the lack of policy 
coordination, all the more crucial because of the fractious nature of Argentine society and its 
associated interest group pressures. It also meant a lack of coordination in implementation of the 
developmentalist ideal. Policy was fragmented with no single organization charged with 
administration of plans. Different sectors of the economy were promoted by specific Secretariats 
with little coordination between them. For example, trade policy was split between a Secretariat of 
Foreign Trade and an Advisory Committee on Imports. The remit of each overlapped with an 
assigned role of the Central Bank which considered the effect of trade on the balance of payments. 
Financial matters meanwhile were the shared domain of the Central Bank and the Banco Industrial, 
both concerned with distribution of industrial credit while the Ministry of Finance was charged with 
overseeing the budget implications of tax privileges for industrial promotion and of levels of tariffs 
and surcharges on imports, in turn conflicting with the Advisory Committee on Imports. A 
permanent planning department was set up within the Office of the Presidency, with responsibility 
to define national economic objectives but exercised little real control over a disparate and fractious 
state sector.18 Policy implementation divided between a myriad of committees, secretariats and 
ministries reflects the weakness of state institutions and the realities of a system defined by direct 
negotiation between executive and interest groups.
Broadly speaking, the period can be divided into three distinct phases reflecting the shifting 
priorities of Frondizi’s alliance building. The first of these is the period leading up to his election 
and was characterised by overtures to labour and clandestine courting of Peron himself in order to 
secure the workers’ vote. Following Frondizi’s election in early 1958, and the appointment of his 
ideological mentor Rogelio Frigerio as a special adviser and de facto economics minister, the 
regime stayed true to its developmentalist ideals and pursued rapid ‘vertical’ industrialisation. The 
government initially sought to repay the Peronists for their electoral support, with concessions such 
as a generous initial wage policy and an end to government interference in the leadership decisions 
of Peronist unions. But while fiscal policy was in this early phase expansionist, by now it was clear 
that the favoured faction was business. Spending was financed through lines of credit from both the 
Central Bank and the Industrial Credit Bank, which pleased the business community. Such fiscal 
indiscipline resulted in serious budgetary deficits and rising inflation, which required a stabilisation 
plan in early 1959 designed with the approval of the IMF which Argentina had joined three years 
previously. This plan marked the start of the third phase in which policy was nominally more
18 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), Development (World Bank) Internal 
Memorandum, Current Economic Position and Prospects o f  Argentina, Annex IV: ‘Industry’, May 5 1965, p. 15 and 
Altimir, O. Santamaria, H. and Sourouille, J. ‘Los instrumentos de promotion industrial en la posguerra’, Desarrollo 
Economico, 1966-7 No.s 21 -24.
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subordinated to economic discipline than political ideology. It also saw the exit of Frigerio and 
appointment of the more economically orthodox Alvaro Alsogaray as economics minister in June, 
an outspoken critic of the developmentalist ideal. The apparent switch within a single 
administration from industrial expansionism to economic liberalism, neither of which had the 
explicit approval from the public, resulted in alienation of both labour and some sections of 
business. Wage earning labour saw their purchasing power and living standards decline as a result 
of the IMF inspired austerity while business sectors were antagonised by the sudden scarcity of 
credit. Frondizi struggled to maintain his pacts and appease popular sectors by restricting as far as 
possible the recommended contractions, much to the exasperation of his ‘liberal’ economics 
minister Alsogaray. But discord was by now widespread and pervaded society. The president had 
failed on an important pledge from the secret alliance with Peron to legalise the Justicialista party 
and the pact had broken down. Increasing labour unrest over pay in an inflationary environment left 
the administration increasingly beleaguered. When Frondizi finally allowed the Peronists to run in 
elections in 1962, this antagonised forces already balking at the apparently relentless penetration of 
foreign capital into the national ‘heritage’. Finally, Frondizi was removed from office by the 
military who had arguably never permitted him full political autonomy after relinquishing power in 
1958.19
How to interpret the apparent division of the government into distinct and contradictory 
phases? The shift from expansionism to fiscal discipline is frequently interpreted as a characteristic 
cycle that reflects Argentina’s social polarisation between groups and alliances which hold 
conflicting economic priorities. Thus a period of expansion and rising consumption, that satisfies 
popular sectors, provokes a balance of payments squeeze. The response is devaluation of the 
currency and consequent rises in the price of food, favouring agro-exporting elites, but penalising 
wage earning consumers. In other words different phases of the cycle reflect and interact with 
shifting fortunes in each group’s struggle for power. Other interpretations suggest the Stabilisation 
Plan and associated IMF standby loan allowed deceleration of the inflationary cycle thus permitting 
renewal of the previous expansive process. This time, however, the developmentalist experiment 
has greater international credibility and attracts a massive influx of foreign capital with a less 
regulated economy than in early 1950s.21 In other words, foreign investment was a foundation of 
the vision so the Stabilisation Plan was used as a convenient reassurance to foreign capital. This 
chapter adopts an approach broadly in line with this latter argument. The Stabilisation Plan was a 
means to harness credibility and foment the alliance with foreign capital. Likewise the appointment
19 See Potash, R. The Army and Politics in Argentina 1945-1962, Stanford, 1980, p.272
20 See O’Donnell, G. ‘State and Alliances in Argentina 1956-76, Journal o f  Development Studies, V ol.15:1 (1978).
21 See: Katz & Kosacoff, El Proceso de Industrializacion en la Argentina: Evolucion, Retroceso y  Prespectiva, Buenos 
Aires 1989; And: Sikkink, 1991.
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of Alsogaray, a pro business economics minister was calculated to appease potential foreign
*.7“7investors but also bourgeois groups and the military within Argentina. The Plan, while 
deflationary and the root of many social tensions was ultimately not implemented in the manner in 
which the IMF would have liked however. Frondizi was simultaneously attempting to consolidate 
his relationship with labour, another component in his alliance to build a new capitalism. The main 
premise presented here is that from a purely ideological perspective, Frondizi could boast some 
success in that by the time of his overthrow, Argentina could claim the diversified industrial base he 
had set out to achieve. However, the pact Frondizi had pursued failed and he was deposed when the 
military concluded he had conceded too much to the Peronists. Frondizi had failed to work out a 
viable relationship with the armed forces that would overcome the mutual suspicion that was a 
legacy from Argentina’s immediate past. He had attempted to pursue an alternative to the 
authoritarianism of previous regimes in building a modem capitalism, through co-opting otherwise 
conflicting groups. His government lacked the institutional strength and credibility to carry this out 
and was built on inherently weak accords with widely disparate interest groups.
Particularly explosive in the Argentine political discourse at the time of Frondizi’s 
electioneering was the question of the country’s economic relationship with the rest of the world in 
terms of both capital and trade. Regarding the former, economic nationalism remained a potent 
force in Argentine discourse, with elements of both labour and the business class ideologically in 
favour of excluding foreign ownership from Argentina’s economy. On the subject of foreign 
investment, Frondizi was clear during his electioneering of the need to distinguish between capital 
that complemented Argentina’s resources and that which was extractive and exploitative. In an 
interview with Que, magazine, Frondizi stated that while Argentina’s abundance of natural 
resources meant it was capable of self sufficiency, this would mean slower economic expansion 
than if external capital was brought in to add impetus to the development process. But the 
relationship with that capital needed to be redefined. Traditional foreign investment comprised that 
which countries at the ‘centre’ were in the habit of bestowing on their colonies or other 
underdeveloped nations as a means to “incorporate them effectively as dominions”. On the other 
hand, foreign capital was potentially a new source of wealth to create jobs and boost living 
standards. A boost, in other words, to a nationally integrated process.24 This would suggest, that a 
full 18 months before his election, Frondizi was explicit about his desire to include foreign capital 
in his policies should he be elected.
Much of Frondizi’s discourse at this time was defined by opposition to the military 
government that had deposed Peron in 1955. The regime had set out to dismantle the Peronist
22 The Economist, January 9 1960, p i 19 Argentina’s Year o f  Austerity.
23 Potash, 1980, p.272.
24 Que Sucedio en Siete Dias, no. 112, 8 January 1957, p.l 7, 'Dice Arturo Frondizi'
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legacy and reshape the economy. The man invited to diagnose and treat the problem was none other 
than Raul Prebisch, secretary general of CEPAL. The prescriptive Plan, published in January 1956, 
focused on “healthy money” or monetary stability in order to boost national savings and attract 
foreign investment. The aim was also to enable Argentine industries to purchase capital goods and 
equipment from abroad in order to upgrade their operations. In particular, Prebisch recommended 
that Argentina established a large steel industry by way of import substitution as well as a 
metallurgical manufacturing sector and an automobile industry. Prebisch also identified petroleum 
imports as an important source of balance of payments disequilibria. This was unnecessary because 
Argentina was capable of using its own underexploited reserves to achieve energy self sufficiency. 
The recommended policy, therefore, was to promote exploration and export of oil by the state in 
partnership if necessary, with ‘contracted services,’ namely foreign oil companies.
There are palpable similarities with Frondizi’s vision for the role of foreign capital and 
indeed, his iconic expansion of Argentina’s oil industry was undertaken in partnership with several 
foreign firms as will be discussed below. Yet before he came to office, Frondizi devoted much 
energy to rhetorical attacks on Prebisch and the military government which he served. Frondizi 
vociferously criticised Prebisch’s economic plans and the military government’s record in an 
interview with Que magazine in early 1957, stating that: “The government should stop introducing 
reforms that are going to be resisted by the people and which in many cases only reflect the interests 
of small groups with doubtful national affiliation.”27
So while Frondizi’s own ideals were reasonably close to those of the CEPAL secretary 
general, identification with the opposition to the military government meant that for the time being 
at least, he wanted to be seen to oppose existing policies. The Prebish Plan had also sought a 
compromise solution to steer a course between conflicting demands of various interest groups. So 
instead of imposing austerity on the populace in the quest for monetary stability, Prebisch had 
suggested that a devalued currency aimed at boosting agricultural exports and building up currency 
reserves, need not impact on living standards. While a devalued currency increased living costs for 
wage earning Argentines, Prebisch recommended that employers increase salaries. To mitigate the 
inflationary repercussions of what was potentially a new wage-price spiral, Prebisch suggested the 
wage increases should be taken out of company profits. Not such a terrible burden, the Plan argued, 
because higher productivity resulting from the new stability meant these profits would be regained
jo
in the long term.
25 Prebisch, R. Moneda Sana o Inflation Incontenible: Plan de Restablecimiento Economico, Secretaria de Prensa de la 
Presidencia de la Nation, Buenos Aires, January 1956, p.35
26 Prebisch, 1956. p.41
27 Que, 8 January 1957, ‘Dice Arturo Frondizi’.
28 Prebisch, 1956, p.36.
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This argument elicited opposition from all quarters. While Prebisch indicated the cost of 
living would rise by a mere 10 per cent, the CGT, with its background firmly rooted in the original 
Peronism, demanded a 40 to 50 per cent wage increase. At the other end of the social spectrum, 
business leaders were claiming that no company or industrial sector boasted profits high enough to 
absorb a wage increase of 10 per cent, nor were they capable of expanding productivity enough to 
do so.29 For the Frondizi camp, a devalued currency favouring agricultural exports implied a 
contradiction of the industrial vision and thus made an easy target.30 Given the opposition, the Plan 
was never implemented. The military authorities were keen to maintain order before a planned 
return to democratic rale and these political concerns made the economic restructuring Prebisch 
envisaged impossible.
By the time of Frondizi’s election, he had made promises to various sectors of society. To 
business elites he gave assurances that while his plans involved a degree of statism, he would take 
great care not to “create unnecessary obstacles to private enterprise.” On the other hand, his rhetoric 
centred on a national modernisation whereby economic arguments about the greater efficiency of 
the private sector should not be used to challenge the State’s ‘sovereignty’ over certain sectors, 
specifically the energy sector.31 Meanwhile, Frondizi was also aware of the importance of the 
Peronist movement in spite of the fact that its political party was outlawed and Peron himself 
remained in exile. His astute pact with Peron, brokered by Frigelio between 1956 and 1958, gaining 
the former leader’s tacit support, captured the Peronist vote. This was a dangerous tactic given 
that the return to democracy was permitted by the military on condition that Peron and his party be 
excluded from the political process and the alliance was necessarily highly secret.33 To achieve such 
an agreement meanwhile, promises were made to Peron, namely a commitment to legalise the 
movement and to put an end to government intervention in the unions, a process referred to by 
Frondizi as ‘re-democratisation’ of the trade union movement.
The Developmentalist Phase: May to December 1958.
How did the pledges compare with the action? Argentines did not have to wait long for a 
more explicit description of what the new government had in mind. In Frondizi’s inaugural address 
to Congress on 1 May 1958, he set out his goals for the presidency. There was an ideological attack 
on continued reliance on agricultural exports. Trading cereals, meat and fruit, the prices of which 
were in long term decline, was a drain on the economy. Therefore a new orientation in Argentina’s
29 Review of the River Plate:. 10 January 1956. Wages and Industry’s Profits
30 See Sikkink, K. ‘Prebisch’s Influence in Argentina’, Latin American Research Review, Vol.23, No.2, 1988.
31 Que, 8 January 1957, ‘Dice Arturo Frondizi’
32 The Economist July 4 1959 p. 19 President Under Pressure. See also: Ramon Prieto, Correspondencia Peron - 
Frigerio, Analisis Critica, Buenos Aires 1975. pp. 11-12
33 Potash 1980, p.274
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trading relations would be put into place. In the short term, imports would be limited to bare 
essentials. Historically, Frondizi stated, Argentina had suffered more from excesses of imports 
rather than a lack of foreign goods.
“A great part of our basic resources and our industrial potential has not been exploited 
because of our excessive dependence on imported manufactures. By reducing that dependence, 
economic activity in the interior of the country will increase thanks to the emergence of new 
sources of production and employments that will provide very solid foundations for our national 
development,” he claimed. Monetary and fiscal policy was to be subordinated to the priority of 
industrial expansion: “encouraging those who create wealth, discouraging speculators and the idle 
who participate without contributing.”
The president also pledged to boost national savings and fortify capital markets so that they 
should become an important source of funding for the expansion of national business. But while the 
larger part of ‘national capitalisation’ should come from domestic savings, the inadequacy of this 
source for what Frondizi had in mind was undeniable. Thus, foreign capital was to be brought into 
the scheme to act as an ‘accelerator’. He was not explicit at this stage, however, about his plans to 
involve foreign firms in exploitation of oil reserves.
A further pivot to the new model was self sufficiency in energy, based on the exploitation of 
oil and coal reserves as well as investment in hydroelectric power. It was heavy industry, Frondizi 
envisioned, whereby Argentina produced its own fuel, power, steel and chemicals, and ideally 
capital goods. In short, this Hirschmanian developmentalism was an inward looking model where 
the external connection was reduced as far as possible to support domestic production and 
strengthen the balance sheet by putting an end to imports of steel and fuel. Policies of import 
substitution would also shield local manufacturing from international competition. Autarky, 
therefore, in all except the source of investment and an apparent continuation of discrimination 
against the primary export sector. On the other hand Frondizi did pledge to create a more stable 
environment for private enterprise by stating that while basic industries at the heart of his 
development strategy would be administered by the state, there would be none of the 
nationalisations which marked the first Peron administration. Thus he proclaimed that: “We believe 
that the serious economic problems that confront the country, will not be solved by transferring 
activities away from the private sector to the public sector. We believe therefore, that the practice of 
confiscation under varying pretexts that has helped create an environment of uncertainty and 
insecurity needs to disappear from Argentine political life”.34
34 Frondizi, A. Mensaje Inaugural Leido ante la Asamblea Legislativa, 1 de Mayo 1958, reproduced in: Frondizi, 
‘Mensajes Presidenciales 1958-62, tomo 1: 1 de Mayo al 29 de Diciembre de 1958, Centro de Estudios Nacionales, 
Buenos Aires
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The Peronist voters who had brought Frondizi to power were rewarded with a commitment to 
reverse legislation enacted by the previous regime that had banned the public display of Parodist 
symbols.35 It also rescinded ‘interventions’ in unions, or returned to the organisations the right to 
elect their own leadership. It is likely that these measures fulfilled much of Frondizis’s side of the 
bargain struck with Peron. Indeed the former president wrote to Frondizi shortly afterwards 
expressing his approval of the speech.36 A further concession to labour support came 12 days later 
with the announcement of an ‘emergency’ 60 per cent increase on wages which had been frozen 
since February 1956.37
“It is not fair to request workers make the greatest possible effort in aiding national 
development if  the causes of daily distress which discourage constructive efforts are not overcome,” 
Frondizi declared in a radio address.38 In response to this measure, Peron wrote once more to the 
new head of state expressing approval but warning that hard times lay ahead and Frondizi would not 
be able to proceed indefinitely without angering the popular classes, stating that: “We cannot be too 
enthusiastic about the immediate future in the sense that a most unfortunate task is about to fall 
upon you: to restrict. The economic future of the nation depends greatly on the way in which you 
carry this out as well as the political fortunes of the party which you represent. One’s (political)
">Q
erosion is always proportionate to the sacrifices you impose.”
So in spite of the apparent Peronist tendencies of the early labour and wage policies of the 
Frondizi administration, few were under any illusion that sacrifices did not lie ahead. Thus the 
generous wage increases and the concessions made to the unions at Frondizi’s inauguration may 
have been calculated buffers to a later tranche of policy that the administration knew would have 
serious repercussions on the living standards of the popular classes. In other words, an attempt to 
soften union opposition prior to tough measures as an alternative to a more authoritarian strategy 
implemented by the previous military government which had made a point of suppressing Peronist 
institutions.
Labour and business did not have to wait long for further signs of the direction in which 
Frondizi and Frigerio wished to take the economy.
Policy was unequivocally intended to engineer a profound change in the Argentine economy. The 
aim was to bring Argentine industry up to date, technologically and in terms of methods employed. 
And the best way to achieve this was to concentrate attention on select capital intensive and import 
substituting sectors. The necessary investment would come from abroad if necessary and the market 
would have a fundamental role to play but the economy would be guided by a state which would
35 See Decreto 4161/56 enacted by the military government which banned Peronist symbols including the party hymn.
36 Prieto, 1975, Correspondencia Peron -  Frigerio,
37 Economist Intelligence Unit, July 1958, Economic Review o f  Argentina.
38 Frondizi, Aumento de Emergencia, Radio Address 13 May 1958, reproduced in ‘Mensajes Presidenciales’
39 Quoted in Prieto, 1975, Correspondencia Peron — Frigerio
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maintain a controlling stake in these industries through such concerns as YPF (oil) and SOMISA 
(steel).
Having unveiled an ideological centrality placed on attracting foreign capital alongside 
continued import substitution, the vision was institutionalised through a raft of new legislation 
which empowered the executive to impose new policies regarding free imports of capital goods not 
produced locally, particularly if needed by the petrochemicals, steel and other priority industries.40 
This involved the exemption from customs duties for the relevant machinery imports, the 
application or increase of duties on products that potentially compete with national alternatives, the 
suspension or limitation of imports of raw materials that are available within Argentina’s borders 
and preferential exchange treatment for industrial exports41 So in terms of liberalisation of the 
economy, import substitution was further entrenched. However, the legislation to deregulate the 
entry of foreign capital went further than anyone could have anticipated. Whereas Frondizi and 
Frigerio had emphatically supported the harnessing and subordination of foreign investment to act 
as a junior partner of the state, the new legislation put foreign capital on an equal footing with 
domestic investment and placed no restriction on international companies sending remittances out 
of Argentina in spite of some incentives for firms to reinvest profits. A concession, therefore, to 
foreign capital as a de facto interest group whose acquiescence was needed.
The Battle fo r  Energy
The best known of Frondizi’s policy contradictions is the signing of oil contracts with 
foreign firms as part of the grander quest for energy self sufficiency, the so-called ‘battle for oil* 
central to Frondizi’s vision. This, he argued, represented the subordination of foreign capital to the 
Argentine state in pursuit of modernisation and economic autonomy. However, it was a step 
apparently at odds with a deeply embedded belief in a national oil monopoly which excluded 
foreign investment for reasons of national security and sovereignty held by powerful agents in 
society, in particular the military.
The Peron administration had defined itself in the 1940s as the crusader against exploitation 
of Argentina’s bounty by foreign, especially British, companies. When this attempt at autarky 
exhausted itself by the early 1950s Peron sought to ingratiate himself once more with foreign 
investors and sought partnerships to extract more oil to satisfy the growing demands of the 
Argentine market. An exploration and drilling contract signed with US firm Standard Oil was 
seized upon by the political opposition, led by then leader of the traditionally nationalistic Radical 
Party, Arturo Frondizi, as conceding too much. Frondizi later articulated the argument for excluding
40 Leyes Nacionales 14,780 y 14,781, 1958
41 Ley 14,781, 1958
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foreign capital from Argentina’s oil industry in his book “Petroleum and Policy”42 which defended 
the concept of a national oil monopoly. Thus president Frondizi’s signing of contracts with foreign 
oil companies in 1959 represented a flagrant about face from highly publicised previous stances.
As president, Frondizi stated that his ambition to achieve self sufficiency in petroleum was 
intended to “eliminate a grave threat to Argentina’s sovereignty” and allow the country to “attain 
the stature of the great nations of our time” 43 But in spite of the nationalism in the language, the 
plan for oil attributed an important role to foreign, private contractors, albeit operating under the 
supervision of YPF. In a radio address delivered on 24 July 1958, Frondizi announced to the nation 
that he had signed 10 petroleum concessions with foreign companies, five of which concerned 
oilfields already exploited by YPF.44 Crucially, while Frondizi had made clear his intention to allow 
a subordinated role for foreign capital in the Argentine economy ever since the election campaign, 
he had never revealed a plan to involve foreign firms in the oil industry. Thus these 10 new 
concessions came entirely as a surprise, which led to accusations of arrogance and even despotism 
from his political opponents. One Radical Party deputy, Dr Mauricio Yadarola, a former 
ambassador to the United States, stated that the manner in which the plan was announced, without 
debate in Congress contravened the practices of democratic government45
Frondizi said that given the acute disequilibrium in the balance of payments, an end to 
expensive oil imports which made up some 65 per cent of Argentina’s consumption, was crucial. 
The immediate priority was to mitigate the financial impact of these imports until such time as they 
were no longer necessary. So the first element of the plan, perhaps to demonstrate an internationally 
aggressive leadership, was to renegotiate import prices with foreign suppliers such as British 
Petroleum and the Soviet Union. Secondly, YPF was to be reorganised “along the lines of a modem 
industrial enterprise”, and rid of its cryptic bureaucracy in a drive for greater productivity.46 
Aware that the involvement of foreign firms would inflame his opponents and the Peronist element 
of his electoral support in particular, Frondizi was at pains to insist that foreign involvement was 
cmcial to ensure the success of Argentina’s drive towards self sufficiency. The goal was “to extract 
the greatest possible volume of oil in the shortest possible time,” he said 47 In order to achieve this, 
YPF would use its own resources as far as possible but it would also accept the involvement of 
private capital: “ .. .insofar as official resources may prove inadequate, but without granting 
concessions or in any way renouncing the State’s control over this extant wealth. This cooperation
42 See Frondizi, A. Petroleo y  Politico: Contribucion al Estudio de la Historia Economica Argentina y  de las 
Relaciones entre el lmperialismo y  de la Vida Politico Nacional, Buenos Aires, 1956
43 Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, Secretaria de Estado de Energia y Combustibles, El Petroleo en el Congreso, Buenos 
Aires, 1959
44 Frondizi, ARadio Message 24 July 1958, Reproduced in River Plate Review, July 1958, p21.
45 La Nation, 26 July 1958 El Petroleo a Traves de Varias Opinidnes
46 Frondizi, ARadio Message, p .21
47 Ibid, p.21
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will therefore take place through YPF and exclusively on the basis of payments in pesos and in 
foreign currencies. No payments in oil will be made nor will the country’s control over the areas 
under exploitation be affected. ”48
It is important to note that while the foreign companies’ involvement attracted the most 
commentary at the time for its polemic nature, the plan was essentially a state-led initiative.
Frondizi pledged that the presidency would place all available resources at the disposal of the 
industry in order to speed up completion of all infrastructural works. The plan was at pains to 
reiterate national jurisdiction over all of the country’s oil reserves and consolidated YPF’s 
monopoly in the sense that the foreign contracts emphasised the private firms’ subordination to the 
state enterprise. It also contained a pledge to encourage domestic manufacture of oilfield equipment. 
Contemporary commentators were not unaware of the short leash permitted to foreign contractors 
by Frondizi. According to The Economist, the new policy revealed Frondizi had “found a new way 
of eating one’s oil cake and keeping it.”49 Effective control over these very narrow short-term 
contracts remained in the hands of YPF while the foreign contractors were forced to shoulder all the 
risk. One agreement with Royal Dutch Shell, for example, for exploration, development and 
production stated that exploration expenses would not be repaid to the oil company until oil was 
produced. Payment would then be made in oil.50 On the other hand, the involvement of foreign 
companies in any capacity was a profound break with an Argentine tradition of nationalistic oil 
policy.51 Frondizi’s speech was the first the Argentine people had heard of his visions for the oil 
industry and much nationalistic vitriol was poured on the plan.
The plan as elaborated by Frondizi’s government was not unlike that suggested by Prebisch 
in 1956 as part of the rescue package commissioned by the military government. Prebisch had also 
identified oil imports as a significant contributor to the balance of payments deficit and blamed 
insufficient exploitation of Argentina’s oil reserves. The recommended policy was to abandon 
traditional aversion to private concessions and embark on a programme of accelerated exploration 
and export by the state, possibly in partnership with contractors. This resemblance to his own policy 
and the fact that while in opposition Frondizi had expressed disapproval of Prebisch’s suggestions 
illustrates an awareness that political credit was to be gained by expressing outrage at foreign 
involvement. Frondizi must also have known, therefore, that the same criticism would be aimed at 
his policies implying that he was pinning his hopes on vindication through rapid progress.
To some extent, Frondizi was vindicated as following implementation of the plan, the oil 
industry enjoyed unprecedented growth. Combined production of oil both by YPF and the foreign
48 Ibid, p.21
49 The Economist, September 20 1958, p.950 PresidentFrondizi’s Tightrope
50 The Economist December 13 1958 p. 1020 Oil in Argentina
51 See Review o f  the River Plate, July 31 1958, Editorial, p.2
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firms working under direct contract increased from 4.96 million cubic metres in 1958 to 6.45 
million the following year, an increase of 30 per cent.52 By 1962, the year of Frondizi’s downfall, 
production had almost tripled to 15.6 million cubic metres.53 But in spite of the evident success of 
the plan in taking Argentina closer to oil self sufficiency, public and interest group approval was not 
forthcoming. As a direct result of the petroleum policy, Frondizi lost valuable support from the 
political left and from nationalist groups within his own party, averse to what they perceived as 
concessions to foreign interests. There is evidence that Peron was irked by the plan and sent 
instructions from exile in the Dominican Republic to his union representatives that they mobilize 
against the measures. Frondizi had preempted this, however, and enacted emergency laws granting 
the police greater powers of arrest without warrant. Thus the main union agitators were jailed and 
plans to mobilize Peronist unions against the oil policy were thwarted.54 Similar sentiments of 
indignation about allowing foreign access to the oil industry, meanwhile, also existed within the 
military.55 So while strictly speaking Frondizi’s plan for the oil industry might have been a success 
and the ‘battle for oil’ won, politically it sewed disillusionment because of the apparent 
contradiction of prior promises and strengthened the perception of a government indifferent to 
public opinion.
Another policy to provoke controversy and disillusionment among elements of society was 
the government’s plan to restructure a bankrupt electricity provider for the Buenos Aires 
metropolitan region. CADE (Compania Argentina de Electricidad), indebted, inefficient and a 
target of city dwellers’ frustrations at being repeatedly plunged into darkness by an ineffective 
power grid, was converted into a mixed enterprise eligible for foreign loans on 8 September 1958. 
Under the terms of the new resolution, the state’s holding in the company’s capital was to increase 
gradually over the following decade until the entire capital was in the government’s hands. The firm 
was heavily indebted to the Industrial Bank because of the refusal by successive governments to 
allow increases in electricity rates, a policy staple under Peron and his military successors. Under 
the new plan these debts were to be written off and the state was to invest heavily in the 
construction of new power stations.56
Again, the popular classes and Peronist elements were irked by the merely ‘partial 
nationalisation’ in spite of the government’s pledge to eventually become the sole owner, because 
of a pre-election promise to Peron and his supporters to implement outright nationalisation of the 
electricity services and cancel all private sector concessions. Indeed, the mayor of Buenos Aires, 
accompanied by a team of councillors attempted to seize the offices of CADE “in the name of the
52 Bank o f  London and South America Quarterly Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, July 1960
53 Sikkink, 1991, p. 104'
54 The Economist November 22 1958, p.682, Pressure Groups at Work.
55 Ibid, p.95
56 Gregorio Meira, Minister o f Fuels and Energy, La Solucion del Caso CADE, Radio Address 8 September 1958
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S7municipality” shortly after the resolution was announced but were thwarted by company staff.
This ‘popular mobilisation’, characteristic of Argentine public life illustrates the weakness of the 
Frondizi regime’s popular support base.
By the end of the first year of Frondizi’s term of office, he was actively engaged with all the 
main factions of Argentine society. Those that had supported them had received their rewards but 
the president had pressed ahead with an economic agenda which would test these contracts of 
appeasement. The most complicated relationship at this stage was with labour. The Libertadora 
military regime which deposed Peron in 1955 had diluted union power by insisting that the CGT, 
which it regarded as a Peronist instrument of totalitarianism, lose its status as the only legitimate 
labour confederation. Frondizi, on the other hand, vocally supported the idea of a powerful CGT. So 
in addition to reinstating the right of unions to elect their own leaders, in July 1958 a bill was 
introduced to reinstate CGT hegemony. But the mere fact that Frondizi was in the habit of 
introducing policy by presidential degree rather than through the awkward and vulnerable process 
of Congressional debate, suggests that this nominally pro union action was more cosmetic than 
sincere.58 After Peronist support in the elections was rewarded with the emergency wage increases, 
democratisation of the unions and measures to empower once more the CGT, the government’s 
actions became overtly less friendly to labour as Frondizi switched his attention to other corporatist 
entities throughout 1958. A strike by oil workers in Mendoza to protest the foreign oil contracts was 
used as a pretext to declare a national ‘State of Siege’ which lent the authorities extraordinary 
powers of arrest. Though the strike barely lasted two weeks, and a later attempt by Peronist unions 
to organise a general strike was thwarted, the decree was not lifted and used to great effect in 
confronting later labour militancy in response to the austerity of Frondizi’s later administration. To 
some extent, this tough line against organised labour may have been a preparation for future battles, 
particularly if Frondizi was aware that greater fiscal and monetary discipline lay ahead. But the less 
conciliatory line also reflected Frondizi’s bargaining with another group, the military, which though 
not a unified force was increasingly dominated by an authoritarian faction known as ‘The Gorillas’ 
who frequently criticised Frondizi for not being sufficiently tough with labour. While Frondizi 
needed to avoid a situation in which such a group found an excuse to intervene in a crisis by 
reinstalling a military junta, the armed forces comprised a potential of support for Frondizi and to a 
certain degree, acted as his protector.59 They were rewarded for this with new hardware and an 
increased budget, which still fell short of the Gorillas’ preferences, and a series of public 
pronouncements of national homage to those in uniform. One such gesture, shortly after Frondizi’s
57 Review o f  the River Plate, September 9 1958, p.39.
58 La Nacion, July 26 1958 Voto Diputados la Ley que Organiza la Entidad Obrera.
59 The Economist, September 20 1958 p.950 President Frondizi’s Tightrope; The Economist, November 22 1958, 
pp.682-3, Pressure Groups at Work.
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election congratulated all three forces for their services to the nation and their exceptional conduct 
in safeguarding the good of the nation during the transition to democracy.60
Frondizi’s relationship with national capital was strong in the early stages of his government 
largely on account of the fact that as a group it was nurtured by the Frondizi-Frigerio electoral 
campaign and then rewarded with abundant credit.61 Frigerio, was in fact a representative of 
business within the government because while acting as Frondizi’s closest economic adviser and 
unofficial chief of economic policy, he also openly presented himself as the Voice of Argentine 
industry. Needles to say, the ever sterner policy towards the demands of the unions did much to win 
favour among these groups. The relationship with the traditional elites, however, was less easy. La 
Nacion, Argentina’s principal conservative newspaper and traditional supporter of elite interests 
expressed serious reservations about the quality of the Frondizi government’s pro business 
economic track record. Regarding the foreign oil contracts, for example, there was praise for the 
fact that the president sought to address the balance of payments and acceptance of the involvement 
of foreign capital but also concern about the methods. A much more effective way to address the 
imbalance would be the accumulation of reserves through increased exports, suggested one editorial. 
This could be achieved through modernisation and intensification of Argentine agriculture through 
a programme of investment. The SRA, meanwhile, was concerned that Frondizi, with his 
emphasis on the intensification of industrial development would continue the effective coercion of 
the agricultural sector into subsidisation of the project. Nevertheless, there was hope within the 
organisation and expressed publicly by its leaders that the tougher line against labour and overtures 
to foreign capital signalled a resuscitation of liberal economic policy that would work to the 
advantage of the agricultural exporting sector. Frondizi himself also made significant overtures to 
the sector, such as participation alongside Juan Maria Mathet, president of the SRA, at the 
International Livestock Fair, a highlight of the Argentine agricultural social calendar.
The balance of alliances had clearly shifted by the end of 1958, away from labour which 
arguably had served its purpose in electing Frondizi, and conceitedly in the direction of capital, 
both national and international. Meanwhile a delicate relationship was in place with an 
unpredictable military. As the Frondizi presidency progressed with ever tougher decisions, the fault 
lines of the balance shifted and the number of openly hostile increased until the situation descended 
into a precarious game of survival politics.
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The Second Phase: The Stabilisation Plan
Clearly Arturo Frondizi and his team took a long-term perspective involving a sincere 
aspiration to fundamentally change the focus of the Argentine economy towards a ‘modernised’ 
industrial base. However, wage increases and high public spending to fund expansion in addition to 
imports of capital goods to construct the industrial base led to serious disequilibria. The money 
supply was increasing by in excess of 40 per cent per year in 1959 compared with 12 per cent in the 
year before Frondizi’s election. Bank credit increased 59 per cent in 1958 to the public sector and 
32 per cent to the private sector.64 In consequence, inflation reached an annual rate of 129 per cent 
within a year of Frondizi taking office, the highest ever experienced in Argentina.
Blaming yawning budget deficits and depleted reserves on the previous government, and 
studiously not blaming Peron, Frodizi invited an IMF mission to Argentina to recommend a course 
of action. The mission suggested a raft of measures in line with many such stabilisation packages 
aimed at cutting the fiscal deficit and curbing the money supply. The steps proposed by the IMF 
included restricting the supply of credit, a wage freeze, reduction in the public payroll, higher taxes 
and utility rates to increase revenues, trade liberalisation and cancellation of a number of proposed 
public works projects. Frondizi was careful in his choice of words when announcing the resulting 
Plan to the nation, framing the new measures within his long term visions for Argentine 
development. The president suggested that macroeconomic stabilisation was part of a preconceived 
strategy and had been delayed so that his ‘modernisation’ of the economy should be allowed to run 
its course first.
“....A  financial stabilisation without an energetic drive in development would have resulted 
in an economy of misery and unemployment. For this reason it was a priority to implement a 
program of national expansion based on the intensification of our oil, coal, chemicals and energy 
production,” he told the nation.65
The package included a pledge to cut the fiscal deficit which was identified as a root of 
inflation, with a particular emphasis on plugging the financial haemorrhage created by an outsized 
public sector. The origins of the deficit lay within the operations of state enterprises, particularly 
utilities and transport. The reasons these operations were loss making were threefold, Frondizi 
argued: poor organisation, a glut of administrative staff and prices inferior to costs. To resolve the 
situation, Frondizi pledged increased utility and petrol prices and hikes in fares on public transport, 
particularly the railways, an effective hike in living costs and reduction in real wages. The
64 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) Internal Memorandum, Current Economic 
Position and Prospects o f  Argentina, January 11 1962. Washington DC.
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inefficiencies of the public sector had impeded the developmentalist vision, preventing companies 
like YPF achieving their optimum productivity.
In terms of trade policy meanwhile, non essential imports were to be subjected to tariffs of 
between 20 per cent and 300 per cent according to the grade of necessity to the country in order to 
protect national industry from the influence of “foreign traders.”66 The dual exchange rate system 
was scrapped and export surcharges were imposed on agricultural goods. The IMF was to back the 
plan with a US$75 million loan alongside further aid from the United States, both from government 
and the private sector, amounting to some US$254 million.
Frondizi hailed the loans as evidence that international business had faith in Argentina’s 
capability as an industrial power and that further finance would be forthcoming. In spite of the high 
rate of indebtedness, he argued, Argentina was not having great difficulty raising further credit 
because there existed in the international community great faith in the country’s long-term ability to 
pay its debts.
“That confidence does not come from the Stabilisation Plan, but from the mobilisation of 
resources already implemented.. .They lend to us fundamentally because they are aware that within 
two years we will have oil, electricity, coal and chemicals enough to end the paradox of an 
increasingly impoverished people in one of the richest countries in the world,” Frondizi announced 
to the nation.67
Nevertheless, at grass roots level, higher utility charges, wage freezes and import surcharges 
significantly reduced the purchasing power of waged labour. Again, the government invoked the 
idea of common sacrifice for the greater good and the president of the Central Bank alluded to a 
‘moral’ campaign to overcome Argentina’s economic difficulties 68 Thus the new hardship lost the 
president support from sectors he had nurtured as a support base. Moyano Llerena, an economist, 
disciple of Alejandro Bunge and intellectual voice of the urban industrialist was harshly critical of 
the plan in his magazine Panorama de la Economia Argentina. Llerena rejected the government’s 
claim that fulfilment of Argentina’s destiny required sacrifices to be endured equally by all, stating: 
“In order that the objectives of the Stabilisation Plan can be achieved, it is unavoidable that the 
effect will be a distinct inequality. It is the essence of the Plan that certain sectors should 
accumulate much greater gains in order to boost their productivity.. .and those investments have to 
be extracted from the rest of the population.. .”69
Particularly contentious was the abolition of price controls which led to a rise in the cost of 
dietary staples such as beef. While Frondizi had dismantled IAPI, an inefficient instrument of Peron
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 La Nacion, January 3 1959, Objetivos del Plan
69 Panorama de la Economia Argentina. Vol.IT, Marzo 1959. Editorial.
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era populism, which subsidised lower living costs for workers, the fallout was politically dangerous
7ft *as meat consumption halved during 1959. Low beef prices meant higher disposable incomes 
which appealed to local manufacturers, as it did to consumers, and was thus a central part of 
Peron’s populist policies, to the detriment of export earnings and foreign exchange reserves.
It did appear that the Frondizi regime was now concentrating its efforts on appeasing 
international capital with a conspicuous commitment to orthodox economics. Jose Carlos Orfila, 
trade secretary to the Economics Ministry told a gathering of senior engineers in the western city of 
Mendoza in March 1959 that the Stabilisation Plan represented a profound change in direction 
towards holding economic discipline as the key to success rather than simple industrial expansion. 
The minister proclaimed: “Up to now we have done a lot of politics and not much economics. For
71that reason the president of the Republic has now resolved to do economics and not politics.”
The regime had also sent a powerful signal proclaiming its newfound pro business 
credentials with the appointment of Alvaro Alsogaray in June 1959, a vocal critic of 
developmentalism, as economy minister. Alsogaray was opposed to high spending expansionism 
and saw tackling inflation and balancing the budget as the main priorities. He quickly trampled on 
any hopes for a new wave of alliance building, stating that such tactics were irrelevant. His 
approach was to explain that the economy was in crisis and steps would need to be taken that would 
bring lean times.
“I believe the time in which the common man... can be motivated with general declarations, 
with demagogic promises or with cosy invocations to his spirit of sacrifice and his sense of
77patriotism are over...” the new minister proclaimed shortly after taking office.
Rather than preside over some aspirational development plan, Alsogaray regarded his role as 
merely creating ‘liberal conditions’ in which anyone can work towards their own gain:
“We are not going to ask anyone to make sacrifices either for the nation or for the 
government... We are going to create an environment in which individual effort, made for the 
benefit of the individual, bears fruit for the whole country.” Alsogaray was a proponent of a classic
7*7
form of liberalism, therefore.
If the choice of Alsogaray was intended to impress foreign capital of a commitment to fiscal 
adjustment, the strategy appeared to be successful. The appointment was heralded by the Bank of 
London South America in its ‘Quarterly Review’ as evidence that the Stabilisation Plan was to be
70 The Economist, November 21 1959, Meatless Days in Argentina.
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“rigorously implemented”.74 Thus Alsogaray lent credibility to the Plan which in turn lent 
credibility to the economy in the eyes of foreign investors.
However, the Plan should be taken as part of an overall scheme to boost investment, 
particularly from abroad, in Argentina’s basic industries rather than a genuine change of heart by an 
ideological president. The amount of investment forthcoming would be insufficient to fulfil 
Frondizi’s vision of industrial deepening without solid confidence in the stability of the Argentine 
economy. By curbing inflation, reducing the public deficit and addressing the balance of payments 
crisis, the plan should have enhanced the country’s reputation and international standing. But it 
appears from the timing of the new policy, several months after the announcement of expansionary 
projects for basic industries such as oil and steel, that macroeconomic stability was lower on 
Frondizi’s list of priorities than industrial development. Indeed, while Alsogaray did implement 
much of the recessive policy at the heart of the plan, his actions were also frequently frustrated by 
the president’s caution about antagonising an already volatile labour force. This was an irritant to 
the business community who had held high expectations of a reduction in their wage bill as a 
consequence of the new monetary caution and the ULA declared the Stabilisation Plan a failure on 
account of: “labour policy proceeding without any attention to economic reality.”75 The nationally 
oriented element of business was irked by the restriction of credit as part of the Plan, meanwhile. 
Furthermore, Frondizi had not lost sight of his ideal of industrial deepening. His priority was to 
attract the funds to build the envisaged industrial base. The contradictory steps regarding the public 
payroll illustrate the paradox between the liberal intentions of the economics minister following the 
recommendations of the IMF and the developmentalist president
In accordance with the Plan, the government attempted in 1959 to reduce the government 
payroll by some 80,000 jobs adopting such measures as a reduction in military conscription and 
selling off some state-owned enterprises. Much of this progress was personally overseen by 
Alsogaray who as an acknowledged economic liberal who maintained cordial relations with some 
highly influential figures in Argentine society, was even able to persuade the armed forces to study 
the possibility of reducing manpower. However, while the scheme was successful in eliminating 
54,000 people from the government wage bill between 1958 and 1960, ideological priorities had 
focused on enhancing certain industries in which the state had a significant interest so 57,000 
people were added to the payroll of state enterprises over the same period, a net gain of 3000. 
Consequently, in 1960, the government deficit “broke all records.”77
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Furthermore, a World Bank internal memo suggests that apparent progress in reducing the budget 
deficit might be superficial on account of continued excess by state-owned enterprises pursuing 
unchecked expansion. According to headline figures published by the Central Bank, the 
government’s activities were no longer ostensibly deficit producing and fiscal reform meant that 
Treasury revenues exceeded expenditure by 15 per cent in 1960 and 23 per cent in 1961. However, 
the World Bank reported, this estimate did not include transfers to state enterprises which more than 
offset any surpluses. The memo states:
“Expenditures of the public sector as a whole are large and expanding. Expenditures of the 
National Government, of state enterprises, and of the city of Buenos Aires were together equivalent 
to 24 per cent of the gross domestic product in 1959 and 1960 and may exceed 30 per cent of the 
total product in 1961.”78
So for all the fiscal discipline and wage restraint promised by Alsogaray, expansionist 
practices continued apace. Indeed, the World Bank’s conclusions about the Argentine economy 
were bleak and had the memo been made public, foreign capital would arguably have been more 
reticent about investing in the country. Neglect and discrimination against agriculture was 
depressing export revenues while prioritisation of industrial re-equipment had resulted in an import
70boom so by 1961 trade results were “unusually bad”. The bank also warned that while the 
production of consumer durables was growing rapidly, industry remained inefficient and unlikely to 
contribute to export revenues in the foreseeable future. Wage pressure in particular was highlighted 
as a blight on industrial competitiveness and was negating the efforts of Alsagoray to carry out the 
provisions of the Stabilisation Plan.
“Though the marked shift that took place after 1958 in the distribution of incomes from 
wages and salaries to profits, interest and self employed incomes, has undoubtedly been helping to 
finance much of the accelerated investment in plant and equipment that has been going on since, it 
has not helped mitigate the pressures for wage adjustments by strong labour unions,” the report 
noted.50
Ultimately, the acquisition of technology abroad and a consequent increase in indebtedness 
alongside greater involvement of foreign capital in national industries meant the Argentine state 
saw its control over national industry much diminished during the Frondizi presidency. In other 
words, through indebtedness, foreign firms were able to usurp control over Argentine concerns 
without suffering the expense of full acquisition. When the regime came to power in 1958, foreign 
firms accounted for 10 per cent of total national production. By 1962 the proportion was nearly a
78 IBRD (World Bank) Restricted Report No.WH-114a, Argentina: Current Economic Position and Prospects, Jan. 11 
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fifth of total output.81 There were some notable exceptions to the trend. The steel industry, one of 
the strategic sectors highlighted by Frondizi’s developmentalist plan, was still dominated by local 
capital.82 Nevertheless, the worst fears of Frondizi’s critics were realised in terms of national 
interests falling into the hands of foreigners and emasculation of a state upheld in the popular 
imagination as employer and entrepreneur. Given that a pivotal aim of developmentalist ideology 
was national empowerment, this increase of foreign influence marked a significant failure in the 
eyes of many, and arguably reflected concessions made to international capital by Frondizi in the 
process of alliance building.
Frondizi’s government did enjoy enough longevity to witness some successes however. 
While GDP declined 5.5 per cent in 1959 following implementation of the Stabilisation Plan, 
growth exceeded 4 per cent the following year. Meanwhile, the Plan for Oil showed early promise 
with production in the industry growing by 28 per cent in 1960. In terms of productivity, the 
developmentalist emphasis on industry also bore fruit, largely due to the boost to the oil industry. In 
the first half of 1961, industrial production per man hour was 21 per cent higher than the same 
period the previous year. The developmentalist drive preceded a protracted period of strong growth 
that lasted more than a decade. Annual growth of the industrial sector averaged 6 per cent between 
1958 and 1974 though Frondizi’s tenure is more often associated with the acute balance of
QA
payments crisis and recession of 1962. The economic buoyancy that came afterwards was even 
hailed as the possible beginning of a new era in Argentine economic performance with a rising 
industrial sector generating ever more employment and growth alongside a robust agricultural
O f
sector, a situation that fits reasonably well with developmentalist aspirations.
So from purely from the point of view of economic planning, the developmentalist 
experiment was a success. Argentina did emerge from the period with a diversified industrial base 
although manufacturing still lagged, accounting for only 21 per cent of total output in 1960 
compared with 22.2 per cent by agriculture and livestock. But the government failed politically 
and the tenuous web of alliances on which it depended broke down. The following sub sections 
address the evolving relationship between the Frondizi government and the distinct economic 
factions.
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The Fragile Alliances:
Having portrayed himself as pro labour and a friend to the Peronist movement, by the 
second year of his tenure Frondizi had established a reputation for being tough on the union 
movement. The austerity associated with the Stabilisation plan led to an intensification of labour 
unrest, some of it violent and the government made regular use of decrees extending greater powers 
to the military to break strikes such as the declared ‘state of siege’. A report in the Bank of London 
and South America’s quarterly journal was disdainful of what it saw as dangerous Peronist activism 
by labour groups and trade unioiis.
‘There still exists and obstinately large body of opinion which has to be weaned from 
allegiance to the regime that was largely responsible for the country’s present economic difficulties. 
In this respect, the efforts being made to encourage the emergence of a more responsible union 
leadership are of great importance for the country’s future,” it read.57
A general strike led by the Peronist unions in response to the Stabilisation Plan elicited an 
authoritarian response. Strike leaders who had declared the plan an instrument of international 
capital allied with the oligarchs of Argentina to undermine the country’s economic sovereignty, 
were promptly arrested, military reservists were called up as a precaution while workers in essential 
sectors, such as transport and oil, were ‘mobilised’ so that they fell under military jurisdiction in
00
matters of discipline. During this unrest Frondizi himself persisted on a state visit to Washington, 
accompanied by 21 dignitaries from the business community. This symbolised the shifting 
emphasis of the government’s campaign to win interest group support, a switch that was 
acknowledged by commentators. The Economist observed: “President Frondizi won the elections 
last year because the peronistas believed him to be their man. Once in power he showed very
Q Q
toughly that he was not.”
The regime also managed to alienate bourgeois sectors, including those representing 
national capital. This animosity is reflected in Alsogaray’s attempts to overhaul sugar production in 
the province of Tucuman where 20,000 independent cane growers had maintained a highly 
inefficient industrial sector reliant on government subsidies and on absolute prohibition of imports. 
Alsogaray moved to eliminate these benefits which elicited a strike by every cane harvester and mill 
worker in the country with the tacit support of growers and factory owners.90
The government’s efforts to attract foreign capital, liberalise imports of certain products and 
enter partnerships with multinational companies to speed up development of the industrial base 
meant local producers found themselves competing with newcomers with access to superior
87 Bank o f London and South America Quarterly Review Vol.l N o.l July 1960, p.9
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technology and funds. The unpopularity of foreign capital, and the oil contracts in particular, 
transcended class divides. Yet the government also provoked a degree of disillusionment among 
foreign investors, particularly when Frondizi without explanation dismissed Alsogaray in April 
1961. The move damaged investors’ confidence in Frondizi’s determination to continue the 
financial discipline of the Stabilisation Plan, particularly given the increased incidence of strikes. In 
spite of the fact that Alsogaray was replaced with another well known ‘liberal’ Roberto Alemann, 
whose belief in the need for monetary stability was well known, it appeared he was even more 
restricted than his predecessor. 91
But it was disillusion within the high command of the armed forces which ultimately led to 
Frondizi’s removal from office and the abandonment of many of his policies. His ascension was 
with the blessing of the outgoing military junta on the condition that he took an uncompromising 
stance regarding the Peronist movement. As such concessions were made as mentioned above 
though revelations about the secret electoral pact with Peron damaged the relationship and stretched 
the armed forces’ patience. Indeed, the existence of the deal was leaked by Peron himself after he 
had quarrelled with the government which created an acutely tense standoff with the military and 
was only eased when Frigerio resigned and the generals’ preferred candidate, Alvaro Alsogaray, 
was appointed minister of the economy. The army high command had approved the government’s 
policies for the oil industry in principle, largely for the strategic advantages of having national 
resources of fuel. However, the armed services were increasingly dominated by the intrigues of 
officers’ lodges and factions who expressed disapproval of the way policy was going. One such 
group, ‘the Green Dragons’ for example, objected to the extent to which Frondizi sought foreign 
capital while the aforementioned ‘Gorillas’ despaired at the concessions made to Peronism. Various 
uprisings and coup threats were dissipated during Frondizi’s tenure but he was ultimately deposed 
in 1962 when conservative elements of the military high command lost patience, stepped in and 
removed him from office.
The fact that Frondizi was forced to leave office by the military on account of concessions 
made to Peronists is ironic as Peronists by then regarded their relationship with the regime as over 
and stood in aggressive opposition. Congressional elections held on 27 March 1960 for the renewal 
of half of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, provincial legislatures and municipal councils 
revealed the extent to which Frondizi had alienated the popular vote. The total number of votes cast 
for Frondizi’s UCRI fell from 3.78 million to 1.78 million, principally on account of Peronist 
abstention.
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The style of Frondizi’s policy was improvisational and inconsistent. Alliances were formed 
with powers at play in politics but the impulse appears to have been to buy time in order to progress 
with the ideological experiment. Attempts were made to mobilise society as a whole to strive 
towards a common future but in reality more groups were alienated than co-opted. Different 
policies irritated different interests which themselves appeared to come in and out of favour 
depending on what the president’s priorities were at the time. Some issues, such as the need to 
attract foreign capital led to alienation of elements from all groups. Arturo Illia, who took power 
after Frondizi was ousted, presided over a nationalist backlash that aimed to return Argentine assets 
to Argentine ownership. Foreign investment, prices, wages and credit were brought under tighter 
control and the state’s responsibility as the country’s main entrepreneur was intensified. The new 
order was a nationalistic strive for self sufficiency, though this time more exclusive of foreign 
capital and many deals signed by such sectors as the oil industry under Frondizi were annulled. The 
balance of alliances shifted once again with a change of government.
Part 2: Spain
The period 1957 to 1960 marked a shift in the rules of the game for Spanish capitalism. As 
the autarkic model of the immediate post-Civil War period began to show signs of strain by the mid 
1950s, the corporatist ideologues’ grasp on power was challenged by a new generation of 
pretenders. A common view in much of the literature on the economic opening and dismantling of 
Spain’s autarkic development model in the late 1950s is that it was a decisive transition from one 
system to another.93 This argument assumes the new technocrats, some of whom were famously 
members of the conservative Catholic lay group Opus Dei, ascended decisively to prominence when 
the old guard fell out of favour with the caudillo. This interpretation is simplistic and the following 
narrative aims to illustrate that the competition for influence was waged across a delicate balance of 
power. The interpretation offered here that the autarkic camp, representing the nationalist 
syndicalist ideology of the Falange was not a spent force but a potent negotiator. The leading voice 
of this movement, Antonio Suanzes, was a childhood friend of Franco’s and was not easily 
discredited. During the transition both camps competed with each other to put their stamp on policy 
with no group winning a clear supremacy in the ability to shape new legislation. To be sure, the 
liberalisers’ influence set a precedent for further reform later, opened the economy to foreign 
investment and laid the foundations for Spain’s reintegration into the international economy. But
93 Comm, F and Diaz-Fuentes, D. La Empresa Publica en Europa, Madrid, 2004. pp.223-224; Spitaller, E. and Galy, M. 
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their efforts to deregulate, liberalise and integrate were diluted by the restraining influence of the 
old guard who retained much influence within the state bureaucracy. Close inspection of the 
introduction of economic liberalisation by the technocrats reveals a piecemeal process of peripatetic 
reforms interspersed with interruptions and hesitations.94 A report on Spain by the World Bank in 
1964, conceived as an economic health check to coincide with the fifth anniversary of the 
Stabilisation was sharply critical of the government’s retention of institutions of autarky in spite of 
the palpable progress achieved in economic openness.95 Furthermore, the series of five year 
‘Development Plans’ starting in 1964, while conceding much to the recommendations of the World 
Bank and the beliefs of the Opus Dei technocrats, were corporatist and dirigiste, revealing Spanish 
policymakers to be far from unanimous on the benefits of laissez faire capitalism. Such change that 
occurred was achieved by chipping away at the illiberal edifice. Reforms were diluted in their 
implementation, so that fiscal tightening frequently comprised steps that were symbolic rather than 
truly effective.
The framework employed in this part of the chapter is based on the model of a war of 
attrition between factions representing economic or social interests within the state before an 
arbitrating dictator whose authority is not questioned. In this particular case the two factions were: 
an old guard of ideologues from the Falange and/or the military, original architects of the 
corporatist state and autarkic model of industrial development in isolation. Striving against them 
were the Opus Dei technocrats, schooled in economics and believers in economic liberalism. For 
the former, the priority was continued fiscal expansionism aimed at the attainment of economic 
autonomy and a greater Spain as well as improved purchasing power and living standards for wage 
earning Spaniards which would dissipate the threat of civil disorder. For the latter, monetary 
indiscipline was identified as the root of Spain’s imbalances and the solution lay in a radical 
restructuring of the model to incorporate reintegration into the international economy. This would 
permit greater access to capital to finance further development in addition to export markets to 
mitigate the problem of exhaustion of foreign exchange reserves.
A cabinet reshuffle in 1957 empowered the technocrats as it gave them charge of the new 
ministries of Trade and Finance. The old guard, meanwhile, retained control over the state 
enterprises through the INI holding company and the ministries which were traditionally 
instruments of nationalist-syndicalist policy, namely Housing, Industry and Labour, which also 
meant jurisdiction over the official state syndicate.96 The two camps exercised comparable amounts 
of power within the state despite their ideological estrangement and were equally subordinated to
94 Carr, R. Modem Spain, 1875-1980, Oxford, 1980. p. 156; de la Dehesa, G. Ruiz, J and Torres, A. ‘Spain’. In: 
Papageorgiou, Michaely, M Choksi, A. Liberalising Foreign Trade, Vol. 6, IBRD 411/6, Washington DC. 1991 p. 155
95 IBRD, The Economic Development o f  Spain, Baltimore, 1963
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148
the authority of the dictator. This meant that the ultimate policy reforms were a compromise 
between the two factions. In the two years following the cabinet reshuffle, the technocrats lobbied 
hard to gather support and legitimacy before taking their most radical step; the 1959 Stabilisation 
Plan sponsored, like that in Argentina the previous year, by the IMF. But though this tough 
economic medicine represented a concerted departure for Spanish policy, the order associated with 
the reformers was a diluted version of what was originally proposed. On the other hand the policy 
also went further in terms of liberalisation of the economy than desired by the conservatives. The 
structure of this dynamic within the bureaucracy is illustrated in Figure 3.2 below.
Falange/Military
INILabour
Ministry
Trade
Ministry
1957
Finance
Ministry
1957
Trade
and
Industry
1939-57
Economist-tech-
nocrats
Dictator
State
Figure 3.2: Spain’s entente cordiale within the state and the war of attrition over 
economic policy.
Within the state, the dictator is the unchallenged authority and arbitrator of debates with 
whom the final decision on policy rests. In the case of Franco, he saw himself as a disciplinarian 
guardian of order rather than a technocrat and consequently delegated the task of policy design to 
others. Each faction within the state, broadly representing an economic interest, and by extension a
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set of economic priorities, was thus forced to compete for the dictator’s attention. Different factions, 
at different times, were given control of particular departments of state, or ministries, affecting 
specific areas of Spanish life. The conflict over economic policy described in this section and 
illustrated in the diagram, was between the Falange, in alliance with factions of the military, whose 
expansionism was discredited, and the more technocratic clique of classically trained economists 
who sought to liberalise the economy and end its isolation. The principal feature of the system that 
distinguishes it from the Argentine equivalent is that the struggle for influence and control of policy 
takes place within the constraints and rules of the corporatist state. The battle for influence will be 
outlined here by contrasting various policies and statements of purpose issued by competing 
factions in the months prior to the Stabilisation Plan and the immediate aftermath.
The most notable new appointees to ministerial posts during the 1957 cabinet reshuffle were 
Alberto Ullastres (Trade), Mariano Navarro (Finance) and Laureano Lopez Rodo, head of the 
Office for Economic Coordination and Planning. While these are the officials most commonly 
associated with the Stabilisation Plan of 1959, they were merely the most conspicuous members of 
a network of economists associated with the Faculty of Economic Sciences at Madrid University. 
Members of the clique were appointed to prominent posts in the civil service, including the Central
07Bank and the various economy-oriented departments of state. The ministers consequently headed 
departments staffed with sympathetic members of the same ideological movement. Though they 
had weaker personal ties with the dictator than the Falange, they did possess a high degree of 
credibility within the regime’s inner circle. They were chosen for impeccable backgrounds of public 
service while their association with Opus Dei lent them respectability in the eyes of an ultra 
Catholic hierarchy. Navarro was a one time Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Public Works, a 
former officer in the military juridical corps and had held prominent posts in the Falangist 
syndicates.98 The aim was to break with the traditional Falange interpretation of Spanish economic 
hardship to international conspiracies by Jews, freemasons or hostile third countries.99 Instead, they 
proposed that the economy suffered from structural deficiencies and attributed high inflation to 
pressures generated by undisciplined public investment and the existence of “parasitic” industries 
that acted as a drain on the national economy.100 In an address to an IMF meeting in New Delhi, the 
first to be held since Spain became a member, Ullastres committed Spain to IMF consensus 
claiming that his government shared the institution’s belief in international economic cooperation,
97 Fuentes Quintana, E. ‘La economfa espanola desde el plan de estabilizadion de 1959’, in: Martinez Vara, T. Mercado 
y  desarrollo econdmico en la Espaha contemporanea’, Madrid, 1986. p. 140
98 Preston, P. Franco, A Biography, London, 1993, pp.668-669.
99 Lieberman, S. Growth and Crisis in the Spanish Economy 1940-93, London 1995. p.51
100 Ullastres, A. Discurso, pleno de la Junta de Arancel de Aduanas, 23/9/1958. in: Ullastres, A. Politico Comercial 
Espanola, Madrid, 1958. p.l 18
150
stability, individual liberty and free enterprise. He also pledged to make Spain’s development
planning compatible with balance of payments equilibrium and monetary stability.101
Nevertheless, to impose monetary and fiscal discipline on Spain was to prove difficult. In
spite of their authority as a senior ministers, Ullastres and Navarro had to take on some powerful
figures who had helped shape the ideological vision of the Movimiento since the Civil War; not
1
least Suanzes himself. Though the Falangist star was fading as a motor for policy design , Suanzes 
was popular in the regime and the INI was regarded as the saviour of many downtrodden provincial 
backwaters to which it had brought labour intensive industries for the first time. To provoke his ire 
was politically dangerous, therefore. Monetary instability and budget imbalances were clearly 
tipping Spain into crisis and threatened to undermine progress in improving living standards that 
were hard won. But the tangible progress in industrialization was widely attributed to Suanzes who 
still enjoyed a lot of support both within the military and other elite factions close to the dictator.
Nevertheless, Navarro singled out the INI as an excessive drain on the Treasury and an 
important culprit of Spain’s rising inflation and less than a year after his appointment introduced 
new legislation to exclude the INI from the state budget.103 A particular irritant to Navarro was the 
Central Bank’s automatic underwriting of public debt, a facility the INI in his view was in the habit 
of exploiting with abandon. The main state agencies such as the INI but also the Institute for 
Agricultural Credit, the National Wheat Office and the National Railways Company could obtain 
funds from the Treasury, the capital market and the central bank in addition to the firms under their 
charge but were in effect using the Banco de Espana as a bottomless kitty.104 Mindful of Suanzes’ 
influence in the regime, the reformers sidelined him as much as much as possible while they 
lobbied other figures associated with the INI. Suanzes was not entirely oblivious to this, however, 
and threatened to resign over the issue. In a letter to Luis Carrero Blanco, Minister of the 
Presidency and prominent member of the regime’s inner circle dated 8 May 1957, Suanzes 
expressed his intention to resign his post in protest at not being invited to attend a meeting between 
Ullastres, Navarro and a number of his subordinates at the Institute in which the issue of financing 
was discussed.
“Given the nature of the issues discussed, all of which were essential for the Institute, and given the 
presence of the relevant Ministers, the fact that the manager and not the president of the Institute 
was invited to the meeting has a clear implication that neither you nor I nor my subordinates nor 
anybody can hide from.... I wish to relinquish my role as president of the Institute and I urge you to
101 Ullastres, ‘Discurso pronunciado por el Excmo. Sr. D. Alberto Ullastres, Ministro de Comercio y Gobemador por 
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take the necessary steps to ensure that this logical and obligatory wish should be satisfied,” he 
wrote.105
The resignation was not accepted and Suanzes was persuaded to remain in his post for a 
further six years. Had he left the scene at this early stage in the reform process, restructuring of the 
economy might have proceeded faster. However, his continued presence strengthened the 
conservative lobby’s power in the negotiating dynamic outlined in figure 3.2, and allowed it to 
continue as a significant check on the power of the reformers.
The pretext for freezing the INI out of the State budget at the end of 1957 was that the INI’s 
industries had reached a level of maturity that meant they were capable of financing themselves. 
Indeed it was written into the INI’s founding articles that its aim was to nurture the industries 
towards self reliance so that they became capable of running a profit and raising further finance on 
the capital markets without reliance on government finance.106 Predictably, the move was not 
welcomed by the INI’s leadership who argued the appropriate maturity was not yet reached. The 
new legislation, the INI’s management stated in its annual report for 1957, meant that the Institute 
would not reach all of the targets it had set itself for that year. The INI hoped to be able to raise 
enough funds on the capital markets to fulfil its ambitions for the following year, it said, and 
suggested obtaining short-term loans from savings institutions in addition to raising funds through 
the sale of shares in its industries on the stock market. If the private sector was not as forthcoming 
as it hoped, it warned that it might be forced to sell off some of its interests or reduce the pace of its 
operations which it warned were ‘already excessively reduced’. The threat was increasingly real, it 
warned, that there could be ‘serious disruptions to the economy and to employment’.107
In reality, the budgetary constraints on the INI, while an important symbolic step in 
liberalising the economy and imposing a degree of fiscal discipline on the public sector, were stifled 
and the new legislation restricted in its implementation. Ostensibly, INI firms after 1957 could only 
finance their expansion by recourse to private investment. But in seeking capital in the market, INI 
firms enjoyed an advantage over their contemporaries in the private sector in that Spain’s savings 
banks, the Cajas de Ahorro, were obliged by law to invest part of their funds in INI securities. As 
they represented ‘public paper’, they were in effect guaranteed by the state to the same extent as 
government bonds and interest on these was exempt from tax. While the State was no longer, 
strictly speaking, financing the firms out of the central budget, it was subsidising their efforts to
105 Letter from Suanzes to Luis Carrero Blanco, Minister o f  the Presidencia del Gobiemo, 8 May 1957: Archivo 
Personal de Juan Antonio Suanzes, Centro de Documentacion del Instituto Nacional de Industria.
106 See: Ley de Creacion del Instituto Nacional de Industria, 25 Septiembre 1941, Articulo 6°
107 INI Memoria del Ejercicio 1957, p. 19
152
raise capital and protecting them against private sector competition on the capital markets.108 Thus 
the move to freeze out the INI was a symbolic step rather than truly meaningful reform.
By September 1958 the autonomous agencies’ net position at the Banco de Espana showed a net 
indebtedness of 13.6 million pesetas, an increase of 111 per cent on the previous year. For all 
Navarro’s aspirations to rein in spending and tackle inflation, his efforts were being frustrated by 
reckless spending on the money hungry visions of figures like Suanzes. What this represents is a 
compromise solution between the priorities of competing factions within the bureaucracy. While the 
new ministers had a reforming remit, the old ideology was not entirely discredited and had some 
powerful proponents. Suanzes could mobilise robust support in the face of hostile bureaucratic 
manoeuvring.
One high ranking official, Civil War veteran, high ranking diplomat and friend of both 
Suanzes and indeed Franco himself, continued to voice strong support for the industrial vision in 
the face of the monetarist threat. In a letter to Suanzes, congratulating him on the success of efforts 
to boost Spain’s ‘strategic’ energy sector, Tomas Suner Ferrer, former general and ambassador to 
Brazil wrote:
“Every day we receive news of possibilities totally inconceivable ten years ago... but this 
path succeeds on the strength of enormous costs the magnitude of which constitutes their risk 
economically speaking. It would be difficult and inadvisable therefore that private capital and 
certain types of public capital should finance firms of this kind.”109
It was not merely the top echelons of the regime associated with the Civil War generals that 
held Suanzes in high regard. His support extended throughout all levels of the civil service, 
particularly provincial officials who either had him to thank for regional development projects that 
had revitalised their previously impoverished municipalities, or hoped to persuade him to favour 
their regions in some new industrial project. Indeed, Suanzes received much support from 
provincial officials during the campaign to implement monetary stability and fiscal austerity to the 
detriment of Suanzes’ expansionary projects. Suanzes’ vision was after all, a nationalist populist 
model of full employment, state sponsored inward looking import substituting industrialisation with 
a suspicion of foreign capital at its core.
“I agree absolutely with your priorities and for a long time I have thought like you that 
investment in industry is always worthwhile and interesting, in that it helps us cease to be the 
agrarian and colonised country we once were, sending our raw materials to be used in
108 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development o f  Spain, Washington 1963, 
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manufacturing abroad, condemning us to a life of misery while other countries enriched themselves 
with our animal like labours, and we in turn import those manufactured goods and pay handsomely 
for them,” reads one such communication from a town councillor in the rural Aragonese province of 
Teruel. The same letter goes on to ask Suanzes to consider Teruel for his next industrial investment 
scheme, stating:
“As you know, the level of misery in our province is great, mass emigration away from rural 
communities is alarmingly high, and considering we are a province rich in natural resources with 
great possibilities for industrialisation, only you can lend us a hand so that this poor land of Teruel 
does not disappear off the map of Spain.”110
In reply, Suanzes is unequivocal in his views of what his opponents in government intended, 
writing: “I am very much heartened to know that you agree with me on the fact that investments in 
industry are of vital interest for the economic transformation of our country and that under no 
circumstances should they be influenced by factors such as inflation and monetary stability or other 
issues of this type that preoccupy so many people to such an extent. The reality is that increases in 
production elevate standards of living, as you appreciate perfectly...”111
Thus the reformers were up against some stiff resistance rallying around firm ideological 
conviction and, therefore, appeasement of this camp was a necessity in any new policy.
Government Consultation on the New Economic Policy
Scepticism among the conservatives about the wisdom of fiscal and monetary discipline was 
not the only ideological dogma on which the regime was founded that the new ministers had to 
confront. The late 1950s was time of global economic integration marked by events such as the 
Treaty of Rome in 1957, which set the pace for greater European unity as well as currency 
convertibility and liberal exchange of goods and services. The new Spanish ministers and their 
teams of civil servants saw a solution to Spain’s current and capital account deficits in European 
integration. But concepts such as unhampered trade and currency convertibility were novel in Spain 
where structuralist interpretations of a hostile international economy, espousing suppression of the 
external connection, lay at the core of belief systems. Thus Spain’s rulers were presented with two 
options on how to address the phenomenon; to either continue its isolation or to integrate. Needless 
to say that while Ullastres and Navarro believed in the latter and had made significant progress in 
persuading others in government to agree, they were aware that proponents of the opposite view 
were still powerful enough to scupper any initiatives.
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A radio address to the nation by Ullastres in January 1959, for example, argued in favour of 
Spain participating in European integration. This in itself was ideologically treacherous territory in 
that aligning Spain with western Europe challenged the sense of national identity promoted by 
Spanish conservatives. The divide in government on this issue is aptly described by Lopez-Rodo in 
his memoirs. Whereas Ullastres, Navarro, Lopez Rodo were Europeanists, Franco himself:
“perhaps due to his status as a soldier, continued to be attracted to the idea that the Spanish 
economy should seek self sufficiency as far as possible and reduce dependency on foreign 
interests.”112
A prerequisite for closer ties with Europe was exchange rate liberalization and thus 
abandonment of a significant component of the autarkic model of import substitution. The language 
employed illustrates continued caution in spite of the progress made already by the technocrats in 
liberalizing the economy. Ullastres’ speech was meant for public consumption and thus dressed 
proposals up as negligible in impact on jobs, wages and prices. But elements in the regime also 
needed to be appeased, concerned as they were by any threat to Spain’s industrial progress or worse 
still, widespread civil disorder in response to a reduction in living standards. The industrialisation 
model pursued thus far was aggressively expansionary in an attempt to diffuse social opposition. So 
on the one hand the Trade Minister spoke of a need to liberalise exchange controls and trade policy 
but he also stressed the insignificance of the effects such a process would have at ground level. The 
fact that foreign trade constituted such a small proportion of national income would ensure that the 
effects would hardly be felt by the populace. Liberalisation of trade was necessary in order to 
address the supply problems experienced by national industries whose supply of raw materials was 
not guaranteed by the existing system of bilateral trade agreements. Sacrifices would be necessary 
but they would be small and ultimately worthwhile in the march towards better living standards for 
the Spanish people.113 Notably, there was little hint at the austerity the minister had in mind for later 
policies.
Convertibility, monetary stability and free trade were clearly appealing to the reformist 
ministers who sought international investment and export revenues as a solution to Spain’s credit 
shortage and budget imbalances.114 But it was still too early in the reform process to act decisively 
in a direction which might have upset conservatives in government agencies and the military who 
were still influential with the Caudillo. Furthermore, Franco himself was hostile to the idea of 
Spain’s reintegration into the world economy and continued to insist that the country could solve its
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own problems without the interference of foreign capital.115 Facing this uphill struggle to gain 
approval for their plans, the ministers’ ultimate course of action was unprecedented in Spain.116 The 
government issued a consultation to academic institutions, interest groups and state agencies asking 
for opinions on the implications for Spain of greater international integration. The consultation 
invited opinions on the benefits and disadvantages if Spain decided to implement convertibility of 
the peseta, the prerequisites for such a step, the best methods to implement it and the possible 
advantages or disadvantages of Spanish participation in European free trade.117 Although it is 
apparently contradictory of the paternalistic authoritarianism that characterised Spanish government 
to publicly seek the approval of interest groups in formulating policy, it represented a shrewd act of 
self empowerment by the reformers. They believed by this stage that few would disagree with the 
need for change and an end to Spain’s isolation given industrial supply problems and rising 
inflation. Suanzes’ correspondence from the era shows, for example, that meetings held by the 
ministers with representatives in various agencies to discuss reform that excluded hostile members
1 I  Q
of the leadership was an increasing irritant to the old guard. It was likely, therefore, that the 
reformers were confident responses in the consultation would be largely favourable regarding the 
concept of integrating Spain into a wider European trading bloc, having gauged opinion for 
themselves. Participation by Spain in an international monetary order and the global, or at least 
European, trading system was a radical departure. Clear evidence of consensus would serve to 
placate the highest authorities in government, ease fears of social instability and subdue the 
objections of conservatives.
In the event, the submission by the INI was highly critical of the proposed new direction in 
economic policy but contrasted conspicuously with the other responses. This may of course have 
been expected by the reformers who hoped to demonstrate the Institute as somehow out of touch 
with broader consensus. With otherwise universal endorsement, the conservatives would find it 
extremely difficult to veto the Stabilisation Plan imposed later that year which was designed in 
cooperation with the IMF. In which case the 1959 Stabilisation itself was not in itself a pivotal point 
in the liberalisation of Spain’s economy, but the culmination of a protracted process of negotiation 
and piecemeal change that dated back at least as far as 1957.
Fortunately for the researcher, the government published the answers submitted by all the 
respondents. The responses show wide recognition of the inevitability of greater opening of the
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Spanish economy and convertibility of the currency, even from some long standing pillars of
Francoist autarky such as the Organization Sindical, the ‘vertical’ state syndicate. This body should
not be taken as an accurate guage of organised labour’s position on the consultation. It was formed
to compensate for the regime’s ban of all existing trade unions and served as an instrument of the
corporatist state which also represented employers’ interests.119 Thus the OS is best understood as
an organ of Francoist ideology subordinated to the regime’s original Falangist ideologues and
promoter of the notion that class conflict had been overcome and a harmonious pyramidal structure
of state, province, municipality and family had substituted older confrontations.120 Yet the group’s
submission showed acceptance of the inappropriateness of continued isolation and the futility of
pursuing industrial self sufficiency. The OS highlighted stress on Spain’s terms of trade with other
countries in Europe adopting currency convertibility. Freer (and cheaper) currency exchange would
make Spanish exports less competitive if the regime maintained its protectionist policy of multiple
exchange rates. Closer ties with Europe was preferable, therefore, incorporating a ‘normalisation of
foreign trade’, namely a single exchange rate thus returning ‘purity’ to the currency by “renouncing
its use as an instrument of subsidy and restriction.”121 In sum, the organisation viewed export
promotion to build up reserves alongside price stability as the most effective means to increase
Spain’s ability import capital goods. This in turn would boost productivity and further the OS’
pursuit of full employment, improved living standards and thus mitigate the threat of labour unrest.
The response did not entirely relinquish the nationalist vision. While the OS acknowledged
the potential benefits of allowing entry to foreign investment in easing capital shortages that had
hampered industrial progress, it also warned of a threat to Spain’s autonomy from full capital
account liberalisation. Spanish economic development had to be achieved through indigenous effort
in order to avoid subordination to foreign interests and the possibility of exploitation. The response
stated that: “the indiscriminate entry of foreign capital that would compete in unfair conditions with
a national economy which does not have sufficient financial resources to acquire the necessary
122means to modernise, should not be accepted; there should be a planned transition.”
Thus the document proposes establishing a list of selected activities that would benefit from foreign 
capital, such as those industries aspiring to achieve exportability and international competitiveness.
The view of private business interests, forced to operate in a protected environment for so 
long might be expected to be cautious on the wisdom of rapid liberalisation and opening of the 
home market to more advanced foreign competition. On the other hand, greater ease of exports with 
a freely convertible and competitively valued currency might fare them well in the international
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marketplace, bring in more revenues which could then be used to purchase better equipment. It 
would also open the door to foreign investment, which would appeal to the capital-starved Spanish 
entrepreneur of the time. The response from the Higher Council of Chambers of Commerce 
reflected this latter view, coming out firmly in support of the government reformers on ending 
Spain’s isolation with a document that was enthusiastic about economic liberalisation. There was 
no hope, it argued, in the existing “ultradirigisme”, and if Spain failed to conform to the wider 
international trend then its isolation would deepen and terms of trade worsen. Thus, Spain needed to 
emerge from its isolation with a convertible and stable currency that would attract investment. If 
Spain failed to implement convertibility, then in the long term it would become uncompetitive in 
relation to those other markets that were participating in the liberalised system. Furthermore, Spain 
would be starved yet further of vital capital imports because foreign producers would be disinclined 
to service a market in which they could only be paid in money that can only be spent on overpriced 
goods within Spain. The Chambers also favoured liberalisation of trade, with the possibility of a 
reciprocal agreement with Latin American countries in addition to the emerging European common 
market. In sum private business interests wished for: “high productivity, liberalisation of economic 
activity, financial equilibrium, internal price and wage stability, thriving foreign trade, and 
ultimately, healthy purchasing power for a currency that needs to be convertible.”124
Private business, it seems, was firmly in favour of the efforts made by reformers in 
government. This illustrates a crucial distinction within the ‘industrial’ elite, in that the enthusiasm 
of private business contrasts sharply with serious reservations held by representatives from 
‘national’ industry. Francoism could no longer be classified as representing a vaguely defined elite 
against forces that favoured redistribution. Indeed, private national capital had found themselves at 
a disadvantage at least in terms of access to capital because while the ideologies elaborated by 
Suanzes and others identified a role for this sector, their Greater Spain vision of development had
i ^ c
prioritised strategic, state enterprise.
The fact that Spain’s central bankers, obliged for so long to underwrite the limitless 
ambitions of the engineer planners came out in favour of change is reasonably predictable. In its 
submission the Banco de Espana argued that greater international economic integration, made 
Spain’s continued adherence to the self sufficient model untenable. The Treaty of Rome, and 
liberalised exchange of capital and goods within a European bloc that neighboured Spain was a 
particularly acute threat to Spanish progress unless changes were made. The concern was how 
would Spain compete with this new behemoth on its doorstep. A European free trade area with
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reciprocated currency convertibility would inevitably lead to greater economies of scale, broader
choices of location for ever larger companies, higher productivity and ultimately rising living
standards. Because of the fact that all this would incorporate some of Spain’s competitors: “any
policy which does not lead to an increase in international trade could lead us to isolation and an ever
1 *)(\wider gap between our prices and international prices”. .
It was essential that Spain be a participant in further negotiations regarding greater 
liberalisation of trade because almost two thirds of its exports were to the European countries 
involved in the agreements. But participation in an international, or at least European, trading 
network had to be accompanied by adherence to greater financial interchange and consequently 
convertibility of the currency was equally important. A liberalisation of trade, the bankers argued, 
accompanied by a parallel deregulation of external payments and convertibility had to be 
underpinned by a single exchange rate. However, the viability of all this reform of Spain’s external 
relations depended on internal stability and the constraint of inflationary pressures.
Unsurprisingly, in the Bank’s view any stabilisation plan to reduce inflation had to focus on 
reducing growth in the money supply which had expanded in recent years far faster than national 
income
How best, then, to prevent the availability of money increasing faster than production? End 
the policy of providing central bank support to the capital market making it easier to enforce 
monetary discipline. Ministers Ullastres and Navarro, as described above, had struggled to curb the 
practice of automatic central bank underwriting of frivolous public investment by the ‘autonomous’ 
agencies of development, particularly the INI. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the ministers could 
rely on the support of the central bank in their attempts at economic policy reform. This like 
mindedness also reflects the fact that the rise of classically trained economists applied to the civil 
service as much as to high ministerial government and the Central Bank in particular had become a 
stronghold of the technocratic clique.127
What of the wider banking sector? Two responses to the consultation, from the Spanish 
Confederation of Savings Banks and the High Bankers Council, both industry associations, also 
came out in support of an end to Spain’s autarky and runaway public spending habits. The savings 
banks highlighted the need to boost savings, a necessary “discipline to achieve better use of 
wealth”. Clearly, when inflation is high, as it was in Spain in the 1950s, savings suffer. What was
126 Consejo Superior de las Camaras Oficiales de Comercio, Industria y Navegacion de Espana (Chambers o f  
Commerce, Industry and Navigation, p.49
127 Fuentes Quintana, E. ‘La economia espanola desde el plan de estabilizadion de 1959’, in: Martinez Vara, T. 
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19ftneeded, therefore, was an “inflexible policy of price stabilisation”. Meanwhile the bankers’ 
council stressed that international isolation was unsustainable because of growing reliance on both 
export revenues and capital imports. The Council stressed, however, that Spain was still not in a 
position to compete on an equal footing with other nations in a liberal international market. Thus 
the policy it suggested was one of ‘preparation* that would build up confidence and credibility and 
eventually elicit the necessary international support for Spain’s full reintegration in the international 
economy. Thus, industry needed to be protected although subsidies and artificial pricing should end. 
Liberalisation of trade to boost exports was important, as was the courting of foreign capital to aid 
continued industrial progress.129 Like the labour organisation, the banking sector approved of re­
establishment of external economic relations by way of liberalisation of the capital and current 
accounts. But like the OS it’s enthusiasm came tempered with a warning against over rapid 
liberalisation, recommending a gradual liberalisation of trade.
The Faculty of Economic Sciences at the University of Madrid, an intellectual incubator of 
the cause to undermine corporatist ideology, used the consultation to further the views held by the 
new generation of technocrats. The faculty’s response arguably reflected most accurately the vision 
of the ministers. Indeed, it was where most of the Opus Dei generation had acquired their belief in a 
self equilibrating market having passed through as either academics or post gradate students. It was 
thus a spiritual home of the liberalising movement and its response revolved around: “the absolute 
necessity of an authentic policy of stability to which all monetary, credit and investment policy is 
subordinated.”130
Once stability was assured Spain would be able to benefit fully from reinsertion in the world 
economy. This is significant in terms of belief systems in that it is diametrically opposed to the 
Movimiento doctrine of national development which subordinates monetary policy to political 
priorities. The standard bearer for this view and a conspicuous exception to the consensus revealed 
by the consultation was the INI. The Institute’s submission was unsigned but reads like one of 
Suanzes’ ideological writings. It echoes the authoritarian propaganda of the immediate post Civil 
War era by calling for a continued drive to greater productivity, continued state control of prices
128 Confederation Espanola de Cajas de Ahorro, Cuestionario Economico del Gobierno, in: Oficina de Coordinacion y 
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alongside labour law that would “reinforce the principles of authority and responsibility”.131 
Whereas growing unrest caused by the economic instability led many to look to a new policy 
direction, the State’s industrial monolith considered reinforcement of the old authoritarian 
principles to be more appropriate. The Institute acknowledged that the trend towards convertibility 
of currencies and greater liberalisation of trade would disadvantage Spain’s competitiveness if it 
remained outside the system, but not in the immediate term. In other words, there was no hurry to 
address the challenge. Meanwhile, the concept of ‘economic stabilisation’ as presented by the 
government reformers was viewed with deep suspicion. The Institute regarded itself as the 
navigator of Spain’s economic transformation from agrarian backwater to industrial power, a role it 
had carried with evident results. The proposed stabilisation of the economy which the government 
alluded to, threatened to stop that transformation in its tracks, the Institute argued, because it 
implied a “constraint of expansion”. In other words:
“Stabilisation might suggest the retention.. .of that expansive or transformative process 
which, applied to production in all sectors and correctly planned and coordinated, is considered 
from all points of view, the pivot of our economic development and constitutes, logically, the 
hopeful aspirations of the vast majority of Spaniards.” 132
The report thus railed against veneration of economic theories that endangered “the sources 
of wellbeing and progress”, stating that while Spain remained an international laggard in terms of 
living standards, industrial expansion and employment growth had to take precedent over modish 
theories calling for restraint and budget austerity. Thus the report dismissed the entire concept of 
orthodox stabilisation for a country in transition, claiming:
“Countries which, on account of their high standards of living can allow themselves the 
luxury -  if it can be called that -  of putting the brakes on its process of expansion, cannot compare
1 TTthemselves with our (country), in which growth is an urgent priority...”
The report contains other idiosyncrasies, stating Spain’s exclusion from Marshall Plan aid 
after World War II was an “enormous injustice” and warning against continued ostracism of Spain.
“Spain is not the periphery of Europe, as is sometimes claimed, comparing it with Turkey 
and Greece.” Continued isolation of Spain would mean loss of the benefits of its “special relations 
with the Hispanic American and Arab worlds”.134 There were rejections of the importance of 
calibrating investment with savings and statements of the necessity of state-led measures to combat 
“speculation.”
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Notwithstanding, general support on matters of monetary reform and economic 
liberalisation from all representative agencies except the INI emboldened the reformers to press 
ahead with an IMF sponsored stabilisation package. Navarro, for example, was at pains to stress the 
extent to which the bodies consulted represented all the most important groups and institutions in 
Spanish society. In a speech to parliament on 28 July in which he unveiled the Plan formally, he 
said: “It is cause for celebration that this consensus on economic issues has found a unanimous 
voice in all the organs representing the country because in this way, the decision of the Government 
becomes an authentic national agreement...”135
This left little room for opponents to obstruct the Plan. The consultation had demonstrated to 
the caudillo that the concept of liberalization in trade, currency exchange as well as greater 
integration in the international economy was approved by the most important agents in Spain. 
Suanzes* was thus presented as anachronistic in terms of the national mood and the reformers could 
now proceed with the Stabilisation, contrary as it was to what the regime had represented hitherto.
The Stabilisation Plan and ‘The New Economic Order ’
The Stabilisation Plan of July 1959 is frequently cited as the definitive moment in starting 
Spain’s liberalisation. There is a conventional view that in spite of its shortcomings, namely 
inadequate structural reforms to the tax system, it was the bold first step in an ambitious project of 
liberalisation.136 It was certainly an effective expression of the government’s commitment to restore 
balance both internally and in terms of external deficits. However, the Plan did not represent on its 
own an unexpected statement of economic housekeeping by newly appointed technocrats having 
conclusively superseded the old guard in the Franco regime. It was, nevertheless, a defining 
moment in the sense that it represented the reforming ministers’ most concerted act of nailing their
• I ^ 7colours to the mast, announcing the Plan amid much discourse on the ‘New Economic Order’.
“The Spanish government considers that it has reached the time to orient its economic policy 
towards aligning the Spanish economy with the nations of the western world by liberating it of
135 Discuso Pronunciado pro el Excmo. Sr. D. Mariano Navarro Rubio, Ministro de Hacienda Ante el Pleno de las 
Cortes Espanolas en Sesion Celebrada el 28 de Julio de 1959, Oficina de Coordinacion y Programacion Economica, 
Documentacion Economica No.7: Nueva Ordenacion Economica, Madrid, 1959.
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interventions which, inherited from the past, are not compatible to the requirements of the current
situation,” stated a government memorandum to the IMF.138
In its conception the Plan was a conventional IMF sponsored austerity package designed to
reduce inflation by curbing excess demand. Devaluation of the currency and inducements to capital
inflows, it was hoped, would restore a healthy balance of payments. Thus, the system of Central
Bank financing of extravagant public investment was to be terminated with limits on the deficit and
money and credit expansion. The Plan attributed a pivotal role to the market as an economic
equilibrator. The aim outlined by Mariano Navarro to the parliament was to ‘overcome
administrative obstacles which prevent prices reaching their natural level and the price of the peseta 
110reaching its true value. In an acknowledgement of the opposing ideological camp in government,
Navarro said that post Civil War reconstruction had led to ‘economic maturity’. Hence his 
conviction that the INI was now capable of financing itself without draining the resources of the 
Treasury as before. The next step in the process of Spain’s modernization was liberalization. In 
other words, the old model had served its purpose. Thus the legislation outlining the ‘economic 
order’ states: “Thanks to (our) rapid progress, our economic structure has been profoundly 
modified. Now that an endless number of problems have been resolved, it is necessary to confront 
others related to the higher standard of living achieved and the evolution of the global economy, 
especially that of the West, in whose economic organizations Spain is now integrated.”140
Prices were too high, Navarro argued, because excessive state intervention in the form of 
‘premiums and subsidies’. The ‘suppression’ of such state interferences had to be at the heart of any 
stabilization plan.141 This was to be achieved by way of two ‘simultaneous objectives’: domestic 
price stability and international convertibility of the peseta. They were described by Navarro as 
‘simultaneous’ in the sense that: “they both relate to a single problem, the sustainability of the value 
of the currency in its two features -  internal and external.”142
This stability was to be built on liberalization of the economy, based on a definition of 
ending state intervention in prices. Navarro also focused on ‘equalisation’ of the economy, or 
scrapping of multiple exchange rates. At the same session in the parliament Alberto Ullastres 
outlined the new policy on trade which was less liberal in spirit as it endorsed the continuation of 
Spain’s restricted regime of import substitution on manufactures. Restrictions were to be lifted on
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half of Spain’s imports, namely primary imports, on the pretext that it would make raw materials 
more available to Spanish industry. Exchange rate liberalization and currency convertibility 
outlined by Navarro would facilitate this trade in raw materials in addition to allowing industries to 
purchase new capital goods and technology from abroad. In terms of imported manufactures, the 
restrictions would for the most part remain in place.143 Spain was now committed to the liberalising 
ideals of the international organs it had joined the previous year and restructured its system of 
financing so that availability of credit was limited to quotas set by the Finance Ministry.144
At the behest of Navarro and Ullastres, a team from the OEEC compiled a report on the 
progress of the Stabilisation Plan during its first six months. The document authored by one Milton 
Gilbert, director of economic affairs at the OEEC was heavily censored by its recipients, so that 
only the most ideologically palatable parts were released for public consumption as well as to 
public officials outside the Opus Dei circle. However, Alberto Martin Artajo, an official at the 
Banco Exterior and former foreign minister to the pre 1957 cabinet leaked the contents to Suanzes, 
warning that what the government suppressed included a recommendation by the OEEC that the INI 
and control of its component industries be ‘decentralised’.145
In response, Suanzes states that Mr Gilbert from the OEEC had not to his knowledge carried 
out any research into the administration of the Institute that would qualify him to form opinions on 
its management. Suanzes suggested to Martin Artajo, furthermore, that Mr Gilbert had been 
manipulated as a pawn by forces seeking to discredit the management of the INI.
“It is possible that (Mr Gilbert) has in the end become a more or less innocent victim of 
some attempt by those who, serving their interests or their emotions, do not hesitate to attack the 
good name of other people, neither do they pause to ridicule their own nation... but it remains clear 
to me that this represents unforgivable deviousness....” Suanzes wrote.146
The OEEC report on the state of the Spanish economy following the Stabilisation which was 
published by the government’s Office for Economic Programming and Coordination in April 1960, 
refrained from direct criticism of the INI. It did, however recommend that structural reform 
continue with particular reference to continued ‘intervention’ in the economy. The criticism was 
levied at ‘certain controlling organisations’ rather than specifically at Suanzes and his Institute. The 
report recognised that significant progress was in evidence six months after the Stabilisation Plan 
was launched. Excess demand was under control and prices were stable in spite of a sharp
143 Ullastres, Discurso Pronunciado pro el Excmo. Sr. D. Ullastres, Ministro de Comercio ante el Pleno de las Cortes 
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readjustment to the exchange rate. The organisation cautiously suggested that Spain had turned an 
important ideological comer, abandoning the old model with the comment:
“It appears that the inflationary psychology that has reigned in Spain for so long is on the 
verge of disappearing.”147
On the other hand, the report warned that much still needed to be done in the area of 
structural adjustment saying that liberalisation of the economy was “fragmentary and 
insufficient”.148 In particular the organisation lamented a lack of progress in liberalising the 
economy far enough to allow the private sector more manoeuvrability. In spite of notable progress 
in abolition of price controls and the suppression of mechanisms for intervention in the economy, 
private firms remained subjected to rigid controls on investment and employment.149
The restrictive employment policy criticised by the inspectors was a centrepiece of Franco 
policy that would not be abandoned lightly. Given that the Civil War had been fought against an 
enemy that derived much of its support from an anarcho-syndicalist movement, the regime’s 
greatest fear was a resurgence of labour militancy. The two main policy instruments employed were 
authoritarian, and often violent, suppression of protest but also a generous wage policy alongside 
rigid employment regulation. The Suanzes doctrine, furthermore, moulded the INI and the 
industrialisation programme to act as an instrument of this policy aiming to increase industrial 
employment. Thus, in spite of the liberalising zeal of the architects of the Stabilisation Plan, and the 
credibility lent to the liberalisers by involvement of multilateral organisations such as the OEEC, 
the World Bank and the IMF, certain sacred cows of the regime were still untouchable.
Furthermore, the exchange between Suanzes and Martin Artajo suggests that the OEEC report on 
the state of the Spanish economy was altered to remove, or at least obscure specific criticisms of the 
INI.
Further evidence of this tempering of the technocrats’ plans lies in the evolution of the 1959 
National Investment Plan, published by Lopez Rodo’s Office for Economic Coordination and 
Programming. This represented a concerted effort by the reformists to put Spain’s finances in order 
and impress the international community with its transparency. The details of the budget imply the 
ministers were treading cautiously, however, exercising policies based in economic liberalism but 
stressing the need for expansion of productivity favoured by the pre Opus Dei ‘engineers’. In other 
words, a new direction was hinted at but veiled in the language of the old regime. Indeed, the Plan 
represented a policy of accelerating investment at a time when inflation was rising. Liberal elements 
were included but expansionary public spending was still a feature and there was little hint of the
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structural adjustment Navarro may have planned in the medium term. Thus trade was portrayed as 
the answer to the economy’s imbalances, marking a significant departure from previous export 
pessimism. The Plan hailed progress made thus far in expanding levels of production while 
recognizing the inadequacy of export revenues in the face of growing deficits. Paradoxically 
however, the purpose of achieving this trade balance as articulated to the public was to enhance 
Spain’s international purchasing power. Greater foreign currency reserves meant greater ability to 
import the equipment needed to augment production yet further. The emphasis presented to the 
public, therefore, was on easing supply bottlenecks rather that curbing excess demand or tempering 
industrial expansionism.
“To go faster, it is necessary to import more. And to be able to import, it is necessary to 
export. To export more or progress less: This is the dilemma of the Spanish economy.” Stated the 
public declaration of the Plan.150
The document proposed to orient public spending in favour of export oriented agriculture 
and specific industrial sectors identified as being “most beneficial to the economy of the 
fatherland.” 151 The target and culprit of Spain’s persistent economic imbalances was the double 
“strangulation” imposed by both foreign trade and inadequate energy and raw material production 
within Spain. Agriculture was assigned to address the former through a drive to surpass domestic 
needs and produce an exportable surplus, with a targeted increase in production of 35 per cent 
within four years. To achieve this surplus, agricultural imports were to be reduced by 17 per cent 
over the period while increasing production through extension of irrigated land, intensification of 
agriculture through parcelisation of holdings, improved storage, expansion of forestry, increase of 
land dedicated to exportable fruit products, expansion of olive growing, improvement of livestock
1 57herds and increased mechanization. The target was a surplus of US$183 million by 1963 The 
industrial “strangulation” was to be tackled by intensification of energy production and raw material 
extraction.
“Industrial investment is not to be aimed at intensification of (industrial) export trade.
Rather, it is aimed at achieving an expansion of energy production... Undoubtedly, in the past 
Spain has experienced obstacles to its ability to acquire goods on account of lack of supply in 
certain key sectors of the economy. One of these has been the energy sector, while deficiencies of 
supply have also been identified in the cement and construction materials, steel products and 
fertilizer industries.”153
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Targets were set within the plan for production increases of up to 69 per cent within a year 
in oil refining, cement, steel, fertilizers and nitrates, shipbuilding, aluminium, and chemicals.154 
This is not to say that the idea of industrial exports was entirely discounted. The expansion of 
production in basic industry was aimed at relieving bottlenecks in supply in the short term which 
over a longer period would benefit firms seeking revenues from exports, particularly in the 
manufacturing and food processing sectors.155 The chief beneficiaries of the budget were to be those 
‘basic’ sectors highlighted in the Law of October 1939 as being in the national interest: steel, coal, 
transport and so on. The ministries of Trade and Agriculture were obliged to orient their own 
budgets according to the priorities outlined in the Plan and, crucially, monetary policy was to be 
similarly aligned with a remit to provide the necessary stability alongside full employment.156 The 
plan was highly centralized, establishing a central committee made up of representatives of various 
economy oriented ministries, namely the Presidency, Finance, Public Works, Agriculture, Industry, 
Trade, Employment, Information, Tourism and Housing.157
The reason behind the caution was the fact that opponents to any austerity were powerful 
and the restrictions on state finance for the INI had provoked some high level opposition. Indeed, 
the dictator himself was aware of the objections of some of his closest allies to what the technocrats 
were trying to achieve. Suanzes in April 1959 sent a dossier to the caudillo outlining the funding 
difficulties of the INI, expressing the damage that budgetary conservatism was having on his vision.
“I get the impression that they will very soon allow us a certain quantity but our problems 
have been mounting for a long time... which translates into not merely the Institute and the firms 
that depend on it losing their credit, but also their investments are necessarily hindered.”158
After mid 1959, however, the budget was subordinated to the monetary and fiscal austerity 
which comprised the Stabilisation Plan and priorities were reoriented. In a memorandum to the IMF 
regarding the Stabilisation Plan, the government pledged to limit public spending to less than 80 
million pesetas that would reduce the need for government financing from 18.3 million pesetas in 
1958 to 13.4 million in 1959. The added benefits of 6 million more from the capital market 
including savings banks as well as 4 million of US aid, it was anticipated that the public sector 
would only require a further 3.4 million from the banking sector.159 In consequence, therefore, the 
agricultural sector heralded in the original investment plan as the great saviour of Spain’s trade
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balance which was to be nurtured as an export revenue earner, saw its budget revised and reduced 
over the course of the year.
“Investments planned (in agriculture) were revised in the course of the plan’s development 
and adjusted to a lower level.. .with the aim of accommodating them within the National Economic 
Stabilisation Plan, put into force a few months later.. ..The readjustment of investment in relevant 
public sectors had necessarily to affect the reach of objectives (outlined in the original plan), in 
favour of the objectives of the National Stabilisation Plan,” reads the revised Investment Plan.160
In respect of investment in basic industries, the revised budget states that in calculating the 
original targets for implementation in 1959, the figures were “rounded off at an excessive level and 
represented a limit greater than what is desirable.”161 In short, the original allocations of spending 
for industry were somewhat overenthusiastic. Given that the architects of the ‘overenthusiastic’ 
budget were the reformers, it appears they were conceding much to the conservatives as part of a 
gradualist political strategy, with full intention of rescinding the generosity later. The following 
table (Figure 3.3) illustrates the original targets outlined in 1959 against investments made by 1960 
in addition to the ‘revised’ budgets. This third variable was, however, more a statement of intent 
rather than an effective plan on account of the fact that much of the money had been spent and all 
the targets were close to being reached by the time action could be taken. In the case of spending on 
‘basic industry’, the target was exceeded.
Figure 3.3:1959 National Investment Plan: Gross Total Investment by Sector (millions of
pesetas)
Sector ProiectedfA) Adiusted(B) ImpIementedfC) %C/A %C/B
Agriculture 15,773.4 14,635.5 14,120.5 89.5 96.4
Basic Industries 16,566.4 16,566.4 20,130.2 121.5 121.5
Other Industry 12,052.3 12,052.3 10,873.1 90.2 90.5
Public Works 11,457.9 10,347.6 9,770.2 85.2 94.7
Airports 484.6 184.6 68.8 14.1 37.2
Housing 17,921.5 17,921.5 19,500.0 108.8 108.8
Other 7.226.4 7.226.4 6.315.6 87.3 87.3
Total: 81,482.5 78,934.2 80,778.4 99.1 102.3
Source: Oficina de Coordinacion y  Programacion Economica: Documentacion Economica No. 16, 
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The overall budget reduction is an unspectacular 1 per cent although the actual amount spent 
exceeds the original projection by more than 2 per cent. Much of this excess is attributable to the 
basic industries which not only exceeded their budget allocation by more than a fifth, but were also 
left unscathed by the budget reductions announced in 1960. The agricultural sector, in contrast, saw 
its budget slashed by more than 10 per cent, which suggests greater lobbying power held by the 
state industrialists compared with their colleagues at the Ministry of Agriculture.
However, the liberalisers intended to extend their restructuring of the economy further by 
adopting a plan for development built upon the new monetary stability. The design was for a high 
rate of growth underpinned by foreign trade and a more modest role for the public sector. Efforts to 
liberalise were still limited by stalwarts in the regime and to implement a new phase of development 
without jeopardising the hard won stability and surpluses in the balance of payments, the Ministers 
sought further international sanction. A World Bank mission was invited to Spain early in 1961 to 
conduct a survey and formulate a series of recommendations based on the brief set for them by the 
Spanish government. The report was uncompromising in its criticism of the INI and industrial 
policy in general, declaring that in spite of progress in liberalising the economy, much work was 
still necessary. The continuation of price controls and subsidies in certain sectors seriously 
threatened long-term stability and prospects for a more participatory private sector. Cross subsidies 
among state enterprises were a particular irritant to the World Bank team which highlighted the 
example of ports making land and other installations available to government owned enterprises at 
highly subsidised rates. This, it argued, stifled entrepreneurship in the private sector. The mission 
argued that the INI should suffer greater exposure to market forces urged the immediate removal of 
its special privileges that made uneconomic allocation of resources a serious issue. The report 
highlighted the founding article of the INI which pledged to nurture industry until such time that it 
became self sustaining and committed itself to a gradual phasing out of state control while 
encouraging private initiative. The INI had reneged on this pledge and was actually seeking to 
increase its role in the economy at the expense of fair competition. The private sector was seriously 
constrained in the existing system of subsidised public competition, the report argued. On this point 
the mission described charges against the INI without naming the source of the information.
“We understand that INI has sought to reserve for itself fields of activity in which private 
interests were prepared to operate. We believe that the more broadly the mandate of INI is 
interpreted, the more uncertainty it creates. Businessmen are reluctant to make new investments in 
view of the uncertainty as to the future intentions of INI. Spanish and foreign firms have 
encountered long delays when seeking authorisation to set up plants in fields that INI also wished to
169
enter. Continued uncertainty of this kind can only retard the growth of private industry and the 
inflow of foreign capital.”162
In the view of the World Bank, therefore, the INI had served its purpose as an industrial 
pioneer and now acted as a hindrance to the further maturing of Spain’s economy by distorting the 
market. The solution was simple:
“Over the next five to ten years, when a new relationship with the private sector is being 
worked out, caution should be exercised in assigning new activities to INI.”163
Suanzes’ reaction was despondent as by now he was aware of the ascendancy of the 
liberalisers and a sustained campaign against his industrial project. Writing to one of his 
subordinates shortly after the World Bank report was published, he stated:
“The truth is that I have attached very little importance to the report and the 
recommendations made by the World Bank related to the future development of our economy, as I 
would never have requested a report of this type and it therefore follows that I am not interested in 
what they might say to me...”164
Suanzes referred to the report as part of a “perfectly orchestrated campaign attacking the 
Institute” but remained defiant nonetheless. The efforts of his detractors, he claimed, were merely 
strengthening the Institute. Indeed, the final design of the first Development Plan does not indicate 
much adherence to the World Bank mission’s recommendations regarding exclusion of the INI and 
the centrality of the market. For example, as mentioned above, the World Bank had highlighted the 
need to end ‘unfair’ subsidisation of state enterprises in order to allow the private sector to compete. 
Cross subsidisation, tax advantages based on state industries’ categorisation as ‘strategically 
important’ and alleviation of duty on imported capital goods put private competitors at a severe 
disadvantage, the report argued. Yet the first Development Plan fell somewhat short of this ideal. 
The structure of the Plan was a series of economic forecasts and targets covering a four year period 
from 1964 to 1967. Clearly there was no heed paid to any suggestion that control of the economy 
should be decentralised and left to market forces. The language of the Plan portrayed the initiative 
as a partnership between private and public with an eye to gradually tipping the balance in favour of 
the former. Thus the public sector was to act as a subordinate to the private sector, enshrining in law 
the idea that State enterprises should avoid competing unnecessarily with private interests. New 
public companies would now only be launched in cases where there was “insufficient private 
enterprise”. However, the private sector was to “follow guidelines” regarding what the government
162 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development o f  Spain, Washington 1963, 
p.350
163 Ibid.
164 Letter to Francisco Dopico, subdirector jefe de obras civiles de la empresa nacional ‘Bazan’, 18 December 1962, 
Centro de Documentacion del Instituto Nacional de Industria. Archivo Personal de Juan Antonio Suanzes,
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believed to be the most suitable allocation of resources.165 Furthermore, if  private companies failed 
to meet those guidelines or targets set by the government, it’s the subordinate status of the public 
sector was to be rescinded. Thus the legislation stated that:
“The government will be able to identify the inadequacy of private initiative and the 
opportunity to substitute for it with public activity, in cases when it does not achieve within certain 
sectors the objectives assigned to it, as guidelines, in the Economic Development Plan.”166
The law also maintained and reiterated the right of the public sector to intervene and exclude 
the private sector from sectors designated as o f national interest or important for defence, a 
privilege highlighted by the World Bank as an unfair advantage.
To summarise the new order therefore, the government also undertook to subsidise activity 
in certain sectors identified as struggling to meet targets set by the Plan, a regime in which the law 
stated the private sector could participate in voluntarily. Once the sector in need was identified, a 
process of negotiation would take place between the Ministries of Industry and Finance as well as 
the Organization Sindical, and the Central Committee of the Development Plan, in effect a new 
ministry. In this way a plan would be formulated to direct production targets, necessary subsidies 
and any administrative issues. Failure to reach these targets would mean suspension of government
1 fslhelp. What this represented was a continuation of heavy handed corporatism and centralised state 
control that was dominated by subsidies in spite of pledges to act otherwise.
Much emphasis was also placed on regional development with a view to elevate living 
standards in impoverished provinces. The method employed was to be a system of the central 
government choosing the locations for “poles of industrial development” each of which was to be 
approved by government decree. Again, as with the selection of industrial sectors for preferential 
treatment, the choice of locale for development was left to a team of representatives from various 
ministries and the Central Committee of the Development Plan. Once approved, the inhabitants of 
these areas could expect to see rapid development of publicly funded industrial projects and public 
works initiatives.
Such a system empowered the State rather than diminished it in the spirit of free enterprise 
and was a far cry from the vision laid out by the World Bank in its report. Control of this and 
subsequent development plans was highly centralised and state-owned enterprises were to maintain 
a leading role. In spite of pledges to subordinate activity to private enterprise, decision making was 
a top-down process. Whether a region or an industrial sector could expect to develop was not left up
165 Presidencia del Gobiemo, Comisaria del Plan de Desarrollo, Plan de Desarrollo Economico y  Social para el periodo 
1964-67, Madrid, 1963, p.47
166 Presidencia del Gobiemo, Proyecto de Ley por la que se aprueba el Plan de Desarrollo Economico para el Periodo 
1964-1967y  se dictan normas relatives a su ejecucion, Ley 28 de Diciembre 1963, Articulo 2°, 2:a
167 Ibid. Articulo 5° 1 and 2.
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to market forces, comparative advantage or any other market driven process. It was decided by 
decree from above. It appeared therefore, that the INI could rest assured that it was not on the verge 
of extinction as in spite of the hostility of reformist ministers. Structural adjustment was to stop well 
short of dismantling the developmental state. The leadership of the INI regarded the nature of the 
Plan as vindication, a continuation of its own expansionist ideals.
Conclusion:
This section has looked at parallel economic liberalisations to tackle imbalances associated 
with previously employed models of state sponsored industrialisation. In each case examined here 
policy reform stopped short of what Frondizi’s administration in Argentina and Spain’s Opus Dei 
technocrats had in mind. This was due to a need to placate powerful factions who were either 
concerned about the possibility of social disorder or sought to retain or increase their share of 
national income. There was, in each case a continuation of the basic concept of modernisation 
through forced industrialisation overseen by the state, as a central priority, but the new model 
sought to co-opt a new force, foreign capital, to participate in the project ideally in a subordinated 
role. They both represented, therefore, a rejection of the autarkic component of ideologically 
conceived, national modernisation through managed industrialisation. Thus the stabilisation plans in 
Spain and Argentina, conceived with the help of the IMF, were components of both governments’ 
efforts to attract foreign capital. Association with the IMF arguably added prestige and served as 
high level endorsement of the regimes’ financial responsibility which in turn served to attract 
foreign private investment. Returning to the debate over ‘ownership’ of the stabilisation plans, there 
may have been stringent conditions attached to the relevant loans by the Fund, but the indirect 
benefits associated with IMF endorsement, as opposed to the financing, was the primary motivation 
for each government’s efforts to secure the Fund’s participation. The plans were used as 
instruments in alliance making, both with local and foreign capital, and thus ‘ownership’ can be 
largely attributed to the Argentina and Spanish economic policymakers.
So what separates the two models and qualifies the assumption of this paper that Spain was 
the more successful case? Firstly, the continuity of the Franco dictatorship provided a degree of 
institutional stability despite the splits within the government between conservative and reformist 
factions. Crucially, the clash of ideas between factions was internalised as a debate among branches 
of the state with loyalty to the executive as protector against disorder binding the system together. 
This institutional continuity is reflected in not just the survival of the dictatorship itself which 
ensured political stability, but also of the INI and other bodies such as the Organisation Sindical.
168 TNT, Memoria 1962, pp. 12-13.
172
In the Spanish case, the state successfully harnessed the conflicting interests of distinct 
economic and social groups by constructing a system of corporatist representation within the state, 
which itself was an arena for negotiation under the authority of Franco himself. Different factions, 
representing distinct interests, lobbied for privilege and favour with the executive, and the period 
analysed here was one characterised by the waning influence of the Falange and ascendance of a 
technocratic, pro enterprise internationalist faction. But though one group may have enjoyed 
momentary favour, other groups were still heard and capable of exerting influence to restrain new 
policy.
In Argentina, however, there was no binding force to which interest groups were formally 
answerable. Bargaining was thus external, between the executive who wished to impose reforms, 
and interest groups such as business, labour and foreign capital. The popular voice in Spain was 
captured by the state though a system of vertical syndicalism following military defeat of the old 
syndicalism in the Civil War. In Argentina, while Peron was exiled at the insistence of Argentina’s 
military, his syndicalist movement was not successfully dispersed in spite of interventions in unions 
and prohibition of their political party. Thus Argentine labour was a potent and unchecked force to 
be reckoned with. But while Frondizi was pragmatic enough to realise Peronist labour had to be 
appeased, powerful groups, including the military were suspicious of any conciliatory behaviour 
towards the Peronists. Pacts were necessarily secret but the clandestine nature of negotiations gave 
the appearance of policy inconsistency and contradiction as Frondizi tried to make concessions to as 
many groups as possible. The Argentine state lacked autonomy and the government collapsed under 
the strain of competing demands.
Returning now to the ‘crony capitalism’ corollary to the new institutionalist school of 
economics. Spain, as illustrated here, presents a higher quality of crony capitalism based on 
successful vertical political integration through consolidation of the corporatist state. Its political 
discourse over economic reform was a war of attrition kept within the control of the state while the 
diversity of interests represented by state agencies represented a broader reach of ‘credible 
commitment’ within a system defined by cronyism. The zero sum game of Argentine factions 
making tenuous alliances with Frondizi based on ever less credible assurances that their economic 
interests would be protected, was less stable and the goodwill of asset holders and the wider civil 
society more limited. This snapshot may go some way, therefore, to helping us understand Spain’s 
economic outperformance of Argentina over the longer term.
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Chapter 4
Crisis, Transitions and Frustrated Markets: 1976-80
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This chapter, like the previous section, addresses contemporaneous attempts at economic 
reform and structural adjustment in the face of crisis blamed by the governments in each case on the 
legacy of their predecessors. A further similarity is that this chapter compares an authoritarian with 
a democratic government except that in this case the roles are reversed. The period in question starts 
in 1976 and was a time of rapid political change in both Argentina and Spain. The former was under 
military rule following a second crisis-ridden period of Peronist rule characterised by accelerating 
macroeconomic and political turmoil. The latter was immersed in a fragile but popular political 
transition following the death of Franco in 1975. The monarchy was restored but democracy was 
also constitutionally enshrined. Nevertheless, society was restive and the economy in crisis because 
a precarious political environment had caused inaction regarding the issue of higher international 
energy prices after the first oil crisis in 1974.
The reforms implemented in each case were presided over by economics ministers who 
believed in the market as the optimal allocator of resources and blamed the crises they were 
appointed to tackle on previous dirigisme. Nevertheless, political realities meant both cases as 
examined in this chapter were examples of frustrated orthodoxy with the eventual model stopping 
well short of what the respective ministers had originally envisaged. The difference between the 
two cases is presented here as rooted in the nature of policy implementation with respect to the 
extent to which economic interest groups were granted access to the policymaking process. The 
Argentine economics minister Jose Alfredo Martinez de Hoz, was granted exceptional powers by 
the ruling military junta and took a hard line against associational pressure, particularly labour. 
Meanwhile, the military had outlawed all political activity so parties were proscribed as were 
unions and other collective organisations. In reality, however, as argued throughout this thesis, 
associational life in Argentina is resilient enough to withstand such restriction. Indeed, in the case 
of the Peronist unions, they have spent more of their history operating clandestinely than legally. 
This meant that the minister’s uniformed colleagues in government were in direct negotiation, albeit 
secretly, with unions over such issues as wage policy. So for all the government’s authoritarianism 
and its ideological crusade against the main associations, very little had changed within the policy­
making process. The economics minister may ostensibly have been granted unprecedented power in 
implementing policy but the practice of direct bargaining with interest groups over economic 
policy persisted.
In Spain, meanwhile, the government was constrained by the perceived threat to 
democratisation from reactionary forces in the military so shock treatments to the economy were 
ruled out as too dangerous. The solution was to invite representatives of newly legal political parties 
to negotiate wage and price constraints and persuade them to limit their demands in return for a 
pledge by the government to bring macroeconomic instability to a prompt end, a political accord
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commonly referred to as the Moncloa Pacts named after the prime minsister’s residence in Madrid 
where the negotiations took place. Crucially, associations of employers and labour were not invited 
to the talks on the basis that such interests were adequately represented by the parties. They were 
subsequently put under pressure to endorse the agreements on the grounds that political stability 
was in Spain’s best long-term interest. The result was a gradualist economic reform given at least a 
semblance of cross-party consensus by the negotiations and characterised by institutional continuity 
and recognition of the legality and legitimacy of existing political structures. Calls for revolution or 
authoritarian crackdown became the preserve of extreme factions of the left and right while the 
mainstream parties from all sides of the political spectrum, including regional nationalists, signed 
up to constitutional conformity. Thus through a highly precarious political and economic situation, 
the crucial public good of political stability was maintained. The inclusion of parties in 
policymaking and exclusion of associations, though two large labour union confederations were 
affiliated to the main leftist parties and therefore indirectly represented, reflects, it is suggested here, 
a de facto continuation of the Franco-era vertical system of representation. This does not represent a 
rupture with the old corporatism, so much as a change in management of economic and social 
interests. The official ‘vertical’ corporatist entity, the OS was disbanded following democratisation 
and the legalisation of trade unions. But unions were inherently weak, their claim to representation 
captured by a political party which meant in effect, interest negotiation was still kept within the 
state, carried out under the structure of a political party system that mirrored the old corporatist 
structure, presided over by an executive whose authority was universally recognised.
The chapter is split into two parts, the first of which addresses the Argentine case while the 
second describes the Spanish experience. Each of these subsections starts with a brief review of the 
pertinent literature and state of scholarship followed by an explanation of the principal structures of 
argument and a narrative of events. The chapter ends with a summary of the main points of the case 
study comparison before offering some conclusions.
Part 1: Argentina
The new order implemented in Argentina in April 1976 attempted to change fundamentally 
the environment in which economic forces had to operate, and was designed as a radical departure 
from “the old and deficient schemes” applied by previous regimes.1 Nevertheless, its capacity to 
achieve this was limited in spite of the patronage of military authority because implementation of 
the vision in its purest form was politically unacceptable. Belief in the free market as the most
1 See: Peralta-Ramos, M. ‘Toward an Analysis o f the Structural Basis o f Coercion in Argentina: The Behavior o f the 
Major Factions o f the Bourgeoisie 1976-1983’ in: Peralta-Ramos and Waisman, C. From Military Rule to Liberal 
Democracy in Argentina, Boulder 1987
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desirable allocator of resources meant the reasoning behind reform demanded that protected 
industries be cast adrift by the state. Yet at a time of spiralling political violence and the threat of 
civil war, measures that would be two galling to the public and threatened state control of ‘strategic’ 
assets did not appeal to Argentina’s new rulers. For practical reasons, therefore, the policy stopped 
short of the vision. This chapter holds that the episode conforms to the model outlined in early 
chapters of the thesis whereby the executive, in this case a military junta, negotiated directly with 
interest groups regarding policy. All political activity was proscribed and parties suspended, 
rendering them even weaker than usual. However, pragmatism by military authorities in the cabinet 
meant they continued to engage with unions as well as business interests even though the regime 
made dismantling of Peronist corporate entities such as the CGT a priority. The dynamic was more 
complex than that of the previous snapshot addressing Frondizi’s attempts at economic reform, 
however. Though there was a clearly defined head of state who occupied the office of the 
presidency, the regime was a junta representing all three armed forces. This meant factionalism 
between the services, and indeed within them, played a role in policymaking. Ostensibly this 
resembles the Spanish authoritarian model of enduring corporatist bureaucracy where factions 
nominally representing economic groups negotiate within the state before an arbitrating final 
authority. However, the head of the Junta was not as enduring an authority as his Spanish dictatorial 
counterpart. Only the first leader, Jorge Videla, served his full term, preoccupied by challenges 
from within the military hierarchy. After he stepped down, the regime was punctuated by coups 
within the coup as junta heads were deposed and replaced by usurpers.
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Figure 4.1: Argentina: Hierarchy of representation between President and interest 
groups during the Videla -  Martinez de Hoz partnership 1976-1981
The framework for analysis used in this section to understand economic policymaking 
during Martinez de Hoz’s tenure at the Economics Ministry is outlined in figure 4.1. Again, the 
structure is characterised by a powerful executive. However, the nature of the regime is such that 
the president identifies itself with the new economic policy associated with the ministry of Martinez 
de Hoz. So the economics minister is uniquely powerful in this combination and the creation of a 
‘super ministry’ to administer all facets of economic policy means he is an effective prime minister. 
Thus in the dynamic portrayed, the link between the executive and economics minister is the closest 
of all the combinations portrayed here. Officially, however, Argentina was ruled by a Junta with the 
three armed forces represented in equal measure with the power to appoint a president. During the 
initial stage of the regime, Jorge Videla both governed as President of the Republic and retained his
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post as commander-in-chief of the army. Objections from the other services, particularly the navy, 
led Videla to appoint a ‘fourth man’ to head the army. His choice of Roberto Viola, a personal 
friend and known to be a political moderate proved contentious with more hard line members of the 
services. When Viola was also chosen as Videla’s successor as president, certain factions of the 
military openly defied his authority and the Junta lost its cohesiveness. Nevertheless, during the 
crucial period of Martinez de Hoz’s ministry, Videla maintained effective control over military 
factions, as is portrayed in the diagram. The next tier in the hierarchy below the Junta was the 
cabinet. All the appointed ministers were serving military officers with the exception of Martinez de 
Hoz and the Minister of Culture. Economic policy was market oriented and necessitated a degree of 
austerity for many sectors of society. The winners were likely to be the agricultural elites, because 
of an emphasis on promoting grain and beef exports, and externally oriented industry because of 
greater access to capital and the liberalisation of imports. Thus the minister looked to these groups 
for support while taking a harder and unsympathetic line with groups associated with the old order, 
particularly organised labour. Consequently networks of communication were established between 
the Economics Ministry and business and agricultural interests while the same department of state, 
while retaining a hand in setting wages, kept itself aloof from labour. However, the relationship 
between the minister and entrepreneurial elites eventually soured. Martinez de Hoz had liberalised 
prices as an ideological priority, while personally administering restrained wage increases. But 
when producers refused to absorb these rises and increased prices, the minister became openly 
critical and implemented a price freeze. He was also repeatedly exasperated by speculative activity 
by elites which undermined his efforts to keep inflation in check so resorted to dictating temporary 
price freezes. When this relationship broke down, however, business and agricultural elites resorted 
to their traditional inflationary weapons, such as retention of supply, and direct contact with the 
executive, bypassing the Economics Ministry altogether and isolating the minister.
Labour, meanwhile, identified as a disruptive force and a bastion of Peronist degeneracy, 
was to a great extent the sector treated most harshly. Its institutions were tethered with new 
regulations, unions were intervened and stripped of much of their power, while the right to strike 
was withdrawn. The Economics Ministry retained the right to set wages, whereas it had freed prices 
in the name of economic liberalisation, but did not recognise any form of labour representation or 
lobbying. Labour’s official channel into the state was through the military intervenor of the CGT 
and the Ministry of Labour. The law stated that unions could not participate in politics so union 
leaders were not strictly speaking, permitted to voice concerns to either the intervenor or Labour 
Minister. Meetings were conducted according to the law and consisted of audiences of trade 
unionists listening to the dictates made by the Minister or intervenor. Unofficially, however, 
labour’s access to government remained in place and both the Labour Minister and intervenor held
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regular informal meetings related to proposed legislative reform with union leaders. The workers 
also found sympathisers within the Junta, particularly the Navy which expressed concern about the 
potential for social disorder on account of the falls in living standards associated with Martinez de 
Hoz’s policies. For their part, the official union leaders were pragmatic in their dealings with the 
government and adopted a cautious approach on account of indiscriminate arrests of labour 
representatives deemed a threat to order. This resulted in the disaffection of the union movement’s 
rank and file and saw a burgeoning of clandestine labour movements which were highly effective at 
organising industrial action at the shop floor level and pressurising the government. These 
movements were closely linked with their official counterparts and consequently also enjoyed a 
degree of contact with govement.
Ostensibly, this structure appears corporatist with a vertically integrated hierarchy of 
representation from executive to trade union. However, the labour movement was by far the most 
junior partner among the corporatist entities negotiating with government and remained openly 
hostile to Martinez de Hoz’s policies. Business and landed elites also opted out of the system and 
resorted to direct lobbying of the executive and the Junta, bypassing the Economics Ministry. The 
most important difference with the Spanish system is its fragility. The first military president, 
general Videla was the closest to acting as a Franco style arbitrator but even he could not guarantee 
the loyalty of all factions of the military so his hold on power remained tenuous.
There follows a summary of views expressed in the existing literature on the period which 
leads into a summary of the economic programme attempted by the regime. The subsequent section 
then addresses empirical documentary and archival evidence of relations between the junta and 
different corporate interests and how these affected policy implementation and economic 
performance. The episode is often cited as a definitive end to the inward-oriented growth strategy 
that had prevailed since the 1930s achieved through confrontation with its associated interests and 
labour in particular. Policy was defined by a view that the reduction of labour costs was considered 
indispensable for restoring growth so the government saw to it that real wages declined and 
repressed trade unions, eliminated collective bargaining and the right to strike. An influential essay 
written contemporaneously to the events attributes economic opening as a conscious strategy to 
conclusively dissipate the problem of Argentine social struggle. Assuming inflation is an indicator 
of social struggle, economic opening puts a ceiling on rising prices and obliges businesses to 
confront workers. Economic liberalisation, therefore, used to implement social discipline.
2 Marshall, A. ‘State Intervention, the Labour Market and Inequality in Argentina’, in: Berry, A. (ed.) Poverty, 
Economic Reform and Income Distribution in Latin America, Boulder, 1997
3 Canitrot, A ‘La Disciplina como Objetivo de la Politica Economica. Un ensayo sobre el programa economico del 
Gobiemo Argentino desde 1976, Desarrollo Economico, No.76, Jan.-March 1980; See also Peralta-Ramos, M. ‘Toward
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The new tranche of ideologically driven policy was most famously articulated by the 
economics minister Martinez de Hoz, the chief architect of the economic component of the so- 
called ‘Plan for the Recovery, Reorganisation and Expansion of the Argentine Economy’, launched 
on 2 April 19764. The economics minister, prior to his appointment by the military, was president of 
the ‘Consejo E m presarioan employers’ association representing business and had held 
directorships at several corporations. He was also from a landowning pedigree, whose listed 
occupation in the Argentine Who’s Who was hacendado, and therefore claimed to represent both 
town and country.5
Commentators consequently have made much of Martinez de Hoz’s apparent belief that 
Argentina’s economic recovery was dependent, to a large extent, on agricultural exports, a view 
associated with Argentina’s traditional landed elites. The ‘conflict society’ thesis6 states groups in 
favour of agriculture are necessarily inclined to discriminate against industry and the neo-liberal 
experiment was widely interpreted as ‘anti-industry’ with its sustained attack on the mechanisms of 
import substitution.7 It is easy to identify the period, therefore, as a ‘liberal’ alliance between 
authoritarian rulers and agricultural producers formed around a conspiracy to turn the clock back to 
Argentina’s late nineteenth century golden age of export-led growth.8
To Aldo Ferrer, a devepmentalist ideologue who was a junior minister to the Frondizi 
government and economics minister to General Roberto Levingston’s military mandate of the early 
1970s, this policy was a ‘grave mistake’. Argentina was too large an economy to simply abandon 
an industrialisation process begun in the 1930s and much advanced since. “It is not possible to 
frame a country of Argentina’s dimensions in a pre-industrial economic system”, he writes.9
This process of deindustrialisation that characterises the snapshot examined in this section 
saw industrial product fall by more than a fifth and the contribution of industry to overall GDP 
reduced from 28 per cent to 22 per cent between 1975 and 1982. Furthermore, up to 20 per cent of 
Argentina’s largest manufacturing firms were closed during this period.10 A related argument 
suggests that while the regime presided over a process of deindustrialisation, some industries 
benefited from the new liberalism. A trust in comparative advantage meant the focus of the regime
an Analysis o f the Structural Basis o f Coercion in Argentina: The Behavior o f the Major Fractions o f the Bourgeoisie 
1976-1983 in: Peralta Ramos and Waisman, C. (eds.) From Military Rule to Liberal Democracy in Argentina, Boulder 
1987
4 In Spanish: Programa de Recuperacion, Saneamiento, y  Expansion de la Economia Argentina.
5 The Economist, July 10 1976, Argentina -  Brains and Brawn’, Business Week August 9 1976 (Industrial Edition) Who 
Runs Latin America?
6 Mallon and Sourouille Economic Policymaking in a Conflict Society: The Argentine Case, London 1975,
7 See Azipiazu, E.Basualdo and M.Khavisse El Nuevo Poder Economico el la Argentina de los Ahos 80, Buenos Aires, 
1986, p. 186 or Ferrer, A. ‘The Argentine Economy 1976 to 1979, Journal o f  Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 
Vol. 22, No.2, May, 1980; Katz and Kosacoff. Elproceso de industrializacion en la Argentina: Evolucion, retrocesoy 
porpectiva, Buenos Aires, 1989
8 See Erro. D. Resolving the Argentine Paradox, Boulder, 1993
9 Ferrer, 1980, pp.151-155
10 See Kosacoff and Azpiazu, La Industria Argentina: Desarrollo y  Cambios Estructurales, Buenos Aires 1989, p.20.
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shifted to industries associated with Argentina’s abundance of natural resources, especially the oil 
and steel industries.11 Jorge Schvarzer, then as now was a vocal critic of the regime for its 
pandering to vested interests, accused the generals of creating a web of influence between state and 
selected capitalists without public debate. In particular, Schvarzer accuses Martinez de Hoz of 
deliberately encouraging large conglomerates to grow even larger by granting them privileged 
access to credit from the much-abused National Development Bank.12 The result: the political and 
economic structure of Argentina changed conclusively to favour the capitalist class and especially 
those operating in the capital markets, thus retarding the economy further by neglecting industrial
1Tdevelopment.
The narrative that follows treats the political dynamic as a failed attempt to break away from 
the socio-political constraints inherent in Argentine policymaking. Though it acknowledges that the 
period represents an effort to restructure the dynamic, as argued by Canitrot, the regime did not 
modify the alliance-based approach adopted by earlier regimes such as Frondizi’s. Though there 
was an assault on Peronist corporate entities, both national capital and labour had to be mollified 
and this restricted Martinez de Hoz in his ability to implement his neo-liberal reforms. The classic 
pattern of distributional conflict continued unabated, therefore, and the regime ultimately resorted to 
calls for solidarity in the national interest, a strategy not unlike Frondizi’s conception of a National 
Movement. In spite of initial economic success and relative political stability during the first five 
years of military rule, Argentina ultimately slipped back into crisis as the regime alienated all 
sectors and lost credibility.
The armed forces took control in a long-anticipated coup on 24 March 1976 in a context of 
extreme political violence by leftist groups, hyperinflation, a widening public deficit, a crippling 
shortfall in the balance of payments and imminent default on the external debt.14 The crisis was 
acknowledged as unparalleled in the country’s history15 so any ideological purpose had by necessity, 
therefore, to be incorporated into emergency policies of crisis management .16 The cabinet 
appointed after the coup was comprised entirely of serving military officers with the exception of 
Martinez de Hoz at the Economy Ministry and the new Minister of Culture and Education, 
professor Ricardo Pedro Bruera. Martinez de Hoz was put in charge of the newly consolidated
11 Schvarzer, J, La industria que supimos condeguir, Buenos Aires 1996,p.288
12 See chapter I; Schvarzer, J. The National Development Bank and the Technological Development o f  Argentine 
Industry, Buenos Aires, 1981; Lewis, P. The Crisis o f  Argentine Capitalism, Chapel Hill, 1990. p.456
13 See Schvarzer, J. lmplantacion de un Modelo Economico: La Experiencia Argentina entre 1975 y  el 2000, Buenos 
Aires, 1998.
14 Lewis, P. The Crisis o f Argentine Capitalism, Chapel Hill, 1990, p.448
15 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), Argentina: Reconstruction and Development, 
Report No. 1645 -  AR, August 31 1977. p.ii
16 Ministerio de Economia, Un Aho de Evolucion Economica Argentina, Buenos Aires 1977
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“super ministry” and was so constitutionally powerful, he was identified by The Economist
1 7newspaper as “prime minister of Argentina in all but name.”
In the eyes of the ruling Junta, the political violence that beset the country was a result of 
ideological, political and economic distortions originating in the first Peron presidency. Groups 
advocating exclusion of Peronism from the political process and champions of liberal economic 
ideas therefore found a sympathetic audience in the armed forces for the first time. There is also 
evidence to suggest that the dominant factions of the military hierarchy were persuaded by the 
liberal view that economic opening was the means to enhance Argentina’s international standing. 
The vision was informed by a new ‘internationalist’ as opposed to inward-looking nationalism 
whereby an open economy rather than the introversion that had prevailed since the 1930s would 
strengthen the country and not weaken it. The established introversion, moulded to suit forces such 
as Peronism, deprived Argentina of a destiny to be something more outstanding than “a land 
inhabited by more or less satisfied and contented people.”18
Given the patronage of an authoritarian system and his exceptional powers, Martinez de Hoz 
was theoretically given an extraordinarily free hand to implement his ideological vision for a new 
Argentine economy. Without having to appease an electorate, and with a suppressed union 
movement, the programme could be more long-term in its focus. Policy was thus liberated from a 
‘political business cycle’ associated with the electoral terms of democratic government.19 So from a 
political perspective, with the exception of servicing the external debt, macroeconomic stabilisation 
did not have to be tackled so urgently. The prioritisation of long-term over short-term objectives 
“was feasible under a regime that was not facing elections the next year, since continuity was 
essential,” Martinez de Hoz writes.20 Indeed, a central feature of his plan was its “dynamic 
gradualism” as opposed to a macroeconomic shock treatment, the effects of which might be too
71superficial to constitute the desired restructuring of the economy. In this way, measures to address
immediate problems such as inflation or balance-of-payments disequilibrium, while a necessity,
22were regarded as secondary in importance as short-term as opposed to long-term issues.
So in tackling inflation, for example, the government established a programme of partial 
devaluations of the local currency against the US dollar. The rate of devaluation decreased over 
time and it was hoped that in a context of increasing economic openness to the outside world, 
domestic interest and inflation rates would converge with international levels. The long-term view
17 The Economist, June 11 1977, A Centimetre a Day.
18 Review of the River Plate, Jan. 12 1977, Leader.
19 19 Alesina, A. Tolitical Models o f Macroeconomic Policy and Reforms', in Haggard, S and Webb, S (eds.) Voting fo r  
Reform, (World Bank, Oxford, 1994). p.38
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was that a new relative price structure would emerge and induce resource allocation to favour the 
development of sectors with a comparative advantage allowing them to compete internationally and 
enhance the overall productivity of the economy.23 Nevertheless, in other areas, Martinez de Hoz 
did implement a ‘dash for freedom’.24
The overall economic programme emphasised three objectives: monetary and financial 
stability, acceleration of economic growth and the achievement of “a reasonable distribution of 
created wealth while maintaining the income level in relation to the aggregate production of the 
economy.”25 The causes of the problem, as identified by Martinez de Hoz, were economic isolation, 
state interventionism and over-regulation which had stifled individual initiative and reduced private 
enterprise to jostling for favours from public officials. This had not been accompanied by an 
increase in public resources and the inevitable consequence had been a budget imbalance.
“Subsidized investment had become widespread, which determined a low return rate for the 
economy as a whole, though perhaps not for the entrepreneurs. Business profitability was divorced 
from the common good.”26
Martinez de Hoz saw himself as redefining the way industrial policy was understood in 
Argentina. Traditionally, he argued, industry was seen as something that needed to be nurtured at 
the expense of other sectors, through mechanisms of promotion or protection. The minister wanted 
to change this perception, dismissing it as incompatible with the kind of market system he wanted 
to encourage, free of distortions caused by the kind of public intervention encouraged by the 
traditional view.27
Like Frondizi, the new regime attempted a profound change in the structure of financing 
industrial activity through liberalisation of capital flows. Except that unlike Frondizi’s reform, the 
effort at assigning a greater role to market forces extended to the arena of trade. Thus import tariffs 
were reduced by up to 90 per cent on some products on the idea that by being forced to compete 
with foreign competition, domestic industry might become more efficient. Martinez de Hoz’s main 
criticism of past trade policy and the traditional form of Argentine import substitution was its 
emphasis on protecting local manufacturers in that it only applied to imports of finished products. 
The need to import ever more raw materials or capital goods required by the protected local 
industries meant that industrial growth was dependent on more imports while exports had failed to 
keep pace with demand for foreign currency to purchase those imports. Meanwhile, the lack of
23 Kosacoff, B. The Development o f  Argentine Industry, in:, Kosacoff (ed.) ‘Corporate Strategies under Structural 
Adjustmant in Argentina’, Oxford, 2000
24 The Economist July 10 1976, Brains and Brawn
25 Ministerio de Economia, 1977, p.5
26 Martinez de Hoz, 1990, p. 152
27 Martinez de Hoz, J-A. Bases Para Una Argentina Modema, 1976-80, Buenos Aires, 1981, p.l 50.
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competitiveness had raised costs while the quality of industrial output had not improved, thus 
hindering growth.
Early results were encouraging. During the first year of military rule, substantial progress 
was made in reducing the public sector deficit from 16 per cent of GDP in 1975 to 11 per cent by 
the end of 1976. The “gliding parity” exchange rate and a drop in aggregate demand resulting 
from restrictive fiscal management meant a sharp reduction in inflation from 737 per cent for the 12 
months to the end of 1976, to 116 per cent the following year. Meanwhile, a reduction of export 
taxes led to acceleration of foreign exchange earnings alongside a fall in imports related to the drop 
in real wages and the sliding parity exchange rate policy offered much-needed resuscitation of the 
current account. The leader of a group of US Congressmen visiting Argentina in January 1977 
called Martinez de Hoz a “miracle man”.30
At the same time, however, Martinez de Hoz’s plan was circumumscribed by the conflicting 
priorities of his military superiors who were engaged in a battle against radical leftist elements. The 
military made it clear that economic policies could not increase unemployment for fear of further 
radicalisation of the popular classes. Secondly, given that the Junta perceived itself to be engaged in 
a de facto civil war, any plans to cut down the state sector had to stop short of privatisation of 
strategic assets. This also suited vested interests such as the industrial bourgeoisie because it 
entailed continuity of state patronage of ‘basic industries* perceived to operate in sectors in which 
Argentina had a conceivable comparative advantage, particularly the oil sector. Martinez de Hoz 
pledged, therefore, to promote these basic industries on the basis that their development would have 
a multiplier effect on the rest of the economy.32
So notwithstanding an ideological commitment to the market as an enforcer of optimal 
allocation of resources, the state did not regard its total relinquishment of involvement in the 
country’s march towards industrialisation as an option. In certain respects, industrial policy echoed 
that of Frondizi in its quest to streamline the public sector and reopen Argentina to international 
sources of credit. Regarding the oil industry, for example, the government still envisaged petroleum 
self-sufficiency as a key objective, to be achieved through greater efficiency of YPF and a closer
•j-i #
partnership with the private sector. At the time of Martinez de Hoz’s appointment, Argentine oil 
production was covering approximately 85 per cent of demand following a period of declining
28 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), Argentina: Reconstruction and Development, 
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29 Ibid. p.iii
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production.34 The state monopoly signed 35 exploration contracts with private firms to drill 768 
wells by 1980 while deals were struck with private firms working reserves controlled by YPF to pay 
in extracted oil and gas.
As for the state-sector the government recognised, as had Frondizi’s team, a need to reduce 
the public payroll as public expenditure as a proportion of GDP was at 40 per cent when Martinez 
de Hoz took over the Economics Ministry. The fiscal deficit represented 13.5 per cent of GDP, an 
excessive figure blamed on oversized government and an ineffective tax system. To address this, 
the government pledged to “rationalise the central administration, eliminate the deficits of state 
corporations, abolish the covering of provincial budget deficits with federal funds and restructure 
the management of public works. To quote a specific example, the budgetary burden of the national 
railways had amounted to some US$2 million per day shortly before the military takeover. This 
subsidy was halved in the 1977 budget and a rationalisation programme was put in place to 
eliminate loss-making services. In their first year of office, the government reduced passenger 
services by 36 per cent and cut the amount of railway employees by 20 per cent before the end of 
1977.36 By 1980, nearly a quarter of the railways, in terms of track length, had been closed or 
dismantled, and the number of employees on the payroll had fallen 40 per cent to 96,000.
What was implemented was a strategy labelled “peripheral privatisation”, mainly involving 
public utilities whereby certain services were contracted out to private companies. So the state 
railways left maintenance of rolling stock to private contractors while ENTEL, the state telephone 
company no longer maintained much of its own equipment. YPF relinquished management of 
certain oil fields and Gas del Estado ceased to be the sole operator of Argentina’s power stations. In 
evidence, therefore, is a limit to the adoption of free market principles. None of the large state 
enterprises were privatised and the Martinez de Hoz’s military bosses insisted that Fabricaciones 
Militares should be exempted from any closures or privatisation. The minister was forced to content 
himself with some trophy privatisations of companies nationalised by the previous regime when 
they were on the verge of bankruptcy in order to avoid the ‘social problem’ of the loss of a large 
employer.39 Martinez de Hoz insisted, however, that he never ruled out the possibility of selling off 
the larger state enterprises, and that the issue needed to be approached gradually and on a case-by- 
case basis. 40
34 Ibid.
35 Ministerio de Economia, 1977, p.7
36 Ibid., pp.8-9
37 Martinez de Hoz, 1990, p. 165
38 Second administration of Juan Peron, 1973-74, succeeded after his death by second wife Isabel 1974-76
39 Bank o f London and South America Review, April 1977, Vol.l 1, No.4/77. p.194
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There were also limits to the extent to which the regime implemented its pledge to liberalise 
trade. Tariffs were maintained on imports with a view to gradual reduction. Martinez de Hoz 
believed that industry required a degree of protection at its inception but that protection should be 
phased out progressively as the new operation matures. It was a failure to implement this type of 
gradual reduction in protection that had resulted in the inadequacies and uncompetetiveness of 
Argentine industry, the Minister said.41
Tariff barriers were reduced from an average of 55 per cent in 1976, the maximum rate 
being 210 per cent, to an average of 41 per cent, and a maximum 100 per cent by the end of the year. 
In 1978 legislation was put in place to regulate a gradual reduction to levels of zero per cent on 
goods not produced locally to a maximum of 75 per cent on automobiles. This continued 
protectiveness of the car industry implies that Argentine pride in its motor industry resisted the new 
ideological conviction as much as the state-owned ‘strategic’ industries. Nevertheless, the new 
economic team were frank about their perception if it as a bastion of the old regime of sectoral 
discrimination and privilege at odds with the realities of the market. The response, again, was a 
planned restructuring of the car industry, acknowledged by Martinez de Hoz as an “important sector 
of the Argentine economy” notwithstanding its past mismanagement. So while tariffs on 
automobiles remained relatively high, a new law eliminating the previous policy of outright 
prohibition marked a first step in the gradual opening of the Argentine automobile market.42 
The introduction of foreign competition did catalyse the intended consolidation of the market. Three 
out of the seven plants operating in 1978 closed before the end of the year and the number of 
models produced fell by up to a fifth. Simultaneously, the price of cars grew proportionately less 
than the overall rate of inflation while demand increased. Sales of cars increased from 176,047 in 
1978 to 283,000 in 1980, a 60 per cent increase. 43
In addition to limitations to the extent to which market-led policy was implemented, the 
promised monetary discipline was also stifled. In the three months after the Junta seized power, the 
rate of increase in currency in circulation was the highest for the period in Argentine history. For 
the second quarter of 1976, the increase was 34 per cent while the same period the previous year, 
under the regime of Isabela Peron blamed by Martinez de Hoz for irresponsible monetary policy, 
saw an incerase of just 18 per cent. For 1974, the figure was 15 per cent. One financial newspaper 
observed at the time that: “it constitutes a remarkable psychological success for the authorities that 
they should have made even people who must be presumed to follow the statistics on the subject 
believe that they are following a restrictive currency policy or that they are achieving notable
41 Ibid, p. 154.
42 Ley 21,932/1979
43 Martinez de Hoz, 1981, p. 173
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success in their tax collection policy to deal with government expenditure which is not happening 
either.”44
By 1978, the inconsistencies between free market, economic disciplinarian rhetoric and 
actual policy was translating into imbalances and distortions. The deregulation of prices had 
encouraged opportunist behaviour by entrepreneurial sectors which offset achievements in reducing 
inflation through demand management and wage restraint. The economic team had also removed 
ceilings on domestic interest rates and abolished capital controls hoping to restrict the availability of 
credit to the domestic private sector while boosting savings rates and attracting foreign exchange. 
Simultaneously, the government introduced the Tablita, a system whereby adjustments of the 
exchange rate and public utility tariffs were lagged behind the increase in general prices in an effort 
to dampen inflationary expectation. However, it was becoming clear by the end of the 1970s, that 
not only was the economic team losing the battle against inflation, but economic growth was not 
forthcoming and political discontent was spreading. The lagging exchange rate adjustments 
combined with falling import tariffs and stagnating international prices put exporters in an 
increasingly difficult competitive position.45
Furthermore, freed interest rates rose after 1977 and brought many small and medium-sized 
firms to their knees, as debt repayments started to surpass revenues. A rise in bankruptcies 
precipitated a banking crisis which in turn resulted in financial panic and accelerated capital flight. 
The government was forced to intervene and the Central Bank guaranteed deposits in savings 
accounts against bankruptcy of the institution where the funds were held. Though this was an 
emergency measure, it was regarded in banking circles, both domestically and internationally, as a 
reversal of Argentine progress towards a free market economy 46
At this stage, a rift started to emerge between Martinez de Hoz and the Junta which was 
increasingly concerned about social and economic stability. There was also conspicuous discord 
within the Junta over issues such as who should be Videla’s successor as president, and the viability 
of Martinez de Hoz’s economic vision.47 When Videla’s term of office drew to a close in October 
1980, he was replaced as head of the Junta by the army commander-in-chief general Roberto Viola 
who, it became increasingly clear, was less than enthusiastic about Martinez de Hoz’s programme. 
The minister lobbied both the Junta and Viola himself to preserve the course he had set but found an 
ever decreasing number of sympathetic ears within the regime.48 With a myriad of interest groups 
protesting the Tablita, including the hitherto loyal SRA agricultural lobby who were concerned at
44 Review of the River Plate, July 30 1976, Leader.
45 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) Economic Memorandum on Argentina, March 2 
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overvaluation of the currency, Martinez de Hoz was eventually compelled by Viola to abandon the 
policy. On 29 March 1981 Viola was formally inaugurated as president and Martinez de Hoz 
replaced by Lorenzo Sigaut. With the departure of the technocrat, the regime was no longer 
committed to the liberal plan which was imperfectly implemented and stifled by military priorities 
in any case. Given the lack of constitutional checks on the regime and the apparent assault on 
corporatist entities, particularly those normally regarded as hostile by economically liberal factions 
of the military, it is perhaps surprising that the toughest policies were stillborn. But this chapter 
holds restrictions on union power were themselves limited because of the regime’s pragmatic 
priorities and the government continued to negotiate with labour even through the height of the 
liberal period of Martinez de Hoz’s ministry.
Policy and the Economic Interests
Extending the zero-sum analysis, an attack on the economic status quo such as that attempted by 
Martinez de Hoz is also an assault on the groups that benefit from the old statism, namely urban 
waged labour, traditionally entrusting its political voice to the Peronist movement. This was 
precisely the group identified by both factions of the ruling coalition, the military and the liberal 
elite, as responsible for the country’s problems and the depth of the economic imbalances. So the 
government legislated to depoliticise the unions and decreed that parties identified with 
“Communist” ideologies must close down. Their assets were frozen while the remainder, including 
the Radical and Peronist Justicialist parties were obliged to suspend all political activities.49 
Regarding the corporatist entities, those associated with Peronism were intervened in the first 
instance and eventually, in the case of the CGT and CGE, banned outright.50 Unions were also 
limited to negotiation with employers over labour issues and prohibited from participation in 
politics or association with any party or candidate.51 Furthermore, unions were directly answerable 
to the Labour Ministry which exercised the right to intervene in their management or cancel their 
registration. The junta also abolished the Peronist system of labour immunity, under which trade 
union delegates were entitled to privileged treatment before the law, on the grounds that it was 
contrary to the national Constitution.
But the debilitation, persecution and eventual proscription of the established Peronist union 
infrastructure should not be confused with the exclusion of labour from debate over policy. The 
CGT was indeed weakened by the fact that it was discredited by association with the unsuccessful 
Peronist governments of 1973 to 1976 and the general agreement regarding the need to plot a new
49 Review o f the River Plate, March 31 1976. p.401
50 Decreto Ley 22/105 Articulos 1-3.
51 Ibid, Articulo 9
52 Ibid. Articulo 61.
53 Review o f the River Plate, March 31 1976. p.401
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course in economic policy was shared by most labour groups.54 The Junta also insisted that it held a 
monopoly over policymaking, hence the ‘superminister’ status bestowed on Martinez de Hoz.55 Yet 
the government, through the Labour Ministry, kept channels open with union leaders throughout the 
most intransigent phase of the liberal reforms who themselves maintained high level contacts within 
the regime. Unions, as a result of their corporatist origins, were far more than mere instruments of 
collective bargaining and held considerable economic power. The Labour Minister, general Horacio 
Liendo, for example, regularly consulted his predecessors in the post with respect to reforms to 
labour legislation. Given that these figures were predominantly associated with, or senior members 
of, the mothballed political parties, the contact illustrates the extent to which the government 
recognised the extent to which political forces played a role in moderating labour conflicts.56 
Furthermore, though union leaders were prohibited from acting together or even holding meetings, 
the military was aware that their function went well beyond merely asking for wage increases. 
Unions, and their leaders, managed important social works, hotels and clinics, administered large 
sums of money and maintained constant contact with members of the armed forces, the Church, 
business organisations and some foreign embassies. In short, despite the restrictions, they were able 
to make their views known and exchange ideas with a variety of people in high places.57 Secondly, 
the regime was aware that by refusing to bargain with union leaders, workers themselves might 
become frustrated, bypass their representatives and organise highly destructive collective action. 
There is also evidence that in spite of the rigidities of Videla’s hierarchy of command during the 
first five years of military government, elements of the armed forces’ command remained 
sympathetic to the labour cause.
An example of this contrast between authoritarian fa?ade and inclusive practice can be 
found in press coverage of a meeting on June 30 1976 between the government’s “intervenor” in the 
CGT, Julio Cesar Porcile and representatives of more than one hundred affiliated unions. The 
official purpose of the event was not to hold talks, but for labour leaders to listen to the report of the 
Argentine delegation at the sixty first annual International Labour Organisation convention in 
Geneva. Unofficially, however, it was acknowledged that talks took place about the establishment 
of a mechanism that would make possible periodic consultation between the government and union 
leaders.58 Such events were a regular occurrence throughout 1976, though the official programme 
continued to insist that the only speaker should be the intervenor himself and CGT delegates were 
expected to sit and listen. The issue of contention was that the government intended to reform the
54 Erro, 1993, p. 100
55 Pion-Berlin 1985 pp.55-56.
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labour laws and realised the most effective way to achieve this peacefully with minimum economic 
disruption was to consult representatives of labour.
In spite of the restrictions on union activity, meanwhile, the ability of organised labour to 
use its favoured weapons of strikes, lockouts and go slows remained very much in evidence. During 
the first week of September, for example, the motor industry was brought to a standstill by strike 
action in protest at a three day week operating in response to reduced demand which itself was a 
consequence of a slowing economy and declining real wages. A 12 per cent wage increase 
announced by the government was simultaneously widely derided by workers as inadequate.59 
The protest spread over subsequent months to some state enterprises, particularly the telephones and 
utilities sectors, though on account of the laws restricting strike action, they were portrayed by 
participants as spontaneous, unorganised actions.60 In truth, however, particularly in the case of 
strikes by electricity workers at the state generator SEGBA, the actions were organised by a 
clandestine proxy CGT, the Confederation General de Trabajo en la Resistencia (CGTR) which 
sponsored more radical forms of resistance than those advocated by the mainstream union leaders. 
Sabotage, in the form of bombs at SEGBA installations, overloading the transformers and flooding, 
extended to other public services while 14 kilometres of cable were stolen from the state telephone 
company.61 Martinez de Hoz’s project to reduce government spending by slashing the wage bill 
associated with the state enterprises also provoked industrial action, initially among members of the 
Power and Light (Luzy Fuerza) union of workers at SEGBA but later spreading to the 
dockworkers.62 Though such sectors were politically sensitive for their ‘strategic’ value the ability 
of the military to prevent this kind of subversion was limited. Direct supervision of shifts by troops 
could force people back to the shop floor but given many of the trades involved were highly skilled, 
the soldiers did not possess enough understanding of the work in order to be able to supervise it 
effectively. Thus it was extremely difficult for military supervisors to spot a ‘go slow’ action.63 The 
impact of the strikes and other forms of action proved a ‘nasty jolt’ to the government, coming after 
six months of intense efforts to inhibit all expressions of working class militancy including 
imprisonment of several thousand unionists, the use of death squads and draconian legislation.64
Meanwhile, the combination of a need to be seen to engage the government more 
aggressively to offset the rise of radical alternative union leaderships and increased confidence that 
there were sympathetic ears within the Junta led to open defiance of the law by the legal union 
leadership. In January 1977, the leadership of 70 non-intervened unions produced a document
59 Review o f the River Plate, September 22 1976, On the Labour Front.
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demanding they be incorporated into the process of reforming legislation regarding the structure of 
collective representation. This was a high-risk tactic given its open defiance of the junta’s 
legislative centrepiece, Decree No.9 of March 24 1976 which prohibited all political activities.
The document criticised the materialistic “liberal capitalist” policy pursued by Martinez de 
Hoz which enabled minority sectors to subjugate the workers and recreate the inequitable society of 
the late nineteenth century. The new policy also involved the sale of national wealth and transferred 
management of the financial system to monopolies thus placing the capital of the nation and its 
public savings in foreign hands. It warned that restrictions on union activity and limits to labour 
participation in affairs would result in highly destructive class struggle and called for the restoration 
of internal democracy within unions with full participation of members. There were also seven 
controversial economic and political proposals: restoration of purchasing power of real wages, 
worker participation in deciding wage policy through free collective bargaining, an end of the ban 
on union activity and restoration of the CGT’s autonomy, the freeing of trade unionists arrested 
without charge and publication of lists of political detainees, abolition of the Redundancy Law 
which facilitated the sacking of thousands of public sector employees, reinstatement of privilege 
clauses in collective agreements of state enterprises, and a substantial change of direction in 
economic policy and prioritisation of social justice and full employment.65
The intention was to deliver the document to Martinez de Hoz but the minister refused to 
accept it either through the Labour Ministry or the Intervenor of the CGT. The unions were also 
prevented by law from publishing it by buying advertising space in the national press but many 
newspapers published extracts as news which publicised an increasingly proactive ‘official’ union 
leadership in openly challenging the Junta. While the demands themselves were familiar Peronist 
notions, the criticism of the economic component of the Junta’s policies was highly polemic. The 
nature of the Junta’s perception of itself was that a policy of so called National Reorganisation 
comprised both political and economic components as equals so that an attack on one was also an 
attack on the Junta itself. The Labour Ministry, the department of state most sympathetic to workers, 
was said to have been “caught completely off balance.... by the brazen way in which the document 
was made public.”66
Immediately after this open act of defiance, the unions called off a proposed illegal meeting 
of secretaries on the basis that it would have been too obvious a form of provocation and that the 
document was enough for the time being. On the other hand, the government took no direct action
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related to the document which was regarded as implication of behind-the-scenes tacit agreement
( \7between labour leaders and the military.
By late 1978, another firmly Peronist “dissident verticalist” labour movement had evolved, 
which adopted the name of National Labour Commission (CNT)68. This new confederation 
comprised 71 intervened and non-intervened unions and on August 30 1978, in defiance of the 
Junta’s prohibition on political organisation, published a communique announcing its existence 
signed by some of Argentina’s best-known union negotiators. The document lamented “the 
reduction of incomes to levels never seen before accompanied by restrictions imposed on the free 
exercise of union activity and efforts to weaken representative organisation by such means in the 
law which would amount to virtual expropriation (of union assets) if put into practice.” The 
Argentine labour movement, according to the document, is one of the driving forces that created 
modem Argentina and the best qualified to protect the country’s sovereignty. It also mentioned 
“numerous leaders and delegates imprisoned without trial and constant sackings of authentic worker 
representatives.” The CNT’s principal demand, however, was the normalisation of the CGT and an 
end to interventions with restoration of the right to strike.69
A further and equally vocal opponent to government union policy was “The 25”, a disparate 
collection of verticalists, anti verticalists and independents which eventually merged with the CNT 
to form the Single Centre for Argentine Workers/Conduction Unica de Trabajadores Argentinos 
(CUTA). The formation of the new body coincided with the long-awaited reform of the 
Professional Associations Law70 which definitively banned the CGT and CGE, regulated the right 
to organise and curtailed the right of unions to manage financial assets. Aware that the international 
community took a dim view of the Junta’s human rights record, the CUTA adopted the tactic of 
lobbying international bodies such as the International Labour Organisation. Indeed, its first public 
act following its foundation was to receive a delegation from the Inter American Commission on 
Human Rights, an autonomous organ of the Organisation of American States (OAS). The mission 
concluded after the meeting that:
“...the Argentine labour union movement still had its traditional strength, despite the 
restrictive measures imposed by the Government, and that the working class is greatly concerned 
about the economic policy adopted by the Government, which it believes, places the greatest 
sacrifices on its shoulders to correct the situation. ”71
Meanwhile, industrial action was achieving concessions on demands for wage increases and 
the reinstatement of sacked workers purged from state enterprises. A dispute at the white goods
67 Review o f the River Plate January 31 1977 On the Labour Front.
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manufacturer SIAM Electrodomestica in Avellaneda was solved when management agreed to 
reinstate 70 per cent of personnel while the rest would remain suspended on 75 per cent of their 
salary for six weeks. A public transport strike in Rosario was halted by the granting of a 25 per cent 
salary increase.
So while enhanced regulation of union activity, including the proscription of the CGT led 
many to believe that union power was in decline72, alternative organisations were capable of filling 
its organisational role. Furthermore, the original decree of March 24 1976 that prohibited all 
political action or association was by 1980 routinely flouted by the labour movement which saw no 
need to meet clandestinely. Indeed, the government by now talked of a dialogue between all sectors 
of society over policy and there were hints from the Labour Ministry that workers would not be 
excluded. At no point, therefore, was the influence of organised labour banished from the 
traditional dynamic of political dialogue between interest groups and the executive. As a force, it 
continued to wield its traditional economic weapons to gain policy concessions and more immediate 
gains such as wage increases and reinstatement of personnel sacked as a consequence of Martinez 
de Hoz’s campaign to slim the public sector and its wage bill. This is in spite of the fact that under 
the economy minister’s charge, policy was at its most aggressive regarding the labour movement 
and the government took steps to keep it on a tight leash. These included government retention of 
the right to set wages, in contrast to the ideologically consistent freeing of prices, and the eventual 
abolition of the CGT. Yet this did not prevent the government acting in a more conciliatory way 
than these measures suggested in respect of labour.
How did the inner circle of command relate to interest groups during the Martinez de Hoz 
mandate at the Ministry of the Economy? The united front presented by the regime which supported 
the minister and allowed themselves to be directly associated with the neo-liberal policies is cited as 
anexplanation for the political and economic success of the Videla presidency (1976-1980). This 
assumes policy was formulated within a military inner circle which excluded all political 
coitributions whether from parties, corporatist entities or economic interest groups. The reality, 
hovever, is that the Junta was less unified than this view suggests. Though Videla was denounced 
as i military dictator by the international community, there were limits to his power. The structure 
of he Junta stated that all three armed services should retain an equal measure of power with an 
apjointee, in this case Videla, to occupy the office of president. Initially, Videla operated as both 
President of the Republic and Commander in Chief of the Army, rendering it the service with 
effectively the most power. Following insistence from the charismatic and outspoken head of the
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navy Admiral Emilio Massera, Videla appointed his close friend General Roberto Viola to replace 
him as army commander and pledged to retire at the end of his term as president in 1980. Though 
the navy had a fearsome reputation as a bastion of conservatism and heavy handed warrior against 
leftist guerrillas, Admiral Massera became a loud voice of moderation within the Junta. In particular 
he regularly voiced concern about the threat to social order posed by the austerity of Martinez de 
Hoz’s economic policies. He also exasperated many of his colleagues by declaring his opposition to 
the campaign of state sanctioned violence against political subversion. Contemporary commentators 
hinted that he was preparing himself as successor to Isabel Peron as head of a future populist 
government.74 But he was not the only moderate voice in the cabinet. The Labour Minister,
General Liendo acted as an arbitrator between the executive and the labour movement and was an 
advocate of an organised popular participation in policymaking, particularly regarding labour law, 
while the military intervenors in the CGT and other such organisations served a similar role.
General Viola was known to share some common ground with this camp and was regarded as too 
liberal by more hard line factions of the military authorities that became openly hostile to both his 
appointment as head of the army, which according to Argentine tradition outranked the head of the 
navy as the more senior service, and later to his appointment as President to replace Videla. A 
mission to Argentina by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, instigated by Viola to 
dissipate international criticism of the government’s rights record backfired because many generals 
bridled at what appeared to be an invitation to outsiders to interfere in the country’s internal affairs. 
The visit proved disastrously embarrassing when relatives of missing people queued along four 
blocks in Buenos Aires to air their grievances to the delegation.75
When Viola was nominated as Videla’s successor in October 1980, it became clear that 
Martinez de Hoz’s policies were out of favour with the top military ranks of the regime. The 
minister lobbied Viola to preserve the economic course e had set by the liberals’ power base was 
now irretrievably eroded and on February 2 1981, the Tablita was abandoned. In his inaugural 
speech as president on March 28 1981, Viola announced a ‘Plan of National Integration’ and 
proposed a gruadual normalisation of intermediary organisations such as unions and political
7 * •parties. Most controversially, he stated that he would open the door to dialogue with 
“representative sectors of Peronism”.77 This put the presidency on a collision course with the new 
commander-in-chief of the army general Leolpoldo Galtieri who gave a speech on 10 April warning 
Viola not to seek popularity by dissociating himself from direct responsibility for the Junta’s
74 The Economist January 26 1980 (Argentina Survey) The Plots Thicken.
75 The Economist January 26 1980 (Argentina Survey) The Plots Thicken.
76 La Nacion 29 March 1981 p.22; Bank of London and South America (BOLSA) Review, May 1981 Vol. 15, p.72;
Pion Berlin, D. ‘The Fall of Military Rule in Argentina 1976-83’ Journal o f  Inter-American Studies, Summer 1985 
Vol.25(2)
77 Latin America Weekly Report May 1 1981, Argentina’s New President Faces Showdown with his Generals.
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achievements hitherto, particularly the campaign against Peronism and the guerrillas. Galtieri 
eventually staged the coup within the coup, restoring the original Videla-era structure of the regime 
whereby as head of the army, he was also President of the Republic.
The Junta was less heavy-handed in its anti-inflationary policy regarding business sectors. 
While Martinez de Hoz retained the government’s right to set wages, thus constraining labour’s 
contribution to inflation, prices were left to producers’ discretion. The idea was that lower wages 
would translate into reduced costs for industry and therefore lower prices for the finished product. 
This did not occur, however, and industrialists continued to raise prices, jeopardising efforts to curb 
inflation so that the government resorted to more aggressive tactics on prices. But price freezes, 
such as that implemented in March 1977, were presented as ‘truces’ and were always temporary 
measures. Though the government was committed to a reduction in real wages, there were regular 
salary increases for workers which Martinez de Hoz expected industry to absorb without 
compensating through higher prices. When business was uncooperative, the minister became 
exasperated and ultimately found himself in direct confrontation with a powerful interest group he 
had hoped to nurture as a partner.
Other issues of contention between business and the Minister were the deindustrialisation of 
the period, favouring internationally and agro-oriented industries associated with his origins within
no
the UIA, and his efforts to liberalise trade. The plan to put downward pressure on factory prices 
by allowing cheap alternatives from abroad was not popular with local capital which benefited from 
Argentina’s traditional inward looking policies of tariff barriers. The Peronist business association, 
the CGE, was disbanded by the Junta and many of its members joined the UIA. During the early 
months of the military government, national capital was compliant with the regime. Though 
Martinez de Hoz had extolled entrepreneurs to act responsibly regarding price increases, no 
legislative constraints were placed on their actions. The early stages of trade liberalisation involved 
the freeing of exports rather than allowing greater entry to imports so small business saw little 
reason to feel threatened. Though import bans and restrictions were lifted, the prospective importer 
was obliged to present a sworn declaration showing his need to import rather than buy locally. He 
also needed to buy a Foreign Commerce Investment Bond, effectively a deposit, before embarking 
on prolonged negotiation with Byzantine customs regulations and bureaucracy.79 But the industries 
associated with the CGE ultimately bore the brunt of an ideologically driven policy to liberalise 
markets and eliminate the web of regulation, subsidies, privileges and protectionist tariff policies on 
which they depended. Local firms faced a two-pronged assault of higher domestic interest rates
78 Erro, D. Resolving the Argentine Paradox: Politics and Development 1966-92, London 1993.
79 Review o f the River Plate, July 30 1976 Free Imports and Protecting Industy.
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alongside pressure on revenues resulting from an increasingly competitive local market flooded 
with cheap imports of manufactured goods. Argentine industry found itself suffering something of a 
local debt crisis that preceded by some years the better-known Latin American credit crunch that 
started in 1982. The result -  a process of deindustrialisation that characterises the episode examined 
in this section. Between 1975 and 1982, industrial product fell by more than a fifth and the 
contribution of industry to overall GDP was reduced from 28 per cent to 22 per cent. Up to a fifth of
O A
Argentina’s largest manufacturing firms were closed during this period.
A conspicuous beneficiary of this pattern was the iron and steel industry. The sector was a 
long running tool of Hirschmanian aspirations to promote the wider economy by supporting sectors 
identified as likely to encourage the widest range of linkages. Peron’s National Steel Plan and the 
creation of state enterprise SOMISA in 1947 was conceived as a means to kick start the industry. 
The view was that a large company would maximise economies of scale but because of the 
magnitude of the required investment, the state was the only institution capable of shouldering the 
burden. Once established, it was hoped, a dynamic publicly owned giant would promote 
complimentary, less capital-intensive activities within the private sector. In other words, firms 
would emerge to consume SOMISA’s products. In the event, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the 
industry failed to keep pace with domestic demand for processed iron products, putting pressure on 
the balance-of-payments. Nevertheless, successive administrations did not lose faith in the sector, 
and investment continued to flow into projects to expand its capacity. The recessive environment of 
the late 1970s, however, saw the cancellation of many projects to establish new plants and expand 
existing ones as part of Martinez de Hoz’s efforts to cut public spending and rationalise the state- 
owned enterprises. In the event, many smaller private steel producers, their subsidies cut off, came 
under pressure. Two firms, Siderca and Acindar, beneficiaries of the peripheral privatisation 
initiative and closely linked contractually with SOMISA were able to acquire many weaker 
competitors, eventually forming a virtual duopoly by the 1980s. Thus the number of steel producers 
fell from 59 in 1975, to 47 in 1980 and 42 by 1985. From the perspective of the Economics 
Ministry, their policies were a success. So while output rose by 60 per cent, the steel industry 
underwent a 25 per cent cut in the number of people it employed from 1978 to 1981, comprising 
11,100 redundancies.81
Martinez de Hoz was explicit in his belief that Argentina’s economic recovery was 
dependent, to a large extent, on agricultural exports and considerable changes were implemented to 
the sector during his ministry. The marketing of agricultural produce had been monopolised by the
80 Kosacoff, B. and Azpiazu, D. La Industria Argentina: Desarrolloy Cambios Estructurales, Buenos Aires 1989.
81 Azpiazu and Basualdo, La Industria Siderurgica Argentina en un Contexto de Privatizaciones y  Transformaciones 
Estructurales, Buenos Aires, 1993. pp.6-10
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Junta Nacional de Granos, a marketing board set up by the previous administration, and Martinez 
de Hoz swiftly stripped it of its powers to assign it a more passive, supervisory role while the bulk 
of trade was carried out once more by private actors. Meanwhile export taxes were phased out and 
the agricultural sector began to thrive. However, the Tablita and its inadvertent consequence of 
maintaining a high exchange rate dented the competitiveness of Argentine exports and the SRA 
became a prominent opponent of Martinez de Hoz’s policies. Agricultural producers started to stage 
protests and the SRA issued a series of statements questioning why economic liberalisation should 
be extended to all but the exchange rate.83 Like industrialists, farmers chose to pass on the cost of 
re-equipment to the consumer by raising the price of staples such as grain, beef and milk, much to 
the frustration of the minister. They also engaged in speculative practices which further reduced 
supply in the domestic market. Cattle farmers in particular held on to livestock in the hope prices 
would continue to rise, a tactic described by the liberal business newspaper Review of the River 
Plate as “economic dyslexia”.84 Because grain, beef and milk comprise the majority of the 
calculated Consumer Price Index, speculative action by farmers had an immediate and profound 
impact on the rate of inflation and real wages. To some extent, such practices were used as a protest 
tool against government, especially the Tablita, in the hope that the economics ministry might agree
Q C
to a currency devaluation which would be in the agricultural exporters’ interests.
With the departure of Martinez de Hoz as Economics Minister and his replacement by 
Lorenzo Sigaut in 1981, the government’s grip on some corporate entities loosened and the UIA 
had its autonomy restored. The group used its newfound liberty to criticise in the strongest language 
possible, the Junta’s economic record of deindustrialisation both through personal contact with the 
Dr Sigaut, an option still not available to labour groups, and in its publications. The handling of the 
monetary and exchange rate policy was singled out for the strongest criticism. Devaluations, which 
may have helped primary exports but did little to aid industry in need of capital goods imports, were 
not accompanied by “complimentary measures” to cushion producers and had failed to correct the 
disequilibrium in the balance-of-payments. Internal activity had remained stagnant. Manufacturing 
activity had dropped by 1981 to the lowest levels in a decade and proposals put forward by the UIA 
to resuscitate the sector “suffered delays to their implementation and sterilisation in their 
practice.”86
82 Bank of London and South America (BOLSA) Review, August 1979, Vol. 13, No.8/79
83 Erro, D. Resolving the Argentine Paradox: Politics and Development 1966-92, London 1993 p.l 13
84 Review of the River Plate, January 12 1977 Farming: A Call fo r  Action,
85 Peralta Ramos, M. ‘Toward an Analysis o f  the Structural Basis o f Coercion in Argentina: The Behavior o f the Major 
Factions o f the Bourgeoisie 1976-1983’ in: Peralta-Ramos and Waisman, C. From Military Rule to Liberal Democracy 
in Argentina, Boulder 1987
86 Union Industrial Argentina, Memoriay Balance 1981, p .l.
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To conclude this sub section therefore, the period did not represent as radical a break with 
Argentine policy traditions as is often suggested. Although the free market zeal of Martinez de 
Hoz’s team is not in dispute, he was ultimately unable to implement his vision fully. The minister 
may have intended to oversee a transformation and liberalisation of the economy. However, 
rigidities in the economy and the disapproval of elements in the military to whom he was ultimately 
answerable prevented this. What emerged from his tenure was essentially one more shift of power 
in favour of the business sector, away from the popular sector of which there have been many. The 
sacred cows of the public sector, transport, oil and gas, steel, power and so on, were not privatised. 
Import tariffs to protect domestic industry were far from eliminated. Thus one of Martinez de Hoz’s 
most notable failures, at least from his own ideological perspective, was an ultimate inability to 
reduce public spending. Indeed, some reductions in state financing were merely cosmetic, replaced 
by the heavy borrowing from abroad that occurred in the 1970s with such severe consequences in 
the 1980s. All of this is commonly blamed on the stubbornness, or at least caution, of his military 
bosses. But it is hardly surprising that these elements were not disposed to abandon their view of 
certain sectors as pivotal to national security and remained intransigent on whether the state should 
relinquish control. In their eyes, the country was in virtual civil war and the junta took a belligerent 
approach to its management of affairs, curbing press freedom and sanctioning the murder of 
political opponents. Perhaps then, if Martinez de Hoz had ascended to the head of the Economics 
Ministry in more peaceful times, his vision would have been realised more fully.
Part 2: Spain.
This sub-section examines the agreement reached in October 1977 between the centrist 
government of Adolfo Suarez and delegates from newly legalised political parties on economic 
policy which shaped economic and social policy in post-Franco Spain. The end result was the 
Moncloa Pacts, a heterodox stabilisation that involved reciprocal cuts in wages and prices in return 
for pledges to lower inflation, with tentative steps towards further liberalisation of the economy. 
Like the contemporary reforms in Argentina, a determined economics minister, Enrique Fuentes 
Quintana, sought to apply orthodox reforms to dismantle the legacy of an inward-looking 
development model. Also, as in Argentina, the minister’s power was checked by the political 
pragmatism of the executive, sensitive to the risk of social unrest resulting from labour discontent. 
But unlike Argentina the eventual policy was shaped by neo-corporatist negotiation, where the 
executive invited representatives of political parties, each of which purported to represent a faction
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of society such as labour or, as is characteristic of Spanish political discourse, a regional nationalist 
interest. A further distinction from the former case is that associations were not present on the basis 
that the parties were deemed sufficient representation for social, political and economic groups. 
Fuentes Quintana, though a senior cabinet minister, represented a voice among many at the 
negotiating table and the reforms were thus a compromise solution. In exchange for limits to wage 
increases, the minister pledged to curb inflation. Labour unions were told, through their affiliated 
political parties, that in return for suffering the austerity associated with fiscal and monetary 
tightening, the entire legacy of Franco-era ‘vertical syndicalism would be dismantled and replaced 
with legislation enshrining the right of collective bargaining.
The dynamic of the bargaining is illustrated in figure 4.2 whereby the government engages 
with representatives from all legitimate political parties. The economics minister’s role is to pursue 
a policy of crisis resolution but is engaged with the parties over what shape the eventual policy will 
take. The prime minister, meanwhile, retains a role comparable to that of the dictator in the previous 
snapshot whereby he acts as a convenor to the negotiations but is recognised by all participants as 
the legitimate authority and arbitrator. The next tier of the structure is occupied by the parties which 
come from all factions of Spain’s political spectrum and are thus designated as the only officially 
recognised representatives of society’s interests. This is achieved through a number of brave 
decisions on the part of the government in a climate of uncertainty following the transition to 
democracy. In order for the negotiators to be recognised as legitimate by society, it was necessary 
for the government to legalise such entities as the Communist Party and regional (nationalist) 
groups against the objections of rightist elements. The eventual economic package, the Moncloa 
accords which are the subject of this section were then presented to parliament, the Cortes, for 
ratification. Excluded from this dynamic were associations on the basis that their voice was 
adequately represented by political parties. Indeed, the two principal labour federations were 
directly affiliated to the main leftist parties, the Socialists and Communists and in the event gave 
grudging approval to the accords after the event in accordance with the advice of the PCE and 
PSOE. Essentially, the dynamic supports the argument at the heart o f this thesis whereby 
negotiations are kept within the state so that non state associations representing specific economic 
interests are in effect assigned the role of passive subordinates. This in turn ensures that interest 
groups play a minimal role in policymaking and creates a more benign political climate in which to
R7take difficult economic decisions.
87 El Pais 21 October 1977, Redaction definitive del documento sobre el programa economico
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Figure 4.2. The hierarchy of representation during the Moncloa negotiations 1977.
Parties:
STATE
Centre:
UCD
Right:
AP
Government
Left:
PSOE,
PCE
Economy Minister
Prime Minister 
(Executive)
Regionals:
CC
PSC
PDC
PNV
CORTES
(Ratification)
(Weak) associations 
affiliated to 
mainstream parties
Spain’s economic reforms of the late 1970s represented a delayed response to the oil shock 
at the start of the decade to which Spain was particularly venerable. Economic growth had 
continued apace throughout the 1960s, reflecting favourably on the Opus Dei ruling technocrats and
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three French-inspired Development Plans. Yet the new industries were in large part energy 
intensive aid Spain was necessarily highly dependent on oil imports. The rigidities of the Franco 
regime in is closing years prevented an effective response to the crisis while social-political 
tensions folowing the dictator’s death meant the eventual ‘stabilisation’ was moderated. Figure 4.3 
(see below illustrates this politically motivated delay in stabilisation by showing that Spain tackled 
the inflatioiary effects of the 1973 international oil crisis a full two years after its OECD 
neighbours It was an inauspicious time to face a terms-of-trade shock, given that the dictator was 
dead and a generation of reformers was attempting to reinstall democracy after decades of 
authoritarim rule against the instincts of a powerful conservative faction in government. The 
apparent svccess of this “dual transition” in such unlikely circumstances has inspired many to
enthuse about the model as a “nugget of transitology” to inspire other developing countries,
88particularl) since the end of the Cold War.
Figure 4.3: Inflation, Consumer Prices Spain vs. OECD
1973-84
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Source: dela Dehesa, G. ‘Politica economica frente a la crisis 1973-1984’, Information Comercial 
Espanola, Ministerio de Economia y Hacienda, Num 617-618, 1985.
This argument compares Spain favourably with other democratic transitions in both Europe 
and elsewhere and attributes its consolidation to the fact that it was achieved through a process of 
alliance bulding. Spain underwent a pacted transition, and the compromises incorporated into an 
economic stabilisation plan in 1977 illustrate the extent to which the political process was achieved
88 The comparative literature comparing Spain’s transition favourably with that o f  other countries is extensive. See: 
Whitehead, LThe Drama o f  Democratic Transition,, Madrid, 1997, p. 17; O’Donnell, G. Schmitter, P & Whitehead, L. 
‘Negotiating md Renegotiating Pacts’ in: O’Donnell, G. Schmitter, P & Whitehead, L. Transitions from  Authoritarian 
Rule, Baltimore, 1986; Sachs, J. Poland’s Jump to the Market Economy London, 1993 p.26; Huntington, S. The Third 
Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman, 1991; pp. 104-105
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through consensus at a politically sensitive moment in history.89 But interest groups such as the 
newly-legalised labour unions, the INI and the infant employers’ association, the CEOE 
representing respectively workers, the state enterprises and the private sector were excluded from 
talks over wage policy. This does not lend strong support to the idea that Spain’s economic reforms 
were achieved through inclusive negotiations. The idea of a ‘pacted’ transition has its limits 
therefore. Though they are often referred to as such, this was not a ‘social’ pact. There were other 
pacts in which interest groups were included. In 1979, the Acuerdo Basico Interconfederal was 
signed by the CEOC, the employers’ association and the UGT. Another, the Acuerdo Marco 
Interconfederal, between the UGT and the CEOE, emerged in 1980 followed by yet another, signed 
by the same groups, the Acuerdo Nacional de Empleo, in 1981 (see chapter 5).90
Literature on this transitional period falls broadly into two related camps. The first of these 
argues that the era is best understood as a consequence of neo-corporatism inherent in the Spanish 
polity. Political parties and associations held a monopoly of representation at the negotiating table 
on behalf of interests such as capital and labour.91 The second interpretative strand builds on this 
assessment but derides the ‘social pacts’ of late 1970s as ‘elite’ settlements, where forces 
representing dynastic interests, business and capital dictated policy adopted by the government.92 
The principal inspiration for this view is the early work of Richard Gunther which suggested that 
although the Spanish state was corporatist in its design, networks of representation were clientelist. 
In spite of the ‘vertical’ structure of representation, in reality, business elites enjoyed better access 
to political elites.93 The focus in this section is on the first wage and price agreement, the Moncloa 
accords because it is most representative of policymaking networks in post-Franco Spain. The 
participants were the leadership of newly legalised political parties who spoke for relevant interest 
groups. Thus Labour was represented by two such organs, the Communist PCE and the ascendant 
Socialist PSOE. Neither the Communist or Socialist union confederations (CCOO and UGT 
respectively) were invited to the negotiating table and their role in approving the final settlement 
was implicit and subordinated to the two workers’ parties.
Subsequent pacts, where interest groups were engaged with the government, were more a 
political public relations exercise and the impact they had on wages or prices was negligible. Figure
89 Schmitter, P. ‘An Introduction to Southern European Transitions from Authoritarian Rule’ and O’Donnell, Schmitter 
& Whitehead ‘Negotiating and Renegotiating Pacts’ in O’Donnell, G. Schmitter, P & Whitehead, L. Transitions from  
Authoritarian Rule.
90 De laDehesa, G. ‘Spain’, in: Williamson, J. (ed.) The Political Economy o f  Economic Policy Reform, Washington, 
1994. p. 128
91 See Perez-Diaz, V. The Return to Civil Society, London 1993; See also Schmitter, P. ‘Still the Century o f  
Corporatism’, in: Schmitter and Lehmbruch, G. Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation, London, 1979
92 Petras, J. ‘Spanish Socialism: The Politics o f Neo-Liberalism’ in: Kurth, W. and Petras (eds.) Mediterranean 
Paradoxes, Oxford, 1993. See also: Aguilar, S. Bartelo, A. Muniesa, B. Regio, A. Vidal-Villa, J.M. ‘Notes on the 
Economy and Popular Movements in the Transition’, in Abel, C and Torrents, N. Spain: Conditional Democracy, 
London, 1984
93 Gunther, R. Public Policy in a No-Party State, Berkeley, 1980.
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4.4 shows that by far the most significant agreement o f the period was the first while the effect of 
the AMI, AI or AES was relatively slight, merely conforming to a long-mn trend that owed its 
momentum to the Moncloa accords.
Nevertheless, the arguments presented here contend that the nascent and resuscitated pre- 
Civil War unions were politically weak and unrepresentative of the labour force while the threat of 
violence remained a very real issue for policymakers and the populace to keep in mind during the 
negotiations. So while the stabilisation plan of 1977 may appear to be a triumph of negotiation and 
accord, it was a de facto  authoritarian solution to macroeconomic instability just as much as the 
1959 stabilisation examined in the previous ‘snapshot.’ On the basis of this continued threat of 
violence, the line of analysis presented here departs from convention that the economic transition 
was pacted.
Figure 4.4. Spain: Index of industrial wages. 1963=100 ( 
Source, Mitchell 2003)
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The conservatives at the head of the armed forces were uncomfortable with the new political 
pluralism which they had failed to anticipate given that the constitutional monarch was Franco’s 
hand picked successor. The evident popularity of the political project restrained them from 
intervening, however. But following a rise in political violence during the transition associated with 
Basque separatism and labour militancy, there was a fear that the Spanish state would disintegrate. 
Furthermore, the months after the dictator’s death witnessed a mass mobilisation of opposition 
forces calling for legalisation of political movements. The number of politically motivated strikes 
by workers grew 1800 per cent, from 931 in 1973, to 2290 in 1974 to 3156 in 1975 and to 17731 in 
1976.94 There was a very real threat that the democratic experiment would be abandoned and the 
old guard would intervene as had occurred in 1981.95 Indeed, the final months of Franco’s life had 
bome witness to an intensification of violence by the regime expressed through heavy-handed strike 
breaking and executions of political activists.96 Thus, the armed forces, including the Guardia Civil, 
a paramilitary security service closely linked with the regime during the dictatorship, played a 
significant role as the silent and invisible negotiator in discourse over wage and fiscal.
The final draft of the Moncloa Pact for macroeconomic stabilisation comprised a
Q 7
‘heterodox’ mix of price and wage restraint. As an economic reform programme that incorporated 
a populist component it is often invoked as an example to follow by politicians in the developing 
world who face the challenge of reforming a statist economy in a context of social discontent and 
interest group pressure.98 The temperance of the package’s orthodoxy reflects the polarisation of 
Spanish society at the time with popular movements gaining confidence following Franco’s death 
on 20 November 1975. This confidence is reflected in the sharp increase in strike activity 
coinciding with the dictator’s demise. Elite factions supported by the military’s officer class were 
faced with two possible responses: to accept reform or implement an authoritarian backlash. But 
this decision also had to be made at a time when serious macroeconomic imbalances caused by the 
international downturn associated with the oil shock necessitated economic adjustment which 
would exacerbate labour unrest. The economic miracle of the 1960s had failed and annual GDP 
growth which had averaged 9.4 per cent between 1960 and 1973 fell to 0.8 per cent between 1975 
and 1983." The reason Spain was so acutely vulnerable to international oil prices lay in the nature
94 Maravall, J-M La Politico de la Transicion, Madrid, 1981, p.33.
95 Foweraker, J.‘Corporatist Strategies and the Transition to Democracy in Spain’, Comparative Politics, Vol. 20, no.l, 
October 1987. p.61
96 Preston, The Triumph o f  Democracy in Spain, London, 2001. pp. 72-74
97 Spitaller and Galy, ‘Spain: Landmarks in Economic Development 1939-92 ’, IMF Working Paper 92/78 (Sept. 1992),
P f1-3El Pais 25 Octubre 2002 Los mimbres de la Constitucion 
99 Salmon, K. The Modern Spanish Economy, Transformation and Integration into Europe, (2nd Ed.) London, 1995. p.7
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of its industrialisation model. Oil accounted for 68 per cent of Spain’s energy requirements in 1973 
compared with an OECD average of 55 per cent.100
The international crisis also helped to expose structural problems in the Spanish economic 
model that ran deeper than the direct effect of higher energy prices. The populist wage policies of 
the Franco regime alongside public sector deficits compounded rising energy prices so that inflation 
reached 26 per cent by 1977. Furthermore, the climate of uncertainty associated with the dictator’s 
demise and the delicate transition to democracy with threats looming on all sides resulted in a 
distinctly permissive economic policy direction. Political violence perpetrated by a great variety of 
groups, regional separatists and extremists of both the Right and Left intensified the sense of crisis. 
The Moncloa Pacts were borne out of this environment. Social tensions were great but the economy 
was reaching crisis point and unpopular measures were inevitable.
Commentators who herald the reforms as a model of gradualist, pacted transition regard the 
pacts as a policy mix of restricted monetary policy and income restraint with a lenient fiscal stance 
aimed at mitigating the social costs of restructuring the economy. In the context of a fragile 
transition to democracy, social consensus is key and in this sense, Spain’s approach was radical.
The agreements represented recognition by both Right and Left that a return to economic stability 
and increased productive efficiency were crucial to the viability of the newly established democracy. 
To oppose reforms for political reasons would be self-destructive so for the sake of political 
pluralism, ideology and political priorities were put to one side. A related view emphasises the 
looming presence of the army, ready to seize power at the first sign of social disorder, regional 
seperatism or other threats to the post Civil War order.101
Criticism of the pact is polarised between those who consider it too permissive in terms of 
its wage policy and those who say it bolstered elite interests at the expense of labour which was an 
inherently weak political force following decades of Francoist suppression. Both camps agree that 
the result of the misjudgement was rising unemployment and economic stagnation in the early 
1980s. Robert Harrison is of the former camp, suggesting that in retrospect, because of the 
government’s desire to avert serious social and political problems, the negotiators allowed real 
wages to rise too fast in relation to productivity growth which resulted in stagnation and an end to 
Spain’s long cherished record of full employment.102 Meanwhile, neo-Marxist assessments of the 
pact adhering to the latter camp sustain that the agreements favoured the capitalist class and the
100 See Fuentes Quintana, E. Centro Asociado de la Universidad Nacional de Educacion a Distancia, Cadiz, Leccion 
inaugural: La crisis economica actual: sus problem as y  soluciones, 27 Nov. 1976
101 Lieberman, S. Growth and Crisis in the Spanish Economy 1940-93, London, 1995.p.7. See also: Gunther, ‘Spain:
The very model o f the model elite settlement’. In: John Higley and Richard Gunther, Elites and Democratic 
Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe, Cambridge, 1992, p.55; de la Dehesa. ‘Spain’, in: Williamson, J. 
(ed.) The Political Economy o f  Economic Policy Reform, Washington DC, 1994, p. 135. See also Foweraker, J. 
‘Corporatist Strategies and the Transition to Democracy in Spain’, Comparative Politics, Vol.20 no.l October 1987
102 Harrison, R. The Spanish Economy in the 2(fh Century, London 1985. p.l 80
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bourgeois government. On the one hand, the Moncloa pact helped eliminate the deficit in the 
balance of payments and reduced inflation to 16 per cent. The fact that the negotiations were 
politically inclusive at only the highest level, granting a voice only to recently legalised political 
parties lends support to this view. The working class was denied a part in the formulation of the 
agreements and had to bear the brunt of the austerity associated with fiscal reform, devaluation of 
the currency and monetary discipline.103 In this way, Moncloa marked the start of an era in which 
labour was co-opted into an elite agreement and thus tolerated a continuous decline in real wages. It 
was thus a catastrophic failure of Spanish unionism.104
If this is the case, why should representatives of leftist parties have signed the pact when 
they ostensibly represented the working classes? A likely solution lies in the fact that the 
Communist Party was led and represented at the talks by Ramon Tamames, then as now one of 
Spain’s best known economists. His academic background may have left him open minded to the 
long-term benefits of reduced inflation and thus more prepared to sign up to short-term wage 
restraint. In other words, adopting a perception o f the negotiation in expanding sum terms rather 
than zero sum terms.105 Tamames himself states that the priority for the negotiators was to facilitate 
a fundamental transformation in the economic model with far reaching reforms to the fiscal regime, 
social security and the modernisation of regulatory regimes. It was part of a protracted process that 
facilitated ratification of a democratic constitution in 1978 in a parliament newly filled with 
democratically elected deputies and senators. In other words, representatives of the Left regarded 
themselves as caretakers of the democratic transition and were thus prepared to temper their 
distributional priorities in order to avoid derailment of the long-term process.106
Economic reform.
The 1977 general election, Spain’s first since the 1930s, represented a consolidation of the 
new political system and also excluded the Francoist lobby from parliamentary power. Thus 
strengthened, prime minister Suarez was able to address the economic crisis and appointed Enrique 
Fuentes Quintana, one of Spain’s best-known liberal economists as vice president for economic 
affairs. His tenure marked the passing of an era of passive economic policy, totally subordinated to 
the political priorities of the system’s transition. Thus the exogenous shock of the OPEC oil price 
hikes in 1973, in spite of Spain’s disproportionate dependence on imported oil, had not been 
addressed and the crisis was allowed to deepen. While a budget for 1977, drawn up late in 1976 was
103 See Aguilar, S. Bartelo, A. Muniesa, B. Regio, A. Vidal-Villa, J.M. ‘Notes on the Economy and Popular Movements 
in the Transition’, in Abel, C and Torrents, N. Spain: Conditional Democracy, London, 1984, p.128
104 Perez, S. ‘From Labour to Finance: Understanding the Failure o f Socialist Economic Policies in Spain’, Comparative 
Political Studies Vol.32. No.6. September 1999
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106 Tamames, R. ‘Politica Economica y Cambio Social en la Transition,’ Informacion Comercial Espanola, Enero- 
Febrero 1985.
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designed to curb expenditure, the realities of the political situation, and the prevalence of strikes and 
unrest meant the figures were revised in February 1977. The new budget was considerably more 
expansionary with growth of expenditure and revenue at 49 per cent and 32 per cent respectively,
• 107which translated mto a deficit equivalent to more than 1 per cent of GDP.
Early attempts by the new economics minister to curb the external debt and inflation, 
including a 20 per cent currency devaluation and an attempt to freeze wages and prices did not win 
the cooperation of interest groups. Union leaders objected to wage increase ceilings while business
10Kbalked at fiscal tightening and restricted credit. Senior figures in government also acknowledged 
publicly that price freezes were unenforcable over the long term in spite of the existence of an 
inspectorate of prices (Servicio de Vigilancia del Mercado).109
With collective action and non-cooperation threatening the government’s authority, Suarez 
adopted a new approach, namely the Moncloa negotiations as a vehicle to introduce the reforms but 
reinforcing neo-corporatist hierarchies to impose discipline on the political process. Fuentes- 
Quintana’s priority remained a reduction in the deficit in the balance-of-payments through a 20 per 
cent devaluation of the peseta and curbing growth in money supply and instituting wage restraint so 
that salaries grew in line with inflation. To the minister, economic interests had to be kept out of the 
process of policymaking because their influence was counterproductive. Lobbying had tempered, in 
his view, the liberalisation of the 1959 Stabilisation Plan so that it was imperfectly applied and he 
viewed his task to be one of addressing unfinished business. His opinions echoed those of his 
counterpart in Buenos Aires, Martinez de Hoz, that the nature of the Spanish economic crisis was a 
consequence the “parasitic interventionism” of previous development policy. In particular, Fuentes 
Quintana identified the Development Plans of the 1960s as having undermined the purpose of the 
1959 Stabilisation. This had resulted in “bureaucratisation” and over-centralisaiton of the Spanish 
economy. He stated:
“The social market economy, envisaged in 1959 was not implemented properly in any of its 
fundamental tenets and we were left with free enterprise subject to a semi liberty and a State that 
was incapable of defining a complete budget for its activities or financing itself with sufficient 
efficiency or even-handedness”.no
It was time, he argued, to divorce economic policy from political priorities and for Spaniards 
to appreciate the extent of the crisis. Interest groups had to appreciate that they could not be 
indulged and should abandon unreasonable, and self-centered expectations of the government. He
107 OECD Economic Surveys, Spain, Paris, June 1978. p.31
108 El Pais 21 July 1977 Fuertes presiones sobre elprograma economico; 26 July 1977 Las centrales sindicales contra 
el plan economico; Lieberman, S. Growth and Crisis in the Spanish Economy 1940-93. London 1995 p.178
109 El Pais 30 July 1977 “El control de precios es ineficaz mas alia de cortos perlodos de tiempo”; Fuentes Quintana, E. 
Centro Asociado de la Universidad Nacional de Education a Distancia, Cadiz, lection inaugural: La crisis economica 
actual: sus problemas y  soluciones, 27 Nov. 1976 pp.45-58
110 Fuentes Quintana, E. La crisis economica actual: sus problemas y  soluciones, 27 Nov. 1976 p.31
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pointed out that consumers expected the State to “provide” stable, or better still, declining prices but 
when the same individuals act as producers, they expect compensation for the effect of rising prices 
on production costs. The unemployed meanwhile expect the provision of jobs while savers and 
investors clamour for higher yields, interest rates and stock market growth as a reward for the 
retention of some of their potential consumption. All these priorities simultaneously contradict each 
other so it is inevitable that any measure to address economic problems will fall short of the 
expected miracle.111
The government had hitherto devoted too much effort to humouring as many conflicting 
demands as possible with temporary measures such as price freezes and consequently failed to 
articulate effective measures, Fuentes Quintana argued. The solution, regardless of society’s 
objections, had to be built on an end to protectionism, a legacy of the defunct model, liberalisation 
of the exchange rate and monetary discipline. To preserve the antiquated productive structure of
119Franco’s Spain would be “a rejection of progress” so economic policy had to be professionalised.
The Negotiations: The Political Background
Franco famously stated towards the end of his life that he had left Spain “well tied up” with 
Juan Carlos to succeed him as monarchical head of state and Carlos Arias Navarro, a close personal 
friend appointed prime minister. When it became clear that the new administration was not eager to 
implement constitutional change, the popular clamour for reform grew louder. A simultaneous 
deterioration of the economic situation further dented Arias Navarro’s credibility and he resigned. 
His replacement was Adolfo Suarez, a senior member of the Francoist hierarchy and former 
Minister Secretary General of the Movimiento, or ruling party. In spite of his conservative 
credentials, however, Suarez was more open-minded regarding political reform. An early 
achievement was approval by parliament of a political reform law to formally establish 
democracy.113 This legislation established free election by secret ballot with the right to vote 
granted to all Spanish adults for the first time since the Civil War.114
It also paved the way for future constitutional reform with a statute that enshrined the right 
of the democratic legislature to institute change.115 Shortly afterwards, a further law was enacted 
that granted legitimacy to political parties although Francoist pressures ensured a delay in 
legalisation of the Spanish Communist Party.116
111 Fuentes Quintana, E. La crisis economica actual: sus problemas y  soluciones, 27 Nov. 1976 pp.33-34
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The eventual inclusion of the Communist party in mainstream politics was thus the result of 
careful negotiation kept within the establishment. Suarez had given assurances to the armed forces 
that he would not legalise the party as part of the process of democratisation, associated as it was 
with clandestine labour opposition during the dictatorship. Yet exclusion of the largest party from 
the political process would weaken the legitimacy and credibility of the reform process. The 
compromise was to open a dialogue with the party’s moderate wing, which included such figures as 
Tamames and the leader Santiago Carrillo, so that the party could be deradicalised. The party was 
eventually granted legal status in return for abandonment of a number of ideological priorities, such 
as demands for retribution on the old regime and its traditional anti monarchism. Carrillo became 
the friendly face of Spanish constitutional communism, making well-publicised criticisms of the 
Soviet Union for its totalitarianism that appeased both conservatives and reformists alike.117 
Nevertheless, to many Francoist stalwarts, legalisation of the Communist Party represented:
“.. .a disgraceful decision, through which 40 years of history have been reversed, the 
pacification of Spain ruined and the army angered... exposing the future of the next generation to 
great uncertainty.”118
Therefore, in a shrewd move intended to offset the possibility of hot-headed reaction by the 
military, Suarez ensured the announcement was broadcast during the 1977 Easter weekend when 
most senior officers were holidaying away from their posts.
The rival party on the left of the political spectrum was the PSOE led by Felipe Gonzalez 
whose election to the leadership in April 1977 had itself marked his party’s moderation. Gonzalez’s 
main criticism of his rival for the workers’ vote was that “the Communists have never yet respected 
the rules of democracy when in power.” He was nevertheless supportive of the initiative to include 
them in the political process as a “realistic” measure.119
On the right of the political spectrum was an alliance of parties dominated by an older 
generation of ex ideologues and Opus Dei members from the old regime who sought “Francoism 
after Franco” and as much political continuity as possible across the transition. The leader of the 
Popular Alliance was Manuel Fraga Iribame, a Francoist stalwart and former Minister of 
Information and Tourism in the early 1960s. Fraga was credited with presiding over Spain’s tourist 
boom but had an authoritarian record.120 An associate in the Popular Alliance was fellow Opus Dei 
ex minister Laureano Lopez Rodo, architect of the Development Plans of the previous decade who 
was also involved in implementation the 1959 Stabilisation Plan (see previous chapter). Thus 
Spain’s Francoist political Right was associating itself with the country’s economic miracle though
117 The Economist, April 2 1977, Survey on Apain, p.22
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the undemocratic credentials of its figureheads tempered their pro-growth appeal to Spain’s 
ascendant middle classes.
The political centre ground was dominated by two multi party alliances: the Christian 
Democratic Alliance and the slightly further to the Right, the Democratic Centre. What 
distinguished the former was that it had rightist sympathies but studiously distanced itself from the 
Franco regime and excluded veterans of the Moviemiento from its ranks. Although it seemed a 
natural organisation for Suarez to associate himself with as a candidate for elections he had 
scheduled for June 1977, he remained unaffiliated. The union then renamed itself Centre 
Democratic Union (UCD) and appointed a Suarez protege Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo as leader. 
Another conspicuous presence on the transitional political landscape were the Basque and Catalan 
regional parties, many of which were founded around the principle of regional autonomy. Yet these 
were also made to temper their demands for devolution until after the elections to avoid excessive 
antagonising of the conservatives.
Finally, Suarez drafted an electoral law to create a system whereby the two largest parties 
would be disproportionately represented in parliament and thus avoid an unworkably fragmented
191lower house. The conservatives agreed to this on the assumption that they would benefit but in 
the event, the political Right was eclipsed by UCD centrism. The elections which took place on 15 
June 1977 gave the UCD 34.7 per cent of the vote and 47 per cent of the seats in Parliament. The 
PSOE gained 29 per cent of the vote and 34 per cent of seats. The Communists, meanwhile, were 
awarded 6 per cent of seats on 9 per cent of the vote while the Popular Alliance followed with 8 per 
cent of the vote and 5 per cent of seats.122 While the electoral law minimised party fragmentation 
and facilitated the formation of stable governments, the extent to which all interest groups were 
represented in the political process was limited. Minority parties were given a voice but their power 
was out of proportion to their popular support. In a political environment of negotiation and 
constitutional transition set in the context of growing economic imbalances, this seriously 
debilitates groups with an interest in policy design. On the other hand, it facilitates the passage of 
reforms through the legislature by limiting the extent to which political groups representing specific 
regional or social factions of society can exercise the power of veto.
The negotiations over economic reform thus represented a pact between political elites 
acting through large parties rather than interest groups whose representation at the negotiating table 
or in parliament was limited and indirect. The voice of the partisan forces in Spanish society, 
Labour, the anti-democratic Francoist elites and the military, and regional separatists, were captured 
by nascent parties. Labour unions, for example, were not included in the Moncloa negotiations over
121 Real Decreto-Ley 20/1977
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wage policy on the pretext that they were adequately represented by the leftist parties, namely the 
PCE and the PSOE. Business interests were similarly forced to make do with a political party to 
represent their interests. In a sense, therefore, the negotiations over economic policy and crisis 
management in the new democratic Spain, were less inclusive and more corporatist than the process 
leading up to the 1959 Stabilisation Plan which had involved a consultation sent to interest groups 
such as chambers of commerce and banking organisations.
The negotiations are perhaps best understood, therefore, as an emergency measure to pre­
empt a renewed political crisis that imperilled democratic reform and as such their value is more 
symbolic than as a real economic policy model. To Paul Preston, the events present a paradox. 
While the pacts indicate “a remarkable spirit of cooperation and sacrifice among the main political 
parties”, and were signed by 31 representatives of all legal parties, there were limitations to their 
success.123 This moment in Spanish history reflected the culmination of strategies of moderation 
and self-sacrifice pursued by the political opposition during the dictatorship which sought a 
transition to pluralism. As such, like the 1959 Stabilisation Plan described in the previous snapshot, 
the Moncloa accord represented a war of attrition between factions within a ruling political elite, 
both of which were acutely aware that the political transformation they cherished could at any 
moment be put into reverse. All sides in the negotiations would have ideally liked to take economic 
reform further in their respective ideological directions. But the left accepted wage ceilings of 20 to 
22 per cent when inflation was running at close to 30 per cent, as well as monetarist measures to 
restrict credit and public spending. In return, the government made promises of major structural 
reforms in agriculture and a more progressive tax system as well as a pledge to bring inflation back 
below the wage ceiling.
There is evidence to suggest, meanwhile, that the government was telling the negotiators in 
private that the economic crisis was in fact deeper than the public understood, presenting a scenario 
of impending disaster to the Left that Tamames and others may have acknowledged. Jordi Pujol, 
who represented the Catalan nationalists at the negotiations, relates that when he expressed concern 
to the Economics Minister Fuentes Quintana about the rate of inflation, he was told the situation 
was far worse than he knew.
Pujol claims that Fuentes Quintana confessed: “We have the feeling that we are very close 
to reaching what could be a South American scenario, very difficult to control in terms of both 
economic and social issues, and seriously dangerous politically.”124
123 Preston, 2001. p. 137.
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Pujol also suggests that the headline inflation rate of 26 per cent was kept from the public 
who were informed in official communiques that the rate was 22 per cent, in line with the agreed 
wage ceiling:
“In July 1977 the president of my party, Trias Fargas, and I went to visit the deputy 
president of the government, Fuentes-Quintana and said to him: ‘we are concerned. We have the
17Simpression that inflation has reached 22 per cent’... He replied: ‘No, in truth its even worse...”
The true extent of the crisis was downplayed to the public, therefore, as higher rates of
inflation would have led to increased wage demands by a labour force that was making frequent use
of strike action. Indeed, in March 1977, Ricardo Torron, director of the Institute Nacional de
Estadistica (INE) resigned over the government’s refusal to implement a new cost of living index
on the grounds that it would boost wage pressures. The old index covered 244 products, comprising
food, drink, housing, utilities and clothing. The replacement was designed to reflect the new living
styles of an urbanised, industrial economy, covering a more broad based 369 items including many
of the trappings of modernity, such as furnishings, medical expenses, leisure, transport and
communications. The founding principles of the new index were inspired by survey data that
showed Spaniards, as they prospered, spent a diminishing proportion of their income on food. So
the weighting given over to this category by the new index was 41 per cent compared to the
previous 49 per cent. It was realised that the new measurements would reveal inflation to be
126significantly higher than was publicly acknowledged.
Fuentes Quintana’s idea of fundamental economic restructuring as a long-term solution to 
the inflationary problem did not find a sympathetic audience at the negotiations from either Left or 
Right. The position of the rightist Alianza Popular was that the government should take long- 
overdue action to exert its authority against the determination of the Left to undermine state power 
in a “rupture” with the past. Thus the party called for “an equitably shared austerity” and the 
assertion of authority in the face of the inevitable protests. Though the AP did not articulate a 
specific economic plan for stabilisation, it revealed enough to show the nature of the proposed 
austerity differed from the economics ministers’ view. The AP pursued the quick fix Fuentes- 
Quintana sought to avoid and suggested frozen wages, adjusted prices, an overhaul of tax collection 
and the productive system, the restriction of certain goods.127 Rhetorically, the AP affirmed its 
status as the heir to Francoism in a democratic Spain, with absolute faith in the importance of social 
order as a foundation to “progress”. Any economic or political adjustment needed to be constructed
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around social stability and should not jeapordise order.128 The party line was to hail the 
achievements of the previous 40 years, particularly the “regeneration of national life” achieved 
under the dictatorship. The ideological priority, therefore, was nationalist continuity and minimal 
“rupture” with the past.129 Of the principal participants in the Moncloa negotiations, the AP was 
arguably least enthusiastic about the eventual pact. Nevertheless, after stubborn abstention from the 
agreement throughout the talks, Fraga Iribame and Laureano Lopez Rodo emerged from the 
Moncloa Palace to announce they had signed the agreement on behalf of the party. They 
downplayed the importance of the pact, however, and insisted that it did not represent “an
130unconditional endorsement of the govenmment so much as “statement of intent”.
On the left, the Communist Party’s principal objection to economic policy was that steps to 
tackle inflation had focused on salary restraint, at the expense of workers, rather than “democratic” 
use of economic resources. The party’s stated policy aims on entering the negotiations were more 
progressive taxation, protection of the purchasing power of workers’ wages and salary increases for 
the lowest paid, a reduction in unemployment, greater benefits to small businesses, greater 
investment in agriculture and economic reform that put an end to the existing “oligarchic” model of 
development.131 A press release issued during the Moncloa negotiations by Ramon Tamames and 
Tomas Garcia, his deputy in the PCE, lambasted Fuentes Quintana’s economic package for what it 
excluded. There was no mention, the Communists said, of the agricultural sector which had suffered 
as much as any other from rising prices, particularly of land, with serious repercussions for 
hundreds of thousands of rural families. Neither was there any mention of the question of energy 
nor a plan for more effective harnessing of national resources by a reorganised public sector in areas 
such as hydroelectric power. The most vocal objection made by Tamames and Garcia, was lack of 
progress on new legislation regarding workers’ rights and the devolution by the state with its 
vertical syndicate, of powers of representation to unions. The party’s most emphatic demand was 
that a new corporatism be instituted whereby “social forces”, namely labour, be represented in the
132management of economic institutions such as the INI and the Central Bank. The party leader 
stated:
“The democratic State, in order to become just that must accept the right of representatives 
of workers, prefessionals, small and mecium-sized business and the citizens’ movement to occupy 
the political space they deserve.”
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The Communists, on gaining some concessions from the government such as the pledge to 
allow full autonomy and the right to independent representation for labour unions, signed the pact in 
spite of serious reservations about much of its content. The main reason for this acquiescence was 
the necessity to act in the interests of “saving democracy.” The document, Santiago Carrillo stated 
before Congress on 27 October 1977, comprised austerity and sacrifices to be suffered by all social 
sectors. Nevertheless, he continued, for the first time in Spanish history, those sacrifices would not 
fall exclusively on the shoulders of workers. He emphasised, meanwhile, that Spaniards should not 
consider Moncloa to be a social pact.
“Social pacts are established generally between unions, employers and governments... This 
was a poltical and economic pact elaborated by political parties which will presently be presented 
for consideration to the unions and employers but what is most clear is its political character.”134 
The rival party on the Left of the political spectrum the Socialist PSOE also took a reticent stand 
regarding the Moncloa accords, warning of tough times ahead. Like his counterparts at the AP, the 
Socialist Party’s secretary general Felipe Gonzalez insisted that the pacts were merely a building 
block rather than an end in themselves. The principal priority for the PSOE was to prevent the 
burden of economic austerity falling disproportionately on the labour force and to ensure real wages 
did not decline. A further point of contention was an end to political and legal delays to the calling
t
of the first truly autonomous union elections since before the Civil War. The Socialists also 
suggested that associational representatives from both business groups and unions should have a say 
in the negotiations on the basis that it would lend greater legitimacy to the final agreement. The 
party also stressed a more coherent plan should be put in place by the government to generate 
employment.136
Labour, business and the armed forces.
The coherence of Labour during the transition was limited in that the institutional structure of the 
unions was in transition from the ‘vertical’ representation of the official syndicates of the Franco 
regime. Following their legalisation in April 1977, the unions and workers commissions which had 
acted clandestinely or in exile until the dictator’s death were as varied and numerous as the political 
parties137. The most influential were the three ‘general’ unions, namely the CCOO, the UGT and the 
Workers Syndicalist Union (USO). These bodies’ levels of influence varied by region and economic 
sectors and in spite of some examples of coordinated protest, most notably a general strike in
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November 1976, they were a fractious trio. Other more specialist unions included the National 
Workers’ Commission (CNT) which drew most of its membership from the teaching profession and 
the service sector but was irredeemably split between generations over attempts to deradicalise 
policy. Furthermore, given Spain’s regionalism, some unions were defined by their Basque, Catalan 
or Galician identities while others were specific to sectors such as the Agricultural Workers’ Union 
(SOC), which was strongest in the southern province of Andalusia. Therefore, the level of 
coordination between the myriad organisations was low and many were preoccupied by internal 
rivalries, particularly between the older generation of people exiled or imprisoned by the Franco 
regime, and the younger, less intransigent newcomers.
Furthermore, though the principal general unions, the UGT and CCOO were associated with
the Socialist and Communist parties respectively, no single workers’ party could claim to be the
legitimate voice of labour. Suarez toyed with the idea of incorporating an affiliated union into the
UCD, wary that the PSOE and PCE possessed in their respective unions an effective tool for 
• 1rallying support. Ultimately, however, Suarez pushed for inclusion of the Communist Party in the 
political process to add legitimacy to the reforms among the populace by giving labour a 
conspicuous nominal voice but subject to a party. However, the PCE could not boast a clearly 
defined support base in the union movement beyond the CCOO. Furthermore, the degree to which 
unions were truly representative of the Spanish labour force is debatable as they largely maintained 
their pre-Civil War structures and hierarchies. Small firms with less than six employees were 
excluded from union election rights and in an economy characterised by the rise of an 
entrepreneurial class and a thriving informal sector this represents a significant proportion of the 
workforce. In addition, since the 1930s new sectors such as the tourist industry had emerged in the 
Spanish economy that accounted for increasing proportions of national income and employment.
But while such non-traditional sectors were not represented by a coherent union, declining sectors 
such as mining were. Finally, an increasingly important component of the labour force; women, 
were also excluded from the movement. These factors meant that Spain’s rate of union membership 
was among the lowest in Europe at just 11 per cent of the workforce compared with 43 per cent in 
West Germany, 45 per cent in Italy and 46 per cent in the United Kingdom.139
But though the unions were not as effective as their counterparts in Argentina at organising 
coordinated dissent as an economic weapon to protest policy, they achieved enough to persuade 
parties to heed their interests in any economic reform. A survey by Europa Press in July 1977 of 
union views on the Suarez government’s earliest steps to combat the economic crisis revealed cross-
138 El Pais 3 Aug. 1977 Union de Centro Democratico creara supropia central sindical
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factional consensus that policy focused on forcing labour to shoulder the burden of economic 
reform. Statements by Nicolas Redondo, secretary general of the UGT, and Marcelino Camacho of 
the CCOO acknowledged that a stabilisation plan of some description was inevitable but criticised 
the lack of effective effort to address high unemployment and declining real wages.140
The public response of unions to the Moncloa accords depended on the political affiliations 
of the respective movements. The CCOO, for example, came out broadly in support of its parent 
party, the PCE, with an official statement of approval “with reservations”. The union called for 
greater attention to issues such as unemployment benefit and criticised the accords’ vagueness over 
how unemployment would be addressed. It also stated that even a 20 per cent wage increase was 
inadequate when inflation for the year was likely to reach 30 per cent.141
Though the unions found themselves frozen out of the Moncloa negotiations, there were 
concessions to organised labour both included in the reforms and presented alongside them. In 
particular, a new law enshrined the right of workers to appoint their preferred negotiators in 
disputes with employers. This was designed as a compromise between the dual hegemonies of the 
UGT and CCOO.142 In effect, the unions were expected to tolerate wage austerity in return for more 
permissive labour legislation that provided for the right to strike and allowed workers to join their 
union of choice or remain unaffiliated if the so chose. In truth, labour was absorbed in more 
parochial concerns and did not possess the unity or coordination to effectively oppose 
macroeconomic policy. Most strikes and demonstrations were related to issues such as regional 
autonomy for Catalans and Basques and though they complicated the government’s situation 
regarding the economy, did not pose a real threat to central policy.143
But if the voice of labour suffered from a lack of coordination, so did its counterbalance from 
the business class. A new employers’ association, the Spanish Confederation of Business 
Organisations (CEOE) was formed in June 1977 but with 800,000 member firms, its centralisation 
was deceptive. In the late 1970s it was a disorganised institution, rendered ineffective by infighting 
and the fractuous relations between its members.144 While the reluctant verdict on the 22 per cent 
wage ceiling negotiated as part of the Moncloa pact announced to the public was supportive, the 
objections of members who thought the figure excessive were numerous. The organisation also 
failed to issue an official response to the reform package beyond pronouncements by a spokesman
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that the pact was received with ‘distaste’ by members who considered it riddled with contradictions 
and resented the absence of any suggestions made by the CEOE.145
“Brief in its positive aspects and excessive in the negative ones”, read one such statement.146
When the political talks concluded, the government emphatically turned to the associations, 
representing both business and labour, and staged a high-profile meeting to discuss the plan. The 
highest ranking members of the cabinet were present, including Suarez and Fuentes-Quintana, as 
were representatives of the CCOO, UGT and CEOE. However, this was not a further stage in the 
negotiations as the accords were already finalised between the political party. The meeting was 
conceived as an “informative” event for the benefit of the unions and employers’ groups. Smaller 
union organisations and associational groups representing such interests as small businesses were 
not invited to the event on the basis that they were not sufficiently “representative”.147
Thus the negotiations for economic reform that took place in 1977 to belatedly address the 
crisis associated with the first oil shock represented a continuation of the ‘top down’ style preferred 
by the dictatorship. The Franco regime had operated as a corporatist state with structures of 
command emanating downwards from the supreme ruler through the civil (and military) 
administration. The new democratic system had nominally dismantled the dictatorship but the 
central administration continued the practice of internalised decision making. Negotiations in 1977 
were between factions of the political elite which indirectly represented varying factions of society. 
Civil society was otherwise weak and easy to exclude from the political process. Compromises 
were made whereby reforms were implemented that were less far reaching than was economically 
optimal for the sake of social stability. Yet to claim that this reflected a broad consensus is an 
exaggeration.
How much of a threat were the military at the time of the negotiations? Though steps were 
being taken to curb the forces’ impunity, they continued to be considered a latent threat.
The police services and associated intelligence agencies such as the Military Investigation Service 
(SIM) still pervaded civil life and remained political in their outlook. Meanwhile, the upper 
echelons of the army during the transition were dominated by Civil War veterans, most of whom 
came from elite families. Officers who had entered military academies after the 1940s could only
14fthave reached as far as the rank of Lieutenant Colonel by the time of the democratic transition.
The navy and air force were not such gerontocracies because of their need for technological
145 El Pais 12 October 1977 Comisiones Obreras apoya, con reservas el acuerdo de la Moncloa.
146 El Pais 25 October 1977 El programa economico presentado a trabajadores y  empresarios en una reunion de 
tramite
147 El Pais 25 October 1977 El programa economico presentado a trabajadores y  empresarios en una reunion de 
tramite
148 Preston, P. The Politics o f  Revenge: Fascism and the Military in 20,h Century Spain, London 2001 p.l 81
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expertise among officers. It was specifically the army, therefore, that remained a bastion of 
Francoist reaction during the transition period. While the navy and air force were active participants 
in the Nato defence hierarchy, army officers continued to perceive their role as internal, rather than, 
international, as guardians of Spanish stability and values.
Prime minister Suarez actively sought to divorce the armed forces from civil society and end 
anachronistic vestiges of military rule such as the practice of putting civilians on trial in military 
courts for political crimes. Indeed, the trial and execution of Salvador Puig Antich, a Catalan 
anarchist on 2 March 1974 resulted in intense international condemnation and threatened the 
reformers’ achievements in reintegrating the country with the outside world.149 Suarez’s boldest 
engagement with the hard liners was to substitute the old military ministries of the Franco-era state 
with a new cabinet position of Vice President for Defence.150 The first defence minister, lieutenant 
general Manuel Gutierrez Mellado, used this post to lead the campaign to transform the armed 
forces into an apolitical professional force, which earned him much villification among his former 
colleagues in uniform.151
A particular irritant to the army hard liners was legalisation of the Communist Party in April 
1977, perceived as a betrayal of the cause for which the Civil War was fought and won. The army 
publicly condemned the act and also made veiled threats to stage a coup in a statement reiterating 
the force’s “undeniable obligation to defend the unity and flag of the nation, the integrity of 
monarchical institutions and the good name of the armed forces”.152 Indeed, the indignation of the 
hardliners boiled over on 17 November 1978 with the so-called Operation Galaxia, a coup which 
involved an attempt to seize Suarez and his entire cabinet at the Moncloa Palace. Fortunately, the 
plan was leaked to the government at the eleventh hour and preventative action was taken, including 
the arrest of the chief plotters.153 Another failed coup orchestrated by Lieutenant Colonel Antonio 
Tejero Molina on 23 February 1981 showed reactionary elements in the armed forces remained a 
credible political threat half a decade after Franco’s death. Appeasement was the tactic adopted by 
the supporters of democratisation. The king Juan Carlos was at pains to stress his military 
connections and ensure the services’ loyalty to his authority.154 While as a consession to leftist 
demands the Moncloa accords included an annexe in which the government pledged to modernise 
and trim the autonomy and legal jurisdiction of the armed forces, Suarez never pursued the 
commitments he made for fear of antagonising reactionary officers.155
149 Preston, P. The Politics o f  Revenge... pp. 181-2
150 Lieberman, S. Growth and Crisis in the Spanish Economy 1940-93, London, 1993 p. 177
151 El Pais 8 February 1977, Proxma disposicion sobre la neutralidadpolitica de los Ejercitos
152 El Pais 15 April 1977, Repulsa general en todas las unidades p o r  la legalizacion del PCE.
153 El Pais 19 November 1978, El teniente Gomez de Salazar llevo a cabo las investigaciones
154 The Economist, April 2 1977, Survey on Spain p.20: ‘The Men with the Guns’.
155 Acuerdo Sobre el Programa de Saneamiento y Reforma de la Economia: Criterios previos aprobados el dia 9 de 
Octubre de 1977. Articulo 2:VIT and IX. See also Maravall and Santamaria, 1986.p.90
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The measures, when implemented following the Moncloa accords made an important 
contribution to the restoration of overall financial equilibrium. On the other hand, fiscal policy 
remained subordinated to the political necessity of softening the impact on workers and avoid social 
unrest. An objective stated in the government budget for 1978 was to lessen the effect of 
stabilisation measures on rates of employment.156 The principal instrument of this policy was the 
INI, charged during the transition to boost employment by bolstering loss-making public enterprises, 
their profits decimated by high energy prices, and absorbing private firms that would otherwise 
become insolvent. In short, the agency became a “hospital” for failing companies during the 
transition period.157 So the restriction of fiscal reform in the face of the crisis bought the 
government some more time to consolidate the democratic transition. The directors of the INI 
publicly endorsed the Moncloa accord, although they had played no role in the negotiations, content 
with the continuity of their role as an instrument of central economic or industrial policy.158 The 
accord’s ‘Statute on Public Companies’ had pledged to liberalise the economy enough to allow fair 
competition between the private and public sector and had also made assurances that greater 
industrial efficiency was a long-term priority. However, the use of the INI as a cushion against 
restrictive monetary policy, essentially as a bolster for employment meant that little was done in the 
immediate term by the INI to achieve these aims. Fuentes-Quintana frequently stated his desire to 
“increase the external liberalisation of the economy as a source of pressure for greater efficency of 
resources and employment”, a view he had expressed since the 1950s.159 Yet he found his ability to 
fulfill this ambition constrained by the political priorities to which he was subordinated.
There were crucial concessions to the Left regarding the right to organise and the 
dismantling of the corporatist vertical syndicalism of the Franco era. A jubilant Ramon Tamames, 
while announcing the Communist Party’s decision to sign the pacts reassured his labour support 
base that:
“In no way have they interfered in the autonomy of the unions or business associations or 
their ability to engage in negotiations at all levels to maintain their own independent discourse with 
the government.”160
156 Maravall, J.M. and Santamaria, J. ‘Political Change in Spain and the Prospects for Democracy’ in O’Donnell, G, 
Schmitter and Whitehead, L. Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe, (London 1986) p.73
157 Comin and Acena, INI: 50 ahos de industrializacion en Espaha, Madrid 1991, p.476.
158 Institute Nacional de Industria, Memoria: 1977, Vol. 1, pl7.
159 Fuentes-Quintana, Papeles de Economia Espahola: Fondonpara la investigacion economica, Suplemento n o .l. 
Madrid, 1980 p.4
160 Santiago Carrillo, Discurso ante el Pleno del Congreso 27 October 1977
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To summarise economic policy in the transition era as articulated in the Moncloa accord, 
public investment was to be increased in order to stimulate activity and curb unemployment growth. 
Inflation was to be addressed through wage restraint, higher productivity and restrictions on the 
money supply. What was unforeseen at the time of the pacts, however, was the second oil shock of 
1979 which exacerbated the crisis and deepened the climate of political uncertainty. However, the 
Moncloa accord is frequently hailed as the symbol of Spain’s negotiated and pacted transition, 
where concessions were made by all sides of the political spectrum and demands were tempered for 
the sake of long-term gain and consolidation of the democratic project. It is crucial to remember, 
however, that the success of these negotiations and the ability to achieve a compromise depended 
on the continuation of limited social representation. The corporatist tradition of internalisation of 
inter-elite negotiation over matters of economic policy was very much alive in the period 
immediately after the democratic transition and the general election of 1977.
The economic adjustment was a de facto authoritarian policy because of it’s top-down 
administration, as well as the threat of violence that elites and negotiators were only too aware of. 
The trade-off between restrictive monetary policy and generous fiscal policy, to improve the 
balance of payments and temper demand while softening the austerity as far as possible in order to 
buy time, shares many parallels with the Stabilisation Plan of the previous section. The policy 
compromise was reached through a war of attrition between groups at the negotiating table. The 
desire to liberalise, increase competition and restructure the industrial base needed to be constrained 
by the realities that a conservative military might have been prepared to renege on their tolerance of 
democratisation. These political realities meant that the political elite monopolised interest group 
representation, which was made easier by the weakness of civil society following 38 years of 
authoritarian rule. It also meant that economic policy was heterodox, in that it comprised a mix of 
orthodox monetarism with high expenditure to offset the effects on wage earning industrial workers. 
While the political goals were achieved in many respects and democracy survived, the crisis 
deepened and painful decisions were taken during the 1980s and the socialist administration of 
Felipe Gonzalez. What the Moncloa accords illustrate, therefore, is the continued top-down 
administration of Spain’s political economy, the influence on decision-making of a latent threat of 
violence and the weakness of civil society and interest group representation in spite of a large urban 
proletariat and burgeoning industrial bourgeoisie.
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Conclusions
This snapshot addresses parallel attempts to address economic crises through radical overhaul of the 
national capitalism and change the rules of the game so that a definitive end was put to the tradition 
of state-led assisted capitalism. In both cases, political circumstances dictated that the architects of 
the reforms, economics ministers who believed in unrestricted markets, saw their plans tempered. 
But the process by which the reforms were stifled was distinct in each case and reflected the state of 
state-society relations in Argentina and Spain. In the former, Martinez de Hoz sought to address the 
issue of interest group interference in, or at least influence over, economic decision making in the 
government through a concerted attack on union power. His approach to business was less bellicose 
but he anticipated a benign attitude from capitalist organisations related to a belief that the new 
policy would be in their interests. But his implicit alliance with business and agriculture was 
counterbalanced by other sectors of government continuing to engage with labour. This, in a sense, 
resembles the Spanish model identified in this thesis as more capable of ensuring the pure public 
good of political stability because different economic factions had links with distinct branches of 
the armed forces and were therefore represented within the junta. There are two crucial distinctions, 
however. First, the head of the junta had a short-term and precarious hold on power and the period 
saw a significant degree of infighting. General Viola, for example, was deposed by hardliners. The 
authority of an arbitrating executive of the kind seen in the Spanish case was not in evidence, 
therfore. The second distinction is that the factions of the military communicating with associations 
representing economic interests did not themselves claim to be the official representation of those 
groups. They ensured a line of communication between the government and elements such as 
labour or business, but they were instruments of the “zero sum game” system, whereby the 
executive negotiates directly with non state actors. Even if it had gone some way towards securing a 
broad, if uneven and unofficial, system of representation and thus helping to underpin some degree 
of political order, certain factions chose to opt out of the hierarchy. Labour was the junior partner 
and engaged with the government through aggressive industrial action, while business and landed 
elites used their connections to gain direct access to the executive and the Junta, bypassing the 
economics ministry. The struggle for control of policy, therefore, remained beyond the structure of 
the state, unlike in Spain. The end result was a renewed web of alliances between different factions 
of government and varying sectors of society. This proved unsustainable and represented a further 
failure of Argentine reformers to break away from the allegiance-based approach to economic 
policy.
In Spain, Fuentes Quintana may well have aspired to sweep away the remnants of the 
Franco-era statism but the fragility of the political transition meant the government’s priorities 
restricted his ability to do so. The result was a negotiated settlement which excluded associations
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but included the newly legal parties. This simultaneously strengthened the former, and consolidated 
the new pluralism, while it contributed to the weakening of the latter. This thesis does not suggest 
that civil strife ended in one stroke in late 1977 as strikes and labour unrest continued while there 
were elements in society that were less than content with the Moncloa accords. However, the events 
illustrate the dynamics of the Spanish polity that have allowed it to diverge from its Argentine 
counterpart in securing political stability through a neo-corporatist process of representation, now in 
the form of political pluralism but still highly centralised. Indeed, given the political precariousness 
in which the Moncloa accords were formulated, the incident represents an endorsement of the 
system’s ability to create a perception of inclusion at a uniquely challenging moment in history. 
While the dictatorship was nominally dismantled, and a new Constitution enshrined to mark a 
symbolic point of departure from the old system, the central administration continued to operate 
within a system of internalised and tightly disciplined decision making where factions within the 
party or government claimed a virtual monopoly of representation for their respective constituencies 
and negotiated policy before the arbitrating head of state whose authority was not questioned by the 
protagonists. This virtual facsimile of the Franco state continued to ensure political stability as a 
pure public good, minimising the challenge from economic interests by weakening their non state 
representatives.
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Chapter 5:
The Push for International Integration. 
Argentina 1989-1996, Spain 1982-1989
225
The third and final historical episode of the thesis differs from the previous 
two in that the comparison does not address concurrent reforms. The focus remains, 
however, events in each case that are comparable in their aims and methods, namely a 
conscious effort to dismantle the legacy of “protectionist” economic policy through 
liberalisation of markets and a concerted privatisation of the old state enterprises. In 
Spain, this process occurred in earnest during the mid 1980s under the Socialist 
government of Felipe Gonzalez who came to power in 1982. This is contrasted with 
Argentina’s equivalent experience, during the Peronist presidency of Carlos Saul 
Menem and his technocratic economy minister Domingo Cavallo in the early 1990s. 
Both reform programmes were hailed for achieving stability and economic growth. 
But far reaching economic restructuring and the associated successes came at the cost 
of mass unemployment, critics point out. Mass unemployment helps justify the choice 
of case studies for this section if it is understood to evidence a shift in paradigm, away 
from protectionist, state-assisted model which prioritised full employment. Both 
instances are commonly regarded as a structural turning point, whereby irreversible 
changes were forced on economy and society when crisis was addressed with 
construction of a “new macroeconomy”.1
A further distinction from the previous two sections is that in this instance, 
both reforming governments were democratically elected, and subsequently re-elected 
for consecutive terms as shown in figure 5.0.
Figure 5.0: Electoral success o f Gonzalez and Menem compared.2
Argentina Spain:
Menem % o f  vote % o f legislature Gonzalez (PSOE) : % of vote % of legislature
1989 44.6 50* 1982 48.3 57
1995 49.9 52** 1986 44.1 52
1989 39.6 50
*Frente Justicialista Popular electoral alliance, includes Partico Justicialista, Partido Intransigente and 
Movimiento para la Integration y Desarrollo (MID) led by Arturo Frondizi.
**Partido Justicialista.
1 Comm, F. and Diaz Fuentes, D. La empresa publica en Europa, Madrid 2004 p.253; Gerchunoff, P. 
and Llach, L. El ciclo de la ilusion y  el desencanto: Un siglo de politicas economicas argentinas. 
Buenos Aires 2003 p. 429
2 Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit, Argentina Country Report, London No.3, 1989; Spain Country 
Report, London No.2 1989
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Though electoral support in Spain for the Gonzalez government diminished 
gradually at each election, it retained a comfortable parliamentary majority 
throughout the period in which the most profound reforms were implemented. In 
Argentina, where the president is elected separately to the legislature, Menem actually 
increased the parliamentary majority of his party, or in the first instance, electoral 
alliance, and the proportion of the electorate voting for his presidency. This is perhaps 
surprising given the rise in unemployment associated with both regimes and given the 
depth of the economic reforms applied in each case. But this comparison reflects a 
difference between the two types of parliamentary system. Argentine votes for 
Menem’s party were distinct from election of the president himself as many deputies 
in the legislature from the Justicialist party retained a traditional Peronist ideology and 
were opposed to the reform programme. Indeed, the first time Menem was elected he 
represented an electoral alliance including his own Peronist party but also the 
Movimiento para Integration y Desarrollo, headed by the developmentalist former 
president Arturo Frondizi. Argentine political discourse characteristically bypasses a 
weak Congress as will be shown in this section and highlighted in the two previous 
chapters. The vote for Menem himself as head of state reflects his ability to win 
support by making promises to voters he did not necessarily keep when in office, a 
similarity with Frondizi’s presidency described in chapter 3. The Spanish system is a 
vote for the Socialist Party and there is no presidential election though the party 
leader, in this case Felipe Gonzalez, rules as the ultimate authority in a tightly 
disciplined state once in power, effectively as an elected dictatorship. However, this 
chapter is not arguing for the advantages of a parliamentary system over 
presidentialism so much as suggesting the Spanish model traces its ancestry to the 
pyramidical, vertical hierarchies of the corporatist state established in the 1940s.
Furthermore, in a crony capitalist system, economic interests can be persuaded 
to support reforms even though they signify a drop in the amount of rents received in 
the short term if there is a sense of crisis and the looming possibility that an 
alternative to reform would mean a much greater loss in the longer term. In the 
absence of perceived crisis, economic interests find the short term diversion of 
resources involved in the relinquishing of privileges too costly. Crisis provokes 
reform but it also increases the tolerance of social actors faced with declining rents
3 Tomell, A. ‘Economic Crises and Reform in Mexico’, in Haber, S (ed.) Crony Capitalism and 
Economic Growth in Latin America, Stanford, 2002, p. 130.
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and privileges. In Argentina at the time of Menem’s election, the economy was facing 
a profound economic crisis the most conspicuous features of which were public 
indebtedness and hyperinflation. Spain during the 1980s, meanwhile, was also 
dominated by a sense of crisis but also had the motive of imminent acceptance into 
the European Economic Community which may have provided an incentive because 
of the promise of benefits once membership was assured. Both cases were less than a 
decade after their respective democratisations which may also have added impetus for 
ensuring popular order over social conflict.
Nevertheless, the manner in which the reforms were applied in these cases 
conforms to the model elaborated in this thesis. Clientelistic relationships are present 
in each and both economies retain elements of oligopoly in spite of claims by each 
system to be representative of all social groups and economic interests and aiming at 
competitive market structures. Carlos Menem, who oversaw the Argentine reforms of 
the early 1990s, was of the Peronist Justicialist party and was elected on a 
traditionalist, redistributive platform. Spanish prime minister Felipe Gonzalez, who 
presided over a programme of “industrial reorganisation” in the mid 1980s was of the 
socialist PSOE, like Argentina’s Justicialist party, closely affiliated to the trade union 
confederation. But both premiers quickly abandoned their popular agendas and 
introduced reforms which earned the respect of traditional targets for their more 
vitriolic rhetoric, such as business groups and foreign capital.
The argument employed in this chapter, therefore, is that the Spanish case 
represents a process of successful vertical representation through a pyramid shaped 
political hierarchy inherited from a more complete corporatist model than its 
Argentine equivalent. In short, crony capitalism with a broader spread of cronies who 
accept subordination to the state’s authority. The case of Argentina, meanwhile, 
illustrates aggressive economic liberalisation achieved through presidential decree and 
the exploitation of judicial authority rather than due political process. It also displays 
signs of confrontation with certain economic interests most likely to disrupt the 
reforms, while simultaneously seeking the support of others.
In this way, both cases in this chapter conform to the “crony capitalism” 
model elaborated by Stephen Haber.4 It is a system in which those close to political 
authorities receive favours that allow them to earn rents above those that would
4 Haber, S. Crony Capitalism and Economic Growth in Latin America. Theory and Evidency. Stanford, 
2002 .
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prevail in an economy in which the factors of production were priced by the market. 
Spain in the 1980s and Argentina in the 1990s, evidence complicity of certain groups 
in the reform processes whose support was sought in the form of capital or political 
support. But like the examples in previous chapters, the Spanish example suggests 
such negotiations were more successfully internalised by a centralised state, occupied 
at the time by a tightly disciplined party which purported to represent a very broad 
variety of economic interests. The Argentine example is a case where the executive, 
either confronts or solicits support from non state actors and asset holders directly, 
with less recourse to institutional and political structures. Conventional wisdom has it 
that Menem, in implementing neo-liberal reforms finally broke the back of union 
power and curbed the ability of labour to mount effective opposition to economic 
policies that do not favour the interests of wage earners. In fact, as this chapter argues, 
he perpetuated a system whereby established, economically powerful and well 
organised interest groups have to be engaged in order to seek their support, if  not the 
unions specifically.
The differing outcomes of programmes to privatise inefficient state 
enterprises, often one time beacons of the old populist expansionism, illustrate the 
distinction between the two cases. In the Argentine example, dozens of state concerns 
were privatised rapidly and, at times, chaotically leading to an internationalisation of 
the Argentine economy. If the government retained minority stakes in the concerns, it 
was not in a very strong position relative to the private, usually foreign, interests that 
had acquired the majority of the shares. Manufacturing industries, transportation 
networks and utilities, once the instruments of economic nationalism, became 
subsidiaries of multinational corporations.
The Spanish equivalent process of the 1980s, however, was more tightly 
controlled by the government. The state retained sometimes small, stakes in the 
privatised concerns but continued to exercise boardroom power out of proportion to 
its shareholdings. Chief executives of former state monopolies continued to be 
political appointees, in spite of the fact that the companies were no longer state- 
owned, and the government maintained very close relationships with the banking 
sector. Private companies continued to exercise a role as instruments of Spanish 
economic policy and in return for their cooperation, were awarded subsidies and 
implicit protectionism against foreign competition in the Spanish market. But unlike 
the Argentine, case, foreign capital, was very much the junior partner in a relationship
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with the Spanish state. In spite of the much heralded liberalisation of the economy, the 
Socialist government consolidated a highly centralised model of policymaking. The 
executive retained direct linkages with specific sectors of the economy and presided 
over a secular weakening of labour associations so that engagement over wage policy 
was conducted in an increasingly paternalistic manner.
This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the literature on 
each case to place this study in its analytical context. Next, is a narrative overview of 
policy reform in each case followed by a comparison of how the state engaged with 
economic interests in Spain and Argentina. A final section outlines the conclusions 
drawn from the study.
The Conventional Wisdom
Literature on each case of reform addresses the liberal, in the case of 
Argentina neo-liberal nature of the reforms and contextualises them with debates 
about the extent to which they were responses to international intellectual currents or 
home grown impulses. In the case of Spain, the liberalisation of the 1980s has also 
provoked a discourse about the extent to which reforms were indeed liberal, or a local 
peculiarity masquerading as economically orthodox for the sake of appearance, 
perhaps offering an alternative model.
Starting with Argentina, some authors argue Menem’s government succumbed 
to the temptations of intellectual currents dominating debate at the international level. 
Argentine neo-liberalism was not Menemism so much as one example among many 
of orthodox stabilisations and structural adjustments around the developing world at 
the time.5 The ideological impulse, therefore, came from outside the country. In 
addition, given the “conditionality” attached to financial rescue packages and loans 
from multilateral organisations such as the International Monetary Fund, the policies 
were also imposed from abroad. It was lenders, in the wake of the Latin American 
debt crisis of the 1980s, who were overseeing the dismantling of the economic and 
social structures of the traditional Latin American State, including its “populist”
5 Stallings, B. ‘International Influence on Economic Policy: Debt, Stabilisation and Structural Reform’ 
and Haggard, S and Kaufman, R. ‘The Political Economy o f Inflation and Stabilisation in Middle 
Income Countries’ and Kahler, M. ‘External Influence, Conditionality and the Politics o f  Adjustment’ 
in Haggard and Kaufman, The Politics o f  Economic Adjustment, Princeton, 1992
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institutions, while constructing its successor, namely a modem, efficient, 
administrative state6.
The identification of the reforms with the architect of the Convertibility Plan, 
Domingo Cavallo, who was economy minister from 1991 to 1996, has led to their 
adoption by the supporters of the notion of “technopols” in economic decision 
making. Whereas a “technocrat” is typically foreign educated with a puritanical belief 
in orthodox economics and a contempt for political, or even democratic institutions, a
n
“technopol” is able to act within the existing polity. The “Chicago Boys” who shaped 
Chilean economic policy under the patronage of authoritarian rule in the 1970s, were 
therefore technocrats. Cavallo, however, though foreign educated, and a believer in 
the market as the optimal distributor of resources, engaged democratic institutions, 
involved the Congress, parties, elected officials, popular sectors and elites in his 
unprecedented effort to reform the state. By successfully manoeuvring through 
Argentine political realities, unlike his predecessors, Cavallo served longer than any 
prior economy minister and “in the 1990s was the bridge that brought to Argentina the 
1980s international consensus in favour of economic liberalisation”.8
A less flattering view of the phenomenon identifies the international consensus 
regarding neo-liberalism as a tool hijacked by privileged groups in Argentina to 
further their own interests. The period associated with the Convertibility Plan, a fixed 
exchange rate achieved through a currency board which eliminated hyperinflation, 
was one marked by a free market “despotism”. An institutional shift occurred, 
therefore, “which abruptly imposed the dogmas of aggressive competitiveness from 
the conventional wisdom”.9 The ideological insistence on rolling back the state from 
economic life, and wholesale deregulation of markets, was a form of “commercial 
anarchy” that empowered elites at the expense of equitable distribution.
A related school in the literature presents the Menem-Cavallo reforms as a 
continuation of a process of concentration of ownership that started during the 
military government of the late 1970s. The period was not a departure from history, so 
much as acceleration and deepening of a long-term process of “centralisation of
6 Burki, S and Edwards, S. ‘Dismantling the Populist State: The Unfinished Revolution in Latin 
America and the Caribbean’ World Bank Latin American Studies, Washington DC 1996.
7 Dominguez, J. Technopols: Freeing Politics and Markets in Latin America in the 1990s,
Pennsylvania 1997; Williamson, J ‘In Search o f a Manual for Technopols” in: Williamson J. (ed.) The 
Political Economy o f  Policy Reform, Washington DC 1994.
8 Corrales, J ‘Why Argentines Followed Cavallo’ in Dominguez, 1997, p.50
9 Lo Vuolo, Alternativas: La Economia como Cuestion Social, Buenos Aires. 2001, p.456
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capital, production and income.”10 This argument, that highlights a regressive trend in 
Argentine distribution of income, is championed by leading figures in the Buenos 
Aires branch of the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO)11 What 
distinguishes the 1990s, is the substitution of traditional struggles between capital and 
wage earners typical of the import substitution era, for a new battle between local 
capital and foreign creditors. Wage earners and the state were by this time, already 
subordinated to capital. Privatisation of state enterprises weakened the state as an
economic actor, while labour reform enfeebled labour as an influential voice in debate
10 •over policymaking. Menem and Cavallo presided over a final flourish m the
oligopolisation of the economy, therefore, and the association of local economic elites
1 ^with foreign capital at the expense of progress in social equity.
Another argument treats the policies of Menem’s government as a return to the 
orthodox ideas of the Proceso in the late 1970s, following a heterodox interlude 
during the 1980s when economic policy was subordinated to political struggle.
Menem learned from the hyperinflation of the late 1980s that economic stability was 
required for successful implementation of any policy. The new policies were 
revolutionary, therefore, and comprised a concerted effort to dismantle the core of the 
corporatist system, through privatisation of state enterprises and confrontation with 
and neutralisation of economic interest groups.14
But whether the period represents continuity or return to previous ideas, few 
commentators disagree that fundamental changes took place in the structure of the 
Argentine economy and that gains were unevenly distributed.15 While during the 
1990s, the Argentine economy appeared to display a new dynamism, and long elusive 
monetary stability, some sectors thrived more than others. High growth, low inflation 
and increased investment came alongside higher rates of unemployment. New
10 Basualdo, E. Concentration y  centralization del capital en la Argentina durante la decada del 
noventa, Buenos Aires 2000 p .l 1; See also Aspiazu, D. and Vispo, A. ‘Some Lessons o f the Argentine 
Privatisation Process’ CEPAL Review Vol.54 December 1994; Azpiazu, D. La concentration en la 
industria argentina a mediados de los ahos noventa, Buenos Aires 1998
11 In Spanish: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales.
12 Basualdo, 2000 p. 17
13 Azpiazu and Vispo 1994. p. 138
14 Canitrot, A. ‘Crisis and Transformation o f the Argentine State’ and Acuna C. ‘Politics and 
Economics in the Argentina o f the Nineties (Or why the future no longer is what it used to be)’ in: 
Smith, WC, Acuna and Gamarra, A. (eds.) Democracy, Markets and Structural Reform in Latin 
America, Miami, 1996
15 An exception -  Schvarzer, J. Implantation de un modelo economico: La experiencia argentina entre 
1975-2000. Buenos Aires 1998. suggests the fundamental changes occurred in the 1970s under 
Martinez de Hoz.
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economic actors emerged, namely foreign corporations, following the privatisation of 
almost all the state sector. Established economic actors changed their behaviour in 
response to constraints of the new economic discipline.16
The approach employed in this section acknowledges these arguments that 
much was altered, possibly permanently, about the Argentine political economy but 
its point of departure is to highlight the continuity of the established political dynamic 
of direct negotiation over policy between the executive and economic interests. Some 
interest group associations were weakened, principally through privatisation of the 
largest employers such as the railway network which altered the terms of negotiation 
for unions. The appearance for the first time of mass unemployment also debilitated 
the bargaining power of organised labour. In this respect, Menem’s Argentina of the 
1990s resembles Gonzalez’s Spain of the 1980s, except the old corporatist entities 
were not substituted by an effective political party system that purported to 
incorporate the entire spectrum of economic interests. The new economic model did 
not spread the perception of “credible commitment” widely enough.
Furthermore, as Daniel Heymann argues, new economic actors were 
introduced into the dynamic, or at least became more powerful. In this case, it was 
foreign capital that became the senior partner in a relationship with the executive, to 
the exclusion of local entrepreneurial capital. Aggressive privatisation turned 
Argentine industries into subsidiaries of foreign multinationals except that unlike the 
Spanish equivalent, the state did not retain an element of control whereby they could 
continue to be used as instruments of policy under the implicit authority of the 
government. Instead, the Argentine state became the less powerful member of the 
relationship and a vested interest that was relatively subdued throughout the second 
half of the twentieth century was suddenly permitted a renaissance. Argentina post 
Menem therefore resembles the model elaborated by Gary Gereffi and Peter Evans of 
a triple alliance of state, local capital and foreign corporations collaborating to subdue
17popular sector interests with the multinational as the most powerful element.
16 Heymann, D. ‘Poli'ticas de reforma y comportamiento macroeconomica: La Argentina en los 
noventa.’ In: Heymann and Kosacoff B. (eds.) La Argentina de los Noventa. DesempehoEconomico en 
un Contexto de Reformas. Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, Naciones
Unidas, CEPAL.
17 Gereffi, G. and Evans, P. ‘Transnational Corporations, Dependent Development and State Policy in 
the Semiperiphery: A Comparison o f Brazil and Mexico’ Latin American Research Review, Vol. 16 (3) 
1981.
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A further distinction between this study and other analyses of the period is the
use of the comparison with Spain in the 1980s to put the era into a bilateral context as
opposed to addressing it either as part of a broader developing world swing from
state-led to market oriented policies conforming to the “Washington Consensus” of 
18neo-liberal policy, of or an exclusively Argentine phenomenon. It addresses broadly 
similar reforms of liberalisation, ostensibly at the expense of particular economic 
interests but highlights the continuity of both political dynamics that shaped distinct 
political and economic outcomes.
In terms of the Spanish case, the literature on the period presided over by the
Socialist governments of Felipe Gonzalez (1982-96) falls into two broad categories.
The first identifies it as characterised by a neo-liberal approach to economic
policymaking.19 The second highlights the continuation of the corporatist tradition,
pointing to periodic adjustments to wages, prices and employment law through social
concertation and a top down approach to policymaking.20 As such, the Spanish model
in the 1980s is portrayed as a mixed approach extracting elements of both the
protectionist and neo-liberal traditions to produce a moderate alternative to the market 
0 1oriented strategy. There are also those who identify the period as predominantly
neo-liberal with a number of limitations but stop short of using this to argue for the
00Spanish model as an alternative middle way.
The main thrust of the neo-liberal interpretation is that the Socialist 
government took power in 1982 implemented a policy about face to embrace supply 
side adjustment strategies. The historical episode can therefore be taken as a stage in
18 Gore, C. ‘The Rise and Fall o f the Washington Concensus as a Paradigm for Developing Countries’ 
World Development Vol.28 (5), 2000 p.799; Reinhardt, N and Peres, W. ‘Latin America’s New  
Economic Model: Micro Responses and Economic Restructuring,’ World Development, Vol.28, No.9, 
September 2000, pp. 1543-1566
19 See Wozniak, L ‘The Dissolution o f Party-Union Relationships in Spain’, International Journal o f  
Political Economy, Vol.22 (4) Winter 1992-93 ; Petras, J. ‘Spanish Socialism: The Politics of Neo- 
Liberalism’ in: Kurth W. and Petras (eds.) Mediterranean Paradoxes, Oxford 1993
20 Perez-Diaz, V. The Return to Civil Society, London, 1993;
21 Echemendy, S. ‘Revamping the Weak, Protecting the Strong and Managing Privatisation Governing 
Globalisation in the Spanish Takeoff, Comparative Political Studies Vol. 37 (6) August 2004
22 Dehesa, de la, G. ‘Spain’, in Williamson, J. (ed.) The Political Economy o f  Economic Policy Reform, 
Washington 1994
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the accumulative conversion of the Spanish model to one that uses the market as the 
primary distributor of resources and the retreat of the state.
Though the PSOE government came to power in 1982 having made an 
electoral commitment to improve the standard of living for its working class 
constituency, it never implemented the promised expansionist, job creating policies of 
its electoral platform. Instead, the neo-liberal camp notes, it chose a growth path that 
depended on internationalisation of the economy and labour market flexibility.24 The 
period was also characterised by economic austerity and a decline in solidaristic ties
•yc
between the PSOE and the union movement.
Scholars who identify the PSOE mandate as neo-liberal are divided between
approvers and critics of the policy. The former point to consolidation of the Spanish
economy’s modernisation and integration into the international system, particularly
with accession to the European Economic Community in 1986.26 The latter group,
while underscoring the neo-liberal nature of policy, are more critical, particularly of
the PSOE’s dismal record on unemployment.27
Sofia Perez uses the Spanish case to argue against the ‘conventional wisdom’
that liberal economies lead to higher rates of employment. The assumption among
orthodox economists, she states, is that though European governments have gone far
in integrating and liberalising their financial systems, adjustment has been retarded by
resistance to the liberalisation of labour markets. This renders European economies
inflation prone and limits the willingness of entrepreneurs to invest in domestic job
creation. However, the PSOE served an exceptionally long term of office and used
their parliamentary majority to implement a stringent adjustment programme yet
28failed to reverse the high rate of unemployment.
Paradoxically, the high unemployment that characterised the Spanish economy 
is used by others to argue the Socialists did not, or at least could not, implement 
meaningful liberalisation and adjustment. Samual Bentolila and Oliver Blanchard
23 Gonzalez Temprano, A. ‘La modemizacion del sistema productivo y la apertura al exterior’ Politico 
y  Sociedad, 1998, Vol.29
24 Wozniak 1992, p.80
25 Heywood, P. The Government and Politics o f  Spain, London 1995. p.226
26 Gonzalez Temprano, 1998.
27 Recio, A. and Roca, J. ‘The Spanish Socialists in Power: Thirteen Years of Economic Policy’,
Oxford Review o f  Economic Policy, 1998 Vol. 14(1); Perez, S. ‘From Labour to Finance: 
Understanding the Failure o f Socialist Economic Policies in Spain’, Comparative Political Studies 
Vol.32 (6) September 1999.
28 Perez, 1999, p.660. See also Rand Smith, W. ‘Industrial Crisis and the Left: Adjustment Strategies in 
Socialist France and Spain’ Comparative Politics Vol.28 (1) October 1995
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profess that the specificity of the Spanish experience, high inflation in the 1970s and 
mass joblessness in the 1980s that surpassed European Averages, comes from “the 
Franco legacy”. Spain retained an “archaic system of labour relations and a 
thoroughly inadequate production structure” which explains both the high inflation of 
the 1970s and unemployment of the 1980s.29
Another problem for the neo-liberal interpretation is die fact that the Spanish 
state continued to play a central role in management of the economy and wielded 
considerable influence in sectors identified as strategic. What was presented as a 
policy of industrial reorganisation which involved selected privatisations and 
restructuring of antiquated state industries, was in practice a policy of selective 
protectionism.30 Thus alongside the much touted liberalisation of the Spanish 
economy, certain companies and sectors enjoyed continued protection from foreign 
competition in spite of the requirements of European Community membership, a
•j |
process termed “protectionist liberalisation”. A related “rational choice” approach 
interprets the exclusion of certain elites, the privatisation of some industries alongside 
the protection and nurturing of others, as steps by the government to exclude oligarchs 
associated with previous regimes.
The thrust of this interpretation is to emphasise the importance of certain 
policy elites where actors such as an industrial bourgeoisie dictated the policies of the 
government. It is to this school that the study presented here attempts to contribute, 
arguing that in the early 1980s, Spain continued to operate as a crony capitalist 
economy, favouring certain economic interests when formulating policy. However, as 
will be outlined in subsequent sub sections, while some economic interests may have 
enjoyed more privileged access to policymakers than others, the party leadership also 
maintained links to other groups who were given a semblance of participation. No 
doubt, the PSOE nurtured contacts with certain elite sectors more enthusiastically than 
others. It was repeatedly accused while in office of exchanging political favours for 
party funding though the party remained heavily in debt. But the Echemendy
29 Bentolila, S and Blanchard, O. ‘Spanish Unemployment’, Economic Policy V ol.5 (10) April 1990 
p.234
30 Salmon, K. The Modem Spanish Economy: Tranformation and Integrationinto Europe, London 
1995 p .ll
31 Echemendy, 2004 p.625
32 Geddes, B. ‘Challenging the Conventional Wisdom’, in: Frieden, J, Pastor, M. and Tomz, M. 
Modem Political Economy and Latin America: Theory and Policy, Oxford, 2000, p.245.
33 Newton 1997, p.220
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interpretation of PSOE relations with particular sectors of capital, to the exclusion of 
others does not give due regard to the fact that support came from a great variety of 
economic interests and social groups. The argument presented here holds that the 
PSOE governments of the 1980s and 1990s represented a continuation of highly 
centralised policymaking where all interests were given at least a semblance of 
participation in the political process, thus creating a sense of ‘credible commitment’ 
to a broader variety of people. In a sense, a full decade after the death of Franco, the 
Spanish political economy was ‘neo-Francoist’ in its “vertical” networks of 
representation.34 This in turn ensured political stability to which the party’s electoral 
endurance testifies.
Structures o f  policymaking and hierarchies o f power
This sub section outlines the framework for understanding each case and the 
dynamics of representation in their respective reform programmes. The Argentine 
reforms of the early 1990s were hailed by many contemporary observers and scholars 
as a likely turning point in Argentine economic history, a point at which what had 
once been the western hemisphere’s most promising economy would recapture its 
natural destiny.35 The reforms also elicited praise from multilateral institutions such as 
the World Bank. One report summarised:
“Argentina has had one of the most successful of recent stabilisation and 
reform efforts. From one of the most extreme hyperinflations by historical standards 
in 1989, it moved relatively quickly by 1994 to an annual inflation rate of 3.9 per 
cent. Output and productivity growth have been remarkable... there is growing 
evidence that Argentina underwent an important adjustment in response to the radical 
restructuring and liberalisation of its economy.”
This chapter does not dispute the idea that certain aspects of the Argentine 
political economy changed permanently and beyond recognition. An important 
legacy, and indeed tool of the Peronist state has gone for ever, namely the once 
monolithic state enterprises, used as much as instruments of labour policy as of 
industrial policy. Almost all were privatised under Menem, in an aggressive campaign
34 El Pais, 7 September 1985, Apuntespara una teoria delfelipismo.
35 See for example, the cautiously optimistic preface in Lewis, P.W The Crisis o f  Argentine Capitalism, 
Chapel Hill, 1990
36 World Bank Report No. 15402-AR Argentina: The Convertibility Plan, Assessment and Potential 
July 12 1996. p.i
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to scale down the role of the state in the Argentine economy and strike at the core of 
the corporatist system37. Second, associational power, especially in the case of the 
unions diminished sharply during the period both through a direct assault from the 
government and an increase in unemployment which reduced labour bargaining 
power. But Menem’s government failed to alter the system in a number of important 
ways. Firstly, Argentine policymaking continued to operate through bilateral 
negotiations with economic interests, in this case, local financial capital and foreign 
multinationals. In the case of the latter, the rush to privatise and open the economy to 
foreign investment empowered foreign capital as perhaps the most influential interest 
in the Argentine economy. Multinational corporations that bought up majority stakes 
in the privatised concerns acquired a direct contact with executive power but while 
they were able to influence policymaking, the Argentine government is less able than 
its Spanish counterpart to continue to use the former state enterprises as instruments 
of economic policy post privatisation. Foreign capital is not such a junior partner in its 
alliance with the Argentine state, therefore.
Menem and his economics minister Domingo Cavallo launched an assault on 
associations early in their tenure, particularly against non compliant unions and 
successfully stripped them of their power. This comprised an institutional shock and 
reconfiguration of the economic structure, society and the state, dismantling the 
institutions that had acted as providers of services and bastions of associational 
influence38. This was welcomed both nationally and internationally, by business 
interest as well as to a great extent by popular sectors. Indeed, significant factions of 
the union movement, as well as affiliated Peronist political elements were reluctant to 
join hard line peers in direct confrontation with the new policies. These elements 
hoped they stood to gain from privileged access to the state given the fact that Menem 
was of the Peronist party with which they too were associated. Menem proved adept 
at exploiting this dynamic through a carrot and stick approach to engaging social 
groups.39 However, Menem failed to take advantage of these achievements and
37 Canitrot, A. ‘Crisis and Transformation of the Argentine State’ in: Smith, WC, Acuna and Gamarra, 
A. (eds.) Democracy, Markets and Structural Reform in Latin America, Miami, 1996
38 Azpiazu, D. La concentracion en la industria argentina a mediados de los anos noventa, Buenos 
Aires 1998, p. 13, Heymann, D. and Kosacoff, B. ‘Comentarios generales sobre el comportamiento de 
la economia y temas abiertas al finalizar los noventa’, in: Heymann and Kosacoff, (eds.) La Argentina 
en los noventa, Buenos Aires, 2000, p. 13
39 Gerchunoff, P and Torre, JC. ‘La politica de liberalization economica en la administration de 
Menem’ Desarrollo Economico, Vol 36, (143) Oct-Dic 1996 p.735
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construct, or at least enforce a disciplined political party system. In fact, a 
policymaking style of rule by decree, frequently bypassing Congress in favour of 
nurturing clientelistic relationships to ensure support for policy initiatives arguably 
debilitated the institutions of state further.40 Furthermore, because of the nature of 
Argentine state-society relations, there were constraints to the government’s power to 
“deregulate” and liberalise the economy. The state can deregulate only what it has 
itself regulated. Many of Argentina's restrictions on economic activity were by private 
agreement, not by state decree. For example, though capital markets may have been 
liberalised, the government was not able to prevent the practice whereby banks would 
open accounts only for people who owned property.41 This means, lobbying and 
negotiation continued to involve direct engagement with economic or social interests 
and the state’s “credible commitment” to protect property rights, is not regarded 
necessarily as universal. Menem failed, therefore, to restore faith in the state.
Figure 5.1: Hierarchy of power in establishing the new economic model in Argentina, 
1990-1995.
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40 Mustapic, AM ‘Oscillating Relations: President and Congress in Argentina’ in: Morgenstem, S. and
Nacif, B. Legislative Politics in Latin America, Cambridge 2002, p.31. 
41 The Economist, November 9, 1991, Argentina, The Starting Gun
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The principal arguments are outlined in the diagram 5.1 which displays the 
structure of representation in economic policymaking in Argentina during the early 
1990s. At the top is the president, who is senior partner to but in a mutually dependent 
relationship with the Economics Minister. Each of these figures presides over a team 
running disproportionately powerful super ministries, the Office of the Presidency and 
the Economy Ministry. The links between the two individuals are strong during the 
early stage of the period examined here, though in later years the relationship broke 
down, in part because Menem feared Cavallo could become a potential rival for the 
role of head of state.42 They jointly or individually maintained alliances with 
economic interests directly through departments of state they had either “colonised” 
or indeed created. Menem was the acceptable public face of “Menemism”, and took 
the role of presenting policy to the general public, while Cavallo was the friend of 
business, both local and international. Subordinates in the economics ministry also 
engaged with labour factions though early on in the period, potentially unsupportive 
associations were attacked with vigour, their powers curbed and influence decimated. 
The Menem-Cavallo partnership, meanwhile, curbed the power of public 
administration in the name of neo-liberal ideology, cutting budgets, dismissing public 
servants by the thousand, cancelling subsidies, shrinking ministries, and privatising 
state industry. So the “state” represented in the diagram, is in fact a stronghold within 
the state. The Labour Ministry, is ostensibly charged with managing labour relations, 
and on the occasions when the government came into confrontation with unions, for 
example, would implement government policy. It became increasingly marginalised, 
however, as time progressed.
The most important feature of the diagram is the link with foreign capital. The 
argument on which this section hinges is that while the government successfully 
curbed associational power in its traditional territories, namely the labour market and 
business interests, it created a dynamic where a new economic interest, foreign 
capital, acquired significant bargaining power. This meant that though public opinion 
favoured Menem and Cavallo for a time, the reforms were not far reaching enough to 
broaden the scope of the state’s “credible commitment”. In spite of all the reforms, 
there remained an obviously favoured asset holder which the government prioritised 
in making assurances in return for financial support. This, as argued in the early
42 Financial Times, May 14 1992 Survey o f  Argentina
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chapters of this thesis, does not further the pure public good of long term political 
stability or state credibility.
Trade liberalisation and allowing foreign capital unhindered access to 
Argentine markets reduced the ability of bourgeois elements to challenge new policy, 
while unemployment and the divorce of the state from the traditional industries that 
dated from as early as the 1940s limited the bargaining power of labour. In addition, 
the discrediting of the armed forces following defeat in an ill advised war with Britain 
and the economic collapse of the early 1980s meant Menem had little to fear from the 
military.
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Figure 5.2: Structure of hierarchies of representation in Spain during the 1980s
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The hierarchy of decision making in the Spanish case is outlined in figure 5.2, 
a variation of figure 1.5 in the introduction of this thesis. The structure retains the 
basic features of the examples analysed in previous chapters of the thesis, whereby 
power is concentrated in the hands of the executive whose authority is not effectively 
questioned. All economic and social interests are represented within the state and the 
vertical hierarchy of command runs from the prime minister and party leader, down to 
local committees at community level. Central to understanding the success of the 
PSOE government in implementing tough economic reforms was the endurance of 
party discipline within the structure outlined earlier in this thesis. Other factors 
contributed to the failure of opponents to the reforms to prevent their implementation, 
most notably the weakness of the political opposition during Felipe Gonzalez’s 
tenure. The centrist UCD had ceased to operate as a political force in Spain while the 
conservative right was ideologically in agreement with most PSOE economic policies 
including labour market reforms. Furthermore, led by Manuel Fraga Ibame who was 
minister of Information in the 1960s during the Opus Dei period of the dictatorship, 
the main rightist opposition party was too associated with the old order to be palatable 
to anything but a hard core of nostalgic, reactionary voters.43 A potential bastion of 
dissent was the Communist Left, the Socialists’ traditional competitor for the working 
class vote yet the PCE found itself too preoccupied with internal squabbling to mount 
an effective challenge to the PSOE’s policies 44
Neither was there effective dissent from within the Socialist party itself as 
PSOE deputies were repeatedly threatened with expulsion if they dared vote against 
government policies.45 The roots of this dynamic were established at the PSOE’s 
‘Extraordinary Congress’ in 1979, at which the party made a tepid assertion of its 
enduring belief in Marxist values and rejected a “drift to the right” yet established a 
set of rules bolstering the authority of the party leader that ensured unchallenged 
policymaking when in government three years later.46 In addition to party discipline, 
the electoral system for political candidates within the party was structured to ensure 
loyalists remained dominant. Candidate lists at all levels, from local elections to 
central government were compiled by a “closed” non transparent process, presided
43 Financial Times 13 December 1984 Gonzalez Popularity Survives the TJ Turns.
44 Wozniak, 1992 p.82
45 Ibid. p.82
46 El Pais 30 September 1979 El Congreso aprobo una resolucion de izquierday eligio una ejecutiva 
moderada
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over by hand picked committees led by a “general vice secretary” who expressed the 
voice of the party leadership. The chosen candidate would be required to promote the 
policies of the central administration and would lose his place in the party if he 
expressed dissent.
To the intellectual social commentator and Andalusian regionalist Jose 
Aumente, Felipe Gonzalez’s rule represented “a despotism of manipulation”, whereby 
Francoist methods of government were applied within the context of representative 
parliamentary democracy in a subtle form of authoritarianism.47
But like the vertical representation of the Franco regime established after the 
Civil War, this despotism of manipulation could claim legitimacy when implementing 
policy through the apparent ubiquity of its constituency. By the late 1970s the PSOE 
had affirmed itself as a “mass” party, thus turning its back on the idea of a 
predominantly working class support base.48 Indeed, the breakdown of delegates, 
elected as representatives at the 1979 conference by provincial congresses of the party 
by proportional representation challenges the idea of a principally working class 
constituency 49 Public sector workers accounted for 23 per cent of members, while 8 
per cent were “salaried professionals”. Skilled workers comprised 7 per cent and 
unskilled labourers 1 per cent. Agricultural labourers accounted for 0.3 per cent while 
the remainder were students, retirees, housewives and other minority groups.50 The 
Socialist party’s traditional constituency, therefore did not represent a majority of 
members at the 1979 conference which suggests it had already captured the bourgeois 
vote even prior to the reforms seen as pro business, not implemented until after 1982. 
That is not to say, however, that Felipe Gonzalez in particular did not recognise the 
importance of labour support, particularly while electioneering after the conference 
but also during his government. His rhetoric eulogised labour as frequently as it did 
entrepreneurs.51
Thus the party could claim to be truly representative of all the principal 
economic interests in Spain and was not associated with a particular group such as 
labour as it had been in the past, which served to bestow legitimacy on tough 
economic policies. While Falangist ideologues in the 1940s had rejected “unnatural”
47 El Pais 7 September 1985 Apuntes para una teria del felipismo
48 El Pais 30 September 1979 Felipe Gonzalez recobra el control del Partido Socialista
49 Newton, M. Institutions o f  Modem Spain: A Political and Economic Guide, Cambridge, 1997 p. 192
50 El Pais 30 September 1979 El Congreso aprobo una resolucion de izquierday eligid una ejecutiva 
moderada
51 El Pais 30 September 1979 Felipe Gonzalez recobra el control del Partido Socialista
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units of representation such as labour unions, the PSOE of the 1980s viewed itself as 
having transcended class based politics and had itself become the governing class.52
A further aid to the success of tough policies and the apparent lack of 
opposition was the issue of cronyism whereby the PSOE leadership populated the 
public administration with supporters. By the mid 1980s, up to 40,000 civil servants 
were also members of the PSOE.53 At the party’s 1984 extraordinary congress to mark 
two years in power, up to 30 per cent of delegates held top administrative posts in the 
civil service.54 There is an obvious parallel here with the flaw identified in the 
Argentine political economy in earlier chapters of this thesis. But the PSOE 
government ruled for 14 years and represented a continuation of the political stability 
imposed by force after 1939 and by the will of the populace thereafter. So while in 
Spain as in Argentina, important public posts including the boards of state enterprises 
and credit institutions were populated by cronies and political appointees, the 
continuity of the government and absence of political crisis in Spain prevented a 
fragmentation of policy of the kind characteristic of Argentina. Indeed, Felipe 
Gonzalez was confident in the early 1980s that his government would enjoy 
considerable longevity and spoke in terms of a “25 year governing project”.55 At the 
heart of the Gonzalez regime’s priorities lay the fact that it valued political stability 
over all else.56
Finally, there were participants in the process which were nominally external 
to the hierarchy of power described here, namely capital both domestic and foreign. In 
terms of the former, Spain operated as a form of oligarchy whereby certain groups 
supported the government and acted as tools of economic reform. The clearest 
example of this is when privatised former state concerns retained their monopolies, 
received protection from foreign competition and received considerable subsidies in 
return for supporting the government. The example of Telefonica de Espana is 
outlined below, which though fully privatised by this period, played a key role in 
pursuing a government ambition to nurture Spanish high technology. Financial capital 
was also a favoured group in Gonzalez’s Spain, whereby leading banks would provide 
financial support for government conceived projects in return for tax breaks and
52 Financial Times 13 December 1984 Gonzalez Popularity Survives the U  Turns.
53 El Pais 7 September 1985 Apuntes para una teria del felipismo
54 Financial Times 13 December 1984 Gonzalez Popularity Survives the U  Turns.
55 Ibid.
56 Petras, 1993. pp.97-98
245
continued protection57. Foreign capital, meanwhile, was a lobbying force in the sense 
that investment was encouraged but, was not an equal partner in negotiations with the 
Spanish state in the same way that it became in Argentina in the 1990s. As mentioned, 
a pertinent illustration of this is the ability of the Spanish government to retain control 
over privatised enterprises through retention of the right to appoint senior 
management to firms in “strategic” sectors. Thus there were limits to the ability of 
foreign bidders in privatisations of state concerns in particular industrial sectors, to 
influence the processes of the boardroom.
To highlight the fundamental difference between the two cases as portrayed in 
the two diagrams, both centralised forms of economic decision making centred on a 
powerful executive. Both “presidents” negotiated to a greater or lesser extent with non 
state interests, such as capital and labour. Both systems also relied heavily on 
technocratic economics ministers as architects of economic reform. But, the Spanish 
prime minister retained greater control over the hierarchy he headed and all parties 
were junior in relation to his authority. The Argentine case is marked by the inability 
to fully subordinate non state actors, particularly foreign capital. The following 
section, a narrative account of the period in the context of the hierarchies and 
relationships spelt out here, seeks to illustrate this point further with historical 
evidence taken from archives and contemporary media sources.
Neo-liberal reform in Argentina
Argentina’s presidential elections at the end of 1989 were won by the 
opposition candidate, Carlos Menem of the Peronist Partido Justicialista. His populist 
campaign had been true to the political traditions of his party and the new regime’s 
initial attempts at stabilisation had a predictably heterodox nature.
“When Carlos Saul Menem of the Peronist Party was elected President in 1989, 
Argentines and the international business community prepared for the worst,” wrote 
Gary Becker, 1992 Nobel Laureate.58 Indeed, the Justicialist party had blocked most 
of the reforms attempted by the previous administration with awkward voting 
strategies in Congress and organisation of strikes through mass mobilisation of 
Peronist unions. It was an unlikely start, therefore, to a period that fundamentally
57 Echemendy, 2004, p.625
58 Becker, G. ‘Argentina’s Welcome Turn Toward the Open Road’, Business Week, No.3319, May 17 
1993, p.22
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transformed the structure of the Argentine economy, breaking with many decades of 
tradition in ways that not even the most zealous economic liberals of the late 1970s 
had dared to attempt.
Menem then pledged to implement reform based on a new economic ideology 
at odds with his party’s statist heritage. The state was to go into retreat from the 
economy by way of a thorough programme of privatisation. Fiscal policy was to be 
overhauled and tax collection bolstered, while protectionism was to be all but 
abandoned in an effort to make Argentina more market friendly. The legal foundation 
to the new order was the Ley de Reforma del Estado, which declared all state 
institutions to be in ‘a state of emergency’. This included public services, the public 
administration, state-owned enterprises, public limited companies with majority state 
ownership, publicly owned banks and other financial institutions.59 The legislation 
authorised the executive to intervene in any such organisation and prepare it for 
imminent privatisation. The only state entities exempted were the national 
universities.60 Thus, an appointed trustee was empowered to restructure the state 
institution by splitting it into divisions for sale, merging it with other firms or in less 
promising cases, liquidation.61 In order to proceed, the law stipulated that the firms 
must first be declared “subject to privatisation” by the executive and approved as such 
by Congress. Meddling with the sacred cows of Argentine statism and national 
ownership had inauspicious historical precedents which posed serious challenges to 
presidents such as Frondizi. Thus as a sweetener, and as a means to neutralise any 
potential labour opposition, the law included a ‘Participatory Ownership Programme’ 
whereby employees of the privatised concerns were to be granted special corporate 
bonds yielding a share of company profits. Individual entitlement to these bonds was 
determined by such factors as age and length of service.62 Meanwhile, the law 
included a clause on job protection and assured that employees’ pension plans would 
not be affected.
There was no shortage of ideological justification for this move. Menem 
subscribed to the argument gaining international popularity at the time, the so called 
Washington Consensus that government should desist from meddling in a country’s 
production and price structure so that the benign effects of market competitiveness
59 Ley 23,696, De la Emergencia Administrativa, Articulo 1°
60 Ibid, Articulo 2°
61 Ibid, Articulo 7°
62 Ibid, Articulo 29
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can work their magic.63 This should mould a new industrial structure that runs 
efficiently and produces competitively priced and high quality goods and services 
while posting ever increasing profits. In the words of Domingo Cavallo, the best 
known of the four economics ministers to serve under Menem, the transfer of 
entrepreneurial activity from the public to the private sector would increase 
efficiency. It would be a new industrial policy that represented a ‘change in the rules 
of the game’ whereby Argentina’s abundant resources would be mobilised and the 
economy would be opened to deeper partnership with neighbouring Brazil and the 
wider world.64
However, while this type of market-oriented argument was being taken 
seriously across Latin America and elsewhere, what distinguished the Argentine 
experience as overseen by Menem was its rapidity and the extent to which it was 
applied.65 Under the new legislation, roughly 90 per cent of Argentina’s state-owned 
enterprises were nominated as targets for privatisation. This did not just include 
public services and the state industries, but also significant parts of the financial sector 
in which the government had a long standing stake.66 The first wave of privatisations 
from 1990 to 1991 covered the telecommunications industry, air transport, the state’s 
share holdings in the petrochemical industry, much of the oil industry, 30 per cent of 
the government’s share in the national highways and 5000km of national railways. A 
second wave between 1992 and 1993 included the energy sector and the generation 
and distribution of electrical power, the transport and distribution of natural gas, the 
national water and sanitation company, the two state-owned steel giants, SOMISA 
and Altos Homos Zapla, and much of what remained of the oil industry including 
refineries, pipelines and the tanker fleet. The long standing pillar of statist oil policy, 
YPF was itself partly privatised.
Therein lies another motivation behind the totality of the privatisation policy 
that is more pragmatic than ideological. By selling off such politically sensitive 
‘strategic’ sectors as telecommunications, electrical power, public transport and the 
oil industry, Menem was sending a ‘loud’ signal to potential foreign investors and 
creditors that they were serious about economic reform. Selling off such sensitive
63 Williamson J. ‘Democracy and the Washington Consensus’ World Development Vol.21 (8), 1993
64 Cavallo, D. Volver a Crecer, Buenos Aires, 1991.
65 See: Azpiazu and Vispo, ‘Some Lessons o f the Argentine Privatisation Process’, CEPAL Review, 
Vol.54, Dec. 1994.
66 Ley 23,696, Anexo 1
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industries as banks, transport, electricity and other utilities would demonstrate this 
commitment. “In short, governments used privatisation quite successfully to bolster 
their short run cash flows and to gain credibility for their new economic strategies,” 
writes one commentator.67
Not surprisingly, such a far reaching sale of government assets will have a 
positive impact on the state’s balance sheet and Argentina’s accounts looked healthier
ththan they had since the export boom of the early 20 Century. Clearly the motives for 
the sell-off went beyond ideology and reflected the urgency of resolving a profound 
macroeconomic crisis. Privatisation was thus a quick way to raise money in the face 
of excessive public debt while eliminating transfers of funds from the Treasury to 
cumbersome, loss-making enterprises. Furthermore, foreign interest in the sell-offs 
reversed a trend that had lasted for two decades, namely the net transfer of capital out
iTO
of Argentina. However, this was necessarily a one off fiscal impact and while 
Menem might have been the toast of free market economists around the world in the 
early 1990s, a dependency on windfalls is not evidence of long-term stability.
Nevertheless, the windfall was enough to create the fiscal stability necessary 
for the second pillar of the new order, namely the Convertibility Plan designed by the 
new economics minister, Domingo Cavallo and launched in June 1991.69 Under the 
new policy, the Central Bank was obliged to back up a fixed exchange rate by 
agreeing to use it in converting national currency into foreign currency, while 
calibrating the monetary base to the level of foreign currency assets. For every peso in 
circulation, there had to be a dollar in reserve. As dollars and pesos were 
interchangeable, this was effectively a dual currency.
“We followed the typical rules of a currency board but did not make the use of the 
currency compulsory, nor did we make it exclusive. Instead, we made it compete with 
other currencies.” Cavallo wrote.70
This use of a dual currency, Cavallo argued, meant Argentines (and investors) 
could be sure that the state would never print money in order to benefit from an 
inflation tax because, should this occur, investors could shift to the other currency.
67 Ramamurti, R ‘The New Frontier o f  Privatisation ' in: Ravi Ramamurti (ed.) 'Privatising 
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Baltimore, 1996, p. 1
68 Azpiazu and Vispo, 1994, p. 132
69 See: Ley 23,928/1991, Ley de Desindexacion y  Convertibilidad del Austral
70 Cavallo, D. ‘Policymakers Roundtable’, Journal o f  Banking and Finance, Vol.23, 1999, p. 1537
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While a currency board is not strictly speaking a currency peg, the relationship to the 
dollar under the Convertibility Plan meant the credibility of the dollar was reflected in 
greater credibility for the peso. This assumption, of course, rested on faith that the 
currency board would not be dismantled by a disgruntled later regime.
A further tranche of the new regime was the most concerted attempt yet to 
dismantle Argentina’s system of economic protectionism. A new Decree, was issued 
to complement the existing legislation implemented by Martinez de Hoz two decades
71earlier. Foreign investors were to enjoy the same constitutional rights as national
* 79investors and all barriers to repatriation of profits and revenues were lifted.
Ostensibly, the new order was a success and in the eyes of many, Argentina 
had finally and irreversibly turned a comer. Inflation, which had run at an annual rate 
of 5000 per cent in 198973 fell to less than 4 per cent by 1994.74 This much touted 
defeat of hyperinflation persuaded foreign investors, and indeed Argentine capitalists 
who had spirited their funds elsewhere, that the economy was suitably stable and net 
capital inflows reached US$30 billion between 1991 and 1993.75 The economy also 
started to grow at impressive rates with GDP increasing by an average of 6 per cent 
per annum between 1991 and 1998. But the greatest vindication for Menem, Cavallo 
and their tecnicos was the apparent dynamism displayed by the newly privatised 
enterprises. Levels of production by the infrastructural utilities, namely electricity, 
gas, water, transport and communications grew at an average annual rate of 7 per cent 
between 1990 and 1998, one percentage point faster than GDP growth.76
“We have found the way to cure the disease that afflicted our country for 
decades: the persistent high inflation that finally led us into hyperinflation,” wrote 
Domingo Cavallo in 1999.77
But this cure for inflation came at a cost. Firstly, the rate of inflation was still 
higher than that in most developed countries which in the early 1990s were mired in 
recession. Thus the peso was effectively overvalued compared with the dollar,
71 Decreto 1853/1993
72 Ibid, Articulo 5.
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harming the trade balance. In effect, this proved to be a catch 22 whereby Cavallo’s 
pivotal convertibility depended on a slowing flow of foreign reserves. Unfortunately, 
the available policy instruments were limited since a devaluation would have 
undermined the still fragile credibility of Cavallo and his policies. In 1997, Jeffrey 
Sachs, Harvard economist and veteran adviser to Latin American governments 
warned Argentine bankers that Argentina’s recovery was not sustainable without a 
higher rate of export growth.
“If I were an official in a country so dependent on foreign capital I should be 
worrying night and day about this,” he said.78
Effectively, the hard won macroeconomic stability associated with the 
Convertibility Plan was threatened by a lack of foreign exchange. The privatisation 
programme brought in large quantities of new reserves, as described above, but this 
was a finite source, and towards the end of the decade concerns were raised about the 
imminence of speculative attack on the currency and whether the regime was 
sustainable.
The most stinging criticism of the New Economic Model in Argentina was 
that hyperinflation had been replaced with hyperunemployment as a consequence of 
the substitution under the new regime of labour for capital.79 The initial economic 
success following implementation of the Convertibility Plan was accompanied by 
employment growth but unemployment subsequently rose sharply to reach 18.6 per 
cent of the workforce by May 1995 This was all the more pronounced in an economy 
that until 1990 had not exceeded an unemployment rate of 7 per cent.80 It was blamed 
in part by the World Bank on the failure of wages to adjust to labour market 
conditions on account of “institutional constraints”. In particular, restrictions on 
temporary or fixed term contracts, excessive severance payments, centralised 
collective bargaining and agreements negotiated under previous governments 
“embedded in legislation” that discouraged renegotiation of collective bargaining
Q 1
agreements. The World Bank and others called for greater labour flexibility on the
78 Quoted in the Financial Times, July 4, 1997, p.5, ‘Export Boost Urged on Argentina’,
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basis that mobility of workers was hampered because of high hiring costs and 
severance payments. The proposed solution was labour reform to remove restrictions 
on setting wages for employers.
The government’s relationship with labour was largely defined by 
unemployment but also with an assault on union power early in Menem’s first term of 
office. Menem ordered military communications experts to man telephone exchanges 
when striking employees threatened to block the sale of public telecom monopoly. 
Perhaps more symbolic of the assault on union power was the government’s heavy 
handed and determined response to a rail workers’ strike in February 1991 in protest 
at a proposed privatisation of the network which paralysed services for more than a 
month. The railwaymen, were demanding in addition, a 200 per cent pay increase at
jn
state-owned Ferrocarriles Argentinos. Cavallo, meanwhile, claimed the railways 
were running a US$40 million deficit per month of which US$30 million comprised 
the wage bill.84
The government used a law limiting the right to strike against a public utility
DC
immediately to declare the strike illegal.
“I believe the railway workers are employed with a public service and the entire 
community is dependent on its services for which reason we are unfortunately going 
to have to take tough action”, Cavallo pronounced to the press.
The government then intervened in the main railroad union La Fratemidad 
following the methods of the Proceso government by charging the Labour Ministry to 
appoint an intervenor. The union leadership reacted to this by refusing to allow the 
government appointee access to its headquarters, forcing him to meet trade unionists 
in a neighbouring (union-owned) hotel.87 Menem said the union had to be suppressed
00
because it was displaying contempt for the law and the Constitution. Menem also 
ordered police to accompany conductors who ignored the strike, authorized military 
vehicles and the presidential jet Tango 1 to bring thousands of Buenos Aires' residents
82 Pessino, 1995; IBRD Report No. 15402-AR Argentina: The Convertibility Plan, Assessment and 
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home from summer vacation spots along the Atlantic coast. In addition, the 
government contracted five private bus companies to run a service between Buenos 
Aires and the city of Cordoba at a reduced fare, ostensibly rallying public sympathy.90 
The stoppage was the first serious challenge to Menem’s invocation of the anti-strike 
law. He even threatened to use military force to break the strike.
Menem and Cavallo were acting against the ideals of the ruling Peronist party and 
drew strong criticism from traditional factions in the Congress but all the politicians 
were able to do was call for the government to negotiate compromise.91 Indeed, 
Menem made a point of bypassing Congress as much as possible by legislating 
through presidential decree, specifically on account of the opposition he was likely to 
meet.92 Thus Menem reformed through a judicialisation of political process, 
evidenced both through his rule by decree and use of legal means to declare 
opposition illegal and have enterprises slated for privatisation declared in a state of 
“emergency.”93
An ultimate climbdown by the rail union was an important boost to the 
government’s power to confront not only other unions, but all economic interest 
associations that threatened to hinder policy reform. Shortly after the railway dispute, 
haulage drivers struck against a plan to privatise trunk roads and install pay tolls. The 
government dismantled the existing system whereby the state roads agency, Unidad 
Nacional, had given over income from fuel tax to help cover the deficits of the 
national oil monopoly YPF, sanitary works and the railways through the Treasury.
The government in late 1990 carried out a survey of the transport system that revealed 
a road network that was crumbling and in need of urgent renovation. It then hired 
various private construction firms to improve roads in exchange for an ongoing share 
of pay toll revenues. Traditionally, such an overhaul of financing arrangements would 
have been carried out in consultation with the relevant union, in this case the 
Federation of National Road Transport Workers. On this occasion, the union 
leadership was consulted once “after everything was already cooked up”, provoking
89 Associated Press, March 5 1991, Workers Vow to Continue Strike
90 La Nacion March 5 1991, Una empresa con deficit cronico.
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the strike that involved road blockades and numerous statements of refusal to pay the 
new tolls.94 Again, after Menem successfully harnessed public opinion in his favour, 
arguing the truck drivers were acting in their own selfish interests and forcing 
Argentines to live with underfinanced, inadequate roads, the government was 
victorious.95
Continuing the government’s campaign against union power, the Labour 
Ministry ruled that wage indexation was illegal while Menem ordered independent 
audits of corrupt union welfare organisations.96 There was an attempt in July 1991 to 
confront the government by veteran trade unionists, angered by the president’s 
departure from Peronist ideals. The three leaders, Luis Barrionuevo, Saul Ubaldini 
and Lorenzo Miguel, buried their differences to form an anti-government alliance and 
tried to reconstitute Los 62, the Peronist union grouping that had mounted effective 
opposition to assaults on associational power in the past. Barrionuevo was head of 
ANSSAL, a government-run union welfare organisation, and a fervent supporter of 
Menem until he was fired after a bitter round of government infighting. He then 
become a vitriolic critic of the government. Ubaldini, who headed a dissident union 
umbrella organisation, attacked government policies from the outset, but was forced 
onto the defensive after Menem successfully drew a number of unions away from his 
organisation to a pro-government grouping. Miguel, leader of the powerful UOM 
metalworkers' union, had sought accommodation with Menem but became a critic 
following the government's plan to privatise SOMISA, the giant loss-making steel 
mill. He also attracted the support of the oilworkers' union which was campaigning
07against the privatisation of YPF, the government oil company. However, the veteran 
activists were not able to gather enough support to mount a serious challenge to the 
government and remained a marginal force, chiefly because Menem was so adept at a
QO
strategy of divide and rule in nurturing allies.
If organised labour as a long established and highly organised economic 
interest with a history of disruptive action came under early attack from a reforming 
government, other local interests did not find themselves favoured. Rural and business 
elites also eventually engaged in direct confrontation with the Menem-Cavallo
94 Clarin April 14 1991, Que se mueva detras del peaje.
95 Clarin April 14 1991 Menem: jPaguen!
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government. There was support from entrepreneurial and land based elites for 
measures that weakened unions, rolled back the state and introduced private enterprise 
as an important economic variable. But Cavallo’s overhaul of the fiscal system, the 
introduction of new taxes including VAT in addition to trade liberalisation was met 
with elite opposition. Agricultural elites found themselves subject to progressive 
taxation, industrial sectors had to address the challenge of foreign competition in their 
long protected domestic market." But successful and high profile neutralisation of 
union power in the transportation sector which was a traditional stronghold of 
syndical power, was a boon to confrontation of other economic associations. A 
threatened action by agricultural producers in protest at tax rates drew stem rhetoric 
from the government. Cavallo explicitly stated on one occasion that a blockade or 
strike by rural producers would elicit a “similar” response from the government as the 
railway strike, potentially involving mobilisation of the military to ensure delivery of 
food supplies.
“We are all going to have to get used to paying our taxes”, Cavallo said.100 
Business groups, who also found much to cheer about the new regime, similarly 
realised it involved mixed blessings. The attack on corporate subsidies as 
manifestations of the old interventionism, and parallel assaults on tax evasion, 
inefficiency and rent seeking earned Cavallo as many elite enemies as it did friends.101 
Ideologically, organisations such as the ULA which traditionally represents externally 
integrated industries, expressed public approval of Cavallo’s policies. Nevertheless, 
the association questioned the need for the government to liberalise trade to quite the 
extent that it did, pointing out that Argentina had become one of the world’s least 
restrictive economies while developed nations in Western Europe and North America 
maintained a degree of tariff and other controls on imports.102 It also objected to a 
tightening of corporation tax mles and a hiking of the rate to 30 per cent.103 Later, it 
became a vocal critic of delays to the promised labour market liberalisation, which 
was blocked by concessions to Peronist elements in the administration.
The government had a more stable relationship with banking interests for 
whom the euphoria associated with the economy’s new found stability took a long
99 Acuna, 1996 p. 52
100 La Nacion March 13 1991 Cavallo: Habra jirm eza frente a un paro rural
101 Corrales, J. ‘Why Argentines Followed Cavallo’ in Dominguez, J. Technopols. 1997, p.79
102 Union Industrial Argentina, Memoria y  Balance 1991, Buenos Aires 1992, p.6
103 Ibid. P.7
255
time to fade. Menem pursued an alliance with Argentine bankers as financers but also 
collaborators in the campaign to stamp out tax evasion and nurturers of private 
initiative.104
But the issue that united bankers, farmers, industrialists and entrepreneurs and 
strained their relationship with the government was the high cost of credit in the early 
1990s. High interest rates were discouraging investment at a time when continued 
expansion depended heavily on investment and Cavallo was seeking the support of 
private capital. From one perspective, interest rates had fallen significantly as 
inflation subsided, capital flooded into the country and Argentines regained 
confidence in their currency following the successful implementation of the 
Convertibility Plan. Deposits at Argentine banks multiplied throughout Cavallo’s time 
at the Economy Ministry as depositors became increasingly willing to leave their 
money in the bank. Businesses made huge savings as their financial costs shrank and 
the risk of devaluation receded. Interest rates fell to 8 per cent a year by mid 1992, 
compared with 17.5 per cent at the beginning of the year and financial overheads for 
medium sized enterprises halved. Companies were also able to raise money on the 
local and international capital markets with increasing ease and banks were been able 
to raise capital at ever declining rates, allowing them to lower interest rates further.105 
But the benefits were unevenly distributed. Despite the declining cost of credit, 
smaller companies and those based outside greater Buenos Aires, remained saddled 
with higher interest charges because of banks’ aversion to risk given persistently high 
reserve requirements and the aforementioned conservatism regarding attitudes to 
clients who did not own land or property.
After the initial shock of the Convertibility Plan, by 1992 Cavallo had to work 
increasingly hard to convince public opinion that his policies were in the wider 
interest. The more progress made in stabilising the economy, the less prepared people 
were to continue to accept the need for austerity. One distributive impact that the 
government hoped to achieve through privatisation of utilities was a flow of 
investment towards outdated public services hitherto restricted by the financial 
limitations of belonging to the state sector. The result should have been, greater 
efficiency and lower prices for the customer. In practice however, a broad reduction
104 Menem, C. ‘Mensaje del presidente de la nacion’, in: Asociacion de Bancos de la Republica 
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in rates for gas, electricity and so on favoured the wholesale consumer rather than the 
domestic user. So the advantage was weighted heavily in favour of the industrialist 
rather than the urban citizen.106
Cavallo’s response starting in 1992, approximately a year after the 
Convertibility Plan was launched, was to engage in a charm offensive with 
representatives of different interests. This so-called “triangular” campaign targeted 
three social sectors, the elites, the general public and the Peronist rank and file. He 
and his closest advisors in the economy ministry took charge of relations with 
Argentina’s elite thorough appearances in public forums explaining the new policies. 
Menem, the charismatic public figure, took charge of relations with the wider public. 
In this, he was evidently successful as “Menemism” had acquired an appeal to the 
Argentine public to which provincial election results bore testament.107 The weight of 
the president’s charisma and public support was not lost on his political opponents in 
Congress and allowed him to ignore their objections to his policies. A telling example 
of using his popularity as a political tool against those that might attempt to hinder his 
work with Congressional or Constitutional norms, was his threat to put his proposals 
before plebiscites.108 A third front, comprised relations with the old guard of Peronists 
in Congress as the rank and file of Menem’s Justicialist party. Though Congress had 
been repeatedly sidelined, Cavallo offered certain contentious policies as carrots to 
potentially awkward political forces. One such overture was to allow labour 
liberalisation to progress through the legislature, resulting in a serious flaw in 
Cavallo’s economic track record in the eyes of the World Bank: foot dragging over 
promised labour market flexibility.109 Cavallo also established the Secretaria de 
Relaciones Institucionales, a branch within the Ministry of Economy entrusted with 
conducting the minister’s public relations with other branches of government. 
Populated with Peronist civil servants, the secretariat achieved widespread 
endorsement of the reforms though by this stage, unions were considerably weaker 
following the progression of the privatisation programme and the failed strikes of the 
previous year.
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Cavallo’s establishment of a new secretariat of the Economy Ministry to 
conduct his public relations with other, selected branches of public administration was 
part of a broader process of concentration of administrative power. If the Argentine 
civil service was traditionally a battle ground for different factions of civil society, 
with individual economic vested interests “colonising” particular departments to 
capture policy, the Menem-Cavallo partnership sought to wipe out bastions of 
opposition.
Menem took over an insolvent state in 1989 and quickly enacted a series of 
structural reforms that progressively recast the foundations of public finance and 
resulted in concentration of power with the presidency. Privatisation of state 
enterprises was a part of this process. But a parallel reform took place in the 
centralisation of administrative and ministerial power. There was, for example, an 
effort to ease the fiscal deficit by curbing subsidies to industries wishing to locate 
outside the region of Buenos Aires. Industrial promotion of the interior was a policy 
started in earnest during the first Peron presidency. Subsequent regimes continued the 
initiative with their own programmes offering tax breaks and subsidies to 
industrialists willing to open factories away from the capital. By the time Menem was 
elected to office in 1989, there were dozens of such schemes in operation, putting a 
severe strain on government finances and the new president quickly suspended 
subsidy payments. At the same time the provinces lost their tax subsidies. In effect, 
the federal government curbed the powers of provincial authorities to allocate 
subsidies and tax breaks, slowing the rate of approval for new projects to a trickle. 
While this put in order a chaotic system where corruption was endemic and wastage 
rife, it also marked a departure from a long standing commitment to industrialise the 
interior.110
A report produced by the Economy Ministry’s “Subsecretariat of 
Administrative and Technical Coordination” in 1990 identified thorough reform of the 
state as crucial for the recovery of economic growth in Argentina. Its 
recommendations for the short term were a substantial cut in spending, rationalisation 
and simplifications of state structures and dismantling institutions linked to 
interventionist policies of the past. It also sought the strengthening of revenue-raising 
branches of state such as the tax authorities and the customs service. The central
110 See: Sawers, L. and Massacane, R. ‘Structural Reform and Industrial Promotion in Argentina, 
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administration and government ministries were to be subjected to a significant 
efficiency drive, reducing bureaucracy, installing new technology and embarking on 
more meritocratic recruitment practices. The report forecast a reduction in public 
sector employment of approximately 122,000 jobs, including 46,500 from the central 
administration.111
But though this was recommended in the name of an ideology of limiting the 
role of the state, particularly in the economic sphere, the reality was a strengthening of 
executive power relative to other departments of government. The presidency evolved 
into the principal spender of state money, accounting for 14 per cent of the national 
budget. While ministries saw their budgets and powers cut, the Presidency continued 
to bestow ministerial rank to its own secretariats. The World Bank, while repeatedly 
praising Menem and Cavallo’s economic record in government, grew concerned at the 
centralisation of power.
“Since the Presidency is the jurisdiction that most needs reform, the 
government should apply the same principles of downsizing to the Presidency that 
were applied throughout the rest of the public sector”, the Bank said in a 1993 
study.112
The empowerment of secretariats within the presidency to equivalent of 
ministerial level concerned the Bank because it appeared to be flouting constitutional 
law in order to establish a substitute, directly controlled public administration, while 
apparently allowing the formal bureaucracy to wither in the name of neo-liberal 
retreat of the state. The Argentine Constitution mandates the existence of no more 
than 8 ministries, a limit reinforced by the administrative reforms of the early Menem 
presidency. But Menem’s government was establishing de facto ministries within the 
Presidency, as was Cavallo within the Economy Ministry.
In evidence, therefore, is a concentration of both economic and political, 
administrative power to favoured sectors, at the expense of popular sectors that 
conforms to previous historical episodes highlighted in some of the “dependency” 
literature. The charm offensive and establishment of secretariats to engage specific 
interests over economic policy also illustrates a continued bilateral alliance-based
111 Subsecretaria de Coordination Administrativa y Tecnica del Ministerio de Economia. Hacia un 
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emphasis to policymaking, depending on simultaneous alliances with different 
interests.
Protectionist Liberalisation in Spain
In Spain, on taking power in 1982, the PSOE and its new economy minister 
Miguel Boyer faced a formidable task in revitalising a drifting economy and preparing 
the economy for its long coveted accession to the European Community. 
Unemployment stood at 16 per cent of the workforce while the current account deficit 
was close to 6 per cent of Gross National Product. An attempted coup in 1981 by 
reactionary Civil Guard officers had rattled investors and led to rapid capital flight 
and depleted foreign exchange reserves in spite of a healthy tourist sector.113 The 
country’s industrial infrastructure reflected the strategic priorities of the dictatorship 
rather than economic reality and would enjoy scant competitive advantage in open 
competition with other European rivals. In particular, the energy sector was in crisis 
with the main firms heavily indebted by protectionist legislation that had prevented 
their passing on higher energy costs related to the oil shocks of the 1970s to the 
consumer.
Other major industries in such sectors as steel and shipbuilding were mostly 
close to bankruptcy and large firms such as Aluminio Espanol and Rio Tinto 
Explosives, the country’s leading chemicals group, had defaulted on debts. This in 
turn weakened the banking sector, already reeling from mounting bad debt following 
liberal lending to Latin America in previous decades.114
In opposition the Socialists had gained much political capital out of railing 
against the ruling UCD for failing to implement progressive, socially minded policy 
yet within two years, were openly rejecting any idea of putting social priorities ahead 
of economic ones. At the opening in Madrid of the party’s first congress since taking 
power two years earlier prime minister Felipe Gonzalez told delegates that economic 
reform had to take precedence over social policy.
’’Without a sound economic policy there cannot be a serious social 
programme. We were not called on to govern in order to distribute scarcity and 
hunger,” the Prime Minister said.115
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When he came to office in 1982, the Spanish electorate understood Gonzalez’s 
plans to involve a “policy of expansion” placing employment creation as an urgent 
priority to be achieved through government investment which was to be treated as the 
motor of the economy.116
“In the struggle against unemployment we will employ all the methods 
available to us, all our efforts from job creating investment to the modification and 
reduction of working hours and the reform of techniques and sectors and public 
support for contracts for sectors which find themselves in the most difficulty in 
finding employment”, Gonzalez said at his inaugural speech to parliament in 
November 1982.117
But that is not to say Gonzalez masqueraded as a traditional leftist ideologue 
and made no secret of his rejection of Socialist, particularly Marxist values as a viable 
solution for the imbalances in the Spanish economy. Miguel Boyer was explicit from 
his first weeks in office that monetary policy was to be restrictive and earlier electoral
1 1 o
pledges to prioritise expansion over adjustment had been abandoned. Meanwhile, in 
the same speech at the opening of his administration Gonzalez highlighted the issue of 
inflation as an equally urgent economic problem.
“We recognise the harmful repercussions of inflation on savings, investment, 
on the balance of payments or on the value of the currency... Therefore, it is clear that 
inflation requires a policy as firm and energetic as the struggle against unemployment, 
to combat it through the application of a rigorous monetary policy as well as 
employing other available methods, among which, and highly important, responsible 
agreements between the social interests which (in the past) have proved 
indispensable.”, he said.119
In short, Gonzalez heralded a restrictive monetary policy, and thus stated an 
assault on wage growth, but also pledged to persist with the methods of the previous 
administration, namely, wage and price adjustment by agreement with the relevant 
associations. Riding a tide of popularity and public euphoria following his election, 
and the fact that the PSOE drew as much support from business as it did from labour,
116 Recio and Roca 1998 p. 140.
117 Gonzalez, F. Congreso de los Diputados, 30 noviembre de 1982. http://www.la- 
moncloa.es/recursosla moncloa/
118 El Pais 24 November 1982 Miguel Boyer anuncia unapolitico de sacrijicios y  de ajuste de los 
desequilibrios economicos.
119 Gonzalez, Congreso de los Diputados, 30 noviembre de 1982. httD://www.la-moncloa.es/recursosla 
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he could be confident that he would be in a strong bargaining position. At this early 
stage of his administration, the main labour union federation, the UGT was still 
affiliated with the party.120 But though the government was initially in favour of a 
policy of centralised social agreements, taking advantage of the willingness of the 
unions at the time, the real influence of economic interests on the eventual policy was 
negligible.
The most significant such ‘concertaciori’ to illustrate this point was the 
Economic and Social Pact, signed by the unions and the CEOE employers’ 
association. This was the fruit of prolonged negotiation between the government and 
relevant vested interests representing capital and labour and resulted in a Moncloa 
style agreement on wage and price restrictions in addition to greater flexibility in 
hiring arrangements. It represented a cmcial step in labour market liberalisation as it 
allowed for the first time hiring contracts of limited duration and permitted employers 
to hire workers on a part time basis. The unions settled, meanwhile, with the 
establishment of a minimum wage for workers under the age of 18 and believed they 
had protected the restrictions on employers’ ability to dismiss workers. The agreement 
called for below inflation wage increases in 1985 of between 5.5 per cent and 7.5 per 
cent. The CEOE had pressed hard for labour reforms that made it easier to lay off 
workers and had threatened to walk out of the negotiations.121 The government gave 
generous tax advantages to employers and additional social benefits to workers. 
Retirement benefits were raised and unemployment insurance pay was increased to 48 
per cent of the daily wage.122
Though it appeared that all sides had won at least some ground in the wording 
of the final agreement, the government remained the senior partner in the 
negotiations. Crucially, though it had made some concessions to the employers’ and 
labour associations, it reserved the right to modify the agreements by parliamentary, 
legislative process.123 Legislative institutions and processes were clearly more 
important to the government than social concertation, presumably because the 
parliamentary majority held by the PSOE gave the executive tighter control over
120 Redo and Roca 1998 p. 145
121 El Pais 4 October 1984, La exigencia de la CEOE de un mayor facilidad de despido coloca el 
acuerdo social al borde de la ruptura.
122 Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social Acuerdo Economico y  Social 1985-1986 Madrid 1985; El 
Pais 1 October 1984 El gobiemo se reserva la comunicacion de los presupuestos con enmiendas 
parlamentarias, para facilitar el AES
123 El Pais 1 October 1984 El gobiemo....
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policy. This contrasts with the aforementioned Argentine system employed by 
Menem whereby inherently weak political institutions such as the Congress were 
bypassed or ignored in favour of direct negotiations with groups to ensure their 
support for new policy. The PSOE policy of industrial reform also illustrates the 
extent to which the government exercised control throughout its tenure, though the 
period is often identified as one in which the state stepped back from involvement in 
the economy. In fact the PSOE spoke in terms of “regenerating the state in order to 
modernise”.124
Felipe Gonzalez put industrial “reconversion” at the heart of the PSOE’s 
economic policy during the 1980s. The government believed the Spamsh economy 
had never responded appropriately to the international crises of the 1970s and 
adjustment was long overdue. Spanish competitiveness had suffered as a result so the 
government resolved to take affirmative action against inefficient industries to reduce
126
budget deficits, rectify imbalances and bring Spain into line with the rest of Europe. 
The Medium Term Economic Programme for 1983 to 1986 identified an excessive 
rise of real industrial wages, uncontrolled growth of public social spending, and an ill 
advised practice by the Bank of Spain to finance budget deficits. It proposed, 
therefore, to reform domestic economic institutions to facilitate the implementation of 
economic adjustment processes and to improve the functioning of markets. The 
PSOE’s adjustment policy was arguably “the strongest and most sustained effort to 
restore basic equilibrium in the economy any Spanish government had made since the 
beginning of the economic crisis in the (early) 1970s”.127 The industrial reconversion 
“plan” of June 1983, enacted into law in July 1984 targeted 11 sectors for 
restructuring, including steel, shipbuilding, textiles and auto parts. In its projected 
modernisation of sectors with “potential”, it proposed the elimination of nearly 70,000 
jobs from the public industries. The measures were explained to the public in terms 
of a need to adapt industry to the changing economic environment with the basic 
objective of increasing competitiveness. This centred on a wholesale streamlining of
124 El Pais 21 July 1985 Sobre la modernization de Espaha Editorial wirtten by Jose Maria Benegas, 
PSOE member o f parliament for Vizcaya.
125 Comm and Diaz Fuentes La Empresa Publica en Europa, Madrid 2004 p.253
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Spanish industry that focused on the rejuvenation of certain sectors through policy 
favouritism as opposed to outright protectionism, and the disposal from the state 
sector of loss makers. The aspiration was a more orderly pattern of industrial activity
n o
than would have resulted from market forces alone.
Central to the streamlining was the INI which Gonzalez stated had to 
relinquish its past role as “a cemetery for white elephants”.129 Thus a new chairman of 
the INI was appointed in 1983, Luis Carlos Crossier, a career PSOE member who 
immediately implemented an aggressive cost cutting campaign of forced redundancies 
and sell-offs of loss making concerns. This included the sale of the flagship car 
company SEAT to Volkswagen. Simultaneously, steps were taken to cushion 
traditional industries such as energy and steel from the full impact of market forces. 
The INI also played a key leverage role backing the government’s budget planning, in 
terms of managing state spending but particularly in the arena of wage policy. Salary 
ceilings of between one and two points below inflation set during the AES 
negotiations were applied primarily in INI firms and this in turn “buttressed” the 
private sector by driving down overall labour costs.130
Out of the PSOE’s policy of industrial favouritism came the creation of 
“national champions”, large firms in the private sector that prioritised the national 
interest, predominantly in the fields of energy, including utilities and petroleum, 
telecommunications and banking. Some of these organisations were “mixed” in that 
privatised former state monopolies, such as Telefonica were strictly speaking majority 
private owned but effectively managed by the state. National champions were 
essentially a new generation of firms identified for favoured treatment by an 
interventionist government in what was termed under the dictatorship as “strategic” 
sectors. Telefonica was majority controlled by 700,000 private shareholders and 
therefore not part of the public sector but held a monopoly over the Spanish 
telecommunications network. The government retained a 47 per cent stake through 
direct and indirect shareholdings and placed representatives on the board. The 
chairmanship was a political appointment, and after 1982 held by Luis Solana, brother 
of the Culture Minister, and compared to his predecessors an exception in not being a
128 Salmon, K. The Modem Spanish Economy: Transformation and Integration into Europe, London 
1995.p.l 1; Echemendy, 2004
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former Minister himself.
Solana’s strategy was to reinforce Telefonica's role as an instrument of 
industrial policy. Legally the company was not bound by clear obligations to the state 
other than to provide telephone services and pay taxes. Under the appointee Solana, 
however, the company became an instrument of protectionist industrial policy, 
referred to by the government as "an authentic locomotive" for industry. What this 
meant was that Telefonica became a state subsidised monopsony, obliged to purchase 
Spanish made technology and equipment and consequently an effective non tariff 
barrier to foreign competition. This insistence on home produced supplies often meant 
Spain held on to old technology longer than necessary but the PSOE priority was to 
build up advanced technology sectors geared to export in cases where the national 
market was to small to justify the outlay. During the 1980s, Telefonica took over a 
number of Spanish companies in the technology-telecommunications sector, such as 
Amper, and undertook joint ventures with foreign companies or bought minority 
stakes in subsidiaries of foreign companies operating in Spain. Though strictly 
speaking a private concern, therefore, Telefonica was a direct instrument of 
government policy to nurture Spanish technology, and became an enforcer of 
protectionism by dominating the market and purchasing equipment made in Spain.131
The government also retained and in large part nurtured the state sector. At the 
start of the PSOE’s first term of office in 1982, three state companies ranked among 
the top 15 non financial firms in terms of profits. Paradoxically, this number had 
increased to seven state firms by 1992. Meanwhile, in spite of pledges to enact 
wholesale privatisation, by the same year only two firms, Endesa and Repsol had 
floated small percentages of their share capital. This means that the empowerment of 
certain firms took place while they were still state-owned.132 This was achieved in 
part through promotion by asset expansion -  the compulsory state acquisition of 
private firms in the same sector -  and the imposition of regulatory obstacles to foreign 
competitors attempting to acquire Spanish firms. A further method was government 
patronage o f strategic sector consolidation to create giants as a defence against 
possible foreign interest. Early in the 1990s, for example, the government oversaw 
creation of the country’s largest bank by pooling all the state’s financial institutions
131 Financial Times 24 October 1983 Chosen Instrument in Technology Drive
132 Echemendy 2004 p.637.
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under a new holding company.133 Plans to “streamline” the electricity sector also 
involved the creation of giants either through conventional sector mergers, or by way 
of establishing holding companies, particularly in advance of the creation of the 
European single market in 1992. Though the Maastricht treaty did not involve energy 
market harmonisation across the European Community, the Spanish market feared 
liberalisation of the sector would leave their own market open to foreign 
domination.134
“Two thirds of the country’s power is supplied by private companies and the 
government, which controls the price of electricity, knows if it loses its tight grip on 
the industry now it may never recover it,” the Financial Times commented at the time, 
citing Claudio Aranzadi, minister of Industry and Energy.
The PSOE’s principal economic achievement, therefore, is an improvement in 
the national accounts through reduction of financial commitments by privatisation of 
enterprises it considered expendable.135 But by reducing its financial commitment to 
former state owned enterprises, it did not relinquish total control over key Spanish 
companies and continued to play an active role and influence the management of 
firms from sectors that broadly corresponded with the Franco regime’s list of 
‘strategic’ interests such as transportation, energy and finance.
This policy of favouritist protectionism has been labelled elitist, the result of
networks of influence between the highest political authority and powerful sectors of
the bourgeoisie representing financial capital and energy interests in particular. The
neglect of manufacturing, consequently implies a relative weakness of capitalists
associated with this particular sector of the economy, hence the sale of the former
1 ^national champion in automobiles, Seat, to Volkswagen of Germany. This begs the 
question, therefore, of whether the PSOE government alienated broader business 
interests in its selective favouritism.
The PSOE government’s economic strategy is commonly perceived as 
characterised by an emphasis on rapid economic growth over distribution of social 
benefits that pleased business executives more than workers. An unemployment rate 
in excess of 20 per cent is the most compelling evidence to support this view. Indeed
133 Financial Times, 26 April 1991, Spain Poised to Establish Leading Bank.
134 Fianncial Times 24 April 1991, Spanish Utilities Propose $5 bln Power Merger
135 Comin and Diaz Fuentes, La empresa publica en Europa, Madrid 2004 p.254
136 Echemendy 2004; Petras 1993.
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the view that the government’s policy emphasis was fundamentally pro business and 
anti labour presented the PSOE’s opponents with considerable political capital and 
aided a regrouping of the left throughout the 1980s, with the United Left/Izquierda 
Unida coalition permitting the Communist Party to present a new face by 
incorporating disenchanted Socialists. The conservative Popular Party, which for 
years laboured with the difficulty of having a former Franco minister as its 
figurehead, under the direction of a new leader Jose Maria Aznar, was able to capture 
an increasing proportion of the middle class vote during the second half of the 
1980s.137 The decimation of the PSOE’s electoral majority in parliament appears to 
track a disillusionment of the middle class. In 1982, the party won 202 seats in 
parliament. Following elections in 1986, this was reduced to 184. In 1989, this 
declined further to 176 seats, the minimum necessary to control the 350 member 
Parliament.138 But does this reflect the loss of entrepreneurial support for a 
government that neglected its constituencies in favour of clientelist links with specific 
elites? The view expressed here is that business remained supportive of the PSOE 
because of a persistence of belief that the party represented its best interests, in part 
because of an absence of alternatives, but also because of an illusion of incorporation 
of entrepreneurial interests in policymaking. The most important employers’ 
association, the CEOE was a participant in negotiations over wage and price policy 
during the early period of the Felipe Gonzalez government and used these talks to 
press for more flexible labour laws. But employers’ real power and influence was 
limited and the government’s priority was industrial reform in specific sectors and it 
pursued an oligarchic style of governance. Thus the experience fits neatly into the 
“crony capitalism” model elaborated by Stephen Haber.139
The Spanish political elite of the time did indeed appear to pursue an 
oligarchic structure to the political economy and even established overtly nepotistic 
relations with certain sectors. By the late 1980s, for example, selected families had 
come to dominate both the central administration while simultaneously boasting 
dynastic ties with certain enterprises closely tied to economic policy. Among the best 
known such families at the time were the Solanas, virtually a national institution in 
itself. Javier Solana, later to become director general of Nato and European
137 New York Times 31 October 1989, The Spanish Victory. A Mandate fo r  the Socialists
138 New York Times 31 October 1989, The Spanish Victory. A Mandate fo r  the Socialists
139 Haber, S. The Political Economy o f  Crony Capitalism, Stanford, 1999.
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Commissioner, was education minister under Felipe Gonzalez while his brother Luis, 
as mentioned above, was chairman of Telefonica. Luis’ wife Leonor Perez, 
meanwhile, was a senior board member of Mercado Puerta de Toledo SA which 
operated the most important wholesale food markets in Madrid under contract from 
the government. Another Solana brother was managing director of Recintos Feriales 
de Madrid which operated trade fairs and conferences under contract from the city 
authorities. Other dynasties of blue blooded PSOE pedigree included the Yanez- 
Bamuevo and Fernandez Ordonez families, who boasted cabinet ministers senior 
legal officials as well as influential industrialists among their members.140
Such oligarchs cannot be taken as representative of the role of broader 
concepts such as a bourgeoisie or business interests. For the CEOE, the principal 
policy issue in the early years of the PSOE period was labour reform, particularly 
regarding ease of dismissal. In this area, employers saw eye to eye with the 
government which was set upon labour market liberalisation as a form of structural 
adjustment which would strike at the heart of an economic crisis blamed on rigidities 
inherited from misguided past regimes.141 The planners at the economy ministry 
regarded a low level of business confidence and a historic Spanish scarcity of capital 
as symptoms of a structural malaise. But at the same time, entrepreneurs and 
employers were not favoured by the government which sought to prevent employers 
raising prices in response to higher wage demands.142 The AES pact of 1983-1984 
gave the impression of a CEOE actively involved in the formulation of policies 
achieved by Concertacion. Indeed, the most fundamental disagreements in the 
negotiations were predictably between the CEOE and the UGT socialist union over 
labour and wage policy. This had the effect of portraying Felipe Gonzalez as an 
arbitrator between opposing interests and gave the impression to the public that the 
government had achieved a compromise between self interested groups for the benefit 
of the wider society.143
140 El Pais 17 October 1988 Uno mas no importa.
141 Bilbao, A. ‘Trabajadores, gestion economico y crisis sindical’ in: Miguelez and Prieto, Las 
relaciones laborales en Espaha.
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It became clear, however, that the extent to which the government considered 
itself constrained by the pact was limited. By late 1985, a year after the pact was 
signed, the government had unilaterally adjusted policies in a way that represented an 
abandonment of its commitments under the AES which was most damaging to the 
CEOE. Of particular irritation to the employers’ association was adjustment of 
economic growth targets 3 per cent for 1985 and 3.5 per cent in 1986, and for an 
inflation rate of 7 per cent and 6 per cent. The government revised these objectives to 
1.9 per cent growth and 7.9 per cent inflation for 1985 without consulting the 
associations and the CEOE subsequently threatened to pull out of its commitments on 
investment incentives, public spending, youth and part time employment, training and 
the setting up of a solidarity fund for jobs made as part of the AES pact.144
The CEOE was unsuccessful in gaining greater labour flexibility that would be 
to the benefit of small and medium sized employers. In spite of pledges by the 
government, it remained in practice virtually impossible to enforce redundancies 
without reaching an agreement with the union confederations. In its wrangling over 
ease of dismissal, the CEOE failed to co-opt the government as an effective ally. 
Labour law inflexibility was far more of a hindrance to smaller scale operations 
because state enterprises in the process of partial or full privatisation were better able 
to absorb the expense of the existing system.
The procedure for redundancies, excepting the case of bankruptcy, was that the 
company presented an Expediente de Regulation de Empleo145 document to workers’ 
representatives and sent a copy to The Labour Ministry. The company and unions 
then had 30 days to negotiate. If they reached agreement, they informed the Labour 
Ministry, which had 15 days to reply. If it did not reply, the agreement would stand. 
On the other hand, if there is no agreement, the company could not go ahead without 
the authorities' express approval. The authorities were supposed to decide within 30 
days but in practice rarely did.
The government, in pursuit of its Industrial Reconversion programme, adopted the 
practice of suspending workers’ contracts instead of terminating them. As the 
employer had to continue paying social security charges for the workers concerned, 
this loophole was beyond the means of all but the largest firms but not enough of a
144 Financial Times 1 August 1985 Spain’s Employers Threaten to Quit Economic Pact.
145 Employment Adjustment File
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barrier to the government’s industrial reform programme to prevent a steady 
acceleration of plant closures and redundancies.146
It is misleading, therefore, to characterise the PSOE governments of the 1980s 
as pro business in the broad sense because the entrepreneurial class did not enjoy 
favourable treatment or disproportionate influence on the policymaking process. A 
common complaint expressed by the CEOE was that the private sector was in fact 
suffering discrimination in the distribution of capital while the state sector, and the 
privatised concerns, enjoyed the lion’s share. New finance for the private sector from 
all sources between mid 1983 and mid 1984 was more than 40 per cent down on the 
previous 12 months. This fall was accompanied by a rise of more than 100 per cent in 
new finance to the public sector.147
It appears the groups to benefit most from economic policy and wield the most 
influence on policy were industrial and financial capital, to the exclusion of 
manufacturing capital, as observed by Echemendy, and private enterprise. But though 
the CEOE frequently aired their frustrations at capital scarcity, delays in labour 
reform, restrictions on price rises and union power, the PSOE continued to attract a 
considerable degree of support from the entrepreneurial class as indicated in the 
composition of delegates at the party’s annual congresses. Much of the CEOE’s 
frustration was directed at the unions, allowing the government, particularly Felipe 
Gonzalez who took a personal, active role in wage and price negotiations, to present 
itself as the arbitrator.
The relationship with labour, however, was yet more complex because of the 
corporatist legacy of a socialist trade union confederation affiliated with the PSOE, 
the UGT, alongside a rival, communist collective, the CCOO. Based on this dynamic, 
the PSOE was initially in favour of engaging labour over wage policy through the 
methods of concertation employed by the UCD in the late 1970s, continuing the 
tradition of the Moncloa pacts. However, when agreement was not reached, the 
government continued to influence wage negotiations in other ways. Civil servants’ 
salaries and the minimum wage, for example, were fixed unilaterally and the 
government instituted campaigns in the media before collective bargaining began in
146 Financial Times 20 January 1986 Lack o f  Flexibility Proves Expensive
147 Financial Times 17 August 1984, State Sector Hungry fo r  New Cash
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earnest. The executive would leak to the press the acceptable wage rises, threatening 
to institute more restrictive monetary policy if its advice was not followed, so that by 
the time negotiations started, labour representatives were intimidated into conceding 
much that the government wanted.148
However, as the 1980s progressed, the UGT leadership increasingly perceived the 
party as not seriously committed to a corporatist strategy of centralised agreements 
with the union through a negotiation of equals. The dynamic of negotiations for 
accords such as the AES was that the union was invited to support measures 
previously decided by the government. If the support was not given, the government 
would accuse the union of defending selfish interests, the interests of employed 
workers against the interests of unemployed people.149 This strategy is reminiscent of 
the Falange’s assertion during the 1940s that class based associations are “unnatural” 
because of their narrow scope of representation according to specific economic 
interests. This was used to justify the establishment of “vertical” corporatist entities 
affiliated with the state. Whereas the Franco administration had demonised unions as 
harmful to the social order, the PSOE government of Felipe Gonzalez demonised 
them as harmful to the economic order.150
The position of the unions during the PSOE era, therefore, was that they retained 
their legal status but found themselves increasingly marginalised with the government 
implicitly blaming them for economic crisis. Intransigence on the part of the 
syndicates, the government argued, had resulted in “inappropriate” real wage growth 
since the 1970s. Wage policy, because of the “selfish” demands of the unions, had not 
been addressed which had a highly negative effect on competitiveness of Spanish 
goods and services. Unions’ refusal to allow workers to assume a loss of income 
associated with rising inflation, and therefore maintaining wage demands, was at the 
heart of wage-price spirals.151 Attention had focused on wages when it should have 
concentrated on savings rates and investment which were low because of a lack of 
business confidence related to high inflation. Investment was dependent on profit 
which in turn relied on lower wage costs. The unions, therefore, were at the root of 
Spanish economic difficulties and preventing its march forward to modernisation and
148 Recio and Roca 1998 p. 145
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membership of the European Community.152 The PSOE’s economic team maintained 
an unswerving belief that wages were the primary factor driving inflation and that the 
demands of unions represented the central threat to the success of its economic 
programme.153
The UGT was the more tolerant of the two principal union confederations towards 
the government’s distancing of itself from organised labour. In the signing of the 
AES, for example, the heads of particular unions within the UGT, such as 
construction workers, expressed disquiet about the uneven way in which the 
agreement was negotiated, giving too much ground to the government. Objections 
were strongest regarding the government’s attempts to allow freedom of dismissal to 
employers, more than limits on wage rises. But though senior members of the 
federation openly expressed disquiet, they never suggested they would not sign the
154agreement.
The CCOO was less compliant with its secretary general Marcelino Camacho 
dismissing aspects of the agreement as “unconstitutional” and refusing to sign.155 Yet 
within the overall decline of union power throughout the period, the diminishing of 
the CCOO’s influence had been yet more acute. By the beginning of the 1980s, it had 
already become a relative irrelevance as a credible representative force and had seen 
itself eclipsed by the UGT.
But as the government’s first term of office progressed, the UGT also started to 
engage the PSOE economic policies with greater vigour and led to the abandonment 
of even a fa?ade of consensual wage and price setting. Having agreed to cumulative 
real wage losses of more than 1 per cent in 1985 and 1986 by linking wage 
agreements to government inflation targets that were overshot, the UGT in 
negotiations in 1987 insisted on an upper wage range limit two points above the 
government’s conservative inflation calculation. The UGT leadership was also 
disillusioned by the fact that the government refused to comply with a 1984 promise 
to expand the unemployment coverage rate from 32 per cent to 48 per cent of 
registered unemployed and to the fact that employers had failed to on earlier
152 Bilbao, A. ‘Trabajadores, gestion economico y crisis sindicaF in: Migueles and Prieto, Las 
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negotiated commitments to raise wages in line with increasing productivity at 
firms.156 The government was not prepared to concede to any of the more aggressive
157demands and walked away from the negotiations without an accord.
The UGT’s leader Nicolas Redondo finally resigned his seat in Parliament in 1987, 
having been the only PSOE deputy to defy the party whip since the 1982 elections, 
marking the final divorce of union confederation and socialist party that had existed 
since the Nineteenth Century. In fact, Redondo’s dissent was a rare example of PSOE 
disunity in an era characterised by high levels of centralised discipline.
Shortly afterwards came a rare moment of Spanish union unity, when the 
CCOO and UGT collaborated to organise a successful general strike on 14 December 
1988 and gained some minor concessions on employment law. But the incident was 
an exception, and most strikers and protesters during the strike were not in fact union 
members but members of the public who felt compelled to stage a protest against high 
unemployment and other economic issues. The extent of unity both between the two 
union confederations and within them is also deceptive, as many senior UGT 
members were opposed to the strike. On 1 December, the UGT suspended eight 
senior representatives of the agricultural workers’ union and a day later, nine 
executives from the chemical workers’ union for publicly stating opposition to the 
strike. Organisers of the strike accused the government of attempting to undermine 
the UGT by encouraging its senior members to express their opposition to the action 
and highlight support for the government.158
An accepted view is that the institutional dependence of the UGT on the PSOE 
led the government to default repeatedly on promises made to the union in its zeal to 
implement neo liberal reform. The breakdown in their relationship ultimately doomed 
the success of PSOE policies. Since the government' economic strategy hinged on the 
cooperation of the unions, this breakdown led to the ultimate discrediting of the 
PSOE’s economic record, most conspicuously in its record of high unemployment, 
and electoral defeat in 1996.759 The PSOE’s split from its former labour union affiliate
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and ally is thus presented as a lesson for other social democratic parties with their 
origins in syndicalist movements. In fact, the PSOE retained working class support to 
a greater extent than it is credited with and its 13 years in power are testament to this. 
Support was channelled through the party system rather than through the more archaic 
network of labour syndicates and this reflects the consolidation of a neo corporatist 
party and the continued weakness of interest groups in Spain. The government 
insisted throughout the industrial reconversion programme, that its policies had halted 
the rise in unemployment if not reversed the trend, and made repeated pledges to 
reduce the figures, holding up evidence of economic recovery such as falling inflation 
or rising GDP as proof of imminent increases in employment.160
Electoral support for the PSOE among workers, as opposed to entrepreneurial 
groups, remained relatively robust throughout the 1980s, and was weaker among the 
middle classes. The Socialist vote among blue collar workers in industry and services 
dropped from 50 per cent in 1982 to 40 per cent in 1993, but rose from 26 per cent to 
29 per cent among small farmers and from 41 to 43 per cent among agricultural 
labourers. The middle class vote simultaneously dropped from 42 per cent in 1982 to 
17 per cent in 1993. This suggests that the image of the PSOE as an example of 
socialism without workers is not accurate.161
Unions remained inherently weak in relation to established political parties in 
Spain and had little real influence over economic policy. The tradition of negotiated 
settlement dated from the mid 1970s when they were used as a tool for political rather 
than directly economic strategy, to safeguard democracy at a time of political and 
economic instability. While the CCOO had existed as an effective opposition force 
during the Franco dictatorship that had harnessed the institutional structure of the 
corporatist state, and the UGT had existed, legally or clandestinely since the 
nineteenth century, neither could boast deeply ingrained institutional traditions in the
1671980s. They had only a short history of democratic participation and were eclipsed 
by the success of a mass party to define itself as a legitimate representative of social 
interests in pursuit of the wider benefit of Spain.
160 PSOE, Equipo de Documentation Politico. Un aho para la esperanza. 365 dias de gobiemo  
socialista, Madrid 1983. p.43
161 Javier Astudillo Ruiz, ‘Without Unions, but Socialist: the Spanish Socialist Party and its Divorce 
from its Union Confederation 1982-1996, Politics and Society Vol.29 (2) June 2001, p.278
162 Hamman, K. ‘Spanish Unions: Institucional Legacy and Responsiveness to Economic and Industrial 
Change’ Industrial and Labor Relations Review Vol.51 (3) April 1998 p.440
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CONCLUSION
To summarise both experiences, therefore, though they were concerned with 
similar goals, namely reforming a statist economic model regarded as archaic and at 
the root of recurrent crises, there was a profound difference in structures of decision 
making. Though, arguably, both examples were characterised by confrontation with 
certain interests and favouring of others, the Spanish case is marked by a more 
successful attempt to portray itself as in the broadest possible interest. Both sets of 
reforms are frequently criticised for their record on mass unemployment, 
concentration of wealth and perpetuation of oligarchic networks. They are both 
repeatedly applied the label “neo-liberal” to summarise their priorities and reasoning. 
But the Spanish case, evidences a continuation of the centralised, disciplined 
hierarchy of decision making illustrated in the two previous parts of this thesis as 
during the period under scrutiny here. Furthermore, the Spanish government 
consolidated the model further through the continued weakening of labour as an 
influential associational interest.
In Argentina, Carlos Menem introduced reforms by presidential decree, declaring 
the situation to be an emergency and resorting to legal means to legitimise some 
unconstitutional and undemocratic decision making. The early phase of policymaking, 
that which saw the first wave of mass privatisation, was one of judicialisation of 
political authority, therefore. Labour disputes were tackled with threats to declare 
martial law, use the military as muscle and mass sackings. A highly charismatic 
personalistic leadership embarked on public relations campaigns to marginalise 
economic interests which did not conform. Cavallo, as architect of the economic 
programme, as outlined above, also embarked on a charm offensive to woo interest 
groups and indeed established a secretariat within the economics ministry to liaise 
with interest groups.
Clearly there was more to the Menem-Cavallo reform package than privatisation, 
but the selling off of state concerns best illustrates the extent to which the period can 
be characterised by a distribution of favours through empowerment of a particular 
interest group. Concentration of wealth and power is well documented in existing 
literature, as is the empowerment of foreign capital to heights not seen since the early 
twentieth century. But the decline in popular power through judicial means is less so. 
Judicial tools were used to neutralise labour opposition and privatisation, effectively 
by legal decree, destroyed the natural habitat of the union confederations, as workers
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now had to engage the management of foreign multinationals rather than 
representatives of government or the executive itself. While this may be interpreted 
by some as a victory, or at least a cyclical upturn in the fortunes of capital against 
labour, the point of this study is to emphasise the continued lack of a credible set of 
representative state institutions in the Argentine political economy. The system 
whereby the executive, and sometimes a disproportionately powerful economics 
minister, negotiates directly with economic interests continues, and the most 
conspicuous development at the end of the 1990s, was the empowerment of foreign 
capital as a potent non state influence on policymaking for the future.
In Spain, the PSOE government of the 1980s undertook difficult reforms that 
in some respects dismantled the Spanish industrial legacy and altered the national 
capitalism by liberalising labour law and making a concerted attack on real wages and 
price growth. But the structure of economic policy making retained its core features 
that are highlighted in the two previous sub sections of this thesis, namely a 
centralised, highly disciplined state hierarchy, in this case under the guise of a 
political party system, that claims a monopoly of representation. A rival means of 
representation, associations to promote the priorities of specific economic interests 
such as labour unions or employers’ associations, acted as little more than ideological 
think tanks. They were consulted during the early stage of the Socialist tenure of the 
Spanish economy after 1982 to negotiate wage, price and dismissal policy, but if their 
co-operation was not forthcoming, the government could ignore them safe in the 
knowledge that they were powerless to react in a meaningful way. Labour unions in 
particular were presented implicitly as an archaic blemish on an efficient democratic 
state that needed to modernise and join the European Community. The PSOE was 
successful in persuading Spaniards it held their interests at heart and was acting for 
the greater good. The party remained in power for three terms, while the two main 
union confederations saw membership decline and their influence wane. The CEOE, 
also held limited ability to influence policy. The events described in this section are 
testament to the success of the Spanish party system as a neo-corporatist web of 
representation, holding mass appeal and convincing the populace of its legitimacy.
Like the Franco regime before it, the party, representing all regions and 
economic groups, formulated policy with an arbitrating executive whose power was 
absolute at the pinnacle of the hierarchy, though the head of government was an 
elected prime minister rather than a dictator. Through a clientelist system of political
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appointees, the party wielded influence in the boardrooms of the largest private 
enterprises and thus kept a tight control over industrial policy. The cabinet, economy 
ministers and the prime minister himself, was firmly at the controls of industrial 
reconversion as even the private sector, through the retention of government stakes, 
was incorporated into the state, inhabited until electoral defeat in 1996, by the 
Socialist party. The party in social democratic Spain, thus retained many of the 
traditions and methods of dictatorial Spain of the 1940s to the 1970s, monopolising 
representation and maintaining centralised control of economic policymaking.
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Concluding Remarks:
Different Qualities o f Crony Capitalism in Late Industrialising Economies
and Management o f Social Conflict.
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Forced industrialisation of the kind economic historians associate with the work of 
Alexander Gerschenkron, whereby the state makes institutional arrangements to create the 
conditions for a take-off, can have a cyclical impact. The effect of necessarily high government 
spending and monetary policies designed to promote and protect new industries is to put 
inflationary pressure on an economy. But a side effect of the process is that it creates new economic 
vested interests with a stake in the new order who will struggle to maintain the status quo. Among 
these are an industrial bourgeoisie. Industrialists associated with internally integrated industries 
benefit from expansionist monetary policy, including easy access to credit at low rates of interests. 
As such they will resist attempts to tax them and seek to maintain a regime of economic 
protectionism. Industrialisation of the type seen in many underdeveloped economies from the mid 
twentieth century also creates, or at least enriches, an industrial proletariat that eclipses the rural 
peasantry. This group, if sufficiently organised, will struggle for subsidisation of manufactures and 
food, because this translates into higher disposable income. On this issue they might be allied with 
the nationally oriented industrialists who will see such features as a subsidy on labour. Meanwhile, 
neither group will support trade liberalisation if it threatens greater competition for domestic 
industries from foreign firms. This will reduce profitability for local firms which in turn depresses 
wages and may lead to higher unemployment.
These priorities may conflict with those of more traditional interests. If an economy before 
industrialisation was dependent on extraction and export of commodities, either mineral or 
agricultural, traditional elites will favour policies that are opposite to those sought by wage earning 
proletariat or national industrialists. An interest in exporting inclines these elites towards liberal 
trade policy, with minimal taxes on commerce and low exchange rates to make their products more 
competitive on an international market.
When fiscal expansionism of the kind associated with state-led industrialisation leads to 
inflationary crisis, or if the model must be adjusted because of an exogenous shock, not all groups 
will agree to the need for reform. Some may regard the proposed adjustments as attempts at their 
expense by other interests to acquire a larger share of national wealth. A macroeconomic 
stabilisation, for example, designed to address inflation with fiscal and monetary tightening, will be 
perceived by popular groups as in the interests of exporting elites or international capital and at the 
expense of their living standards. They may mount an effective campaign to block the reform, either 
informally through the wielding of economic weapons such as strike action, or exercise a veto in the 
legislature through a political organisation that represents them. Trade liberalisation and the lifting 
of tariff barriers to imports as a means to force national industries to become more competitive will 
be vetoed or resisted by the same groups who will regard it as favouring traditional exporting elites
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or foreign capital, again at the expense of full employment, high real wages, subsidised production 
or privileged access to the domestic market.
Resistance to measures necessary during the cycle of non spontaneous industrialisation 
threatens political order which is a public good widely assumed to be a pre-requisite for effective 
encouragement of productive activity. Ability to ensure political order, therefore, will impact 
economic growth. The ability of a state to keep order depends on the way in which different 
economic interests interact and influence the formulation of economic policy. It is a widely 
accepted view, proposed by the ‘new institutionalist’ economists and economic historians that 
political order, and by extension the consistency of growth, depends on a state’s ‘credible 
commitment’ not to act despotically and requisition assets or rents from citizens. If a state makes 
that credible commitment, by establishing and enforcing limits to its power through a robust set of 
institutions, then property rights are universally guaranteed. This best of all possible worlds 
encourages entrepreneurship, investment and productive activity. It is the institutions’ ability to 
enforce that credible commitment and protect property rights that defines an economy’s prospects 
for long term economic growth, differentiating rich country from poor.
But this study focuses on late industrialising economies whereby institutions were flawed 
and did not guarantee universal rights. In these cases groups conflict with each other to further their 
own aims and capture as much as possible of national wealth, necessarily at the expense of other 
groups. It rests on the idea that governments in such circumstances, which will not make the 
credible commitment to enforce universal property rights can achieve political stability and rapid 
economic growth by making a selective commitment. By entering an agreement with a specific 
group, or groups of asset holders in return for support, a weak government can steer an economy 
towards high growth rates. The type of asset holder courted for support in this way will depend on 
what sector of society the government chooses as a constituency of support, which in turn will 
depend on the favoured economic model. Prior to industrialisation, it is usually the landed elite 
which maintains the closest relationship with government, as the primary earner of export rents in 
an economy. The balance shifts when industrialisation is put into practice after a state, as in the 
Gerschenkronian model, decides to pursue industrialisation as a policy priority. This in turn 
depends on the type of industry prioritised. Typically, an earlier phase of industrialisation focuses 
on lighter manufacturing to cater for a market of wage earners with the highest possible level of 
purchasing power. To avoid competition from abroad, protectionism or import substitution is 
central to the model so the two interests favoured here are logically local capital and the urban 
proletariat. The least favoured group are the exporting elite whose share of national income is 
restricted by the anti trade regime while high currency policies intended to aid imports of capital 
goods for the new industries make their produce less competitive. Exports may also be taxed in
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order to finance the national industrial project. If this group was so influential prior to 
industrialisation, why should they have permitted the process in the first place? Gerschenkron refers 
to an advantage in economic backwardness in that as industrialisation is delayed, the benefits of the 
phenomenon are more clearly observable in other countries. Furthermore, technology transfer 
allows the late industrialiser to take advantage of the fruits of others’ earlier experience, which 
means that when started, the process will occur more rapidly than it did with predecessors. Other 
theorists point to crisis as providing the incentive for change. A dominant group will unilaterally 
relinquish some of its privileges and control over national rents by encouraging a redistributive 
reform if members believe inaction will lead to more serious consequences in the longer term.
The case of Argentina presents a number of problems to this analysis because of the 
consistency of resistance by groups. A deeper phase of industrialisation, favouring heavier 
industries with wider Hirschmanian linkages such as steel, chemicals or energy is more capital 
intensive and less feasible as an autarkic project without a contribution from foreign capital. As a 
condition, therefore, concessions have to be made to international capital such as the lifting of some 
import restrictions alongside fiscal and monetary tightening which translates into job losses, 
declining purchasing power and reduced rents for national manufacturing. The outcome of attempts 
to pursue industrial deepening alongside economic opening evidently did not include an 
acknowledgment by vested interests that reform including a loss of benefits was necessary. In 
Spain, on the other hand, reforms were equally resisted though the economy did not experience the 
same recurrence of political and economic failure seen in decades immediately preceding the 
period this thesis addresses. Growth rates, though not always higher in Spain than Argentina, were 
more consistent and less marked by periodic reversals.
This distinction may have evidenced a more disciplined regime of industrial management as 
identified in studies of parallel statist industrialisations in the far East by figures such as Amsden. It 
is the state’s ability to exert pressure on its subsidised industries for high standards in return for 
protection and favouritism that defines the ability to successfully modernise under the model of 
import substitution. Latin America thus lagged behind East Asia in its import substitution phase 
because the state itself and the public sector became an arena for interest group rivalry and 
clientelism rather than meritocratic and dynamic engines of national development. Industrialisation, 
in a sense, was hijacked by cronies and interest groups, therefore. Does this imply, then, that the 
Spanish system was a more able disciplinarian in its project of industrialisation than Argentina?
This thesis has attempted to show that it does, though the disciplining role has a far broader 
reach than merely industrial performance, as it extends to all levels of society and the economy. The 
narrower the state’s focus, the less able it will be to ensure political stability. Returning to the 
notion of a credible commitment, taking Argentina and Spain as two states that could not convince
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their populations that they served the universal best interest in a context of acute social 
distributional conflict, the distinction between two varying growth records lies in the reach of the 
disciplinarian state. At first glance, each state had much in common throughout the second half of 
the twentieth century. They share the same institutional, ‘Roman-Iberian’ institutional ancestry, as 
argued by Tortella, and an associated centralist tradition of administration. Under this structure, the 
government is overwhelmingly dominated by the executive and institutional checks on the figure of 
the president, dictator or prime minister are limited. This system is susceptible to cronyism because 
the head of the government has the power to personally appoint associates to important positions of 
state so the executive can thus be captured by a lobby or interest. With such a powerful executive, 
interests will be tempted to seek privilege and influence policy through an alliance with the 
government, which in turn, will expect political and financial support. Interests organised into 
coherent non state actors, be they industry associations, clubs or unions, will be able to mobilise 
considerable resources to support a friendly president. But they will also be able to wield 
organisational power as a potent economic weapon, hijacking an economy either by withholding 
produce from market or through industrial action and blockades.
If conflicting interests have ‘colonised’ particular branches of state, as in the model 
elaborated by O’Donnell, they will cause deadlock in policymaking by vetoing any reform seen as 
favouring a rival group at their own long term expense. This, in turn, will lead the executive to 
reinforce and concentrate his power yet further by bypassing institutions of state such as the 
legislature, enacting laws by decree . This undermines the credible commitment even more and 
encourages a personalistic presidential system that perpetuates bargaining between executive and 
asset holders. An alternative is for the president to harness the interests by monopolising their 
representation within the state and act as an enforcer of the rules of the game rather than the direct 
designer of policy. This means interests negotiate with each other as much as with the executive, 
and ideally recognise the legitimacy of the government’s authority. If successful, this system offers 
a hierarchy of representation, legitimising the state by theoretically providing a forum for diverse 
interests to gain access to policy design. If a variety of interests are incorporated into the system, 
rather than merely factions of the elite, then the state creates an illusion of a broader spread of 
credible commitment. It is not an ideal system by any means, and is still defined by clientelist 
relationships, cronyism and rent seeking, but it can subdue the ability or inclination of interests to 
dismpt policymaking, legitimise the state and ensure political order.
This model reflects the Spanish state described in the introduction to this thesis and chapter 
1, as constructed to ensure social order after the 1936-39 Civil War, an especially violent 
distributional conflict. The corporatist system established by the Franco regime in the 1940s stifled 
what Hirschman refers to as the ‘ego centred’ view of a political economy avoiding the zero sum
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dynamic of political discourse. Economic policy in this period was also autarkic and prioritised 
industrialisation. Organised labour was a force underpinning the losing side in the Civil War and the 
Franco government sought to dissipate the potential for further conflict by raising living standards, 
principally through industrial expansion. When this empowered and expanded an urban proletariat, 
this interest was itself incorporated into the corporatist system of representation through the official 
syndicate which also accounted for the interests of employers. This does not imply that workers 
were content under a violent, authoritarian dictatorship, but the state did make a strong claim to 
represent universal wellbeing even if it was constructed following victory in the distributional Civil 
War. This system, within a category of institutionally weak economies, represents a better quality of 
crony capitalism because of its ability to preside over political stability in spite of the weaknesses of 
state, thereby promoting productive activity. But the continued clientelism, inequality and 
prevalence of corruption mean Spain has inherited a profound disadvantage that will leave it 
struggling to achieve convergence with other Western European economies.
Argentina in the late 1940s laid the foundations of a similar system with corporatist entities 
representing labour and business allocated a privileged status as both mobilisers of support and 
channels of representation before government. However, the structure was exclusionary and 
actively discriminated against other interests not nurtured as a support base, particularly landed 
elites regarded as anti industry. Furthermore, when Peron, the system’s architect was deposed in 
1955 and sent into exile, the system was decapitated to leave the Argentine political economy with 
a variety of free standing corporatist entities which commanded huge financial and human 
resources. Though often fractious, they were capable of mobilising support on a nationwide scale.
As such, Argentine governments are forced to negotiate directly with these bodies to gain support.
It is tempting to use the authoritarianism of the Spanish dictatorship and its clear disposition 
to confront political opposition with violence as explanation for the long term political stability 
highlighted in this research. Though Argentine society experienced authoritarian episodes, none 
was so enduring as the Spanish equivalent. Nevertheless, Latin American authoritarianism that 
started to emerge first in Brazil in 1964, then throughout the southern cone of the continent during 
the 1970s inspired the dependency theorists. A principal feature of this interpretation of Latin 
American authoritarianism was that it reflected the tensions associated with industrialisation. As in 
this thesis, dependency theorists noted industrialisation had empowered an urban proletariat and 
lent it the resources and organisation to mount a credible challenge to the traditional elites or their 
allies representing foreign capital. To be sure, Spanish military rule was the product of an elite 
rebellion against redistributional ideologies in the 1930s, but a heavy handed and brutally repressive 
government in itself is not sufficient to guarantee political and economic stability over the long 
term. While it may hinder political opposition, the Argentine experience shows that episodes of
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military rule characterised by brutal confrontation with popular groups associated with Peron were 
not able to stifle the credibility of corporatist entities such as the CGT or the wider Peronist 
movement. More important than authoritarian rule, it is argued here, is a solid institutional 
foundation to networks of representation in an imperfect, clientelist state.
Take, for example, the case study from chapter 3. This contrasts the first push in each 
country during the late 1950s to reform through limited economic opening of their respective 
autarkic policies prioritising industrialisation. The reforms sought support from foreign capital and 
sponsorship from the IMF, both as a source of finance but also as a high profile endorsement of 
economic credentials in order to attract investment. The reformers came to the fore in Argentina and 
Spain following a period of political upheaval and in a context of evident economic crisis. Vested 
interests opposed to the proposals were in evidence in both cases and successfully blocked 
important features of the new model. Except that there were fundamental distinctions in the nature 
of the political upheaval that brought reformers to power in Spain and Argentina. President 
Frondizi, who sought to adjust the industrialisation model established under Peron to one favouring 
heavy industry, opening the economy to foreign investment and imports while introducing criteria 
of monetary discipline, was elected to power after three years of unconstitutional military rule.
Peron was deposed in a military coup and the generals ruled Argentina at the helm of what they 
claimed to be a ‘revolution’.
Spanish reformers in the late 1950s comprised a clique of economically orthodox ministers 
who ascended to ministerial rank following a cabinet reshuffle instigated by Franco who was 
concerned about the possibility of disorder as the autarkic model exhausted itself. In strictly legal 
terms, the upheaval was constitutional and did not form a part of any political rupture. Institutional 
continuity was the key feature of political reform in Spain, therefore. This argument also applies to 
the subsequent case studies from the thesis in spite of Spain’s ostensible political break with the 
past through democratisation following Franco’s death in 1975. Democracy was restored, and the 
head of government selected through pluralistic methods, but there was never any fundamental 
dismantling of the old dynamic. Associational organisations were reintroduced to the Spanish 
political economy, such as the old labour unions which had been so active as mobilisers of 
opposition during the dictatorship. Furthermore, an employers’ association was established by those 
concerned about an ascendant organised labour movement. But these were eclipsed by more formal 
hierarchies of representation dominated by political elites. The democratically elected prime 
minister was in effect an elected dictator while the multi tiered party occupied much of the structure 
of the corporatist system imposed during the dictatorship. The final case study of this work, which 
addresses Spain in the 1980s and attempts to liberalise by the Gonzalez government also conforms 
to this idea.
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Argentina, in contrast, did not enjoy such institutional or constitutional continuity. What 
persisted was the ineffective dynamic where associations outside the state bargain with the 
executive for favours hoping to exclude rival interests. Significantly, these factions do not bargain 
meaningfully with each other and have difficulty forming alliances. If a group which did not have 
access to the president’s ear was frustrated, it would mount opposition in the form of non 
cooperation, disruption of economic activity and even engineer a coup. As illustrated in chapter 3, 
Frondizi found himself making bilateral pacts that contradicted each other to diverse interests to 
secure support, or at least hold off confrontation in a precarious game of survival politics. He sought 
the support of foreign capital and traditional elites with promises of monetary discipline and trade 
liberalisation, while courting labour and the national bourgeoisie with assurances their political 
party would be legalised and that standards of living and spending power would rise. The result was 
chameleonic and inconsistent policymaking and complete fulfilment of commitments made to the 
IMF as conditions for its loans was unrealistic. As far as the Fund was concerned, the Frondizi 
experience was a worst case scenario. Argentina was granted ‘ownership’ of the stabilisation 
package with its associated loans, partly on account of the perceived credibility of Frondizi’s claims 
to prioritise fiscal discipline and the appointment of Alsogaray to head the Economy Ministry. But 
Alsogaray’s ability to implement the plan fully was curtailed by Frondizi’s political debts to forces 
opposed to the measures.
As highlighted in the introductory chapter to this work, there is a contribution to be made by 
this comparison to the debate on ownership of IMF stabilisation plans whereby the increasingly 
accepted view is that if the country receiving loans is allowed control and autonomy when 
designing reforms, they are more likely to succeed. The fact that in each case the IMF’s 
prescriptions were only implemented partially suggests that ownership was granted to the receiving 
governments but the power of the Fund to impose conditionality was limited. Spain was fortunate 
enough to accumulate enough foreign exchange receipts not to have to take the loans, as much 
because of emigrant remittances and tourist spending as a consequence of the reforms. Argentina 
took its loans but was no more compliant to the pledges the government had made when negotiating 
its terms. This suggests that the IMF endorsed Alsogaray, a vocal critic of centrally planned 
industrialisation underpinned by state interventionism, and of Frondizi’s strategies of alliance 
building which he referred to as “demagogic promises.” But the Fund also overestimated the 
minister’s autonomy and underestimated the ease with which he could be replaced by an 
idiosyncratic executive. The Spanish stabilisation, applied against the backdrop of conflict between 
factions within the state also seems to have been agreed on the basis that the IMF approved of the 
credentials of technocratic Opus Dei ministers. It also underestimated their ability to implement the 
conditions to its satisfaction, however.
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There is a case to be made that the consultation carried out by the Spanish reformers on 
economic opening is an example of the kind of alliance building with non state actors this thesis 
associates with the Argentine political economy. However, the scheme represented a public 
relations exercise to demonstrate the workability of the proposals to an executive primarily 
concerned about the possibility of tough proposals fomenting social protest and upsetting the long 
term improvement in living standards for Spaniards. Therefore a primary purpose of the 
consultation was to legitimise policy rather than negotiate with the respondents over the terms of 
their support. But when the reforming government faction were bargaining with other branches of 
state before the dictator, the responses would have added weight to their arguments and undermined 
the case of the conservatives who argued that by threatening living standards, they would 
compromise order.
The episode illustrated institutional continuity underpinning significant shifts in policy 
emphasis and imposing a system of checks and balances on the ability of factions and interests to 
capture economic policy and by extension, a greater share of national rents. Though a clique of 
orthodox economists commonly associated with Opus Dei captured certain departments of 
government and were influential in the civil service by weight of numbers, they ultimately 
influenced rather than dictated the eventual policy because o f the persistence of other factions in 
government. Spain, therefore, could boast a clearly defined set of rules of the game to manage a 
crony capitalist system whereby the executive is the recognised senior partner in the pacts with 
asset holders while no single faction can claim greater legitimacy than the other. In Argentina, such 
discipline is absent.
An evident difference between the two case studies, where the Spanish reforms though no 
more complete than the Argentine equivalent in terms of implementation, were nevertheless 
embedded and did not contribute to political crisis, is the contrast between weak democracy and 
authoritarian government. Frondizi’s Argentina was a newly restored and tentative democracy while 
Spain was firmly controlled by a militaristic regime that did not tolerate dissent and was prepared to 
use violence to suppress signs of social disorder. In which case, chapter 3 could be taken as an anti 
democratic argument in suggesting what mechanisms work best when adopting tough economic 
reform in a crony capitalist system with a history of distributional conflict. But the military in 
Frondizi’s Argentina was still prepared to intervene politically, crush uprisings and the government 
adopted authoritarian methods in controlling sometimes violent strike action and uprisings.
To further the idea that authoritarian government is not in itself a means to ensure political 
stability through periods of economic turmoil and difficult decision making, Chapter 4 reverses the 
comparison between fledgling pluralism and heavy handed military dictatorship. During the late 
1970s, Argentina was ruled by its armed forces who regarded the country as being in a state of civil
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war and proscribed all political activity. Spain, on the other hand was in the midst of a delicate 
transition following the death of Franco in 1975 which inauspiciously coincided with an economic 
crisis. The odds were stacked against the survival of democracy with social disorder a real threat 
and a reactionary military with deep reservations about the entire political project. The section 
attempts to show that despite a reversal of the two political systems, and apparently fundamental 
constitutional change, the mechanisms of policy making and negotiation remained unchanged. 
Argentina, in spite of a determination to do otherwise on the part of senior members of the military 
junta and the civilian economics minister, remained defined by negotiation directly with non state 
actors who were the most coherent and powerful representative mechanism for vested interests. In 
Spain, though it had undergone a political transition and replaced the authoritarian system with 
European parliamentary democracy, continued to shape policy through negotiation between 
interests represented within the state by parties who claimed a particular constituency of support. In 
the case of leftist parties with a working class base, they were affiliated with unions but exercised 
authority over the two large labour confederations, negotiating before the prime minister on their 
behalf. Other interests had more elite or conservative parties to represent them and neither their 
legitimacy of representation nor the legality of previous, pre democratic decisions and institutions 
was questioned. The new democracy in Spain, therefore, retained its characteristic representation of 
interests by officially endorsed organisations, in this case parties, before a centralised government 
and powerful executive. Argentina, meanwhile, though authoritarian in this instance and keen to 
suppress associations and political groups, continued its tradition of alliances between executive 
and non state association, even though some of these were ostensibly illegal.
One could argue that the Argentine system during the military regime of the late 1970s 
resembled that of Spain. It was a pyramid-shaped hierarchy with the dictator at the top, followed by 
the junta who represented different armed services with varying policy priorities and links with 
particular economic interests. They shared more or less equal status with the economics minister 
and thus within the boundaries of state, negotiated new policy directions on behalf of the groups 
with which they were associated. However, this resemblance with Spain in the early dictatorship is 
deceptive. Argentina is distinct because of the ability of interests to opt out of the system which 
suggests it did not enjoy the same perception of legitimacy as its Spanish counterpart. The 
successful organisation of strike action throughout the period and open defiance of the government 
is evidence of failure to construct a legitimate system of political and economic representation and 
the continued strength of interest associations and persistent ability to challenge policies. The zero 
sum discourse continued, therefore. Furthermore, though there may have been links between the 
Argentine labour movement and the junta by way of the navy officers who were concerned about 
disorder and mass political radicalisation, such contacts were unofficial. In Spain, the system was
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deeply embedded and legitimate thus weakening attempts by illegal organisations to claim the true 
voice of labour, for example. Additionally, the executive in Argentina did not enjoy the same 
authority as Franco or later Spanish prime ministers to act as an adhesive to the system. Only the 
first dictator, Videla, served out his full term, primarily because he was more successful than his 
successors in fending off challenges from military factions. There was not even a semblance of 
political continuity within the relatively brief period of military rule, from 1976 to 1983.
A potential weakness in the use of Spanish political continuity as the backbone for stability 
and ability to embed policy is the presence during the late 1970s of a number of threats and 
incentives that may have served to subdue mass dismption and disobedience. Along with a sense of 
economic crisis was an increase in political crisis with a perception that social peace was under 
threat from Basque nationalists, extreme groups from Left and Right and the looming presence of 
the armed forces seen as ready to reverse the democratic transition. Perhaps unpopular wage and 
price policy in this period was successful because the events comply with the model outlined 
earlier. One interest, or faction of cronies, relinquishes a degree of privilege because of a realisation 
that a crisis could lead to much greater sacrifice later and therefore makes concessions to other 
groups. But though this model may apply, the Spanish state, it is argued here, provided the stable 
environment for such bargaining to take place in an orderly manner and prevent the dispute spilling 
out beyond the controlled confines of the negotiating room.
The final case studies in chapter 5 differ from those in previous sections because they do not 
highlight simultaneous reforms though the thematic aspects are directly related as they comprised a 
surge in economic liberalisation and an invitation to foreign capital to increase its stake. An 
important purpose served by chapter 5 is to illustrate that both economies retained their crony 
capitalism in spite of claims by scholars that fundamental departures form historical institutional 
traditions were achieved. Starting with Argentina, mass joblessness may have enfeebled the 
bargaining power of labour. Concentration of wealth and ownership which was started in the late 
1970s during the first wave of liberalisation (see chapter 4) may also have altered the relative power 
of different interests. There was no fundamental break with the existing political economy of 
bargaining between executive and interest, survival politics and failure of official structures of 
political representation. Take, for example, the resurgent interest of foreign capital in Argentina. 
Multinationals which successfully bid for Argentine utilities during the privatisation programme 
acquired a strong voice in Argentine affairs and their chief executives enjoyed direct access to the 
highest political authorities. The contrast with similar processes in Spain is telling. Privatisation 
may also have been a consequence of the state’s desire to withdraw from the economy. But there 
are serious limitations to the extent to which one can claim the Spanish state became non 
interventionist. Through privatisation the state reduced its financial stake in the economy, but it
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retained extensive control through minority stakes in politically sensitive former state enterprises 
through golden shares or political appointees to the boardroom. Furthermore, the chapter also 
highlights the continued clientelism of the Spanish political economy, with considerable oligarchic 
influence on public affairs. But in their relationships with the state, oligarchs were the subordinates 
and the links were used to the government’s advantage. The Spanish state harnessed crony 
capitalism as a means to enforce its development priorities and maintain a protectionist system 
rather than the cronies capturing the state.
The inability of the Argentine state under Menem to control economic agents, most notably 
the privatised concerns, could be interpreted as a healthy sign of non interventionist politics and the 
emergence of checks and balances. Unfortunately, Argentina is afflicted with weak institutions in 
terms of solving the commitment problem, and the government is less able to convince citizens of 
its ability or will to enforce universal property rights. Interests, therefore continue to struggle 
against one another to dominate rather than influence policy while governments must struggle to 
manage this conflict, devoting more time to survival than effective policymaking. In this context, a 
crony capitalist system is best served by an institutional structure that monopolises representation 
and recognises the legitimacy of the executive. The system such as that which exists in Spain is by 
no means ideal because it persists with clientelism and encourages oligopolisation of an economy, 
but it goes a long way towards ensuring the pure public good of political stability in difficult 
economic circumstances.
The working assumption of this thesis is that the more impressive Spanish economic record 
over the period occurred in spite of its institutional flaws rather than because it is in a distinct 
category to Argentina. From a political perspective, both societies have a history of division that 
has, on occasion, boiled over into conflict and direct confrontation between groups. On the surface, 
Spain appears to have experienced a successful transition to democracy and moved on from being a 
conflict society, unlike Argentina. But the methods of economic policymaking employed by 
Spanish governments continue to operate along the same parameters employed by the early 
dictatorship which viewed its greatest challenge as keeping order in a divided society. The 
corporatist system of representation that it constructed, and survives more or less intact to this day, 
has permitted a steady, if slow and by some measures inadequate, process of economic government.
The Argentine system was not so well constructed and is handicapped by elements that 
mobilise against the government. The weakness of the state in the face of vested interests is 
illustrated by the volatility in all economic indicators, including growth or savings but also in the 
way foreign capital has established itself as a major component of economic life while in Spain it 
has remained a junior partner along with all other elements, even the oligarchic banking sector.
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The greater autonomy enjoyed by the Spanish central government from interest group 
meddling or disruption, though not ideal from any perspective because of the potency of certain 
oligarchic groups, makes the Spanish track record of economic discipline look better. But the 
discipline that implies greater conformity to orthodox prescriptions favoured in Washington falls 
short of what a true IMF technocrat would approve of throughout the period examined here. Again, 
as is the case with the state making a closer approximation to a credible commitment to universally 
protect property rights because of tighter control over a crony capitalist system, a record of fiscal 
and monetary discipline obscures diluted orthodoxy and continued illiberal beliefs among the 
highest tiers of government.
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